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Abstract
The thesis examined the role played by international and domestic 
influences in shaping the relationship between state and society in post­
colonial societies. It argued tha t the nature of the state in the 
international system is the product of the historical processes of state 
and societal formation and m ust be studied as such. Therefore, it 
examined the evolution of state-societal relationship from colony to 
independent state in Saint Lucia. The examination is premised on the 
view th a t the state acts in two dimensions -  the domestic and the 
international. The thesis therefore critiques traditional international 
relations theories which treat the state in its totality as an analytic 
abstraction, and argued tha t international relations theory can best 
explain the nature of the state when it brings into analysis the role of the 
domestic in shaping the state. Therefore, the nature of the state was 
examined as the interplay of the ‘‘domestic” and the “international”.
Three historical periods are examined to show how international and 
domestic influences shaped state-societal relations and generated 
conflicts which caused transformative events. These events in tu rn  
caused fundamental changes to the state-societal relationship. All three 
periods showed tha t the nature of state and society is rooted in the 
dominance of external forces over domestic forces. The early state 
originated in the colonial experience which lasted until independence in 
1979. That state was not a product of society and did not enjoy an 
organic relationship with society. As the state evolved, the level of 
influence of the domestic was shown to increase. The independent state, 
though sovereign, was itself a product of external influences and remains 
influenced by external forces. However, the thesis showed tha t in the 
post-independence period these influences are forcing integration 
between state and society.
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1Introduction: Understanding the  emergence 
of the  Post-Colonial S tate  and Society
The ex-colonial states have been internationally enfranchised and 
possess the same external rights and responsibilities as all other 
sovereign states: juridical statehood. A t the same time, however, many 
have not yet been authorized and empowered domestically and  
consequently lack the institutional features o f sovereign states as also 
defined by classical international law. They disclose limited empirical 
statehood: their populations do not enjoy many o f the advantages 
traditionally associated with independent statehood. Their governments 
are often deficient in the political will, institutional authority, and 
organised power to protect human rights or provide socioeconomic 
welfare. The concrete benefits which have historically justified the 
undeniable burdens o f sovereign statehood are often limited to fairly 
narrow elites and not yet extended to the citizenry at large whose lives 
may be scarcely improved by independence or even adversely affected 
by it  These states are primarily juridical. They are still fa r  from  
complete, so to speak, and empirical statehood in large measure still 
remains to be built I refer to them as ‘quasi-states’.1
This thesis is an  examination of the historical evolution of the state 
and society in post-colonial states using Saint Lucia as the case-study. 
In particular, it focuses on the consequences of the interplay of external 
and internal forces on shaping state-societal relations. The thesis starts
1 Robert Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World 
(Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.21. Jackson’s concern was to 
demonstrate how international constitutional change through the universal acceptance 
of the principle of self-determination after 1945 made it possible for many states to be 
created and survive despite what he describes as their limited empirical statehood. This 
is in contrast to established sovereign states whose statehood was based on their 
abilities to provide the benefits of statehood to their citizens and can be said to possess 
‘positive sovereignty’. Quasi-states, on the other hand, because they lack the 
institutional features of sovereign states and their dependence on international law and 
development aid can be said to possess ‘negative sovereignty’ as the basis for their 
sovereign statehood.
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with the above observation from Jackson which highlights a 
characteristic lack of ‘empirical statehood’. However, the thesis will show 
tha t this feature is not an  inherent feature of states bu t a  consequence of 
the colonial experience, a result of the evolution of the state and society. 
There is no suggestion tha t Jackson is wrong in his assessm ent of post­
colonial states bu t rather tha t the story of post-colonial states begins 
before the granting of juridical statehood. Having taken the condition of 
the post-colonial state and society for granted, Jackson proceeded to 
account for the emergence of the post-colonial state in the international 
system by treating sovereignty as a  right possessed by the state to 
participate in the inter-state system. Having equated sovereignty with the 
state, the fact tha t states with limited empirical statehood are now part 
of the system suggests tha t the conception of tha t right -  sovereignty -  
has changed. This is a logical conclusion simply because Jackson treats 
the state as a totality within international relations. Therefore despite 
Jackson recognising the internal features of quasi-states as the defining 
difference with classical states, the basis for the difference in sovereign 
sta tus m ust lie at the level of the system. It is the change in the 
international constitutional framework which provides for the existence 
of post-colonial states. The state is the state is the state.
Viewed differently, the emergence of these states could have been 
seen as an  acceptance of the failure of colonial rule and the consequent 
breakdown of empires an d /o r as a product of the internationalisation of 
the state as the most efficient mechanism for the expansion of the state 
system. However, to reach these conclusions would require tha t the 
‘black-box’ of the state be opened and the historic role of colonial states 
be examined. Therefore, what if Jackson’s totality approach is rejected 
and a new approach looks beyond the present conditions of quasi-states 
to understand the origin of the characteristic of limited empirical 
statehood of these states. That approach should not start by taking 
Jackson’s ‘limited empirical statehood’ for granted bu t instead by asking
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how ‘limited empirical statehood’ became a defining characteristic of the 
post-colonial states. Indeed it may well be tha t in the international 
configuration of power, the limitations of tha t empirical sta tus could be 
historically construed as a consequence of the incorporation of ex­
colonial states in the global economy as they were forced to adjust to an 
international order predicated on the emergence of these states as 
“autonom ous” entities in tha t economy. It can also be argued tha t these 
limitations constitute part of the institutional and geo-political 
constraints tha t have circumscribed the options available to these newly 
independent states. Although this argum ent has not been explicitly 
argued in this manner, it has been suggested in the use of the concept of 
the post-colonial state and its structural limitations.
The new approach m ust pose an alternative set of questions to 
those posited by Jackson, on the basis tha t it is not enough to 
understand the justification for these sta tes’ emergence as sovereign 
states. We need to broaden the understanding to incorporate the 
emergence of the state in the international system, the influences which 
shaped the state and the implications for society of such a state 
structure. These questions are primarily: how can the study o f 
International Relations (IR) allow fo r  a conception o f the sovereign state 
beyond its totality? How did the post-colonial state evolve historically? 
What were the implications fo r the development o f domestic society? Was 
the process o f post-colonial state-building brought about by the combined 
will o f society and government reflecting their common aspirations? How 
have international factors shaped the evolution o f state and society?
Accordingly, this thesis seeks to examine how the interplay of 
international and domestic factors shaped the evolution of state and 
society in Saint Lucia. To achieve that an  alternative approach m ust 
reject the traditional totality approach to understanding the state in 
international relations and instead argue tha t the state in international 
relations can be understood by treating the state as both a domestic and
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international actor. Theoretically, it involves crossing what has been 
described as the ‘Great Divide’.2 Therefore, the thesis starts with the 
argum ent that international relations can and m ust include both state 
and society as units of analysis and situate their historicity. Once that 
theoretical basis is established, a framework exists to explain that state 
and societal relations are a product of the interplay of the international 
system and domestic society. The thesis will show that the characteristic 
of ‘quasi-states’ - the absence of empirical statehood -  can be seen as a 
description of a particular form of social relations which exists within 
states which were formed at a particular stage in the expansion of the 
inter-state system. Specifically, it was the expansion of the state as an 
instrum ent of political control beyond the European states-system which 
created these post-colonial states. This thesis examines how the state 
was formed and the implications for society in the case of Saint Lucia. It 
will highlight tha t the lack of empirical statehood was the result of the 
absence of any significant merging of interests between the state and 
society within political entities which were artificially created for the 
benefit of the European states-system and facilitated by its colonial 
expansion. Because the state was not created to serve the societies 
within which it was established bu t for the external purposes of the 
Imperial State, the state was incongruent and there was a disjuncture 
between state and society. That disjuncture continued as a distinctive 
feature of the post-colonial state as the state functioned primarily as an 
instrum ent of political control, for whichever group tha t has power, 
rather than  as an instrum ent for national development representing 
national aspirations. Despite the instances of integration through a 
strengthened domestic society, the state does not function in consonance 
with society.
2 Ian Clark, Globalisation and International Relations Theory (Oxford; Oxford University 
Press, 1999).
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The change in the international framework which allowed for the 
post-colonial state to become a member of the inter-state system is seen 
as legitimising the globalisation of the post-colonial state as the most 
efficient instrum ent of political control after the failings of colonial rule 
as a form of control. The explanations provided will highlight tha t the 
nature of state-societal relations is the consequence of the dynamic 
interplay of the efforts of the inter-state system to reinforce the state in 
post-colonial societies because of its utility to the system, and the 
attem pts by domestic society to strengthen itself vis-a-vis the state.
From the onset, it is necessary tha t some clarification be provided. 
I do not attem pt to address all, or even most of, the international and 
domestic factors tha t may have shaped the state and society. The 
objective is to provide sufficient understanding of the major influences 
tha t can be seen as having a direct effect on shaping the state and 
society. This explains the approach of choosing the three most significant 
transformative periods in the evolution of the state and society from 
colonial to independent status. These periods contain events which 
represented a decisive break with the old order of the state and created 
the conditions for a new order. The thesis uses a historical approach that 
analyses the nature of the state and society leading to the transformative 
event, the nature of the event, and then assesses the impact of each 
event on the state and society. There are two im portant reasons for 
choosing such an approach. Firstly, the thesis highlights the most 
critical events tha t transformed the state and society and exposes the 
sources of the influences that brought about these events. Secondly, by 
contrasting the period leading to the event with the period after, it draws 
attention to changes which took place.
Therefore I attem pt to examine how the international/dom estic 
interplay, each with varying degrees of influence, gave rise to three 
significant events which transformed the nature of the state and shaped 
its relationship with society.
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1.1 Some Preliminary Definitions
It would be helpful to clarify the meanings of some concepts that
are fundam ental to the explanation which the thesis attem pts to provide.
In arguing for a crossing of the ‘Great Divide’, a concern comes to the
fore - what is ‘international’ and ‘dom estic’? Sorensen offers the
sovereign border as the line of demarcation.3 In the case of this thesis,
the borders of the territories are used as the line of demarcation.
However, they cannot be considered as sovereign borders since the
colonies were not independent self-governing territories. However, there
were universally accepted borders for colonies and these should serve as
the line of demarcation. In the case of the British West Indian colonies
the task  is easier as all except Guyana are islands which make the
demarcation straightforward. Therefore, all actions, material conditions,
institutions and policies which occurred within the colonies are seen as
domestic influences. Conversely, all influences tha t occurred beyond the
borders are seen as international influences. The determining factor is
the location of the activity rather than  the origin of the influence. This
adds a new dimension to Cox’s critical historical approach which
identified three levels or spheres of activity which in unity represent the
totality of social existence.4 According to Cox,
[considered separately, social forces, forms of state, and world orders 
can be represented in a preliminary approximation as particular 
configurations of material capabilities, ideas and 
institutions.... [considered in relation to each other, and thus moving 
toward a fuller representation of historical process, each will be seen 
as containing, as well as bearing the impact of, the others.5
3 Georg Sorensen, Changes in Statehood. The Transformation of International Relations 
(New York; Palgrave, 2001), p.5.
4 Robert Cox, ‘Social Forces, states, and world orders: beyond international relations 
theory’ in Approaches to World Order (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1996).
5 Ibid. p. 101.
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Importantly, each level can contain as well as bear the impact of 
the others. Therefore, decolonization may have been initially achieved by 
the armed struggle of nationalists in some colonies against colonial 
exploitation a t the level of social forces bu t also play out or impact a t the 
level of the world order and become a universal norm. Eventually that 
norm may then influence the evolution of the state in other colonies that 
may never have had a nationalist struggle bu t were decolonized under 
th a t norm - the right to self-determination. Therefore, a t one stage, 
decolonization forces may have been a domestic influence bu t in later 
stages, it became an international influence.
Sorensen raises another complication, “[sjhould developments in 
British colonies before Decolonization be considered part of the domestic 
affairs in Britain? How should the ‘dom estic/international’ dynamic in 
those colonial areas be conceptualized?” 6 Whilst, it suffices to accept the 
demarcation of borders as the acceptable definition of what is 
‘international’ and ‘domestic’, it m ust be stressed tha t historical 
contingency and the role of international norms and rules are critical in 
shaping th a t demarcation.7 It will be useful to see the demarcation as the 
borders established for units of political organization tha t are accepted 
by international norms and practice as distinct and having separate 
identities. Therefore, it is possible to conceptualize the colonies as 
constituting the domestic bu t also the British Empire as ‘domestic’, with 
Great Britain as the center having responsibility for the welfare and 
development of all the colonies.
We also need to differentiate between ‘imperial state’ and ‘colonial 
sta te’. The Imperial State refers to the state apparatus within Great 
Britain while the colonial state refers to the state apparatus within the 
colony. Unlike the traditional IR conception of the state which presented
6 Sorensen, Statehood, p. 12.
7 International norms are important as according to Sorensen it is the act of recognition 
that bestows a special status on states thus making them sovereign.
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the state as a totality, a  new approach in IR m ust allow for a 
differentiation between the state as the institutional mechanism which is 
responsible for ordering social relations within a territory and the 
government which is the “...executive personnel formally in positions of 
suprem e control.”8 It is im portant to note tha t it is possible for the 
imperial state to act according to different sources of influence. For 
example, the action of the Imperial State can be the expression of a 
societal sentiment, e.g. anti-slavery; the ideological position of the 
Government or the group which exercise greatest influence on the state, 
e.g. the trade union sympathies of the British Labour Party; or the 
bureaucratic position of Government Departments, e.g. the Colonial 
Office or the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. There is no attem pt in 
the thesis to identify the institutional source of the policies and actions 
of the Imperial State.
It is possible to differentiate between imperial policy as the policy 
towards the colonies advocated by the His Majesty Government and 
implemented by the Imperial State and colonial policy as the policy 
administered by the colonial state, often the application of imperial 
policy. It becomes possible to identify the colonial state as having a 
separate existence and mode of operation although controlled by the 
Imperial State. It also helps to dem onstrate the extent to which the 
government of the colonial state may interpret imperial policy and engage 
in trade-offs with various interests and local elites to fashion colony- 
specific variations to imperial policy.
The understanding of society rests upon a Gramscian notion of 
civil society as those institutions and processes tha t stand between the 
economic structure and the state with its legislation and coercion.9
8 Fred Halliday, Rethinking International Relations (London; The Macmillan Press Ltd., 
1994), p. 82.
9 A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prisons Notebooks, edited and translated by Q. Hoare 
and G.N. South (London; Lawrence and Wishart, 1971).
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Therefore, society outside the state organizes itself and represents itself, 
forming both a source of pressure on and, sometimes becoming an 
extension of the state. This view offers the opportunity to conceptualize 
the relationship of the state to the rest of society and it becomes possible 
to analyze society as a unit or to identify the institutions within society 
th a t are organized to stand against the state or, in certain cases, to be 
incorporated within the functioning of the state.
The notion of a relationship between state and society or state- 
societal relations can be described as the interrelation between political 
events and structures, economic relations and social processes and 
institutions. In other words, it involves the study of national politics but 
by studying state-societal relations, the persistent debate of state- 
centered versus society-centered approaches is avoided. Instead, state- 
societal relations recognize the contribution of both society and state 
institutions. As this thesis seeks to bring in international influences, it 
accordingly expands state-societal relations from being the consequence 
of domestic processes to becoming the common ground at the 
intersection of international and domestic forces.
1.2 West Indian States in the International System  -  
Saint Lucia as a case-study
It is hoped tha t the use of Saint Lucia, in particular, and the West 
Indies, in general, will vividly illustrate the effect of the interplay of 
‘international/dom estic’ factors on shaping the nature of state-societal 
relations in post-colonial societies. When reference is made to the West 
Indies w hat is m eant is the Commonwealth Caribbean -  a cluster of 
island states reaching from Jam aica in the north to Guyana on the 
South American coastline, all sharing the experience of colonialism from 
different powers a t various stages in their history bu t unified by the 
experience of having their political system shaped by British colonialism.
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The West Indies more than  any other region has had a history of 
colonialism.10 It can be argued that other regions had colonialism 
imposed on existing societies tha t transformed their existence bu t the 
West Indian society was a m anufactured society. The indigenous 
population was virtually decimated within a  short period of the arrival of 
the colonial powers and the societies which were created were entirely 
new, designed for colonial purposes by people alien to the region drawn 
from Europe, Asia and Africa.11 This is significant because the West 
Indian colonies were not only plantation societies bu t were slave societies 
which produced a particular social structure which was required for their 
colonial status. The nature of the relationship between state and society 
was rooted in that historical occurrence.
Saint Lucia presents the ideal historical circumstances for 
analyzing the evolution of the state and the implications for society. The 
state in Saint Lucia, as in all other West Indian islands is a product of 
j the political legacy of British colonialism. It was administered as a 
separate unit until 1838 bu t annexed to the Government of the 
Windward Islands which comprised Barbados, Grenada, Saint Vincent 
and Tobago. However, this collective existed for colonial administrative 
purposes, its membership varied constantly, and there were slight 
differences in the political structures of each colony. The initial political 
system, Crown Colony Government (CCG), provided a narrow suffrage to 
the white oligarchy tha t included the planter, m erchant and professional 
classes united by the ownership of property. The majority of the 
population were slaves who did not possess the right to exist except as 
property. The white Legislative Council was nominated consisting of both
10 S. Mintz, From Plantations to Peasantries in the Caribbean (Princeton; Focus 
Caribbean, 1984).
11 Eric Williams, From Columbus to Castro (London; Deutsch 1970). Williams points out 
that the population of Hispaniola decreased from about 300,000 in 1492 to about 
14,000 in 1514. This was the result of wars, alien diseases and slavery. This trend 
occurred throughout the West Indies.
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official and unofficial members. The official members were 
representatives of the Crown and possessed a majority while the 
unofficial members represented the local oligarchy. The local Executive 
Council comprised of official members plus a few unofficial advisers bu t 
was not responsible to the legislative body for its functioning. Political 
power was in the hands of the Governor who represented the Imperial 
State and implemented the policies of the British Government. The local 
legislature was virtually powerless and was more conservative than  the 
Governor and more reactionary on every issue facing the island -  slavery, 
emancipation, religious tolerance and economic development. Differences 
between the legislature and executive were always resolved in the 
structure of the old system as the location of power between the 
executive and legislature allowed the alien executive to override the 
opposition of the legislature.
The first major transformative event took place with the 
emancipation of slaves. In the period leading to emancipation another 
social feature emerged in the growth of a creole or indigenous white 
oligarchy. Those changes were significant as a local elite demanded 
legislative powers and an increased role in the executive, and, secondly, 
a vast majority of the population now being free demanded social, 
economic and political participation. In terms of the development of the 
state, reforms were not introduced until after the Wood Report of 1921 
when the Legislative Council included an elective element though as a 
minority. However, the Executive Council still had the final say on all 
m atters and, through the Governor, the Colonial Office actually had to 
give its approval. The system was a colonial administration whose 
function was to facilitate the rule of a subject people by an alien power. 
The legislative process was in effect a parody of representative 
government with a set of officials acting on orders whilst the unofficials, 
selected and nominated by the Governor, gave uncritical support for they
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owed their positions to the Governor.12 The absence of a  constituent base 
robbed the Unofficials of the possibility of taking independent positions. 
The minority-elected representatives were never in a position to push an 
alternative programme and acted as an  ever-present bu t powerless 
opposition.
From the above description, it can be said tha t the practice of 
colonial government was an exercise of alien control. It did not grow from 
the society in which it existed as the larger part of the population had no 
relation to the government. The government was further insulated by not 
having to be accountable to even the legislative process tha t existed. The 
interests promoted by the government were externally derived, albeit in 
the interest of the local white oligarchy on m ost occasions. The system 
survived because the majority which had ju s t fought for their freedom 
were yet to attain the consciousness to advance their struggle further. In 
any event, they were aware of the military strength possessed by the 
colonial power while the white oligarchy was 'profoundly 
constitutionalist' and believed in the rule of law. Yet there was always 
underlying tension between government and the people because the 
colonial government was not designed and did not act in the interest of 
the m asses.
The labour revolts of the late 1930's provided the background for 
the second transformative event -  the attainm ent of universal adult 
suffrage and the political democratisation of the society.13 The event was 
inspired by labor unrest and social discontent from the Negro working 
class. The emerging Negro working class was largely centered in Castries, 
the capital of Saint Lucia which was a major coaling station that engaged 
m anual labour at the docks. The revolts were part of a series of actions
12 The members of the legislature were referred to as officials and unofficials.
13 Sir Arthur Lewis, Labour in the West Indies. The Birth of a Workers Movement 
(London; New Beacon Books, 1977) is invaluable in understanding the importance of 
the 1930's in the Caribbean.
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th a t took place throughout the colonies and were more than  a demand 
for higher wages. It was an explosion of social discontent against the way 
the Negro m asses lived and were treated by colonial policy. The period 
until 1950 witnessed every effort by the British to withhold constitutional 
growth and to grant minuscule changes each time it appeared tha t the 
contradictions of colonial rule would not be contained.
Universal adult suffrage was granted in 1951 and the resulting 
elections gave victory to the Saint Lucia Labour Party which had a large 
black working class following and black leadership. The granting of adult 
suffrage was complemented not with the granting of full internal self- 
government b u t with staggered constitutional growth.14 An elected 
majority was allowed in the legislature and an  increase, although still a 
minority, of elected members in the executive council which lessened the 
separation between the legislative and executive councils. It was the 
setting up of the office of Chief Minister which created the head of the 
cabinet and allowed for the genuine existence of a party system. The 
Governor would choose the person who commanded a majority in the 
legislature to be Chief Minister and would appoint m inisters on his 
advice.
Under the Crown Colony system after 1951, the colonial 
government through the Governor was still responsible for deciding 
which ministries should exist. Financial m atters remained in the hands 
of the Financial Secretary, a nominated member, and m atters of external 
relations were not even for consideration. The civil service was not 
correspondingly democratised and remained essentially a British- 
m anned service. In considering this period of gradual constitutional 
change, it is possible to posit the view that leaders were slowly being 
prepared for self-rule. However, in relation to the wider society, there is 
no evidence of the political education of the m asses to prepare them for
14 Gordon K. Lewis, The Growth of the West Indies (London; Modem Reader 
Paperbacks, 1968), p. 107-8.
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their civic duties and participation in the political process. The 
participation of the society was restricted to voting a t election time 
depending on which party provided the greatest appeal. Beyond voting 
there was no allegiance to the process except an  acceptance of 
constitutionalism and rule of law.
Saint Lucia was eventually granted Associated Statehood with 
Britain in 1967 and this led to the third transformative event. This quasi­
sovereign sta tus bestowed total control over internal affairs to the local 
political authority with Britain maintaining responsibility for foreign 
relations and defence though in consultation with the island's 
government.15 The next transformative event took place in 1979 with the 
achievement of independence. Independence m eant the transfer of 
control over all the affairs of Saint Lucia to the local political authority. It 
was the attainm ent of statehood with Saint Lucia, as a state, possessing 
equal sovereign rights in the international system. The functions of the 
state also changed to reflect this constitutional development. The 
attainm ent of independence was in reality a shift in political control from 
an alien capital to local control without the state becoming more 
transparent and accountable to the society in which it exists. The 
managers of the newly independent state were seduced by the trappings 
of independence advocating independence as needed for the 
transformation of the state.
Saint Lucia in many ways represents the typical West Indian 
island state. It shares all the characteristics -  plantation economy; slave 
society; small size; small population; and in particular the legacy of 
British colonial rule. There are a few exceptional characteristics bu t 
these tend to prove the rule rather them the exception. Firstly, unlike 
Jam aica under Manley’s democratic socialism, Guyana under Burnham ’s 
co-operative socialism, Grenada under Bishop’s revolutionary socialism
15 Saint Lucia Year Book 1982, p. 17.
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and  Trinidad u n d e r W illiams’ nationalism , S ain t Lucia h a s  not 
experienced any ideological deviation in the  functioning of the  s ta te  after 
independence. D uring the  periods of experim entation by those regimes, 
these  s ta te s  assum ed  high profiles and  played an  increased  role in 
in ternational politics. This lends su p p o rt to the  view th a t w hen there  is a 
h igh level of in tegration betw een s ta te  and  society, th rough  m obilization 
or political consciousness, there  is a greater aw areness to in tegrate  sta te  
and  society. Secondly, unlike the aberration  of T rinidad and  G uyana, the 
S ain t Lucian society is veiy hom ogenous and  largely of African descent. 
One would expect a  g reater level of integration betw een sta te  and  society 
since there  is no ethnic consideration  in deciding who assum es 
governm ent and  therefore no rational, for exclusive policies. Thirdly, as 
im perial policy in  general w as no t im plem ented sim ultaneously  in the 
W est Indies the  sm aller colonies suffered a delay in the im plem entation 
of progressive policies such  as representative governm ent reforms, 
recognition of trade  un ions and  political parties, and  the  granting  of 
independence. Such  a  delay m ay be the  consequence of lower levels of 
agitation or g reater reactionary tendencies in the  sm aller colonies, the 
desire for the  Im perial S tate  to judge the  effects of a policy before 
applying it across the colonies or considerations of viability associated 
w ith sm all size.
The above broad profile of S ain t Lucia as a  case-study  suggests 
th a t the  historical evolution of the  s ta te  and  society in S ain t Lucia 
provides sufficient reason  to study  the  role th a t in ternational and 
dom estic forces played in shaping  post-colonial s ta te  and  societies.
1.3 Formulating a Theoretical Approach
The acceptance of post-colonial s ta te s  as sovereign s ta te s  in  the 
in ternational system  w as propelled by the changed in ternational 
norm ative fram ework after 1945 w hich allowed for these s ta te s  to exist
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either through recognition of national liberation struggles or through 
pressuring imperial nations to grant independence. Traditional IR theory 
generally does not provide for understanding the nature of these states 
within the international system. For example, in his exposition, Jackson 
notes the essential difference in the nature of these states compared to 
classical states is their internal empirical characteristics, a  requirement 
which was relegated after 1945 as a criterion for statehood.16 
Undoubtedly, Jackson looks within the ‘state’ to establish categories of 
states in the international system. Such an approach opens new 
possibilities for IR theory as it peeps into the black box of the state. Yet it 
carries the fundamental weakness of traditional IR theory, for whilst it 
describes the weakness of the states by looking at their insides it 
explains away the actuality of post-colonial states by focusing on their 
totality. They emerged because of a change in the international 
normative framework; they exist because the international system 
accepts responsibility for them and provides the development assistance 
to ensure survival; and the states are quasi-states because they are weak 
and lack empirical statehood. Jackson attem pts to study the historical 
change in the international system but the state is taken as a constant 
and given a perm anent present. There is a  presentation of the post­
colonial state’s possession of limited statehood as an inherent and 
defining feature.
One of the consequences of treating the state in its totality is to 
overlook its historical specificity and its evolving form and function. It 
becomes impossible to examine the internal dynamics of the state, the 
implications for the society, and it denies an understanding of how the 
international and the domestic are integrated in shaping the state and 
society. Therefore, this thesis requires an  approach tha t is capable of
16 Jackson, Quasi-states.
22
dismantling the reification of the nation-state and can look for the deeper 
sources of social continuity and change.
In suggesting an alternative approach to understanding 
international phenomena, the objectives are clear. First, the aim is to 
ensure tha t domestic-based concepts can enhance theories in IR. These 
include political science and sociological concepts such as the state and 
society. Therefore, we move from the strict ‘inside-out’ approaches of 
neorealism and world-systems and the ‘outside-in’ approach of liberal 
political science. Second, the thesis aims to apply new understandings of 
these concepts to IR theory, thereby expanding the analysis of the 
traditional agenda of issues. Thereby we are able to study the impact of 
the internationalization of the state on domestic settings; the growth of a 
transnational civil society and its effect on domestic societies; the 
consequence of domestic and international power struggles on shaping 
the state; and the strengthening of domestic civil society and the 
consequences for domestic politics. Third, the thesis aims to understand 
how historical changes -  international and domestic - influenced state 
formation and societal development. Fourth, the thesis aims to utilize an 
analytical framework tha t avoids determinism of one influence and 
instead provides an understanding of the competing influences which 
shaped state and society.
Therefore, the task  is to study the historical evolution of state- 
societal relations from the colonial period to the present by analyzing 
simultaneously the domestic and international forces a t play in shaping 
state-societal relations. The theoretical approach of the thesis will be 
shaped by four main them es.17 Firstly, recognition of the significance of 
‘material’ factors in the shaping of social existence. In particular, the 
socio-economic context will be acknowledged for its contribution to the 
shaping of the inter-state system, individual states and consequently,
17 Influenced by the outline provided in Chapter 3 -  Historical Materialism and 
International Relations in Halliday, International Relations.
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state-societal relations. Secondly, the importance of history in the 
understanding of social and political phenomena. History provides the 
context for understanding how events came about, their form and 
essence and how the present is shaped by the past. Thirdly, the 
centrality of classes in understanding state-societal relations. This allows 
us to understand why certain groups struggle for the control of the state, 
how they use the state to pursue their own interests, and how the 
contest between state and society takes place. Fourthly, the role of 
contradictions and conflict in social relations. This forces an  examination 
beyond the form of a phenomenon to its essence. Social phenomena can 
now be dissected and analyzed to highlight the contest of social forces 
and their resolution.
As the focus of the research is on the changing nature of the state 
and society, it is necessary to utilize methodological approaches that 
allow for comparative historical analysis. The thesis is not primarily 
concerned with testing theory bu t with examining an historical case and ! 
looking for patterns or occurrences th a t give meaning to the object of the e 
research. Both state and society will be seen as concepts whose form and 
characteristics are ever changing due to an  expanding international 
society. Thus, the location of explanatory factors for the nature of state- 
societal relations lies in the historical intersection of the expansion of the 
international system and the domestic socio-political configuration. The 
research process will guided by five considerations18 : an awareness that 
action is never free bu t takes places within a framework for action; the 
framework for action changes over time and therefore any approach m ust 
seek to understand these changes; the framework is a historical 
structure - a combination of thought patterns, material conditions and 
hum an institutions -  which while it does not determine action provides 
the constraints and space within which action takes place; the
18 Drawn from Cox’s basic premises for a critical theory. Cox, Social Forces.
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framework m ust not be analyzed for its equilibrium b u t in term s of its 
conflict and the possibility of transformation; and the framework existed 
a t a  num ber of spheres or levels of activity -  social forces, state form and 
the international system. The last consideration is particularly im portant 
as it transcends two shortcomings of traditional approaches. Firstly, it 
avoids the arguments in political science for using the contrasting 
approaches of either state-centered or society-centered explanations of 
the relationship between state and society. Secondly, it provides a 
solution to the traditional IR shortcoming of the diminution of society as 
a useful concept in understanding the state in the international system.
1.4 Thesis Outline
This thesis focuses on three significant political achievements that 
transformed state-societal relations -  the emancipation of slaves and 
consequent emergence of a  free labor market; the attainm ent of adult 
suffrage and the consequent right for the majority to participate in the 
political process; and the attainm ent of independence and the 
consequent right to participate in the international system. In general, 
th is thesis begins by arguing for a new understanding in IR which 
integrates domestic and international influences as necessary to account 
for the nature of post-colonial states and society. Using that 
understanding, it utilizes three historical periods which contained 
transformative events to highlight how these events occurred, the impact 
on the evolution of the state and the implications for society. Each of 
these historical chapters will start by examining existing state-society 
relations and how they were shaped by the interplay of domestic and 
international factors. A transformational event will then be examined 
highlighting the role of domestic and international factors. The chapters 
end with an examination of how the transformational event shaped a 
new state-society relationship.
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In particular, Chapter 2 argues th a t a  satisfactory understanding 
of post-colonial states and society can only be achieved by bringing in 
the international dimension to conceptualize domestic political and social 
development. Therefore, it is posited tha t the nature of states can best be 
understood by using an approach tha t presents a new understanding of 
the state as the interplay of the domestic and the international spheres. 
Domestic society becomes fundamental to IR and the state and society is 
seen as acting in two dimensions -  the domestic and international -  bu t 
in a seamless and integrated space. Chapter 2 also makes the case for an 
approach tha t allows for historical specificity in analyzing the emergence 
of the state and society and avoids taking the characteristics of the post­
colonial state and society for granted.
Chapter 3 argues th a t each state is a product of a particular 
historical context that produced distinct configurations of state structure 
and consequent state-societal relationships. The modem European state 
and its relationship with society was the consequence of a long historical 
process tha t shows a higher level of integration. In other words, though 
state-societal relations are influenced by the international, developments 
within a domestic context are highly influential. On the other hand, it is 
argued tha t the colonial state was influenced more by external 
developments despite the significance of some internal factors. This 
legacy has circumscribed the nature of state-societal relations. The 
Chapter also outlines a framework for an  analysis in post-colonial states 
of the evolution of state-societal relations and the relationship to the 
international system.
Chapter 4 dem onstrates tha t the establishm ent of the colonies was 
the result of the expansion of European international society as both the 
quest for national supremacy and the demands of a new economic order 
for trade and raw materials motivated sovereigns to move beyond the 
borders of Europe. The cultivation of sugar for export transformed these 
colonies requiring a  particular form of state and created a  distinct
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society. In effect the mode of production required a particular form of 
state-societal relationship to be successful. The emancipation of the 
slaves, a vital cog in the plantation system, would be the first 
transformative event tha t affected the evolution of the state and society. 
The Chapter examines some of the dominant domestic and international 
reasons for emancipation and outlines how the state and society was 
transformed as a result.
Chapter 5 focuses on the crises of colonial rule during the inter­
war period and the culmination of social discontent in the labour unrest 
of the 1930’s. This was the second transformative event which resulted 
in the establishm ent of the Moyne Commission to investigate and make 
recommendations for the restructuring of the colonial state and society. 
The recommendations of the Commission would lead to the legitimization 
of trade unions, political parties and universal adult suffrage and 
significant development financing. The colonies had less economic 
importance and nationalist tendencies were increasing domestic pressure 
on the imperial state giving way to new colonial arrangements. State and 
society developed a new relationship as the society was finally given 
political power with trade union leadership and a m eans to redress the 
ills of colonialism.
Chapter 6 examines the movement to independence which was 
inspired less by nationalist agitation and more by the imperial need to 
avoid international criticism for the lack of development in the smaller 
colonies. The change in the international framework facilitated the 
emergence of dozens of colonial states with the increasing intolerance of 
colonial rule. Yet in the case of the smaller colonies, issues of viability 
delayed any enjoyment of self-determination. Eventually the desire of the 
imperial state to unload its colonial burden and the persistent demands 
from emerging elites replacing colonial interests would lead to 
independence and the emergence of the colonial state as an  international 
actor.
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Chapter 7 highlights these key themes and arguments in 
understanding the pattern of interplay between international and 
domestic forces in shaping the relationship between the state and society 
in Saint Lucia.
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2Locating s ta te  and society in  In ternational 
Relations Theory
As highlighted in the previous chapter, understanding the nature 
of the state and society in post-colonial societies requires a focus on the 
interplay between the ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ in shaping the 
structures of the state and society. Accordingly, concepts located within 
International Relations (IR) theory, political science and sociology m ust 
be utilized for such a broad understanding. However, while sociology and 
political science have been preoccupied by the nature of their subject 
m atter with the domestic, IR theory has not had an extended engagement 
with the ‘domestic’.
Until recently, IR theory remained rooted in the acceptance of the 
primacy of its core actor -  the state - and the academic ease it offered for 
analyzing the international. That ease was enhanced by the associative 
feature given to the state, namely sovereignty. For sovereignty to be 
meaningful, the state had to be ‘black-boxed’. Equally, for the state to be 
analytically simple, sovereignty had to be uncontested. This is evident in 
Jam es’ definition of sovereignty as a  legal, absolute and unitary 
condition.1 The state is used as an analytic abstraction while sovereignty 
provides the ideological and value justification for its existence. This is 
reflected in the ease with which Jackson was able to account for the 
emergence of post-colonial states.
^Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society (London; Allen & 
Unwin, 1986).
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Such a conception of the state restricts the research programs of 
IR and in particular is insufficient for the task  of understanding the post­
colonial state and its society. In traditional IR, we are forced to accept the 
post-colonial state as a given entity -  corrupt, little institutional capacity, 
no respect for hum an rights and persistent poverty. However, by 
dismantling the edifice tha t the traditional conception of the state 
presents we can study the historical genesis and evolution of states and 
w hat have been the implications for society. The characteristic lack of 
empirical statehood can be studied in its historical context. In studying 
the historical evolution of the state, we necessarily have to examine its 
relationships within a broader context of social reality tha t includes both 
the domestic and international. Only then can we fully appreciate how 
and why post-colonial states possess limited empirical statehood yet 
exist as sovereign states.
Therefore the aims of this Chapter are to: (a) examine the case 
against traditional conceptions of the state in IR; (b) examine the 
arguments and attem pts to integrate society within IR theory; (c) 
consider a conceptualization of the state tha t allows for an 
understanding of its relationships with both society and the international 
system; and (d) formulate a general theoretical approach tha t would 
allow us to understand the state and its relationship to the domestic and 
international spheres of activity.
2.1 The state o f the State in IR Theory
There are three aspects to traditional conceptions of the state in IR 
theory tha t require examination -  the issue of the state being used as an 
analytic abstraction and autonomous actor in IR; the contrasting modes 
of knowledge tha t provide different conceptions of the state; and the 
definition of the state.
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The trad itional view of the  s ta te  a s  au tonom ous acto r w as heavily
challenged w ith the  emergence of p lu ralis t th inking  in the  1970’s which
forced a  focus on the  prim acy of the  s ta te  in  IR theory and  led to w hat
h as  been called the  ‘first s ta te  debate’.2 Hobson argues th a t  the  ‘first
s ta te  debate’ was,
concerned w ith the  fundam ental question  as to w hether ‘s ta te s ’ 
predom inate over ‘social forces’ and  ‘non-sta te  ac to rs’. P u t differently, 
the  debate revolves around  the degree of autonom y th a t s ta te s  have 
from n o n -sta te  actors and  social processes.3
In H obson’s view, the  debate centered a round  two tren d s of 
thought. At one extrem e, neorealists a rgued th a t  the  s ta te  is highly 
au tonom ous and  h as  prim acy in in ternational politics. At the o ther 
extrem e are  the  p lu ralis ts and  liberalists who argued th a t sta te  
autonom y h a s  declined and o ther actors and  processes are  becom ing 
m ore significant.
From  th a t  perspective, it appears th a t the first s ta te  debate w as a 
denial of neorealism  and  its articu lation  of the  sta te  a s  a  ‘black-box’ and  
its prim acy. The issue  of w hether the  s ta te  p redom inates or h as  
autonom y over o ther social processes or actors in the  conduct of 
in ternational politics appeared  to be the  focus of the  s ta te  debate. 
Halliday also identifies th a t m uch  of the theoretical debate h as  focused, 
“...a round  the  analytic prim acy of the s ta te  a s  the  constitutive actor in 
in ternational rela tions.”4
W hilst it is tru e  the debate involved a focus on the prim acy of the 
sta te , it can  also be argued more im portantly, th a t the  debate w as 
essentially  ab o u t the  case for an  alternative view of in ternational politics 
and  th a t o ther actors are necessarily  im portan t in su ch  a  conception.
2 John Hobson, The State and International Relations (Cambridge; Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), p. 1-2.
3 Ibid.
4 Fred Halliday, Rethinking International Relations (London; Macmillan, 1994), p. 74.
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The case for an alternative view of international politics, through 
‘the first state debate’, was not a denial of the historical accuracy of a 
state-centric world bu t rather tha t it was no longer adequate to 
comprehend contemporary reality. In fact, the emergence of the 
‘sovereign’ state-centric model had mirrored the evolution of the nation­
state as the distinctive political form of organization and was quite 
appropriate as an explanatory model. International relations became a 
system of relations between equal states rather than  a system guided by 
universal law.5
The state-centric model was therefore appropriate, as the most 
im portant actors were states. This is not to suggest tha t other actors did 
not exist in cross border activities. The Catholic Church, trading 
companies and religious groups had a  transnational character before the 
emergence of a modem inter-state system and continued to exist after 
the recognition of the nation-state as the sole sovereign entity in the 
international system. What was distinctive was tha t these groups seemed 
to have more or less acted within the authority of the state. According to 
Morse, “...for several centuries the autonomous nation-state became 
increasingly the major political institution under which people organized 
their social relations.”6 Once the state appeared to decline as the popular 
instrum ent for the expression of the aspirations of people, other 
organizations emerged.
There was a changed from a system dominated in the immediate 
post-World War II period by military and security issues and the 
consequent primary focus on the ‘state as actor’ to a world of other 
concerns and emerging issues and the ascendancy of new actors across
5 Richard Mansbach, Yale H. Ferguson, Donald E. Lampert, The Web of World Politics 
(New Jersey; Prentice-Hall Inc., 1976). The acceptance of no law above the state 
introduced sovereignty as the defining characteristic of the system. The legitimating of 
the state apparatus by a distinctive national grouping saw the emergence of the nation­
state as the dominant political form.
6 Edward L. Morse, Modernisation and the Transformation of International Relations 
(Canada; The Free Press, 1976), p. 3.
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state boundaries. The sharp distinction between the ‘international’ and 
the ‘domestic’ spheres became very blurred when explaining either 
sphere. It was now a feature of world politics for domestic events such as 
revolutions and civil wars to spill over state boundaries and affect inter­
state relations. Similarly, international issues served as either a 
constraint on an d /o r impetus to domestic politics. It is not argued that 
these features were new bu t tha t their occurrence and significance 
increased significantly.
It was the deficiency of realism and neorealism in IR theory to 
adequately account for such new global realities tha t led to a call for a 
re-examination of the use of the state as the ‘constitutive actor’ in 
understanding and explaining international politics. Realist accounts 
had included a  num ber of factors influencing international politics bu t 
stopped short of using them as causative or explanatory factors. For 
example, Carr argued tha t international order was affected by changes at 
the level of the state. In each of his four periods of European history, 
changes in the nature of the state led to corresponding changes in the 
international system.7 However, international politics was about how the 
sovereign state constituted an international order and was explained by 
the nature of the units (states) which formed its constituents. In 
addition, Morgenthau recognized that in w hat determined national 
power, a  num ber of hum an, technological and social factors were 
relevant.8 Yet, he was explicit in the view tha t international politics was 
about the contest for power among nations. Waltz was forthright in his 
view tha t using the state and its internal attributes was unnecessary for 
a  theory of international politics. Explaining theory needed to avoid
7 E.H. Carr, Nationalism and After (London; Macmillan, 1945).
8 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New 
York; McGraw-Hill, 1993).
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looking within the structure tha t determined the relational nature of the 
system.9
The intellectual responses to realism and neorealism challenged
the state as a “black-box” and presented alternative approaches to the
‘billiard-ball’ view of the world with a ‘cobweb model’ tha t focused on
foreign policy processes;10 pursuit of parochial politics and bureaucratic
interests;11 transnationalism ;12 and even acknowledging the emergence
of a ‘world society’.13 A common feature of these alternative views is an
approach tha t includes consideration of nonstate actors. According to
Mansbach et al, the approach is not to,
...deny the param ount position tha t nation-states still occupy in 
international politics. Our claim is simply that the behavior of 
nonstate actors has not been studied systematically and has not been 
integrated into the dominant model.14
That dominant model had always established the state as the core
unit and tha t international politics could be understood from studying
interstate relations.15 Rosenau succinctly pointed out,
...inquiry has been organized exclusively around the foreign policies 
and interaction of states and, unfortunately, the paradigms, models, 
and concepts employed to probe these phenomena simply have not 
proven sufficient to the task  of comprehending the changes that 
appear to be transnationalising world affairs.16
9 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York; McGraw-Hill, 1986).
10 Richard C. Snder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision Making: An 
Approach to the Study of International Politics (New York; Free Press, 1962).
11 Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, 
MA; Little, Brown, 1971).
12 James N. Rosenau, The Study of Global Interdependence: Essays on the 
Transnationalisation of World Affairs (New York; Nichols, 1980).
13 John Burton, The Study of World Society: A London Perspective, International Studies 
Occassional Paper No. 1 (U.S.A., 1974).
14 Mansbach, Ferguson and Lampert, World Politics, p. 2.
15 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Transnational Relations and World Politics 
(Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 1972), p.7.
16 Rosenau, Interdependence, p. 4.
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M ansbach et al identified seven components of the traditional 
state-centric model of international politics and observed tha t an  actor in 
international politics is defined ‘by the ascriptive quality of sovereignty’ or 
‘by the descriptive characteristic of territoriality’. 17 Instead, it is argued 
th a t an  actor should be “...defined by the behavioral attribute of 
autonomy.”18 In other words, an  actor is able to freely exercise influence 
in world politics. Therefore, the contemporary world is seen as a 
multiplicity of autonomous actors that interact through independent 
decision-making and, in the process, shape the behavior of each other.
Mansbach et al in explaining the challenge to the state observed 
“...[w]hile national governments remain principal actors in the 
contemporary global system, the past decade has witnessed an explosive 
increase in popular participation in ‘affairs of state’.”19 Mansbach et al 
are quite correct in rejecting a state-centric approach as “...private 
citizens or groups have increasingly intruded in world politics without 
reference to governments or interstate organizations.”20 What was once 
presented as the exclusive domain of states has now been extended to 
previously unacknowledged actors and, correspondingly, IR theory has to 
accommodate their emergence in its paradigms. Therefore, Rosenau 
made the claim tha t there is now an enlarged space for the study of 
international politics and although nongovernmental entities may never 
be as powerful as governments or have as many issues to address, they 
help shape world events and cause governments to interact with them.21
Hobson, as indicated earlier, saw the first state debate as a  contest 
of ideas on the primacy of the state or the level of autonomy of the state 
in determining international relations. He argued tha t in the end, both
17 Mansbach, Ferguson and Lampert, World Politics, p. 3.
18 Ibid., p. 4. This definition is an ideal type representation.




sides in the debate failed as the debate was not about the state and both 
ended up denying tha t the state can shape international politics free of 
international structures. In attempting to resolve the state debate, he 
proposed a ‘second state debate’ which locates IR theory within the 
agent-structure problematic. In comes the notion of the domestic and the 
international agential powers of the state.22
However, the state debate and Hobson’s final attem pt to resolve it 
does not really address the fundamental issue -  how best to account for 
social reality within international politics. The debate was concerned with 
accounting for the varying levels of primacy of the state in shaping 
international politics.23 The resolution should not be about whether the 
state is the primary constitutive actor and when, but who are the 
constitutive actors, how do they interact and the levels o f interaction and, 
equally important, how do we explain their social existence. It is about 
how to bring in more sources of action and influences tha t shape 
international politics and how international politics shape the state and 
other actors. Of course, to resolve the issue of whether the state has 
primacy helps bu t tha t distracts from a richer and broader conception of 
international politics. This shortcoming within IR - how to provide a 
broader account for phenomena within international politics - has been 
partly identified by Cox as a failure,
...to consider the state/society complex as the basic entity of
international relations. As a  consequence, the prospect th a t there
22 Hobson, The State, p. 5-7. Hobson defines domestic agential power as the ability of 
the state to make domestic or foreign policy as well as shape the domestic realm, free of 
domestic social-structural requirements or the interests of non-state actors. 
International agential power as the ability of the state to make foreign policy and shape 
the international realm free of international structural requirements or the interests of 
international non-state actors.
23 Within sociology and comparative politics, there has been a similar debate on the 
level of autonomy of the state which resulted in Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back 
In (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1985).
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exists a plurality of forms of state, expressing different configurations 
of state/society complexes, remains very largely unexplored...24
The critical point in Cox’s observation is tha t the state as a 
singular concept limits our investigation in international politics and 
bringing in the state/society complex offers tremendous scope for new 
explanations IR. Even without the acceptance of Cox’s view tha t the 
state/society complex should be the basic entity of international 
relations, its examination can provide invaluable explanations of the 
nature of the state in the international system. For example, why some 
states Eire unable to mobilize internal resources to compete 
internationally, why some states have not been able to develop sufficient 
institutional authority to prevent societal disintegration, how those 
holding state power use international advantages to reinforce themselves 
in power, Eind how society is able to establish contacts beyond the state 
to strengthen itself. In examining the state/society complex, the society 
now becomes a  constitutive actor in IR. This provides new agenda items 
for study in IR tha t ceui now be pursued if the state is dismantled as an 
analytic abstraction. IR theory will be able to examine the state in its 
multiple dimensions, how it relates to other actors including the society, 
and a t w hat levels such interaction tcikes place. A new scope of enquiry 
in IR is critical for this thesis to offer a framework tha t will explain how 
and why post-colonial states came into being with limited empirical 
statehood instead of taking the post-colonial state and its attributes for 
granted.
Another dimension tha t remains fundamental to expanding the 
scope of enquiry of IR is to understcind socicd existence and reality. Cox 
noted two different modes of knowledge: positivism and historicism.25 
Positivism refers to an  attem pt to conceive of knowledge with the rigidity
24 Robert Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Order’ in Neoreolism and its critics, ed., 
Robert Keohane (New York; Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 205.
25 Ibid.
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of natural science approaches tha t separate subject from object. This 
approach suggests tha t the events we study in IR are externally derived 
from the actions of the actors. In the case of the state, it can be studied 
as an  abstract natural entity tha t is a  product of the interaction of 
actors. Further, positivism claims tha t a scientific understanding of 
society requires neutral perceptions. There are natural units or parts 
th a t make up social reality based on repeated and regular occurrences 
and m ust be studied as such. Again, the state is seen as the present 
logical outcome of the action of actors and is not seen as historically 
contingent. Historicism refers to an  attem pt to conceive of knowledge as 
the product of people’s perception of and responses to the material 
context in which they exist. Knowledge therefore has to be related to the 
“...changing mental processes of their m akers.”26 In other words, 
knowledge m ust be based on the link between these mental processes 
and the material constraints and opportunities tha t exist for people to 
act.
These two approaches lead to two purposes of theorizing, namely 
problem-solving and critical theory.27 The problem-solving approach 
takes the existing order of the international system as given and the 
existing social and power relationships as unquestioned. The particular 
configuration of order and relationships provides the limits and 
possibilities for explanation. Conversely, the critical approach starts by 
questioning the existing order and examines its genesis and evolution. 
Institutions and social relations are all examined for their origins and 
historical change. Critical approaches place great importance on 
historical specificity as they accept that social existence is a reflection of 
the material conditions that exist and sees the interpretation of and 
changes in social existence as continuing processes. Rather than  taking
26 Ibid., p. 242.
27 Ibid.
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a sphere of activity as a  unit for analysis in itself, critical approaches 
seek to establish the wider social reality as an interrelated whole and 
locate the place of the activity within tha t whole. This dimension is also 
useful for the task  of this thesis as critical theory provides an approach 
th a t can treat the state as part of the wider historical system tha t m ust 
be examined not in term s of its equilibrium bu t in terms of its changing 
processes. Within tha t system, the state is also a  changing concept that 
m ust be studied alongside its social and political relations. Problem­
solving approaches do not offer such possibilities for researching and 
understanding of IR as they seek to justify and rationalize the existing 
order.
The third aspect to the state in IR theory that is im portant for a 
resolution of the impasse, according to Halliday, “...goes to the heart of 
International Relations, to the concepts it bases itself upon, to the 
research programmes it stimulates, and to its relation with other 
disciplines within the social sciences. This is the question of the 
definition of ‘state’ which is used.”28 In a sense, IR theory has to resolve 
w hat is m eant by the state when discussing new approaches to 
understanding and explaining international politics. We have noted how 
traditional IR theory conceptualized international politics as inter-state 
relations and the state as a totality. As such, traditional approaches were 
unable to examine the contending influences and processes which 
shaped the state nor how various forms of states -  distinguished by 
history and structure - played different roles within the international 
system.
Clark presents this shortcoming as a consequence of the ‘Great 
Divide’ and points out tha t the division has allowed for a separate 
framework for theorizing in IR and the claim of IR being a separate
28 Halliday, International Relations, p.76.
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academic discipline.29 The Great Divide allows for assum ptions about
two distinct and different spheres of action with separate tools of
analysis. Clark identifies the various manifestations in which the
separation of ‘state as internal’ and ‘state as external’ has taken place as,
a morality of states and morality of people; communitarianism and 
cosmopolitanism; communitarianism and liberalism; thick and thin; 
democracy of the polis and cosmopolitan democracy; foreign policy 
analysis and International Relations; and reductionism and systemic 
theory.30
This clearly shows tha t even beyond the arguments of the primacy 
of the state and the state as black-box, there is a more fundamental 
problem of a theoretical separation between the ‘state as external’ and 
the ‘state as internal’. It is a separation tha t holds no promise in an  age 
of globalization. As pointed out by Clark “...one of the salient 
characteristics of globalization is precisely the m anner in which it 
transcends or subsum es the separation between the internal and 
external political realms.”31 This is reinforced by Sorensen’s view that the 
“...future of the world order, the configuration of forces that set the 
context for world affairs, cannot be adequately understood if the 
international-domestic relationships are left out.”32
Thus, the new approaches in IR theory m ust look for an agenda 
beyond the totality of the state and m ust assert tha t explanation and 
understanding can incorporate issues, processes and units tha t are not 
about questioning the primacy of the state. Most importantly, it requires 
dismantling the Great Divide and allowing for a place for the ‘domestic’ in 
helping to understand international politics and how international
29 Ian Clark, Globalisation and International Relations Theory (Oxford; Oxford University 
Press, 1999), p. 17. The Great Divide refers to the academic separation between political 
science that studies the internal and international relations that studies the external.
30 Ibid., p. 18.
31 Ibid., p. 16.
32 Georg Sorensen, Changes in Statehood. The Transformation of International Relations 
(New York; Palgrave, 2001), p. 3.
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politics helps in understanding the ‘domestic’. IR theory m ust provide for 
an  examination of the emergence of the state, what factors have 
influenced the nature of the state, and w hat have been the implications 
for societies and the international system.
2 .2  Revisiting IR Theory -  Bringing in the ‘dom estic’
From the above it is recognized tha t IR theory m ust incorporate 
state and society if it is to cross the Great Divide and to project a 
revelatory understanding of state-societal relations and their relationship 
with international politics. It is now obvious tha t IR theory m ust 
continue to break its theoretical chauvinism and look to other disciplines 
for satisfactory adducts that can assist in providing more meaningful 
explanations. Such a rethinking m ust allow for the examination of post­
colonial states and their societies not as failed entities bu t as historical 
constructs and products of an expanding ‘international system’.
It has been shown tha t it was traditional IR theory, through 
Realism, th a t treated the state as a monolithic entity which served as the 
constitutive unit of the interactions tha t defined international politics. 
Neorealism accentuated this approach and with World-System theory 
placed more em phasis on the international or systemic level.33 Therefore, 
the internal attributes of states are constants rather than  variables and 
the range of policy outcomes are due to changing external pressures 
rather than  internal changes. On the other hand, there are pluralist 
approaches tha t locate the explanation of foreign policy and international 
relations a t the level of the state. The state does not respond to bu t also 
constitutes the external.34
33 For a good account of World-systems theory, a variant of Marxism, see Immanuel 
Wallerstein, The Politics of the World-Economy (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 
1984).
34 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games,” in Double-Edged Diplomacy, eds. Peter B. Evans et al (Berkeley:CA; University 
of California, 1993).
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It is clear though tha t both domestic and international 
explanations of international politics recognize tha t both domestic and 
international factors are involved. Therefore according to Putnam, it is no 
longer productive to argue whether domestic politics or international 
relations determines each other as the answer is each act causally on the 
other and it is more useful to ask “how” and “when”.35 According to 
Sorensen, revisions are needed and it will have to be accepted that, 
“...the core values pursued by states, tha t is, security, freedom, order, 
justice, wealth, and welfare, each contain ‘international’ as well as
‘domestic’ aspects the international-domestic should be at the center
of inquiry.”36 Clark also offers a  way forward by treating the state, “...as 
the common bu t contested ground tha t brings the international and the 
national together, rather than  as the barrier which m arks the line of 
separation between them .”37
Therefore, there are two tasks involved in seeking to bring in the 
domestic to International Relations. The first task is to assess the 
attem pts to conceive of international politics as a  whole and present both 
domestic and international dimensions tha t interact and, secondly, to 
consider a definition of the state which dismantles totality with an 
inclusive role for the ‘domestic’ in its understanding of the international 
role of the state.38
Arguments to link domestic and international relations in a move 
from a state-centric conception of international politics were a feature of
35 Ibid.
36 Sorensen, Statehood, p. 1-2.
37 Clark, Globalisation, p. 17.
38 A number of writers have sought to catalogue attempts to bridge the ‘domestic- 
international’ divide. James A. Caporaso, Across the Great Divide: Integrating 
Comparative and International Politics (EUI Working Papers, RSC No. 97/58, Florence 
Italy, 1997) recognizes three possibilities: two-level game; second-image reversed; and 
domestification of international politics. Clark, Globalisation, identifies attempts in 
decision-making theory; historical materialism/world systems; international society and 
constructivism.
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early pluralist writings.39 Other writings developed tha t sought to 
examine how the international and the domestic are related particularly 
in the areas of economic policy, interdependence and transnationalism .40
Keohane and Nye, using the foundations of the ‘second image 
reversed’ and interdependence, introduced the concept of 
internationalization to highlight the effect of the international economic 
exchanges on domestic politics.41 Their compilation of essays argued 
tha t domestic politics can no longer be understood “...without 
comprehending the nature of the linkages between national economies 
and the world economy, and changes in such linkages.”42 
Internationalization is seen as the process which is engendered when 
there are changes in the transaction costs which facilitate flows of goods, 
services and capital. Therefore, international trade and investment have 
expanded and have forced changes at the national levels. Since domestic 
institutions are an  expression of domestic preferences and are designed 
to achieve these preferences there will be changes from the influence of 
the international.43
In another dimension of the debate, Skidmore and Hudson made 
the case for a theory of foreign policy behavior tha t shows how
39 James Rosenau, Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and 
International Systems (New York; Free Press, 1969); Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political 
Community in the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical 
Experience (Princeton, N.J; Princeton University Press, 1957) and Ernst B. Hass, The 
Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957 (Stanford, California; 
Stanford University Press, 1958).
49 For example Peter Katzenstein, “International Relations and Domestic Structures: 
Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial Societies,” International Organisation 
30: (Winter 1976) and Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence 
(USA; Longman, 2001).
41 Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner, eds., Internationalization and Domestic 
Politics (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1996). They argued that 




differences in domestic forces can change foreign policy in states.44 
Skidmore and Hudson argue beyond the traditional foreign policy 
analysis approaches tha t are limited to the state structures and decision­
makers, as these approaches accept “...the traditional realist distinction 
between the political processes governing the making of domestic and 
foreign policies.”45 It is suggested tha t w hat is missing is consideration of 
the role of domestic politics in foreign policy where the influence of 
societal groups is treated as a variable. Such an approach considers how 
organized groups try to influence state policy and how state decision­
m akers relate to these groups. Skidmore and Hudson identified three 
models for state-societal relations and foreign policy -  statist, societal 
and transnational.
However, Putnam  argued tha t these attem pts are limited and m ust 
move beyond mere observation and cataloguing of relationships and 
“...seek theories tha t integrate both spheres, accounting for the areas of 
entanglement between them .”46 Putnam offered the ‘two-level game’ as a 
way of understanding the politics of international negotiations. This 
approach argues tha t a t the national level, domestic groups seek to 
enhance their interest by pressuring governments who themselves try to 
consolidate their power by building coalitions among these groups. At the 
international level, governments seek to use their contact to satisfy 
domestic demands while limiting the adverse consequences of 
international developments.
Putnam introduced a significant departure in early attempts to 
bridge the gap by rejecting explanations tha t treat one level as the 
dominant influence and the other as am intervening variable. Instead the 
‘two-level’ approach argued tha t statesm en are doing two things at once -
44 David Skidmore and Valerie M. Hudson, eds., The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal 
Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation (United Kingdom; Westview Press, 1993).
45 Ibid., p. 5.
46 Putnam, Two-Level Games, p. 436.
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exploiting domestic and international politics simultaneously. The chief 
executive of the country is seen as ‘Janus-faced’ because concerns from 
both levels Eire bcdcinced in a ‘doubled-edged’ diplomacy.47 Where the two 
logics do not coincide, the chief executive has the autonomy to resolve 
them. Thus, Putnam  uses sill three levels of analysis and goes beyond the 
agen t/struc tu re polarization.
Writings using a historical materialist approach have argued for a 
totality shaped by the socio-economic context which in tu rn  determines 
all areas of hum an activity. According to Halliday, “...there is no
‘international system’, or any component activity abstracted from the
mode of production.”48 Using the concept of ‘international society as 
homogeneity’, Halliday refers to “...a set of norms shared by different 
societies and which are promoted by inter-state competition.”49 This 
homogeneity is the product of intemationEd pressures on states to 
conform to an  internationally defined standard in their internal 
structuring. Therefore, despite states attempting, or wanting, to have 
distinct policies smd particular modes of functioning within their national 
boundaries, there is a compelling logic from outside forcing states to 
conform. According to Halliday, this approach allows for an 
understanding of the “...relations between the internal structure of 
societies and the international.”50 By bringing the concepts of both the 
internal and the external into the analysis, it is possible to examine 
“...what happens within states and societies and....the interaction of 
international activity with domestic legitimacy smd stability.”51 This
47 Andrew Moravcsik , “Introduction -  Integrating International and Domestic Theories 
of International Bargaining” in Double-Edged Diplomacy, ed., Peter B. Evans et al 
(Berkeley: CA; University of California, 1993).
48 Halliday, International Relations, p. 60.
49 Ibid., p. 94.
59 Ibid., p. 95.
51 Ibid.
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approach still affords importance to states since homogeneity is 
promoted by inter-state competition
Wallerstein’s notion of a single world-economy offers a different 
conception of a totality which encompasses both the domestic and the 
international despite the diminished significance given to the domestic. 
Wallerstein suggested tha t we use the concept of ‘historical system’ -  
long-term, large-scale wholes within which concepts have meanings.52 
He explains that,
[i]t is a whole which is integrated, tha t is, composed of interrelated 
parts, therefore in some sense systematic and, with comprehensible 
patterns. It is a  system which has a history, tha t is, it has a genesis, 
an historical development, a  close...53
The capitalist world-economy is the contemporary historical 
system which is based on the motive of capital accumulation. This 
historical system, which developed in Europe, expanded to encompass 
the entire social and physical space of humanity, creating all major 
institutions in its image. Thus, all the major institutions are either 
shaped or created by it and are not perm anent or relatively fixed 
structures insulated from the workings of the capitalist world-economy. 
In world-systems analysis, the entire globe is operating within the 
framework of a single social division of labor which is capitalistic in 
nature.
Wallerstein’s approach provides an understanding tha t allows the 
system to be seen as having a  single logic with all the parts functioning 
to fulfill tha t logic. The state as a product of the system has a particular 
function which is not delineated by its disaggregated appearance. In 
essence, the state is a political institution which enforces the social 
division of labor. The notion of a totality of domestic and international 
finds unambiguous expression in the explanation that,
52 Wallerstein, World Economy, p. 27.
53 Ibid.
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social reality is centered in the workings of the world-economy, and we 
will not be able to analyze intelligently any social phenomenon, 
however “micro” it may seem, without placing it as an element 
constrained by the real system in which it finds itself.54
Another historical materialist approach is provided by Cox with the 
notion of historical structures as particular spheres of historically 
located totalities. There are three levels or spheres which are interrelated 
as
[cjhanges in the organization of production generate new social forces 
which, in turn, bring about changes in the structure of states; and the 
generalization of changes in the structure of states alters the 
problematic of world order.55
However, the relationship is not all unilinear and a fuller 
representation of historical processes requires tha t they be considered in 
relation to each other. This highlights the interaction of the international 
and the domestic. Further, a  state’s raison d ’etat is defined by the 
configuration of its social forces and is manifested externally and 
internally. Thus, “[t]here is a practical connection between the effort of a 
state to organize its society and its effort to m aintain itself and pursue its 
goals in the interstate context.”56 Similarly, changes in the form of the 
state are related to changes in the structure of the world order and m ust 
be used to explain changes in the social relations of production. There is 
a ‘parallelism’ which is mutually reinforcing.
Another approach tha t has sought to bridge the international and 
domestic lies in the use of ‘international society’.57 This approach, 
drawing upon the work of English School Rationalism utilized the 
concept of ‘domestication of the international system’.58 It suggested that
54 Ibid., p. 12.
55 Cox, Social Forces, p. 220.
56 Ibid., p. 107.
57 Clark, Globalisation, p. 29.
58 Caporaso, Great Divide, p. 24. This approach uses the work of Hedley Bull.
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if the international system is anarchic with sovereign interacting states, 
then ‘domestication’ implies a process towards a ‘govemmentalized’ and 
rule-governed system. According to Suganami’s ‘domestic analogy’, the 
similarities between the domestic and the international are such that, 
“...the conditions of order within states are similar to those between 
them; and that therefore those which sustain  order domestically should 
be reproduced a t the international level.”59 This approach sees the 
integration as requiring the removal of the conditions tha t define the two 
separate spheres. The test of a  single system is in the establishment and 
functioning of institutions for the formulation, interpretation and 
implementation of laws and the creation of a  hierarchy of norms which 
are binding on all parties.
Other conceptions of integrating international and domestic 
politics have developed in approaches outside of political science and are 
now contributing to a productive synthesis of ideas tha t can only enrich 
the study of international politics. One such intervention has been by 
social constructivism rooted in the belief tha t ideas are responsible, more 
or less, for the shaping of social reality. Applied to IR theory, 
constructivists see norms as shaping the identity of states which 
consequently determines state interests. Logically, as norms change so 
do identity and interest and ultimately state policies and relations. Like 
all major theoretical approaches, constructivists differ on whether to 
favor the international structure,60 agency61 or use a synthesis of 
structure and agency62. However, the approach of Reus-Smith described
59 Hidemi Suganami, The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals (Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 1.
69 For example Martha Finnemore, National Interest in International Society (Ithaca; 
Cornell University Press, 1996).
61 For example Peter Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security (Ithaca; Cornell 
University Press, 1996).
62 For example Christian Reus-Smith, The Moral Purpose of the State (Princeton; 
Princeton University Press, 1996).
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as ‘holistic constructivism’ seeks to integrate the domestic and the 
international spheres of activity.
Reus-Smith utilizes what he called a ‘constructivist philosophy of 
history’ comprising four central tenets to examine how change takes 
place within the international system.63 Firstly, ideational structures are 
as im portant as material structures in shaping individual and collective 
action; secondly, ideational structures shape actors’ social identities; 
thirdly, actors’ social identities inform their interest and fourthly, most 
importantly, structures and agents are mutually constitutive. 
Understanding change in the international system m ust move beyond 
the assum ption tha t change is necessarily associated with the changes in 
sovereign sta tus and tha t the forces driving change are materialist. 
Instead, to understand change requires a  look at the normative structure 
of the international system. According to Reus-Smith, “...the normative 
structure comprises three elements -  a hegemonic conception of the 
moral purpose of the state; an organizing principle of sovereignty; and a 
norm of procedural justice.”64 Therefore, from a ‘holistic constructivist’ 
approach, changes in the normative structure change the social identity 
of the state which in tu rn  changes the constitutional structure. This 
gives rise to a  recursive process which integrates the internal and 
external.
Another insertion into IR theory has been the re-emergence of a 
historical sociology of international relations with the work of Neo- 
Weberian Historical Sociology also offering explanation beyond the 
theoretical divide of the domestic and international.65 Writing in that
63 Christian Reus-Smith, “The idea of history and history with ideas” in Historical 
Sociology of International Relations, eds., Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson 
(Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2002).
64 Ibid., p. 136.
65 Hobson, The State. Neo-Weberian approach is seen as the second wave of Weberian 
Historical Sociology (WHS) in contrast to a realist inspired first wave of writers such as 
Theda Skocpol, States and Revolutions (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1979)
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vein, Hobson sought to provide an approach tha t addresses the 
separateness of state to state, and state to society in international 
relations theory by depicting states, “...as variously embedded or 
integrated within domestic social relations as well as international 
relations...”66 Hobson’s argum ent rests on w hat he calls a paradox 
argum ent -  tha t to bring the state back as an  independent actor in IR 
requires tha t society and international society also be brought back in. 
Therefore, unlike conceptions of state autonomy, the presence of strong 
social actors enhances state power rather than  weakens it. Therefore, 
instead of a trade-off between state power and social forces in an 
‘either/or’ approach, there is an  inclusive ‘b o th /an d ’ logic and there is a 
shift of analysis from ‘state or non-state forces’ to ‘states and non-state 
actors’.67
Using Mann’s conception of a non-reductionist state,68 Hobson 
offers a ‘structurationist’ synthesis of structure and agency. Thus, the 
domestic and international are integrated through the ‘constitutive state’ 
and the co-constitution of state and society/international society. The 
state is placed within an international/national vortex in which the 
structures of the mode of production, world economy and international 
state system, “... are mutually embedded tha t they shape and determine 
one another.” 69 Structures both constrain and enable state capacity and 
accordingly international and national structures become ‘realms of 
constraint’ and ‘realms of opportunity’. States therefore use both 
domestic and international realms as resources to enhance their power
and Charles Tilly, The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton; 
Princeton University Press, 1975).
66 Ibid., p. 204. The more embedded a state is the greater the capacity to govern 
effectively and to conduct international relations.
67John M. Hobson, The Wealth of Nations: A Comparative Sociology of International 
Economic and Political Change (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1997).
68 Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, vol. 1, (Cambridge; Cambridge University 
Press, 1986).
69 Hobson, The State, p. 210.
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or interest in the respective realms. According to Hobson, “...the state is 
a Janus-faced entity, with one face looking to the international and 
global realms and the other facing the domestic arena.”70
Hobson’s analysis highlights two significant premises -  firstly, the 
internal attributes of states and state-societal relations are necessary for 
explaining international politics and; secondly, states are not passive 
consequences of structures and non-state actors, bu t constitute and are 
constituted by domestic and international structures.71 The 
structurationist model of the ‘constitutive’ state and global politics gives 
birth to a ‘neo-integrationist’ approach to international politics.72 A ‘neo- 
integrationist’ approach rejects the idea tha t the domestic and 
international realms are separate or there is a  one-way linkage and 
purports tha t “...there is a seamless web tha t envelops them and binds 
each of these realms together.”73 The state is seen as ‘territorially 
promiscuous’ because it is located in th a t international/national vortex 
where it can play both realms to enhance its interests an d /o r power, 
adapt or conform to the structures. In the process, the realms become 
mutually embedded. Accordingly, states develop ‘exit strategies’ and 
‘adaptive strategies’ tha t highlight the power of the state and the 
structural constraints tha t states face.74
The functioning of the state in two realms from a ‘neo- 
integrationist’ approach gives rise to a conception of international politics 
as an “...increasingly integrated global spatial architecture” and to a 
theoretical position tha t “...gives relatively equal ontological weighting to 
international and global social, normative, economic and political
70 Ibid.
71 Hobson, Wealth of Nations, p. 272-275.
72 Hobson, The State, p. 223-235 and Hobson and Holden, eds., Historical Sociology, p. 
63-81.
73 Ibid., p. 230.
74 Ibid., p. 230-234.
51
structures on the one hand, b u t also the state and state-society relations 
on the other.”75
The above approaches all provide exciting possibilities for 
alternative conceptions of IR and new research programs. For example, 
Putnam ’s approach offers the utility of the j anus-faced chief executive 
and the use of all three levels of analysis. However, the difficulty is tha t it 
is ahistorical and represents a framework tha t can only be used for 
analysis of a particular period or event. It is limited to situations where 
the Chief Executive is empowered to act and has the space to engage in 
international negotiations. Clearly, it cannot be applied to the state in a 
colonial situation. Further, Putnam ’s approach has no holistic 
conception of the international system or of the system’s defining 
characteristics.
Historical materialism offers the notion of a  totality of social reality 
where social existence is not disaggregated bu t presented as possessing a 
single defining characteristic of a capitalist logic. There are two benefits 
of such an approach. Firstly, it locates all the parts as constituting a 
whole. The state, whatever its form, is not an isolated historical 
occurrence and m ust be analyzed in the context of the whole. Secondly, 
it presents social reality as developing in accordance with the changing 
mode of production. Therefore, it has both historical specificity and a 
logic of change. However, the difficulty of some uses of historical 
materialism is the primacy given to some levels or spheres of activity or 
the level of determinism given to capitalistic as the source of all action.
Constructivism goes in the other direction to offer the ideational 
structure as the primary logic for change in society. It has utility, 
certainly in the case of Reus-Smith, in offering an integration of the 
domestic and international and providing an understanding of change 
and history. However, there is an overemphasis on the role of ideas in
75 Ibid., p. 234.
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accounting for change whilst the economic framework within which 
social existence takes place becomes too inconsequential.
Neo-Weberian Historical sociology (NHS) offers a  second wave of 
Weberian historical sociology tha t through Hobson offers a  more complex 
non-realist view of international politics. The greatest strength of the 
approach of Hobson is the use of a structurationist approach tha t argues 
tha t the state-society complex constitutes, and is constituted by, both 
the domestic and the international. At a broader level, the use of 
historical sociology within international relations offers significant 
advantages to achieving the objectives of this thesis.76 Neo-Weberian 
historical sociology allows us to understand the present as a product of 
the past and to recognize that whilst it is im portant to study the past to 
understand the present; the present is itself a representation of its own 
historical conjuncture of social forces.
There are three difficulties with Hobson’s neo-integrationist 
approach. Firstly, he has not provided a conception of the prevailing logic 
of the international system in its present historical mode. Secondly, he 
has not adequately accounted for change within the international system 
and between systems. Thirdly, it focuses on the state as being 
constitutive within the domestic and international bu t leaves the society 
grounded in the domestic.
Having analyzed the above, it is established tha t the first task  for 
rethinking IR as constituting the domestic requires an  understanding 
tha t sees the international system as an integrated system with both 
domestic and international dimensions. In tha t integration academic 
arguments on the state and society cease to be ‘either’ and become ‘both’ 
with the state and society each having a j anus-faced character.
Historical Sociology in IR is defined as “...a critical approach which refuses to treat 
the present as an autonomous entity outside of history, but insists on embedding it 
within a specific socio-temporal place...” (Hobson and Holden, eds., Historical Sociology, 
p. 13). This definition is itself contentious as Hobson deliberately seeks to problematise 
the traditional historical sociology approach in its application to IR.
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2.3  Reconceptualising the State
It was earlier established tha t the second task is to conceptualize 
the central concept in international relations - the state. According to 
Halliday, “[i]ntemational relations as whole takes as given one specific 
definition, w hat one may term the national-territorial totality. Thus the 
state...comprises in conceptual form what is denoted visually on a map - 
viz. the country as a whole and all that is within it: territory, government, 
people and society.”77 This succinct description exposes the grave sin of 
much of IR theory in accounting for the nature of the state. This 
difficulty arises because of the academic division between international 
relations and political science and has been referred to as the double life 
of the state, “...whereby political science or comparative politics deals 
with the ‘internal’, whereas International Relations is the study of the 
‘external’ relations of the state.” 78
The above definition drawing upon international law and political 
theory served as a useful abstraction for international relations at a time 
when explanation centered on a ‘billiard-ball’ conception of the world. 
Consequently, non-state actors and the nature of state-societal relations 
tha t can help explain the international behavior of state are implicitly left 
out. It has already been shown in the previous section that traditional IR 
theory does not adequately provide for a new theorizing of the state.79 
Avoiding the exhaustive debate in other disciplines on the nature and 
form of the state, it is not difficult to look beyond the boundaries of IR for 
alternative conceptions tha t appear more relevant to the contemporary 
world.
77 Halliday, International Relations, p. 78.
78 Clark, Globalisation, p. 17.
79 The debate on the state has also characterized other disciplines notable political 
science and sociology. It is interesting that whilst IR has been arguing to bring in 
society to overcome systemic explanations, sociology and political science have been 
arguing for a movement in the opposite direction -  to reduce reductionism or social 
embeddedness.
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Arguing for a second wave of Weberian Historical Sociology, 
Hobson identified six principles that are needed for an  adequate theory of 
the state, society and international relations.80 These include a study of 
history and change; multi-causality; multi-spatiality; partial autonomy of 
power sources and actors; complex notions of history and change; and a 
theory of state autonomy and power. This approach allows IR theory to 
overcome many of the shortcomings of traditional theory as well as those 
of sociological definitions.
Mann’s formulation of an  IEMP model sought to fulfill these 
principles and provide a concept of the state and international system 
which is of greater utility in understanding international politics.81 The 
model argues tha t the four sources of power -  political, economic, 
ideological and military -  are all partially autonomous and seek to 
influence and in the process m utually structure each other. There are 
instances where one or two sources of power may predominate and 
determine the character of the state and system. The model also 
recognizes the multi-spatiality of the system as the various levels -  sub­
national, national, international and global -  also affect and structure 
each other. Thus the state crosses the ‘Great Divide’.
Hobson also using historical sociology suggested an approach that 
presents the state as embedded or integrated in both domestic social 
relations and international relations and so forming a ‘constitutive’ 
state.82
Cox arguing from a critical historical approach recognizes tha t a 
generic concept of the state is limited in its use to explain international 
politics. Instead, it is of greater utility to focus on the distinctive forms of 
the state. Social forces shape the form of the state as “a particular
80 John Hobson, “The Historical Sociology of the State and the State of Historical 
Sociology’ in International Relations” Review of International Political Economy 5; 2 (xx) 
p. 286-96.
®1 Mann, Social Power, vol. 1.
82 Hobson, Wealth of Nations.
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configuration of social forces defines in practice the limits or param eters 
of state purposes, and the modus operandi of state action...”83 This 
approach suggests th a t forms of the state are historically contingent and 
tha t it is the state tha t ensures the production process. However, the 
state is constrained by its position and relative power in the world order 
and acts with only relative autonomy defined as its raison d'etat -  a 
product of consistent notions of national interest and modes of conduct. 
Thus the form of the state, “...is a product of two configurations of forces: 
one, the configuration of social classes within a historic bloc; the other, 
the permissiveness of the world order.”84
Halliday in examining the potential of sociological definitions of the 
state points out th a t an alternative conception allows questions and 
research programs different from the traditional totality approach. A 
typical sociological definition is given by Skocpol who describes the state 
as, “...a set of administrative, policing and military organizations headed, 
and more or less well coordinated, by an executive authority.”85 The use 
of such a  sociological definition provides many advantages for alternative 
theorizing of IR tha t go beyond the immobility caused by a ‘black-box’ 
understanding of the state.86 This also overcomes the attribute of 
coherence to institutions given in totality approaches.
Firstly, it is now possible to open for analysis many separate 
concepts tha t are befuddled in the traditional notion of the state bu t are 
critical for the task  of this thesis. For example, we differentiate between 
the state and society -  the set of institutions referred to by Skocpol and 
those beyond their control; between state and government -  the set of 
institutions and the executive authority tha t provides leadership; and
83 Robert W. Cox, Production, Power and World Order (New York; Columbia University 
Press, 1987), p. 105.
84 Ibid., p. 148.
85 Skocpol, States, p. 29.
86 Halliday, International Relations, p. 80-83. The following is taken from his account of 
the advantages of rethinking the state.
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between state and nation -  the set of institutions and extent of their 
control, spatially and culturally. We are able to recognize th a t the state 
can have two sets of relationships and operate in two spheres of activity. 
It can relate to society, government and nation on the one hand and 
other states and non-state actors on the other. However, such a 
differentiation still raises the fundamental question of w hat do we mean 
by the state in international politics -  is it the ‘national-territorial 
representation’, is it the voice of the government, is it a powerful 
bureaucratic voice carried through the institutions, or is it a 
representation of society.
Secondly, it allows for an alternative view of the origin and 
development of states and the inter-state system. The traditional view of 
the state supposes an  ahistorical conception and limits an  assessm ent of 
different paths or trajectories of its origin and growth. By analyzing the 
state as a set of institutions it is now possible to understand the context 
and the rationale for the emergence of states. We can now ask new 
research questions such as did the origin of the institutions have an 
external influence; if so, for what purpose; how has the state structure 
changed and under what conditions; and are the state and society 
serving external or internal interests.
Thirdly, a  new conception allows an examination of who controls 
the institutions and for what purposes. Therefore, the state can be seen 
as the expression of a range of interests ranging from a particular 
sectoral interest to an  autonomous expression of national interest. It can 
also be seen tha t the state in its behavior may not be the expression of 
the national interest bu t rather tha t of a particular social group and that 
international behavior can change from time to time. It also indicates 
that the state can use its relationship in either sphere to enhance its 
capacity and promote its interest.
Whilst recognizing the possibilities that are open for new IR 
theorizing there are some difficulties with strict sociological definitions.
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Firstly, as  the  s ta te  is seen as a  se t of institu tions, it is no t clear which 
are considered p a rt of the  sta te  and  w hich are not. Secondly, there  is the  
case of the  level of autonom y given to the sta te . The sta te  is som etim es 
seen as  having trem endous capacity  to be au tonom ous and  in su lated  
from social forces and, on the  o ther hand , a s  em bedded in society with 
little autonom y.
j
2.4 Moving Forward -  A Critical Historical Approach
It h a s  been illustra ted  th a t it is necessary  to move beyond
traditional approaches to study  the  origin and  evolution of the  p ost­
colonial s ta te  and  society if we are to provide a  broader and  profounder 
explanation of the  sta te  and  its rela tionship  with the  in ternational 
system . Further, there  are ontological aspec ts  of s ta te s  and  social 
existence th a t originate in the ‘in te rna tiona l’ b u t which canno t be 
accounted  for using  these  trad itional approaches. Therefore, a s  we take 
sn ap sh o ts  of the  sta te  and  society we can  provide an  account of their 
actions and  roles in constitu ting  and  being constitu ted  by the 
in ternational system . Yet, m ost of these  accoun ts have no t incorporated 
the  historical em ergence of the  s ta te  and  society a s  critical to
understand ing  their n a tu re  and, im portantly , the charac te r of the
f  ,n
in ternational system . The effect of the  in ternational /on shaping  the  state- 
society complex and  the  effect of changing state-society  complexes on the 
actions of the  s ta te  in the  in te rnational system  rem ains largely 
unexplored. The challenge therefore is to apply an  approach  w hich best 
offers the  opportunities to achieve th a t in tellectual task.
2.4.1 An A lternative approach to  IR theory
We identified th a t a fundam enta l w eakness with trad itional IR 
theory w as the epistemological approach  th a t leads to problem  solving 
theorizing and  consequently  to ah istorical approaches to unders tand ing  
the  sta te  and  society. Therefore, the  first step  to form ulating a  new
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approach is to move from a methodology for acquiring knowledge tha t is 
based on a separation of knowledge from practice. All forms of hum an 
association stem from main’s basic association for production and since 
knowledge is built up by interacting individuals, knowledge depends 
upon the development of production and other forms of social activity 
and relationships.87 Thus, knowledge is intrinsically linked with its 
material setting. This is in direct contrast to the positivist’s approach to 
theory tha t sees a separation between theory and practice.88 In positivist 
approaches, “[t]he factual material or subject m atter is provided from 
without; science sees to its formulation in clear and comprehensible 
terms, so tha t men may be able to use the knowledge as they wish.”89 
Theory is then seen as theory in itself divorced from its time and space.
The alternative approach to positivism sees the world as perceived 
by the individual as the product -  present and continuing -  of the society 
as a whole. Therefore, the activities of the individual -  theoretical and 
practical -  are not the result of a self-determining knowledge of a fixed 
object bu t of a continually changing reality of which the individual is 
part. The origin of objective facts, the use of conceptual frameworks to 
understand these facts and the function of these frameworks in social life 
are not separate from the process of theorizing. Accordingly, 
understanding social life m ust not involve the separation of object and 
subject or values from research. To do otherwise is to adopt a traditional 
approach that, “...view parts as separate from wholes and reifies parts as 
isolated things in themselves, as causes separated from effects, as 
subjects separated from objects.”90 Such an approach argues for an
87 Maurice Comforth, The Theory of Knowledge (US; International Publishers Co., 
1971).
88 Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory. Selected Essays, (New York; The Continuum 
Publishing Company, 1995).
89 Ibid. p. 196.
90 Doug Lorimer, Fundamentals of Historical Materialism (Australia; Resistance Books, 
1999).
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emphasis on presenting reality as only generalized facts that can be 
empirically observed and proven.
Within IR theory, neorealism represents the epitome of such a 
positivist approach to understanding and knowledge.91 For Waltz, the 
basic approach for formulating a  theory of international relations is to 
seek laws tha t establish relations between variables or concepts. These 
relations m ust be more than  ju s t incidental bu t rather a repeated 
occurrence with an expectation th a t they would hold in the future. A 
theory becomes a statem ent tha t explains such laws. The statem ent is 
based on assum ptions tha t are nonfactual bu t are necessary to make 
explanation possible and depends on the usefulness of the explanations. 
In addition, Waltz explains tha t theories m ust separate realms of activity 
to explain although the emphasis is not on, “...whether it is useful. And 
usefulness is judged by the explanatory and predictive powers of the 
theory tha t may be fashioned.”92 From tha t perspective, the nature of 
world politics cannot be understood by examining the multiple and 
differentiated internal dynamics of states and society as the central 
concern for this is the descriptive level. It is for that reason tha t Waltz 
favors a systemic theory tha t explains the recurrences and repetitions 
bu t thereby denying continual change.93
However, a new theorizing in IR requires tha t understanding goes 
beyond the assum ptions and what is taken for granted as facts in 
traditional theory. Horkheimer teaches “to look beyond the facts;...to 
distinguish the superficial from the essential without minimizing the 
importance of either...”94 Critical theory, Cox explains, “does not take 
institutions and social and power relations for granted bu t calls them 
into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether
91 Waltz, Theory.
92 Ibid., p. 65.
93 Ibid.
94 Horkheimer, Critical Theory, p.xiv.
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they might be in the process of changing.”95 All concepts m ust be 
historically located and constantly changed to reflect the realities of 
social existence. Thus, whilst Waltz’s approach is ahistorical, since it 
seeks repetition and recurrence or a perm anent present, critical 
approaches are concerned with a continuing process of historical change 
of which both parts and whole are centrally involved. This feature makes 
a critical theory approach most appropriate for this thesis.
Further, the assum ptions that are held by the traditional approach 
for explanation are subject to question by critical theory and examined 
for a holistic understanding of social reality. For example, the notion of 
the post-colonial states as weak and undeveloped is not taken as a 
constant bu t instead is examined for the origin of the weakness, the 
source of the continuity of tha t situation and even possibilities for 
transformation. Critical theory m ust be a theory of history and of the 
continuing process of historical change. Framing such an approach 
within critical theory is the first step to a new broader understanding of 
international politics.
2.4 .2  Fundamentals of a Critical Historical Approach
A critical historical approach starts with the explanation by Marx
that,
the first premise of all hum an history is the existence of living hum an 
individuals. Thus the fact to be established is the physical 
organization of these individuals and their consequent relation to the 
rest of nature.96
Humans create and sustain society through the fundamental 
activity of all hum an groups in the production of its material
95 Cox, Social Forces, p. 208. Cox counterpoises ‘problem-solving theory’ and ‘critical 
theory’.
96 Karl Marx and Freidrich Engels, The German Ideology (Moscow : Progress Publishers, 
1976).
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subsistence.97 As societies transform in the quest for hum an survival 
and hum ans seek to satisfy their material and cultural needs, so does 
the organization of production and then the corresponding social 
relations, social structures and ideas th a t facilitate social life. Society is 
in a constant state of development as the organization of production and 
ideas themselves provide impetus for further development. 98
It is im portant to understand the role of ideas -  and thus 
consciousness -  in the development and transformation of society. Social 
life is created by living conscious people who in everyday life pursue their 
aims and goals, however they exist within a broader structure of society 
determined by the stage of development of the material productive forces. 
For example, the society of slavery and plantation owners is not the same 
as the society of the hand-mill and the feudal lord nor is it not the same 
society as tha t of the steam-mill and the industrial capitalist. Ideas and 
consciousness are shaped by the conflict between the material 
productive forces and the relations of production. However, Marx 
explained tha t it is necessary to distinguish between the material 
transformation of the conditions of production and the ideological forms 
in which people become aware of the conflict in society and struggle for 
change.99 Therefore, despite the ideological fight for change, based on 
ideas and consciousness, no social order passes away until the 
productive forces have created the conditions for transformation.
The notion of contradiction is needed for a critical historicism as it 
provides the knowledge tha t contradictions give rise to conflict which 
serve as the process of renewal and continual remaking of social 
relations.100 The notion of contradictions giving rise to conflict that
97 Maurice Comforth, Historical Materialism (New York; International Publishers, 
1985).
98 Lorimer, Historical Materialism.




propels change is based on four fundamental principles.101 Firstly, 
understanding tha t parts can only be parts to the extent tha t there is a 
whole in which a part exists. Therefore, a whole is an  integrated set of 
relationships of heterogeneous parts tha t have no prior existence as 
parts. Secondly, the properties and characteristics of the parts are 
acquired by being part of the whole. Once a unit becomes part of a 
whole, it is transformed. Thirdly, since hum ans are both object and 
subject, and recreate each other by interacting change is a characteristic 
of all parts. Finally, because of continual change, the whole is not 
inherently balanced or harmonious.
The attem pt to account for state and society within IR theory 
requires tha t the historical nature of the state and society be examined. 
The critical historical approach m ust offer a num ber of advantages over 
other approaches. Firstly, it m ust locate the emergence of state and 
society within a framework for action tha t exposes the conflict and 
contradiction and thereby highlights the process of change. Secondly, the 
framework m ust be able to provide an integrated conception of social 
reality. Thirdly, it m ust be able to incorporate the role of ideas, the 
organization of production and social institutions tha t emerge during the 
process of interaction.
Appropriately, using a Coxian approach this framework can be 
referred to as an  historical structure tha t represents a configuration of 
forces brought about by thought patterns or ideas, hum an institutions 
and material conditions tha t continually change over tim e.102 The 
structure is historical and not fixed in time. These structures do not 
direct action bu t restrict and pressure individuals, groups, states and 
assemblage of states. Material capabilities refer to the natural resources, 
wealth, equipment, technology and organisational forms th a t lead 
production. It is obvious tha t material capabilities can be improved in
101 Lorimer, Historical Materialism.
102 Ibid. Cox built on the Gramscian notion of ‘historic bloc’.
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some respects and represent the fundam ental productive force. Ideas are 
both thought patterns tha t people hold across social groups and are 
commonly or ‘intersubjectively’ held and the collective images held by 
different groups of people of the social order. These ideas, which are 
historically conditioned and are conceptions of reality or consciousness, 
can serve as sources of agreement and conflict between states and 
groups of people. Institutions refer to bureaucratic mechanisms that 
seek to ‘stabilize or even perpetuate a particular order’.103 Institutions 
are critical as they can become the battleground for conflict over ideas, 
bu t also appear as the legitimizing mechanism tha t avoids the need for 
force to ensure compliance. These forces, brought about by thought 
patterns or ideas, hum an institutions and material conditions, are 
reciprocal in effect and attain a particular configuration within each 
sphere of action. The strength of any force can be determined by an 
examination of the particular sphere of action in the specific historical 
instance.
It has been noted tha t understanding the relationship between the 
‘domestic’ and the ‘international’ requires a move beyond traditional 
conceptions within IR theory. Specifically, IR theory m ust conceptualize 
international relations as a totality th a t integrates the ‘domestic’ and the 
‘international’ spheres of activity. IR theory m ust acknowledge a 
dialectical unity between the international and the national. Using a 
critical historical approach now allows for an  examination of the various 
spheres of activity in separation and totality. In separation, the spheres 
of action are examined in relation to their existence as part of the 
totality, and, in totality, the spheres are examined in terms of the 
influence of the totality in shaping their characteristics and nature.
It is a  totality, though not in the sense of an  undifferentiated social 
space bu t spheres of action tha t are integrated, and generate processes
103 Ibid.
64
which influence each other. The influence can be linear, for example, 
when the colonial state imposes labor restrictions on colonial society. 
However, the influence can also be through other spheres as when social 
forces, generated by contradictions in imperial countries, become 
transnational through the world order and support efforts to strengthen 
the labor movement in colonial societies. In addition, the fact tha t 
spheres of action are not mutually exclusive and can incorporate other 
spheres, makes this approach particularly useful to understand how a 
sphere of action can have different relationships with other spheres. For 
example, the state can seek to control social forces by legislative methods 
yet in its interaction with world order it can be constrained by the 
material conditions or ideas which exist a t tha t level.
Despite the presence of a few non-capitalist national formations, 
the character of the totality is determined by the logic of the pursu it of 
profit or the principle of maximizing capital accumulation thus defining it 
as a  capitalist system. This is a concrete historical description and it can 
be argued tha t previous international systems may not have been 
capitalistic and future systems may not be. Whilst it is debatable when 
the capitalist international system emerged, tha t is of little significance 
for this thesis. It is sufficient to accept tha t m ost accounts place the 
discovery of the New World at the end of the fifteenth century as within 
the emergence of the capitalist system. Accordingly, all production 
activities, institutions, or ideas are related to this logic either in 
conformity and legitimization or in conflict and contradiction. Therefore, 
it is evident tha t the components Eire not related in the sense of being 
determined by the logic bu t rather they have no abstract or isolated 
existence or rationale. Economic production sets the context for all 
action including critical action. Despite the logic tha t fuels the expansion 
of the totality, there are national differences and deviations, even 
occasional anti-systemic tendencies. These are fuelled by the prevalence 
of ideas and institutions which themselves Eire a product of
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contradictions within capitalism. This suggests tha t we m ust avoid being 
trapped into a base-superstructure reductionism bu t recognize tha t there 
is a broader framework within which action takes place and allows for 
understanding historical change.
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3U nderstanding Post-Colonial S tate  and 
Society -  The Caribbean Experience
The previous chapter argued tha t the existing conception of the 
state in traditional IR theory was inadequate for a thorough 
understanding of international relations. It also made a case for a new 
approach to IR theoiy to allow for the international influences on state- 
societal relations to be explained. The validity of tha t case becomes more 
apparent when accounting for the emergence of post-colonial societies 
that were a direct product of the expansion of Western European society.
State-societal relations have always been significant in 
determining, and in tu rn  have been influenced, by the nature and 
international relationships of states. This reflects the point made in the 
previous Chapter tha t rather than  see the ‘state as totality’, it is of 
greater utility to see the ‘state as j anus-faced’. Altering the conception of 
the state then makes it possible to examine both, domestic and 
international, dimensions of the state.
This Chapter seeks to lay the basis for understanding the interplay 
between the international system and the domestic state/society complex 
in post-colonial Caribbean states. The discussion begins with the view 
tha t the state is a product of a particular historical context that 
produced distinct configurations of state and societal structures and 
consequent state-societal relationships. The Chapter looks a t the 
examples of the classical European state and of the post-colonial state in 
the Caribbean to highlight tha t there are distinct differences in the paths
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to state formation. The m odem European state and its relationship with 
society was the consequence of a long historical process tha t through 
geographical advantage, imperial conquest, cultural assimilation and 
indigenous political circumstances fashioned its own distinctive features. 
Therefore, the modem European state shows tha t though state-societal 
relations are influenced by the international, the domestic is highly 
influential. Its nature is described by Jackson as possessing empirical 
statehood. On the other hand, the Chapter will show that the colonial 
state, a product of colonialism designed to ensure colonial domination 
was influenced more by external developments despite the significance of 
internal factors. Its nature is described by Jackson as having limited 
empirical statehood and more judicial statehood. The Chapter further 
provides a  general overview of the influence of colonialism, as a process 
of state formation, in shaping the state and society in post-colonial 
societies. The Chapter will lay a firm basis to show that colonialism was 
responsible for the condition of limited empirical statehood. The Chapter 
ends with a framework for an  analysis of the interplay of domestic and 
international spheres and their consequent influence on the evolution of 
state-societal relations.
3.1 The State - Conceptual Issues
It has been noted tha t the state is a social phenomenon, 
contingent upon historical processes. It is historical in two senses. 
Firstly, it did not always exist. Therefore, conceptions of the nature and 
forms of the state have been an  evolving process. The movement from 
stateless to state societies highlights the rationale of the state -  the 
exercise of supreme authority. This highlights the second sense in which
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the state is historical. It changes through time and is determined by 
historical conditions and circum stances.1
Understanding the modem state is a  bewildering exercise. Mann 
quite aptly points out tha t the state is a messy concept.2 In fact, it is so 
messy and contentious tha t Ferguson and Mansbach suggest th a t “... it 
is practically useless as an  analytical tool and as a building block for 
theoiy.”3 Yet according to Held there is “... nothing more central to 
political and social theory than  the nature of the state, and nothing more 
contested.”4
Essentially, definitions contain two levels of analysis - w hat states 
look like and what states do. Hall and Ikenberry offer a composite 
definition th a t contains three elements -  a  set of institutions; these 
institutions as the center of defined territory tha t is known as society; 
and the monopolization of rule making within the territory.5 Dunleavy 
and O’Leary provide an organizational and a functional definition -  the 
state as a collection of institutions of recent historical origin and the 
state as institutions with stated purposes and objectives or 
consequences.6 It is also argued th a t theories of the state can be 
separated by normative theories or philosophy -  what is desirable or 
w hat the state ought to be -  and descriptive-explanatory theories -  w hat 
the state actually is. 7
1 Stuart Hall, “The State in Question” in The Idea of the Modem State, ed. Gregor 
McLennan, David Held and Stuart Hall (Milton Keynes; Open University Press, 1984).
2 Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and 
Results” in States in History, ed. John A. Hall (Oxford; Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1986).
3 Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, The State, Conceptual Chaos and the 
Future of International Relations Theory (London; Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc., 1989), 
p.l.
4 David Held, “Central perspectives on the Modem State” in The Idea of the Modem 
State, ed. Gregor McLennan, David Held and Stuart Hall, (Milton Keynes; Open 
University Press, 1984).
5 John A. Hall and G. John Ikenberry, The State (Milton Keynes; Open University Press, 
1989).
6 Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O’Leaiy, Theories of the State. The Politics of Liberal 
Democracy (London; The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1987).
7 Ibid.
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However, there remains a greater difficulty of even understanding 
what is m eant by the state. Vincent identifies three difficulties to 
understanding the state -  empirical; historical; and conceptual.8 
Empirical refers to the difficulty of pointing out what is ‘the state’. There 
is evidence of different structures, of political institutions, of cultures 
and other political practices bu t there is no specific model. Historical 
refers to the continuity of structures that are called states. Questions 
can be asked on whether there is an  evolution of the structure. 
Conceptual refers to the personification that is given to the state giving it 
a ‘totality’ and in the process incorporating other social formations such 
as society and government to be the same as the state.
In the simplest way, the state can be seen, as a set of institutions 
tha t emerged out of the historical circum stances of societies and became 
accepted as the mechanisms through which social life is coordinated 
within an enforceable area. The state is therefore an historical 
phenomenon and a product of hum an interaction and organized living 
and not a product of nature and th u s ahistorical in existence.9 Clans and 
kinship did have simple forms of organization, which served as 
government bu t did not require a state. Therefore, not all societies in 
history have had a sta te .10 However, some form of government is 
inherent to society.11 The notion of society suggests some form of 
organized living and whether by collective decision-making or traditional 
hierarchies based on various rationales, semblances of government 
existed in state-less societies.
It was the historical movement from simple societies to 
sophisticated societies, centered on production for distribution, which 
gave rise to the specialization of functions and to the first elements of the
8 Andrew Vincent, Theories of the State (Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1987).
9 Gregor McLennan, David Held and Stuart Hall, The Idea of the Modem State (Milton 
Keynes; Open University Press, 1984).
10 Hall and Ikenberry, The State.
11 Dunleavy and O’Leary define government as the process of making rules, controlling, 
guiding or regulating.
70
state. To suggest tha t it is a  product of history is not necessarily implying 
th a t the state is natural and linear. Not all societies move from nomadic 
and pastoral ways of life to institutions of the state in a normal and 
natural process of social development. However, it is clear that once 
societies began to adopt characteristics of settled living and production 
became more than  subsistence, the attendant requirements of 
maintaining tha t way of life created the elemental feature of the state -  
institutions or mechanisms of co-ordination. However, the degree of 
‘stateness’ and nature of the state sire shaped by the particular historical 
circum stances of each society.
Yet a definitive feature of the state th a t inspired its emergence is 
its advantage over all other social forms of organization to mobilize and 
organize resources for war and the appropriation of surplus capital 
through taxes or other forms of paym ent.12 In the context of the modem 
world system, defined as a capitalist system, Wallerstein views the state 
as, “...the most convenient institutional intermediary in the 
establishm ent of market constraints...in favor of particular groups.”13 
Wallerstein further explains tha t beyond such an instm m ental view is 
the fact tha t all social institutions including the state in its evolution will 
assum e lives of their own with various groups using it to promote their 
own interests and having personnel with a selfish interest in the 
functioning of the institution.
The nature and functioning of states -  w hat the state should be 
and w hat the state is - have always been a reflection of the social and 
economic experiences tha t shaped their emergence and evolution. 
Likewise, the nature of state-societal relations is rooted in the historical 
circumstances guiding the evolution of the state and society. The 
following examinations of the Western European and Caribbean
12 Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London; NLB, 1974).
13 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Politics of the World-Economy (Cambridge; Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), p. 30.
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experiences highlight how two different historical trajectories produced 
two different forms of state and consequently state/society complexes.
3.2 The Origin of the state: the Western European 
Experience
To speak of a European experience in state formation is fraught 
with difficulty from the outset in delineating the geographic space under 
examination. It is also highly problematic to suggest tha t there was an 
identical lineage followed by all European states. It is precisely the 
difficulty of treating the European process as homogenous tha t 
highlights tha t the process was predominantly endogenous compared to 
the colonial experience tha t was dominantly exogenous. However, we can 
accept for analytical purposes the proposition tha t the process of state 
formation in Western Europe can serve as a representation of the 
emergence of the classical state form which is also the prevalent form of 
state tha t constitutes the inter-state system. Therefore, we can examine 
the Western European state in its broad historical evolution rather than  
in its disaggregated specific territorial and temporal forms. The rise of the 
European state is examined for the sake of understanding the emergence 
of the European state as an intense process of state building which 
characterized the pre-industrial period and contrasts with the imposition 
of the colonial state which did not enjoy the same organic development.
The modem European state can be linked to the early 
semblances of bureaucratization and centralization in the Graeco-Roman 
city-states.14 Though a contested idea, it is undoubted tha t these states 
shared the modem day feature of a defined territory, specific population, 
idea of citizenship and a conception of the m le of law. The reliance of 
these states, though with variances, on slave labor with its limited
14 Whilst it is customary in Eurocentric accounts of history to trace the defining mark of 
development of western civilization in the great Greek city-states, it is inconceivable 
that the origins of much practice and thought in the city-states were not influenced by 
Egyptian civilization that was the cradle of civilization for more than 10,000 years 
before the city-states.
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productivity resulted in an  expansion tha t was fuelled by geographic 
conquest rather than  economic. The spoils of war -  plunder, tribute, and 
slaves -  spurred the reproduction of the Greek city-states.
The stimuli for the emergence of these Greek city-states were 
located in the advantages of their geographic location and their coastal 
character.15 Trade was based on the convenience of marine 
transportation and the basin of the Mediterranean provided a natural 
advantage.16 Coming out of the classical period, these cities were based 
on an  agrarian economy earning income from com, oil, and wine 
produced from outside the city limits in the rural areas.
That ancient civilization invented the slave mode of production as a 
distinct, dominant, and systematic part of the production process.17 The 
consequence was dramatic for the advancement of the civilization, for 
slavery alone as the ultimate form of surplus extraction “...could free a 
landowning class so radically from its rural background tha t it could be 
transm uted into an essentially urban citizenry tha t yet still drew its 
fundam ental wealth from the soil.”18 This conception of labor, based on 
slavery, itself created limits on the productivity of the city-state. 
Accordingly, the expansion of the city-states was essentially by 
geographic conquest and not economic advancement.
These city-states featured, each onto itself, rudimentary though 
advanced notions of politics and participation through the practice of 
direct democracy and provided vivid evidence of the early signs tha t state 
power was founded in law and of the notion of constitutional 
government. It is in the city-states th a t we observe the emergence of the
15 Perry Anderson, Passages From Antiquity to Feudalism (London; Verso, 1996).
16 William McNeill, The Rise of the West (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1963).
17 Anderson explains that slavery existed before in other civilizations but took the form 
of debt or penal labor. There was no legal concept of slaves as chattel property and the 
slave mode of production did not serve as the predominant form of surplus extraction. 




popular Assembly of citizens and the Council of elders tha t had executive 
powers. However, it is important to note tha t in Athens, the 
crystallization of the Greek polis, did not possess any separate or distinct 
state apparatus and was based on the refusal of having specialized or 
professional adm inistrators outside of the general citizenry. Therefore, 
“...Athenian democracy signified, precisely, the refusal of any such 
division between ‘state’ and ‘society’.”19
The rise of Rome represented a similar pattern to the rise of the 
Greek city-states bu t differed in th a t it retained its aristocratic political 
structure and never engaged in the democratization tha t Greece enjoyed. 
Whilst there were popular modifications to the constitutional evolution of 
Rome, the nobility always maintained power. Other distinct features of 
early Rome are instructive for understanding the subsequent 
development of the state and the shaping of state-societal relations in 
Europe. Unlike Greece, the Romans sought to unite with existing city- 
states by integrating their troops into the Roman army and sought to 
offer them relief in peace and in weir. The Romans also developed the 
‘large-scale slave latifundium’ largely owned by the nobility unlike the 
Greeks who engaged in small-scale oligarchic control of land and 
production and engaged in coastal economic activity.20 The large-scale 
use of slaves m eant tha t more persons were available for military action 
and encouraged the territorial expansion of the Roman Empire.
The most fascinating development in the early Roman Empire was 
the emergence of a legal system tha t was unprecedented in antiquity. It 
was initially concerned with the informal relations of exchange and 
agreements between private citizens. It introduced the notion of absolute 
ownership of property and laid the legal basis for commercialized 
production and exchange of commodities.
19 Anderson, Passages, p. 43.
20 Ibid. p. 61.
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In summary, the movement of the Graeco-Roman world from 
antiquity to the full-fledged city-state highlighted significant endogenous 
developments tha t were to define state-societal relations. Anderson 
summarizes, “[j]ust as Greek civilization had been the first to disengage 
the conditions and rights tha t had always prevailed before it, so Roman 
civilization was the first to separate the pure colour of ‘property’ from the 
economic spectrum of opaque and indeterminate possession tha t 
typically preceded it.”21
The nature of the classical civilizations as imperial empires from 
the Greek to Macedonian to Roman Empires suggests a  high level of 
engagement and interaction as they spread and enveloped new territories 
each with their own endogenous characteristics. Similarly, it has been 
argued th a t the emergence of the next distinctive phase of European 
societal development -  Feudalism -  was a synthesis of the Roman 
Civilization and Germanic traditions. The Germanic tribes were 
encountered, as the Roman Empire moved westwards, as simple settlers 
with a primitive mode of production. Prolonged exposure to Roman 
civilization induced changes including the emergence of trade and the 
requirement to produce for sale; the rise of a  new m erchant class; and 
the introduction of social and political changes to the traditional system 
of the Germanic tribes. Of particular note was the emergence of a 
‘retinue’ system of warriors by chiefs, which by its characteristic feature 
of cutting across tribal lines laid the basis for the qualitative shift from 
clan to feudal order.22
Without engaging in the unresolved debate of the degree of 
influence of the respective Roman and German legacies, suffice it to note 
tha t the emergence of feudalism across Europe was a synthesis of both 
legacies each rooted in a long historical development that, importantly, 
survived the Dark Ages. Wallerstein points out tha t feudalism emerged
21 Ibid. p. 67
22 Edward A. Thompson, The Early Germans (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1965).
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from the disintegration of the Roman Empire tha t in itself was never toted 
or legal.23 According to Anderson the nature of the feudal monarchy was 
“...a m utable amalgam of the Germanic war leader, semi-elective and 
with rudimentary secular functions, and the Roman imperial leader, 
sacred autocrat of unlimited powers and responsibilities.”24
As a composite system, there was not a pure feudal system as 
such nor did feudalism emerge at the same time or lasted the same 
period of time throughout Europe. France was the closest to a ‘pure’ form 
of feudalism whilst feudalism brought to England by the Normans never 
developed. Germany had a belated experience whilst Italy never lost the 
heavy influence of the city-states.
Feudalism can be described as a mode of production in which the 
relationship between producer -  the peasants -  and the means -  the land 
-  was based on a specific social ra ther than  market relationship. The 
peasants were not the owners of the land and the lord had the 
proclaimed legal right and the political m eans to extract surplus. The 
system of lords utilizing a dependent peasantry through land grants 
provided localized sources of power and authority. The feudal system was 
based on a long line of m utual obligation between lords, nobles, and 
serfs tha t eventually led to the monarch. Each level, itself a geographic 
area, represented a successive layer of authority and loyalty to a higher 
level. Each level claimed a degree of political authority and the 
consequent right to be obeyed.
A num ber of significant features of feudalism, in general, highlight 
the nature of the societal relations and the interplay of forces which 
assisted in the development of the state. The hangover of productions 
patterns from earlier periods, for example communal lands and village 
property, created an overlapping system with different forms of land
23 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modem World-Sustem 1 (London; Academic Press Inc., 
1974).
24 Anderson, Passages, p. 131.
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ownership tha t served peasant resistance. Secondly, the existence of 
cities and urban settlements assum ed a new character. Under feudalism, 
the cities could no longer be easily controlled by the noble landowners as 
they now attained an  autonomous and highly developed character. Then- 
large concentration of capital and people became an economic and 
political force tha t would help to undermine feudalism.25 Thirdly, the 
head of the feudal system -  the m onarch -  was not in a position of 
comparable strength to earlier examples of monarchical rule. The 
monarch had no direct political relationship or control of his subjects 
and depended upon the relationship with lords. In a paradoxical way, the 
monarch was the final center of authority bu t did not have any direct 
authority. Therefore, royal authority always had to be asserted against 
parcellised authority bases tha t limited the possibilities for a centralized 
and perm anent state apparatus. According to Wallerstein the lords of the 
m anor thrived when the state was weak and did not support its 
strengthening “...if they were not in weakened condition in which they 
found it more difficult to resist the claims of central authority and more 
ready to welcome the benefits of imposed order.”26
The defining relationship between ruler and subject was 
transformed, for as the demands of governing increased the feudal ruler 
found the returns from his vassals were not sufficient to meet the costs. 
Barrington Moore surm ises tha t the advance of commerce in the cities 
and the demand for more taxes produced three different responses in 
Europe tha t led to different political trajectories.27 However, the constant 
demand for more revenue forced the monarchies to summon ‘E states’ -  
special assembled bodies -  to raise taxes.28 Thus the ‘Estates’ served the
25 Wim P. Blockman, “State Formation in Preindustrial Europe” in Cities and Rise of 
States in Europe A.D. 1000 to 1800, ed. Charles Tilly and Wim P. Blockman (Oxford; 
Westview Press, 1994).
26 Wallerstein, World-System, p. 28.
27 Barrington Moore jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy,[ London; Penguin 
Books). He notes different paths in England, France, and Russia.
28 These estates comprised the nobility, clergy, and urban merchants.
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will of the monarch to expand the fiscal base bu t also provided some 
control over the monarchy.29
The transformation to absolutism took place within the economic 
and political conditions of the fifteenth century. The decline of the 
agrarian feudal economy, demographic changes, and the significant 
increase in wars proved decisive and shaped a new state-societal 
relationship.30 Wallerstein recognizes tha t the rise of the absolute 
monarchy was timed with the emergence of a European world- 
economy.31 The rise of commercial agriculture and expansion of trade 
helped finance new state bureaucracies whilst these bureaucracies were 
huge consumers and guarantors of the new mode of production.
The rural malaise and depopulation of the period or ‘crisis of 
feudalism’ occasioned num erous peasant revolts tha t led to attem pts to 
restore internal order in territorial states, as rivals to the cities or city- 
states, particularly in the fifteenth century.32 The absolutist state was 
seen as a response to the crisis of ‘feudalism’ as an economic mode of 
production and was a move to a  more centralized power. According to 
Wallerstein, the m onarchs of the sixteenth century used four major 
mechanisms to strengthen their rule: bureaucratization; monopolization 
of force; creation of legitimacy; and homogenization of the subject 
population.33 It is necessary to take a  closer look at these mechanisms to 
see how the final elemental features of the m odem  state emerged.
The emergence of a bureaucracy was a powerful addition to the 
monarchs in the sixteenth century as it represented both a means of 
raising m uch needed money and it induced the professionalisation of the 
state machinery. The bureaucracy under feudalism, manned by nobles 
carried inherent nobility clientelism. Increasingly, elements of the
29 Anderson Lineages; Wallerstein, World-System.
3° Ibid.
31 Wallerstein, World-System




bourgeois entered the bureaucracy and with a bureaucracy now capable 
of taxing to meet its cost and generate a surplus, the m onarch was able 
to finance a standing army.
Such an army comprised primarily of mercenaries who were from 
the lower social ranks, formerly unemployed and usually foreign. In fact, 
the recruitm ent of mercenaries was part of both state building through 
the establishment of a standing army, and the development of capitalism 
through the emergence of intermediaries as recruiters and thus 
entrepreneurs. A standing army became a major economic activity as 
consumers of goods and as a source of employment. However, the 
greatest benefit to the monarch was the tremendous capacity to absorb 
restless vagabonds, to suppress banditry and peasant rebellion and to 
ensure the payment of taxes.
The issue of legitimacy for the absolutist state carries tremendous 
significance for comparison with the early modem state. Absolutism did 
not mean tha t the monarch had unlimited powers in the sense of tyranny 
or despotism bu t rather tha t he was not constrained by law. Therefore, 
the monarch had the last say on m atters of dispute with other interest 
groups. It was tha t right which the monarch possessed which made it 
absolutist and legitimate. In any event, the capacity of this early form of 
the state did not lend itself to any absolutist powers. The monarch 
embodied the state and it is through him and the divine right of kings, 
tha t legitimacy was sought. Blockman similarly explains tha t rulers 
made huge efforts to “...develop cults around their dynasties, national 
saints, and national m yths.”34 Later, the legitimacy of the modem state 
would be based on the collective national will.
Wallerstein explains that the movement towards nationalism or the 
national collective sentiment took place within the framework of
34 Blockman, State Formation, p. 242.
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mercantilism and tha t its greatest advocates were the bourgeoisie.35 The 
shaping of a  national will required th a t the population be transformed 
into a culturally homogenous group and with increasingly centralized 
power in the state.
Therefore, the period of absolutism in some parts of Europe 
witnessed the coalescing of smaller and weaker territories into larger 
ones and the emergence of territorially defined limits for law, order, and 
security. It represented the rise of the state as a unit of political 
expression and the establishment of boundary lines for demarcation. 
Barrington-Moore identifies a num ber of institutions tha t came out of 
feudalism which differentiate feudalism from other societies and in 
particular carried a legacy from medieval society to modem western 
society.36 Correspondingly, the growth of trade and commerce 
undermined the feudal structures and introduced, together with newly 
defined territories, the character of national economies. Bureaucracies 
expanded and begun to act as state bureaucracies. Also evident is the 
emergent inter-state system as these ‘national territories’ began to 
conduct formal relations.
The decline of absolutism, as the localization of power within the 
monarchy and the royal courts, paved the way for the emergence of the 
modem state. Tilly argues tha t after 1800, the state building process in 
Europe changed and moved towards the consolidated state (or nation­
state) with nationalism becoming the political ideology.37 The pivotal role 
was played by the emerging commercial classes, and then professional 
and bureaucratic classes and the proletariat. Capitalism was beginning 
to take root and the new found source of power -  based on the
35 Wallerstein, The Modem World-System.
36 Moore jr. Social Origins. He identifies the notion of immunity of some groups from the 
power of the ruler, the right to resist unjust authority, and the conception of a contract.
37 Charles Tilly, “Entanglements of European Cities and States” in Cities and the Rise of 
States in Europe, A.D. 1000 to 1800, ed. Charles Tilly and Wim P. Blockman, (Oxford; 
Westview Press, 1994). Nationalism was either state-led or state-seeking.
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acquisition of wealth -  was to determine the new social and political 
system.
This represented the rise of the modem  state -  a bourgeois 
constitutional state. It was a process crystallized in the course of history, 
as the European International Society spilled beyond, to encompass 
previously untouched societies. The features of the modem state are best 
captured in Weber’s description as,
possessing an administrative and legal order subject to change by 
legislation, to which the organized activities of the administrative staff, 
which are also controlled by regulations, are oriented. This system of 
orders claims binding authority...over all action taking place in the 
area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory organization with a 
territorial basis. Furthermore, today, the use of force is regarded as 
legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed 
by it....The claim of the modem state to monopolize the use of force is 
as essential to it as its character of compulsory jurisdiction and 
continuous operation.38
Pierson identifies eight features from Weber’s definition of the 
state: monopoly control over use of violence; territoriality; sovereignty; 
constitutionality; impersonal power; public bureaucracy; 
authority/legitimacy and citizenship and adds a ninth feature of 
taxation.39 However, three notable elements of the notion of the Weberian 
modem state are worth considering. Firstly, the state now takes the 
distinct form of a nation-state where there is an internal sense of 
community presided over by ‘binding authority’ by the state. It logically 
represents tha t internal community in relation to other communities. 
Secondly, its binding authority is based on an ‘administrative and legal 
order’ tha t is pursued by an administrative staff. Thirdly, the notion of a 
right to be the supreme and sole authority is persistent in all accounts of 
the state and, more so, in the modem state. The defining characteristic
38 ibid.
39 Christopher Pierson, The Modem State (London; Routledge, 1996), p. 8-9.
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seems to be the emphasis on state’s authority -  its rightful claim to 
obedience from its subjects.
3 .3  The Origin of the state: The Caribbean
Experience
Unlike the origin of the European state that was rooted in the 
contiguous expansion of political units, the colonial state was introduced 
to the Caribbean as part of the conquest and settlement of the New 
World and lasted until the granting of Independence almost five hundred 
years later. The colonial state lasted from the early sixteenth century 
mercantilist Europe with a dismantling feudal order and absolutist state 
to the middle of twentieth century Europe with monopoly capitalism and 
liberal democracy characterizing the political order.
Consistent with mercantilist practices, the Caribbean islands 
served as reservoirs of exotic items, such as tobacco and sugar, th a t were 
traded and sold at high prices in Europe. Another value of these 
territories was their strategic position for political and military reasons. 
The attem pts to settle and further exploit the possibilities tha t these 
islands offered resulted in the annihilation of the indigenous population 
through disease or brutality as the Europeans sought to utilize them  as a 
source of labor.40 That action destroyed all significant indigenous social 
forms and provided the Europeans with a clean page upon which to write 
history. 41 The colonial power attained the effective concentration of 
power and unlike other regions did not have to contend with indigenous 
people with competing loyalties.
Consequently, it was the need for labor for the emerging plantation 
structure as the dominant form of social organization tha t introduced the 
barbarous slave trade and transport of hundred of thousands of Africans
40 Eric Williams, From Columbus to Castro. The History of the Caribbean 1492-1969, 
(London; Deutsch, 1970). This occurred in the early sixteenth century.
41 S Mintz, From Plantations to Peasantries in the Caribbean, (Princeton; Focus 
Caribbean, 1984).
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to the Caribbean. Thomas explains th a t “...[t]his slave sta tus m eant tha t 
the mode of production was clearly determined by the colonizing power, 
and was in no way a natural outgrowth of the development of the 
indigenous communities in the New World.”42 Whilst the plantation was 
called a ‘total institution’43 and represented a state in itself, the reality of 
colonial control necessitated the emergence of a simple state structure to 
fulfill two broad functions.44 Firstly, the nature of the master-slave 
relationship and the imperialist rivalries required a military and naval 
presence in the region. Secondly, international trade and social life in 
general required tha t there be linkages and infrastructure throughout 
the territories including ports, custom warehouses, custom offices, and 
military facilities. The state therefore first emerged in the Caribbean as 
an  institutional requirement for the existence of plantation slavery as a 
social and economic system.
Such a rudimentary state structure was known as the ‘Old 
Representative System’ and had its colonial purpose to m aintain law and 
order and ensure tha t the colonies continued their role in the production 
of sugar, trade and providing strategic advantage for Britain. Thomas 
explains tha t “...as long as the colonial slave mode of production was in 
ascendancy, the plantation remained the dominant institution and the 
colonial office was all powerful, so th a t the local territorial state could 
only develop very slowly.”45 Whilst Thomas may be right in recognizing 
the subservience of the state in economic matters, it is important to note 
tha t in political m atters there were instances of local exercise of power 
tha t led to num erous conflicts. Free blacks and coloureds objected to
42 C.Y. Thomas, The Rise of the Authoritarian State in Peripheral Societies (London; 
Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, 1984), p. 10.
43 George Beckford, Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in the Plantation Regions of 
the World (London: Oxford University Press, 1974). The plantation was total as it 
provided all permissible needs of the slave and dominated all aspects and throughout 
their lives.
44 Thomas, Authoritarian State.
43 Ibid., p. 13.
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their social subordination based on colour, and the local planter class 
objected to issues relating to defence expenditure, imperial trade 
regulations and customs-house fees.
According to Goveia, there was a  strong tradition of local autonomy 
enjoyed by the planter class tha t gave rise to dual bases of political 
power.46 Riviere provides a num ber of reasons for the possibility of both 
Thomas’s thesis and Goveia’s claim of dual sources.47Firstly, in many 
instances the Caribbean was always used as the testing ground for w hat 
became policy throughout the Empire. Hence, variations in w hat was 
allowed in the early and later periods of colonial practice. Secondly, the 
high level of absentee ownership m eant tha t there was no strong or large 
indigenous capitalist class to agitate for interests separate from th a t of 
the metropole where the owners were based. The dependence of the local 
planter class on the imperial power for defence ensured th a t local 
autonomy was not disruptive to the existing colonial order. Thirdly, 
before the 1790’s there was a mutuality of interests between the Imperial 
State and the planter class as the colonies were a valuable source of 
capital accumulation. After the 1790’s with the decline of slave 
plantation agriculture and the rise of industrialization, the cost of trade 
with the colonies became a burden and caused increasing differences in 
policy prescriptions and local autonomy ceased to exist.48
Notwithstanding the local conflicts and the contentions between 
the colony and Imperial State, the form of the state, its functions, and its 
relationship to society were determined in the last instance by the 
Imperial State whose concerns were to preserve the social and economic
46 Elsa Goveia, Slave society in the British Leeward Islands at the end of the Eighteenth 
Century (New Haven; Yale Univ. Press, 1965).
47 Bill Riviere, State Systems in the Eastern Caribbean (Institute of Social and Economic 
Research: Jamaica, 1990), p. 24. He describes this environment as one of “...mutually- 
compatible dual power” which formed the basis of local autonomy.
48 It should be noted that local autonomy is not the same as ‘relative autonomy’ as the 
state is very instrumentalist at this stage.
84
relations based upon plantation slavery, and to protect the colonies from 
foreign threats.
The emancipation of the slaves created a new group of freed 
persons who constituted the majority of the population. The emergence 
of th a t majority group gave rise to new dynamics in the society. The 
practice of slavery had developed deep hatred and suspicion between the 
whites and blacks tha t were no longer restrained by the power th a t the 
planters had enjoyed on the plantations and in the wider society. There 
were also concerns about the future viability of the plantations unless 
labour was readily available and affordable. The establishment of an 
independent peasantry had to be controlled rather than  encouraged.
Other social developments linked to the changes in the mode of 
production influenced the evolution of the colonial state. There was the 
introduction of indentured labourers from India to work on the estates as 
a safeguard against the black workforce holding the plantations to 
ransom  with their labour. In addition, as the society expanded and 
created increased opportunities for a  middle class of m erchants and 
educated professionals, the state necessarily had to play a greater role in 
regulating commerce through legislation and regulation. The freed 
society increasingly made demands for social services such as schooling, 
housing and health care which were previously the responsibility of the 
plantation. The Imperial State became more concerned with the 
increasing demands on the post-emancipation state structure and rising 
costs of administration which it insisted should be financed by the 
colony.
As noted earlier the ‘old representative state’ was highly 
reactionary and opposed any action th a t the local planters felt was not in 
their interest. The elementary state of the pre-emancipation colonies 
would give way to a more rigid and coercive state with the emergence of 
the highly authoritarian Crown Colony Government (CCG). Riviere 
identifies the possibility of non-white control of colonial assemblies as
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the prime reason for the introduction of CCG.49 The white population 
was declining because of migration due to the collapse of the plantations 
whilst the non-white group of professionals and landowners begun to 
satisfy the enfranchisement requirements. Local Assemblies were 
abolished and legislation was framed by the Imperial State on the advice 
of the Governor who was also sole executive authority. A Council was 
appointed comprising planters and m erchants to advise the Governor. 
Riviere further summarizes the action as “...a collaborative effort by 
colonial and metropolitan ruling classes to frustrate a perceived 
alteration in political relations and, in effect, the coming into being of a 
new social order.”50 There appears to be a clear equation of class, race 
and state power.
However, there can be an alternative explanation for the emergence 
of CCG considering tha t the conquered, as against settled, colonies had 
CCG before the Emancipation. Quite simply the Imperial State wanted to 
avoid the earlier difficulties tha t it had with the settled colonies when the 
British Parliament sought to pass laws for implementation. The 
developments tha t led to Independence for the American colonies and 
some incidents in the West Indies indicated tha t such an exercise should 
only be undertaken in great emergencies.51 In the case of the conquered 
colonies, the Imperial State was guided by the treaties of capitulation to 
treat the remaining nationals of the previous power as equals b u t as 
expected did not want persons of a competing power to be formulating 
laws. However, in the case of the settled colonies and the introduction of 
CCG after emancipation, it appears tha t with the reactionary nature of 
the local ruling elite and the new configurations of a freed society, it was 
in the interest of the Imperial State to take control of the state apparatus
49 Riviere, State Systems. However, CCG was first implemented in all the conquered 
colonies like Trinidad and St.Lucia and never had any extended experience with ORS.
50 Ibid. p. 39.
51 D.J Murray, The West Indies and the Development of Colonial Government, 1801-1834 
(Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1965). This point is further highlighted in the next 
Chapter.
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to avoid any chaos and turmoil in the colonies.52 However, the Governor 
maintained contact with the planter class as many of its members served 
as advisors and some on the Executive Council. In any event, the social 
circle of the Governor would include the planter class who were all white.
Such a political apparatus was constantly under challenge as the 
plantation system continued to decline. Planters increasingly blamed the 
imperial state for this decline and pu t more pressure on the Imperial 
State for assistance and modifications to the system. The decline in the 
plantations also witnessed an expansion of economic activity as the 
peasantry grew in the islands. The state became more active compared to 
its laissez-faire character in the slavery period. The state, although on a 
limited scale, was involved for the first time in building roads, schools, 
and providing health care.
However, as the class structure became more defined with an 
expanding middle class of businessm en and professionals, the pressure 
for democratization of CCG intensified. By the early twentieth century, 
the demand for self-government was accentuated by the returning 
servicemen of World War 1 who were now considered middle class. This 
enlightened group sought to link with the working class tha t was 
beginning to show discontent with the living and working conditions 
under colonialism. This represented the first signs of an emerging 
alliance between the middle class and the working class. The Imperial 
State noted the rising levels of agitation and modified CCG to allow for 
increased participation from the middle class. Returning servicemen were 
also instrum ental in leading the establishm ent of workingmen 
associations or trade unions to represent the interest of workers. The 
colonial state faced a greater challenge to meet the needs of a restless 
society with a majority black population left out of the political, economic 
and social and development process.
52 CCG was introduced in Jamaica after the Morant Bay Rebellion of 1865.
87
It was the confluence of above circumstances tha t led to the labor 
unrests of the 1930’s. These riots would pu t colonial rule in crisis and 
force the Imperial State to reconsider the policies tha t had guided 
imperial rule. The famous Moyne Commission was established to 
investigate the circumstances tha t gave rise to the riots and unrests and 
to make recommendations to the Colonial Office for redress. The 
Commission Report would serve as a  blueprint for the future conduct of 
colonial policy in the Caribbean.53
It became obvious that the self-government of the colonies could 
no longer be denied because of the increasing strength of the anti­
colonial movement whilst the coercive mechanisms of control were now 
undermined. Similarly, it was obvious tha t economic exploitation no 
longer required political control the exercise of which was becoming a 
heavy burden within the colonies having the international implications. 
The challenge was to find a smooth transition to dominant domestic 
political forces without disrupting the economic relationship of the 
colonies within the global division of labor.54 The response of the Imperial 
State was to introduce m easures gradually to contain the militancy of the 
revolutionary social groups. Land settlement schemes were used to 
pacify the peasantry; the working class was tamed by the bargaining and 
compromises of trade unions; and universal suffrage and political parties 
contained the nationalist fervor of the middle class. By 1954, every adult 
had the right to vote and be part of the political process.
The attainm ent of adult suffrage would transform the nature of the 
relationship between state and society. In the first instance, the states 
were controlled through the legislature dominated by working class 
representatives. The dem ands continued for the complete state 
apparatus including the executive organs to be controlled by persons
53 The recommendations would not be considered for implementation until after the 
War.
54 Riviere, State Systems.
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elected by the people. With the introduction of the Ministerial system of 
Government, the states were controlled by working representatives with a 
working class programme. The legislative agenda gave priority to working 
class issues and the main concern of this government was to redress the 
deficiencies of colonial rule tha t gave rise to the unrest of the 1930’s. The 
Secretary of State was still required to approve all legislation and 
programmes of the Government. The state apparatus gradually became 
dominated by local persons reflecting an indigenous agenda. The state 
became more active in social and economic development programmes but 
remained dependent on the Imperial State for most of the financing.
In the earlier periods, the Imperial State held a policy that the 
colonies were to be self-financing with grant-in-aid provided for these 
colonies tha t were unable to balance their budgets. With an increasingly 
active state in new areas of activity, the Imperial State through the 
Commonwealth Welfare and Development Fund provided most of the 
funds for such expansion. However, the greater autonomy enjoyed by the 
colonial state does not mean tha t it was able to chart is own path in the 
international system. Its influence was restricted to internal issues and 
limited to activities tha t did not seek to disrupt the colonial relationship 
or the nature of involvement in the international system. However, the 
notion of national self-determination was rapidly becoming a norm of the 
international system. This was produced by factors which included the 
anti-colonial attitude of the United States and the Soviet Union, although 
for different reasons, and the lobbying efforts of former non self- 
governing territories such as India and the Philippines.
The Imperial State faced the dilemma of possessing colonies in an 
age of anti-colonialism and facing mounting criticism in international 
fora for the economic and social conditions of the colonies. At the same 
time, the colonies were no longer serving the economic interest that they 
once served. The international economy was more integrated and the 
control of production processes no longer required direct political control
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of territories. The colonies were continuing to be an economic burden for 
the Imperial State especially with the expansion of the state into social 
and economic development activities. Moreover, it would be easier for the 
Imperial State to reduce its financial contribution to independent 
territories than  to colonies. In addition, the Imperial State was caught in 
a societal debate between the persons who favored dismantling the 
rem nants of the Empire and those who still believed in its inviolability. 
The Imperial State faced two major considerations in terminating its 
colonial control. Firstly, the colonies held geopolitical importance in the 
context of the Cold War. Secondly, the Imperial State feared international 
criticism for having abandoned its colonies if there had not been any 
popular wish for their independence.
It was against this background tha t the West Indies Federation 
was agreed to by the colonies and the Imperial State and formed in 1958. 
The Federation collapsed in 1962 and paved the way for the emergence of 
the independent state in the Caribbean.
The movement towards independence in the West Indies took two 
paths -  those tha t went directly to independence and those tha t went 
through associated statehood. The larger territories, Jam aica, Trinidad 
and Guyana, commenced discussions with HMG after the collapse of 
Federation on the way forward to independence.55 In the case of 
Barbados, there were many attem pts at a Federation with the smaller 
islands of the Windward and Leeward Islands which failed and eventually 
led to separate independence. The smaller islands of the Windward and 
Leeward Islands were deemed unviable for independence. The Imperial 
State invented a three-quarter way house to independence which in its 
opinion provided ‘statehood in association with Great Britain’. The 
colonies had full internal self-government bu t HMG retained 
responsibility for defence and external affairs. The ‘association’ was
55 Guyana was not part of the West Indies Federation.
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considered voluntary as the arrangem ent provided for the state to 
term inate it once it followed certain constitutional procedures. In that 
regard, it was not considered colonial by the Imperial State. Although the 
states accepted ‘associated statehood’ under objection as they were 
asked to accept it or independence for which they felt they were not yet 
ready.56
The Constitutional provisions of associated statehood were similar 
to th a t of an  independent state including the entrenchm ent of 
fundam ental rights tha t were not in the colonial constitution, and the 
practices and procedures to safeguard a democratic government. The 
state was fully empowered to legislate and formulate its own development 
programme and was responsible for internal security. The Imperial State 
explained tha t it was accepting responsibility for defence and external 
affairs, as they were too expensive and demanding for small states.57
When independence was finally provided, it was in the context of a 
change in imperial policy tha t allowed the Associated States to request 
HMG to terminate the association, as none would have been able to meet 
the constitutional requirements to terminate it on their own. It can be 
seen tha t these colonies became independent as part of the 
decolonization process which had shifted the criteria for statehood from 
economic viability to the universal right of self-determination of colonial 
peoples. Coming out of colonial circumstances, these territories were 
essentially backward dependent-capitalist economies. They had no 
internal capacity for capital accumulation required for the provision of 
civilized living for their population. Worse, the economies were geared 
towards the export of capital. The expectations of the population were 
exaggerated due to the state of deprivation engendered by colonialism 
and the promise of politicians agitating for self-government. The state
56 Minutes of Legislative Council Meeting, 28 June 1966. Presentation by Chief Minister 
John Compton. This point is developed further in Chapter 6.
57 FCO 43/14, Arthur Bottomley’s Address to Statehood Day Celebrations in St.Lucia,
1 March, 1967.
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now became an arena for political contest between a num ber of groups 
each with their own particular interest rather than  the unified quest for 
national development. The state, now an  international actor, is expected 
to accept the ‘rules of the game’ as determined by bilateral and regional 
arrangem ents and the institutional framework of the international 
system.
3 .4  Colonialism and the shaping of state-societal 
relations
The post-colonial state in the Caribbean, unlike the modem state 
of the Western European legacy, did not enjoy a long historical unfolding 
propelled by powerful endogenous factors. It is rooted in an evolution 
th a t began with an early strong state designed to fulfill a particular 
purpose -  colonial domination. According to Thomas, “...the foundations 
of the modem state lie almost exclusively in the historical process in 
which these territories were incorporated into the European colonial 
empires.”58 Conversely, the examination of the emergence of the m odem  
state in Western Europe highlighted the peculiar historical conditions 
and consequent differing structures tha t evolved and laid the basis for 
the modem state. Of particular significance was the role played by the 
dynamics of the emerging capitalism and an indigenous capitalist class, 
“...by creating a State to provide the framework and laws and various 
institutions for the development of capitalist relations of production.”59 It 
is now obvious tha t historical circumstances of all states are different 
and linear evolutionary explanations or expectations cannot suffice to 
account for the emergence and development of new states.60 Instead, any
58 Thomas, Authoritarian State, p. 9.
59 Riviere, State Systems, p. 18.
60 For example Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing 
Areas, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960); David Easton, A Systems 
Analysis of Political Life, (New York: Wiley, 1965); and Edward Shils, Center and 
Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology,(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).
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understanding of new states m ust be located in the historical 
circum stances of these states.
The above examination of the emergence of the post-colonial state 
dem onstrates tha t there were a num ber of significant differences with the 
emergence of the Western European state. Firstly, the post-colonial state 
was a creature of the international system in the sense tha t its legitimacy 
and right to exist were the consequences of political decisions by the 
community of nations. The Western European state was the product of a 
long historical process of state formation tha t had separate criteria to 
justify its viability and right to exist.61 Secondly, the colonial state was 
an establishm ent of a state that was rationalized for the purposes of the 
colonial power and the minority white planter class. In effect, the 
economic and social condition of the majority of the population and by 
extension the welfare of the colonies was not a primary concern of the 
state. The process of state formation was deliberate compared to the 
process of formation of the classical state in Europe where m ost of the 
features were unintended consequences of rivalries in Europe. 
Accordingly, Tilly recognizes two paths to state formation. Firstly, a 
process of expansion where political units extended their power as 
happened in Europe, and, secondly, a  process of deliberate creation of 
new states by existing states.62 Postcolonial states fall into the second 
process. Thirdly, as the colonial state was designed for a particular 
purpose it was a tool of domination throughout its existence. There 
existed a distinct separation between society and state at the inception 
and despite any later constitutive influences, the state remained 
disjointed from the society. The only threat for replacing tha t state came 
from another colonial power unlike many countries in Europe where
61 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third 
World, (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1990).
62 Charles Tilly, “Theories of Political Development” in The Formation of National States 
in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1975).
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local struggles overthrew existing political orders and m onarchs.63 
Fourthly, in Europe, nations and amalgamations of nations created state 
structures as their central organizing units while post-colonial states 
were required to create nations and often times with disastrous 
consequences.
Post-colonial societies shared the experiences of colonialism, albeit, 
of varying forms and have through the attainm ent of independence 
entered the community of nations as equal sovereign states. The 
experience and consequences were not uniform. The conduct of colonial 
policy of Britain, Spain, France and Holland differed with each having a 
distinct legacy. Colonial societies were different in their size, geography, 
economic and social structure, and population. Africa possessed a large 
m ass of people coupled with strong ethnic lineages with a land area 
bigger than  Europe. Asia likewise possessed a large population and land 
m ass bu t with less distinct ethnic diversity and in the case of India 
possessed the elements of an indigenous state. Latin America was the 
fabled ‘El Dorado’ with a land m ass and civilization tha t stood with a 
stable social and political system. The Caribbean comprised small 
islands with limited populations tha t were essentially seafarers and did 
not display signs of social and political advancement brought about by a 
settled civilization. Yet, within each global region there were as m any 
differences therefore making it easy to find comparable experiences 
producing diverse consequences. Such diversities point to the folly of 
categorizing the colonial experience as a single and uniform encounter 
with Europe.
However, Clapham in describing the Caribbean experience argues 
tha t what “...was distinctive about colonialism ... was the thoroughness 
and brutality with which it destroyed the indigenous Amerindian
63 The Haitian Revolution of 1791 and Haitian Independence in 1804 were exceptions.
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societies.”64 It was thus possible to implement European-oriented 
economic, political and social structures with impunity.
Notwithstanding the above, Clapham identifies a  num ber of 
similarities which defined the post-colonial state.65 Firstly, colonialism 
created territories where none had existed before. This consequently 
disrupted indigenous state formation. Secondly, colonialism created a 
political structure and an associated bureaucracy to manage it. These 
structures were used to control colonial peoples with the threat of force 
hanging as a persistent deterrent to rebellion. Thirdly, a colonial 
economy was introduced as an extension to metropolitan capitalist 
expansion. Fourthly, a new set of attitudes and patterns of relations was 
established among colonialised peoples. These all served to ensure 
colonial control.
Whichever the experience of colonialism, the state was essentially a 
structure of control. The evolution of the state to the contemporary 
period has been a legacy of this colonial past. The state is recognize as a 
legitimate political force because of its power and not necessarily because 
it espoused commonly held views or is a  representation of the desires of 
its citizens. The institutions of colonialism passed from one hand to the 
next a t independence without changing their mode of functioning. It 
simply involved a change of personnel.
This brings to the fore the debate on the state in post-colonial 
societies, though centered on Africa and Asia, tha t was in some respects 
a restatem ent of the Marxist debate on the autonomy of the state in 
capitalist societies.66 The state in post-colonial societies can be defined 
by three critical features. Firstly, Alavi argued tha t the metropolitan 
bourgeoisie undertook a bourgeois revolution in the colonies through the
64 Christopher Clapham, Third World Politics. An Introduction (London; Croom Helm, 
1985), p. 13.
65 Ibid.
66 See Ralph Miliband, The State in capitalist society (London : Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
1969).
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establishm ent of a bourgeois state and its attendant framework.67
However, th a t process was more than  a reproduction of the state
structure of the metropolitan country itself and involved establishing an
apparatus tha t could dominate all indigenous social classes. Thus, it is
argued tha t the ‘superstructure’ is overdeveloped relative to the
‘structure’. According to Alavi,
[t]he post-colonial society inherits tha t overdeveloped apparatus of 
state and its institutionalized practices through which the operations 
of indigenous social classes are regulated and controlled.68
Alavi controversially goes further and argues tha t there are three 
propertied exploiting classes -  the indigenous bourgeoisie, the 
Metropolitan neo-colonialist bourgeoisie, and the landed classes. 
Because of the underdeveloped nature of the indigenous bourgeoisie, 
they cannot subordinate the highly developed state apparatus which was 
the mechanism of control of the imperial state. Under the tutelage of the 
imperial state, the state was an independent mediator of the competing, 
bu t not necessarily conflicting, interest and demands of the three 
classes. This autonomous nature allows the neo-colonialist bourgeoisie 
to continue to pursue their interests in post-colonial societies. The state 
acts, through a military-bureaucratic oligarchy, to maintain the social 
order.
The second feature of the state is tha t it assum es a “...new and 
relatively autonomous economic role, which is not paralleled in the 
classical bourgeois state.”69 That economic role required tha t the state 
appropriated surplus capital and utilize it for economic development as 
determined by the state. Saul introduces a third feature which produced
67 Hamza Alavi, The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh’, New 
Left Review 74, July-August 1972.
68 Ibid., p. 350.
69 Ibid., p. 351.
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the debate on the nature of the autonomy of the post-colonial state.70 In 
the case of the classical state, the state, which served as the symbol of 
unity and appropriates the role of a  cohesive ideological force, emerged 
over a period of time as the society developed. This representation of 
unity serves to justify the status quo and mode of production. In the 
case of the post-colonial state, this characteristic had to be created for 
the state. Therefore, the state and those who manage the state apparatus 
are not autonomous bu t serve a particular function -  the facilitation of 
metropolitan interests.71
In the case of the Caribbean, there are a num ber of differences in 
the colonial experience tha t require a modification in the specifics though 
not the essence of the argument. Firstly, the extermination of the 
indigenous inhabitants brought an  imported labor force tha t existed as 
slavery with the state apparatus a powerful domination mechanism and 
not an  institution tha t had any concern with indigenous capital 
formation. The state served the interest of the landed class and the 
metropolitan bourgeoisie. It existed to ensure profitability of the colony. 
After emancipation, the control task was less coercive and considerably 
easier as the freed persons did not have traditional lineages to return  to 
as the source of cohesion and resistance. Therefore, community and 
family ties as competing sources of loyalty were developed after 
emancipation bu t never became powerful sources of resistance except in 
isolated cases. Secondly, because of small size, limited resources and an 
undeveloped indigenous bourgeoisie, the state placed a greater 
dependence on external sources for surplus capital, became even more 
separated from society, and showed greater willingness to serve 
metropolitan interests. Thirdly, at independence the state apparatus 
became the locus of power for a middleclass political leadership that




sought to serve a growing indigenous bourgeoisie and to m aintain links 
with external interests as the main source of surplus capital to secure 
power.
Notwithstanding these qualifications, Clapham is correct in 
pointing out tha t the distinguishing factor of the third world state is the 
combination of its power and its fragility.72 In its power component the 
state is a source of benefit to the ruling class and their protection against 
discontent. The state is particularly notorious in this regard as “...the 
state provides a source of power and wealth entirely disproportionate to 
th a t available from any other organised force in society...”73 This 
explains why control of state institutions is the prime target for the 
competition between various groups manifested in varying political forms 
- political parties, interest groups, revolutionary movements, the military, 
etc. Control does not necessarily m ean tha t the apparatus is m anned by 
members from the group exercising control bu t rather state personnel 
act in the interest of tha t group.
The absence of state and society merging as the common 
manifestation of a set of shared values is seen as “...central to the 
character and role of the third world state.”74 This was unlike the 
formation of national states in Europe, as Tilly noted it involved “...the 
large role of alternating coalitions between the central power and the 
major social classes within the subject population in determining the 
broad forms of government.”75 The replacement of colonial officials by 
locals did not coincide with a process of indigenization of the state to 
create loyalty to the political process which followed. The state was 
complied with because it represented power and not because of an 
organic unity with the society in which it existed. In a sense, it was still
72 Clapham, Third World. Clapham identifies that the defining commonality of third 
world states is that they are postcolonial states.
73 Ibid., p. 40.
74 Ibid., p. 42
75 Tilly, National States, p. 632.
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alienated from the society though integral to the functioning of th a t 
society. Following independence, the state was passed onto indigenous 
leaders th a t initiated a process of competition rather than  loyalty among 
various interest groups. The fragility of the state is a  consequence of this 
feature and is seen as the weakness of legitimacy.76 It is this feature of 
fragility tha t undermines the public political sphere of postcolonial 
states.
The reality of the postcolonial state is th a t despite its power it has 
to compete with other forms of social organization for the loyalty of 
individuals and control of their lives. Migdal identifies these 
organizations as ranging “...from small families and neighborhood groups 
to mammoth foreign-owned companies.”77 The extent of social control 
exercised depends on the ability of the organizations to “...deliver key 
components for individuals’ strategies of survival.”78 Strategies of 
survival are essentially individuals’ activities for survival tha t include 
satisfying needs for food, shelter, clothing and, importantly, a  belief 
system of what is acceptable. It satisfies not only action for personal 
survival bu t also the individual sense of belonging and group identity. 
The ability of the state to exercise social control depends on its ability to 
‘deliver the goods’. The inability of the third world state to ’deliver the 
goods' is recognized by Jackson as a condition of quasi-states.79
The establishment of the colonial state imposed on societies 
another organization seeking to exercise social control bu t having to 
compete with others tha t had an organic link to society. The alien form of 
the state created a conflict with existing modes of social control and 
survived because of the coercive force tha t it possessed. The conflict with 
other organizations continued into the contemporary period and is
78 Ibid.
77 Joel S. Migdal, State in Society (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 48.
78 Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States. State-Society Relations and State 
Capabilities in the Third World (New Jersey; Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 27.
79 Jackson, Quasi-states, p. 21.
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reflected in instances such as differences over the socialization role of the 
family and the school; whether the state or the church should decide on 
moral issues e.g. contraception, marriage; who should decide on the 
balance between development and the environment. The difference 
between postcolonial state-society relations and tha t of developed states 
is the m anner in which conflict occurs and the avenues for resolution. 
This depends upon the level of integration between the state and society 
for which little exists in the third world state.
However, the state is not entirely an  institution for providing 
benefits or for contributing to the control of the society. Having 
institutionalized its social relations and relationships of command and 
obedience the state can assum e the role of mediator between other 
organisations themselves striving for social control, e.g. in industrial 
disputes. The state is able to perform this role primarily because of its 
information, communication and technological capacity and the 
ascendancy of its executive and judicial branches.80 Since the legitimacy 
of the state depends upon its acceptance by other social organisations 
there is a conscious effort by the state to regulate the activities of these 
organisations. There is a constant play of repression, co-option and 
reward in the bid to secure support.
Generally, postcolonial state-societal relations centre on 
competition among num erous organisations or forms of social relations 
to exercise social control over the individual with the state seeking to 
attain the position of predominance. The peculiarity of postcolonial 
politics lies in this constitution and the actions undertaken by the state 
to achieve supremacy. Such actions include defending its right to 
exclusive responsibility for foreign affairs. By attempting to shu t off the 
rest of society from forming relationships outside the state, it becomes an 
advantage to the state to possess a monopoly on the potential and actual
80 M. Kaplan, “The Theory of the State and the Third World” in The State in Global 
Perspective, ed. A. Kanzancigil (Great Britain; Aldershot, 1986), p. 288.
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benefits of these relationships. The conflict between the state and other 
social organisations extends beyond the domestic to include the 
international where many other forces are involved.
3 .5  State-Societal Relations in the Postcolonial 
Caribbean -  A Framework for Understanding in IR
Traditional explanations of the nature of the state have focussed
primarily on international factors and taken the state as totality which 
give an  unbalanced account of the impact of the various forces shaping 
state-societal relations.
In the case of the Eastern Caribbean, the decisive role played by 
colonialism in establishing the state and society requires th a t a 
framework for analysis tha t moves beyond the international and the form 
of the state. The framework m ust seek to untie the three strands of the 
Gordian knot of state-societal relations -  the international system, state 
form, and domestic society. These three spheres are needed to 
understand how the dialectical relationship between state and society is 
shaped and how the dialectical unity between the international and the 
domestic remained in constant evolution.
In the previous chapter, the case was made for international 
relations theory broadening its scope to include other dimensions of 
states’ existence and relationship in the international system. 
Accordingly, consideration of society within IR theory and a  rethinking of 
the constitution of the state were requirements for a new IR theorizing. 
As noted, an  approach to understanding state-societal relations can be 
based upon Cox’s view that production creates the material basis for all 
social existence and the organization of production affects all social life 
including the state. However, it is recognized tha t the state is the 
framework for the organization of production. Therefore, production 
creates power which power determines the form of production. To 
understand such a role it is no longer sufficient to treat the state as a
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‘black-box’. Instead, a critical historical approach m ust unclothe its 
functioning to expose its multi-dimensionality and its multiple 
overlapping and intersecting relationships with the international system 
and domestic society. Accordingly, the notion of Hobson’s ‘constitutive 
state’ as a janus-faced entity tha t is embedded in both domestic social 
relations and international relations, becomes very valuable.
Cox also explained tha t particular configurations of social forces 
define the limits and param eters of state purpose and how the state 
operates. However, the state is constrained by its power and relative 
position in the international system and acts only with relative 
autonomy. Therefore, the state and its consequent relationships are 
products of the configuration of social forces and the permissiveness of 
the world order. As was pointed out, in the case of the colonial state the 
international system was less permissive in allowing autonomous action 
when compared to the Western European state. This disposition rooted 
in the colonial experience, continues in the contemporary period.
Therefore, the process of understanding the nature of postcolonial 
state-societal relations is to establish a framework for research using a 
critical historical approach as outlined in the previous chapter. The 
framework will provide for understanding:
(a) the rationale for establishing colonies and the role that 
economic considerations played;
(b) the origin of the state and the extent to which it was a 
mechanism to pursue the objectives of the imperial state;
(c) how economic and political realities in the imperial state and 
the international system influenced imperial policy towards the 
colonies;
(d) how the changing international normative framework 
influenced imperial policy and colonial policy;
(e) the functioning of the state according to the permissiveness 
of the international system. For example, it is necessary to identify
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the position of the state in the international system throughout the 
periods of study. For example, did the state moved from being a 
producer of raw materials to becoming industrialized?
(g) how state institutions related to society in term s of 
governance and economic and social development over the periods 
of study;
(h) how the state has been influenced by external ideas and 
approaches to governance and development;
(i) how the various social forces interacted to shape and control
the state structure from slavery to independence. This will
highlight which class the state represented at various historical 
moments bu t also the extent to which the state served as a 
transformative force;
(j) the extent to which leadership of the state a t the various
historical periods was accountable to the society it governed;
(k) the possibilities for societal actors to participate in the
policy-making process;
(1) the extent of state control over institutions and individuals
within society and how independent is society in decision-making 
and action;
(m) the sources of support for societal institutions.
Such a framework will help in understanding how the relationship 
between state and society in St.Lucia originated and was shaped by 
historical forces. More importantly, it will highlight the interplay between 
domestic and international forces as fundam ental to tha t process.
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4S tate  and Society: from Imperial Domination 
to  th e  establishm ent of the  Colonial S tate
As highlighted in previous chapters, the nature of the state-society 
relationship m ust take into account the relationship between 
international and domestic influences, drawing upon the historical 
development of the state and society, in order to highlight their changing 
nature. In examining the earliest state-society relationship in Saint Lucia 
- the plantation state/society complex - the discussion starts with 
interplay between the mode of insertion into the prevailing international 
system, with its distinctive political and economic features, and the 
internal configuration of a slave society. This relationship was 
transformed as a changed international system allowed for the 
emancipation of slaves, and created a new domestic political and 
economic configuration characterized by free labor.
This Chapter follows the outline as indicated in the Introduction. 
The first section will examine the origin and nature of the plantation 
state-societal relationship, thus illustrating the dominance of exogenous 
factors in tha t period. The second section will explore the occurrence of 
the transformative event -  Emancipation -  pinpointing the role of both 
external and internal influences. The third section dem onstrates how 
external and internal forces responded to the transformative event, and 
the resulting state-societal relations.
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4.1 The Plantation State-society Relationship
The emergence of the plantation state-society relationship -  the
earliest state-societal configuration - was associated with the expansion 
of the emerging European system of states. The arrival of Columbus in 
the New World started a ‘colony race’, pitting the major European powers 
against each other in the quest for trading power and naval supremacy. 
The Spanish were lured by the search for gold and valuables on the Latin 
America mainland and were not motivated to battle for control of these 
territories. The English and French, on the contrary, were in search of 
territories to grow crops which were in high demand in Europe.1 Tobacco 
was the early staple crop, bu t a variety of other crops such as cotton and 
ginger were later exported to Europe.
The establishment of colonies as sources of tropical produce 
required the introduction of a particular socio-political framework 
consonant with that purpose. In the early stages of colonialism, as 
agricultural production involved light production and trade was minimal, 
the framework was loose. However, as sugar was introduced involving 
intensive production practices and significant trade, a socio-political 
framework was introduced emphasizing control and domination of the 
labour force and trading practices. Therefore, there is a link between the 
economic and political motives of the imperial state and society, and the 
nature of state-societal relationship th a t emerged in the colonies.
4.1.1 British Colonial Expansion and the Emergence of the
Plantation Economy
Wallerstein explains tha t early English colonization in the West 
Indies was always seen as a dubious endeavour. The Spaniards were 
thought to have the best islands and the English saw plunder as a more
1 Ralph Davies, The Rise of Atlantic Economies (London; Cox and Wyman Ltd, 1973).
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profitable venture.2 However, tha t attitude changed after 1600 with the 
decline of Spanish prestige and the need to search for raw materials and 
strategic supplies.3 The first English attem pt to settle in the West Indies 
was in Saint Lucia in 1605 which failed due to the hostility of the Carib 
Indians.4
The decline in Spanish power allowed other naval powers to 
challenge her supremacy in the New World and to establish colonies of 
their own.5 Apart from the search for raw materials, the establishm ent of 
the system of ‘imperial preference’ - where goods from the metropolis and 
exports from the colonies got preferential treatm ent - served as a  motive 
for the imperial powers to have colonies.6 In addition, imperial powers 
reognised additional benefits in the colonies as an attractive source of 
investment for metropolitan investors and for the establishment of naval 
and military bases for use in time of w ar against rivals.
The English attem pt to establish colonies was influenced by the 
demand for sugar, which was increasing as drinking tea and coffee 
became fashionable. Walvin highlights, “...[i]n 1700-1709 the British per 
capita consumption of sugar was 41b; by 1780-1789 it had tripled and in 
1800-1809 had risen to 181b...”7 Rising demand could not be met by 
existing sources of supply in Brazil, the Canary Islands and Sicily.8 With 
Virginia as a  cheaper source for tobacco, planters increasingly turned to 
sugar cane as the preferred product for cultivation. Therefore, sugar cane 
production, which began as an item for trade by the English in 1637 in
2 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modem World-System I (London; Academic Press Inc.,
1974). The actions of privateers like John Hawkins and Sir Francis Drake were 
sanctioned by the Crown and funded by London financiers.
3 Ibid.
4 Eric Williams, From Columbus to Castro: the History of the Caribbean (London;
Deutsch, 1970).
5 Richard S. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West 
Indies 1624-1713 (London; Jonathan Cape, 1973).
6 Richard Hart, From Occupation to Independence (London; Pluto Press, 1998).
7 James Walvin, Black Ivory. A History of British Slavery (London; HarperCollins 
Publishers, 1992).
8 David Watts, The West Indies: Patterns of Development, Culture and Environmental 
Change since 1492 (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1987).
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Barbados, expanded on an unprecedented scale and intensity 
throughout the Caribbean.9
The plantation system required the use of a large-scale labour 
force tha t was not readily available from the islands. Earlier attem pts to 
use indigenous people and Europeans did not prove successful. In fact, 
the indigenous people were virtually exterminated in the early phase of 
European colonization. Between 1649 and 1655, 12,000 prisoners of war 
were sent to Barbados from Ireland and Scotland.10 European 
indentured workers were tried bu t the conditions of employment were too 
harsh  and life expectancy was low. The obvious choice was African 
slaves, already used successfully to grow sugar cane by Spaniards on the 
mainland and by the Dutch in Brazil. In any event, it was cheaper to 
purchase an African slave than  to hire a European labourer.11 They had 
proven to be sturdier, more resistant to the climate and cost less to feed 
and clothe.
The initial capital outlay for a sugar crop was high, so small-scale 
involvement was uneconomical. The spoilage of cane required th a t the 
conversion to sugar had to be done quickly.12 Thus, for sugar to be a 
commercial and profitable commodity, it had to be grown under 
plantation conditions, the entire process located in a single area. . 
Importantly, sugar production required the use of expensive mills, the 
smallest requiring a t least a hundred acres of sugar for efficient 
operation.13 The plantation economy advanced quickly. In Barbados,
9 Watts, West Indies.
10 Ibid.
11 F.R. Augier, S.C. Gordon, D.G. Hall and M. Reckford, The Making of the West Indies 
(Trinidad; Longman Caribbean, 1960). It is pointed out that the cost of the services of a 
European labourer for ten years was the cost of an African for life plus ownership of his 
offsprings.
12 Davies, Atlantic Economies.
13 Ibid.
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within twenty years to 1667, 11,000 small holders involved in tobacco 
had dwindled to 745 large plantation owners producing sugar.14
The emergence of the plantation system established a new society 
in the colonies based on an economy whose “...efficient scale of 
operations required a  large concentration of fixed capital, and the owner 
of the capital wanted a  completely subordinated and rigidly disciplined 
labour force.”15 The production of sugar was so overwhelming, th a t the 
main features of the economy were defined in terms of the growth of 
sugar production. Consequently, the features of state and society tha t 
emerged did so because of the needs of sugar production under slavery.
The first attem pt a t cultivation in Saint Lucia was in 1651 with 
tobacco, ginger and cotton.16 These were replaced by cocoa and coffee at 
the tu rn  of the century as they became more lucrative. The long spell of 
intercolonial rivalry took its toil on the development of the plantation 
system in Saint Lucia.17 Most damaging were the frequent evacuations of 
settlers when the opposing power took over.
The first sugar plantation in Saint Lucia was established by the 
French in 1765 and by 1780, a t least fifty were established.18 The 
devastation of the hurricanes of 1780, wars between France and Britain, 
and the French Revolutionary War ruined the development of the 
plantation system .19 It was not until 1803, when the English captured
14 Williams, Columbus to Castro.
15 Ibid., p. 257.
16 Henry Breen, StLucia. Historical, Statistical and Descriptive (London; Frank Cass &
Co. Ltd., 1844).
17 There were fourteen exchanges for Saint Lucia. The island was interestingly named 
‘Helen of the West’ after Helen of Troy in obvious reference to its strategic utility. Breen 
described the Port of Castries as one of the safest and most extensive in the Antilles. He 
observes that because of the direction of the wind not more than one ship can enter at a 
time but the largest fleet can ride safely at anchor within the basin and stand out to sea 
within short notice. He quotes Admiral Rodney in a letter to the Earl of Sandwich 
encouraging the acquisition of Saint Lucia in 1778, as there was “...none equal to the 
Carenage of Saint Lucia, or so secure and capable of being defended, which alone is of 
the utmost consequence to a maritime power.”
18 Ibid.
19 B.H. Easter, StLucia and the French Revolution (Castries; Voice Publishing Co., 1965). 
Easter notes that St.Lucia was rewarded the title of Ste. Lucie la Fidele for her support
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the island tha t the focus on rebuilding the plantation system took 
priority. In 1789, there were 43 sugar plantations. By 1843, tha t had 
increased to 81, all of larger sizes.20
The significance of sugar production is reflected in the fact th a t 
Barbados became the richest English territory in the Americas.21 
Jam aica’s external trade with Britain was larger than  New England, 
M ontserrat was higher than  Pennsylvania and Antigua surpassed 
Carolina.22
Generally, the colonies were invaluable to the expansion of English
colonialism. According to Walvin,
British industries and farming disgorged volumes of produce to pay for 
the slaves and to feed and m aintain the colonial settlements. All was 
controlled by an increasingly powerful state. And on the backs of the 
slaves there emerged a massive, lucrative and apparently unending 
flow of economic well-being; the maritime fleet expanded beyond 
imagination; ports and cities grew from simple villages to international 
trading centers; banking and insurance boomed like never before.23
The Imperial State became increasingly interested in its colonies, 
as their profitability as sugar producers became apparent. Consequently, 
the English sought to end the Dutch monopoly of trade by enacting the 
Navigation Act of 1651. The Navigation Acts were laws passed to ensure 
th a t the profits of colonies were kept by the colonial power. These Acts 
established the mercantile system , which provided the tropical produce in 
dem and in Europe and raw materials. As a reward, producers received 
protection from other powers, a secured m arket and a regular supply of 
European goods. Trade was only permitted using colonial ships and
of the French Revolution and sent a representative to the Convention. Castries was 
renamed Feliciteville.
20 Breen, StLucia.
21 Watts, West Indies. It is estimated that England earned £4 million between 1656 and 
1676 from taxes alone from Barbados sugar.
22 Williams, Columbus to Castro.
23 Walvin, Block Ivory, p. 7.
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ports. The Acts were to ensure that, “...the West Indies m ust produce 
w hat we in England want, and want w hat we produce.”24
That arrangement undoubtedly favoured the colonial power. 
Beyond having an  assured market, the colonies had no bargaining space 
for prices, nor did they have a choice to buy cheaper goods from Europe. 
This system established a num ber of economic linkages in Britain, 
including: m erchants, financiers, brokers, insurance agents, traders and 
shippers. The profit from sugar in the West Indies was greater than  any 
other crop cultivated in Europe or America. Sugar was king. Its 
commercial advantage was an attractive prize, leading to persistent 
conflict among imperial powers, as they vied for possession of the 
colonies. For example, Saint Lucia changed hands fourteen times 
between 1639 and 1803.
Generally, the English imposed heavier taxes on trade than  the 
French did. Importers in England were required to pay heavy import 
duties on all colonial products, especially sugar. In addition, planters 
were required to pay the 4.5% export duty from 1663 that was used to 
fund the colonial state. Despite the difficulties facing planters with 
uncertain sugar prices, hurricanes, rising slave costs, and higher 
operational costs including loan repayments, the West Indian colonies 
were still England’s most valuable possessions as a source of revenue 
and of goods. According to Watts, “[t]he national trade figures for 1700 
indicate tha t 14% of all imports into England and Wales then came from 
the West Indies, as opposed to only 6% from North America: and 11% of 
exports, including re-exports, went to each area respectively.”25
After 1700, the demand for sugar in England increased as the 
price of tea decreased and Scotland became part of a political union with 
England to become Great Britain in 1707. Sugar production in the
24 Quoted in Watts, West Indies, p. 191.
25 Ibid., p. 271.
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British colonies trebled between 1700 and 1760.26 The mercantile system 
was eventually replaced by a complex, bu t highly profitable triangular 
trade pattern. Manufactured goods in Europe were shipped to Africa to 
pay for slaves, who were then transported to the New World in exchange 
for sugar and other tropical products for the metropolitan capitals. The 
middle stage, involving the purchase and sale of slaves, was the most 
profitable section. For example, from 1698 to 1707, the Royal African 
Company made an overall transactional gain of 61%.27 The triangular 
trade brought tremendous benefits for m erchants, financiers, 
m anufacturers and ports in England. Both Bristol and Liverpool 
developed into the busiest ports in the world, while products from 
M anchester and the Lancashire region became featured items in West 
Africa.28 Further, Walvin argues that the triangular trade incorporated an 
even greater global trade as, “...textiles from India, crowne shells from 
the Maldives (used as currency in West Africa), European wines and 
luxuries -  all and more found themselves bought and battered...”29
The importance of trade was highlighted in the period from 1750 to 
1775, one of rapid economic growth for both French and British West 
Indian colonies. Exports to England and Wales increased to 19% in 
1750-1, and 25% in 1772-3 of all imports. Exports to the British West 
Indian colonies accounted for 9% in 1750-1 and 15% in 1772-3 of all 
exports from England and Wales.30 Annual profits on estates were over 
10% in Barbados and the Leeward Islands, bu t closer to 15% in Jamaica.
The settlement of the Seven Years War after 1763 devastated the 
triangular trade and contributed to the fate of the plantation system in 
the British West Indies. The possession of St. Dominque and Cuba by
26 N. Deere, The History of Sugar, Vol. 1. (London; Chapman and Hall, 1949).
27 Williams, Columbus to Castro.
28 James Walvin, Sugar and Slaves -  The British Colonial Experience (Manchester; 
Manchester University Press, 1992).
29 Ibid., p. 41.
30 Ralph Davis, English Overseas Trade, 1500 to 1700 (London; Macmillan Publishing 
Co., 1973).
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France, led to a significant demand for slaves and consequent increase in 
price. The cost of transatlantic crossings to and from British colonies 
increased appreciably, forcing planters and m erchants to make their own 
arrangem ents for direct sourcing a t cheaper rates. However, it m eant 
th a t slave ships were returning to Britain empty, which increased the 
price of slaves further. The collapse of the triangular trade had far 
reaching effects as “...in Liverpool 12 of the 30 leading slave-trading 
companies had ceased operations by 1778, largely because West Indian 
planters could no longer meet their payments to them, owing to the 
severe financial indebtedness of their own which had incurred.”31
The examination above highlights how international influences led 
to the establishment of the colonies, and the rationale for their existence. 
However, the greatest impact on the colonies was in the domestic 
configuration, designed as a  supporting framework to serve their 
economic role profitably.
4.1 .2  The Emergence of the Colonial State
The establishment of political structures in the colonies was based 
on the belief tha t the colonies were an  extension of sovereign territory, 
and which required the establishm ent of similar English society 
institutions.32
The first form of political control of colonies involved the granting 
of proprietary rights to the first Earl of Carlisle in Ju ly  1627. That right 
gave the Earl overall control of islands 10 to 20 degrees West, thus 
empowering him to make laws “...with the Consent, Assent, and 
Approbation of the freeholders of the said Province, or the greater part of 
them thereunto to be called.”33 The Earl delegated his authority through
31 Watt, West Indies, p. 277.
32 Michael Crafton, Empire, Enslavement and Freedom in the Caribbean (Ian Randle 
Publishers: Jamaica, 1997).
33 Quoted in Hume Wrong, Government of the West Indies (Oxford; Oxford University 
Press, 1923), p. 28.
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Governors “to do all....things.... according to the laws and laudable 
custom s of England.”34 Each Governor established a Council of 
nominated persons who were dependable for support to serve as the 
executive in the colony.35
The end of Commonwealth Government in England transformed 
political control of English colonies. Islands were now ruled by a Crown- 
appointed Governor and nominated Council vested with executive 
powers. The Governor, Council and elected Assembly were vested with 
legislative power. The legislature was able to pass laws “...provided they 
be not repugnant to our laws of England, bu t agreeing thereto, as near 
as the conditions of affairs will permit.”36 In effect, these local laws could 
not affect the sta tus of the territory, economic relationships or military 
issues. However, whilst in theory the Governor was granted regal powers, 
in practice, he was limited in the exercise of his powers.37 Accordingly, he 
was required to act with the advice and consent of his Council.38
The legislature was modeled on the English system and called the 
Old Representative System (ORS). The Council performed a dual function 
as advisory body to the Governor, and as upper house in the legislature. 
The Assembly functioned with similar rights and privileges as the House 
of Commons, claiming sole rights to initiate taxation. That policy proved 
to be the source of m uch contention in the functioning of colonial 
legislatures. All laws had to be given the vice-regal assent by the 
Governor, and sent to England for scrutiny of the Privy Council and 
Board of Trade. Laws considered a hindrance to trade were not passed.
The Assembly was elected with suffrage determined by property 
and capital. Throughout the colonies, the Assemblies sought ways to
34 Ibid.
35 Initially there were only two settled colonies -  Barbados and St. Christopher.
36 Quoted in Augier et al, West Indies, p. 50. Also Fredrick Spurdle, Early West Indian 
Government (New Zealand; Fredrick Spurdle, 1962).
37 D. J. Murray, The West Indies and the Development of Colonial Government 1801-1834 
(Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1965).
38 Spurdle, West Indian Government
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circumvent outright imperial control. The interest of the planters and of 
the Imperial power did not always coincide and was the source of bitter 
conflict throughout the eighteenth century. A simple example was the 
contrasting attitudes towards newly acquired territories. For established 
planters, it was always a case of rejecting more sources of sugar, and 
thus competitors. For the Crown, new territories m eant more territory for 
strategic reasons and more markets for export and taxes.
The Assembly was aided by the strength of the planters’ lobby in 
London, based on their economic affluence and the profitability of the 
colonies. There are num erous examples of the power of the West Indian 
lobby influencing British Government policy, including the Molasses Act 
of 1733 and Sugar Act of 1764.
By the end of the eighteenth century, the settled colonies, which 
were largely controlled by colonists, followed the Old Representative 
System (ORS). To the colonists it was their right and duty to participate 
in government. Whatever the source of the authority, the colonists saw 
th a t the institutions were established because of their right as 
Englishmen based on “...birthrights inherent in His Majesty’s most loyal 
and dutiful subjects...founded on the law of Parliament.”39
During the Revolutionary War and Napoleonic Wars, Britain 
conquered a num ber of territories. Final handovers were settled with the 
Treaty of Paris in 1814 and the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Saint Lucia 
was one of the conquered colonies and would have for the first time a 
settled political framework for its governance.
By then, it had been established tha t the British Parliament would 
not play an active role in the formulation of laws for the settled colonies. 
Parliament in Britain learnt from experience especially in war time and 
the American War of Independence that, “...unless we have the 
concurrence of the colonies themselves, all tha t we can do in the way of
39 Quoted in Murray, Colonial Government
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internal regulation was not worth a straw.”40 Over time, it would lead to 
the view expressed by Sir Philip Francis tha t “...the transcendental power 
of parliam ent to make laws for every part of the British Empire....is not, 
in prudence, to be used on ordinary occasions, when the subordinate 
powers of legislation can act with equal effect in their several 
departm ents. It is a right reserved for great emergencies.”41 Thereafter, 
the role of the Parliament was to exercise general supervision.
Therefore, the new colonies would have to be governed by giving 
greater control to the Crown from the onset.42 It required a sacrifice of 
the notion th a t the English institution of old representative system was 
the best form of governance for colonies. Accordingly, a new political 
structure was established in the form of Crown Colony Government. The 
only limitation on the Crown was the need to respect the articles and 
term s of capitulation, and tha t the inhabitants of the territory were to 
suffer no discrimination compared to other subjects of the Crown.
Accordingly, the political framework which emerged for Saint Lucia 
after final determination of ownership in 1816 was shaped by the early 
Terms of Capitulation of 1793. These allowed the French civil justice 
system and Roman Catholic religion to continue. However, the criminal 
law system would be discontinued.
The French had a greater influence than  the English in shaping 
the early colonial political structure, largely due to longer periods of 
occupation. On the occasions of British occupation, a military officer 
would be placed in charge under the control of the Commander-in-Chief 
in Barbados. From the mid-seventeenth century, the island was 
controlled by the French West India Company and other private interests 
and annexed to Martinique until it was declared neutral in 1723.43 The 
French system remained in place until the first civil British Governor was
40 Henry Dundas, Parliamentarian, quoted in Murray, Colonial Government.
41 Sir Philip Francis, Parliamentarian, quoted in Murray, Colonial Government
42 Trinidad and St.Lucia.
43 Breen, StLucia.
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appointed in 1801. The Governor was assisted in the civil administration 
of the colony by a Conseil Superieur. It consisted of twelve ‘respectable’ 
inhabitants, who performed administrative, legislative and judicial 
functions.
From March 1802 to Ju n e  1803, the French again controlled the 
island and introduced significant additions to the state structure. In 
addition to the Conseil a Captain General who served as a Governor 
General, a  Colonial Prefect who acted as a  Financial Secretary, and a 
Grand Judge who acted as an  Attorney General, were added.44 These 
officials were mostly resident in Martinique.
The restoration of British rule in 1803 was followed by a return  to 
the structure of 1801 until 1816. That structure lacked clarity of roles 
and was plagued with many conflicts between the civil adm inistrator 
with the authority to represent the Crown interests and the ConseiL The 
latter possessed, and was accustomed to exerting, extensive powers. In 
1816, a new system was introduced. Known as Crown Colony 
Government, it relegated the Conseil to the position of Court of Appeal. 
Financial and administrative functions transferred to the Governor, who 
was aided by an executive and legislative body, known as the Privy 
Council comprising five principal planters.
The new structure caused increasing difficulties because of the 
limited legislative powers and the accumulated executive functions which 
the planters had in the exercise of their duties. In 1832, the Privy 
Council was abolished. Separate legislative and executive bodies were 
then established. The Executive Council consisted of: a Governor, 
Colonial Secretary, Attorney General, Colonial Treasurer and Protector of 
the Slaves. The Legislative Council included: members of the Executive 
Council, a Chief Judge and five principal proprietors appointed by the
44 Ibid.
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Crown.45 In 1838, modifications were made to the Executive Council. The 
role of Protector of Slaves was abolished and the offices of Colonial 
Secretary and Treasurer consolidated. The Legislative Council also 
changed, the Chief Justice being replaced by the Collector of Customs 
and two other people appointed a t the Governor’s discretion.
Under Crown Colony rule, the Governor held extensive powers, 
which he exercised effectively. He presided over the Executive and 
Legislative Councils, bu t was not bound by their rulings.46 There was 
little opportunity for planter interests to be advanced, unless it coincided 
with imperial objectives. The Governor was primarily concerned with 
maintaining the military infrastructure and facilitating trade with 
England. Planters did not see the Governor as representing their 
interests especially on m atters of taxation. In the finally analysis, the 
colonial state always represented the imperial interest and then the 
planter interest when it did not conflict with imperial interest. There was 
little consideration of the slaves or other interests except to ensure law 
and order.
Trinidad and Saint Lucia were the only two colonies in which the 
Crown had complete control of the legislative and executive processes. 
Both provided fitting reasons for Crown Colony Government without 
elected assemblies as both were undeveloped colonies, had a foreign 
population and different religion.47 The Governors of Trinidad and Saint 
Lucia were able to implement colonial policy with less resistance, as they 
could always secure legislative and financial support. No other colonies 
were able to pass amelioration laws and complete the emancipation 




47 Wrong, West Indies.
4® Ibid.
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4.1 .3  The Constitution of Colonial Society
A West Indian plantation colony was a num ber of autonomous 
units relating to a central authority in the colonial state which 
represented the Crown. Socially, a  plantation was a total institution; it 
sought to provide all tha t the slave needed and to extract all tha t the 
owner could from the slave. The strategy used was based on fear and 
force, rather than  incentives. The slaves, who were seen as chattel, 
outnumbered the whites and created a persistent atmosphere of fear in 
the society. The importation of slaves in the Caribbean started slowly, 
bu t surged, as large-scale or plantation sugar cultivation expanded, 
peaking a t 38,000 plantations in 1807.49
The plantation required the establishment of a  social structure 
geared to the plantation economy. The plantation was the main social 
instrum ent through which the slaves were transformed “...into beasts of 
burden who might provide an economic return  to their owners.”50 Slaves 
were nurtured into the ways of plantation life and slavery through the 
gang system. Walvin explains that, “[i]n the West Indies the sugar slaves 
were divided into gangs, a  highly efficient labor system designed to 
squeeze from them  the maximum of effort. It was also a key method for 
the control and discipline of crowds of slaves.”51
The social hierarchy on the estate was defined by the slave system 
and the plantation occupational structure. Whites occupying the upper 
tier were differentiated by occupation and property ownership. Slaves, 
occupying the lower tier were differentiated by their role on the 
plantation, previous rank in Africa, and place of birth. Though slaves 
were primarily responsible for the provision of m anual labour, there were 
slaves who became artisans and domestics. Treatment of slaves also
49 Crafton, Empire.
50 Walvin, Black Ivory, p. 71.
si Ibid., p. 93.
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varied according to role. Generally, the m anual or field slaves worked the 
hardest and were m ost severely treated.
Beyond the obvious historical details of the brutality meted to 
slaves on plantations, there is an  equally important contribution of 
slaves in the urban areas or towns that shaped society in the colonies. 
This phenomenon was associated with early nineteenth century slave 
society. Most urban  slaves were domestics who had greater interaction 
with whites than  plantation slaves. It was also different in tha t whites 
outnum bered slaves in the urban areas. Urban slaves provided all kinds 
of services from washing, cooking, skilled tradesmen, fishermen, drivers, 
to nurses.52 Significantly, the urban areas developed slave vending. In 
some cases, planters used some slaves as higglers to earn extra income, 
bu t in most cases, it was independent economic activity to sell off extra 
supplies grown on slave plots.53
The whites who dominated plantation life established an  elite 
called the “plantocracy’. In contrast, this new sta tus did not reflect their 
original standing in Britain. . Instead, the ‘plantocracy’ were 
characterized by men searching for adventure and greater wealth beyond 
their shores.54 After establishing their plantations, these men returned 
to England to enjoy their newfound wealth, b u t left their property in the 
hands of agents and overseers. This form of ‘absentee-ownership’ has 
been noted to affect efficiency on estates and brought harsher 
punishm ent to the slaves.
Most planters enjoyed a lavish lifestyle in contrast to the brutish 
life suffered by the slaves. One in three Africans did not survive the first 
three years of plantation life.55 However, as the supply of slaves slowed 
and the prices increased, the planters shifted from an emphasis, and
52 B.W. Higman, Slave Populations of the British Caribbean 1807-1834 (Baltimore; The 
John Hopkins University Press, 1984).




included female slaves among their acquisitions. . Slave breeding became 
an essential activity, guaranteeing an alternative supply of slaves. The 
policy ensured the improvement of living conditions for slaves, leading to 
the construction of slave villages on the edges of plantations.
In the early years of slavery, special plots of land and time were 
provided to slaves to grow their own supplies for subsistence. However as 
sugar prices and demand increased, planters sought to convert all fertile 
lands to sugar cultivation. The consequences were disastrous, as “[i]n
most islands slaves went hungry Slaves fainted in the fields, had
difficulty working properly Starving slaves sometimes eat dangerous
plants or unripe food; some died and many more fell ill. Much of the 
problem was caused by the zealous cultivation of more and more 
sugar.”56
Significantly, the laws reflected the state-social relations instituted 
for the orderly management of the plantations as units of production, 
and colonies as possessions for profit. On the estate, the planter had 
unbridled authority, with little legal restraint. Unlike the French Code 
Noir, or the Spanish Siete Partidas, the English did not have an inherited 
body of slave laws to guide the treatm ent of slaves. Accordingly, the laws 
reflected what was required to ensure the survival of the plantation 
system.57
The laws relating to slaves were the definitive statem ents of the 
relationship of the slave to the state and society. Goveia points out that, 
“[o]n the basic idea of the slave as property, a whole system of 
regulations had been built up. Some laws concerned the disposal of the 
slave as property; others governed the actions of slaves as an aspect of 
public order. Some gave slaves a species of legal protection.”58
56 Ibid., p. 82.
57 E.V. Goveia, The West Indian Slave Laws of the 18th Century (United Kingdom; Ginn 
and Company, 1970).
58 Ibid., p. 22.
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Each colony passed laws, usually severe, for the capture, pursuit 
and punishm ent of runaway slaves, including crimes of conspiracy and 
rebellion. Laws were also passed to punish slaves for theft and the 
charge of hitting a  white person, punishable by whipping or death. Until 
the eighteenth century, very few colonies recognized the willful killing of 
a slave as murder. There were also laws restricting the economic activity 
of slaves, to ensure tha t their m asters did not experience competition. 
Slaves could not give evidence against a  white person but, ironically, 
could against another slave. Goveia summarizes that, “[ejarly English 
slave law almost totally neglected the slave as a subject for religious 
instruction, as a member of a family, or as a member of society 
possessing some rights, however inferior. In so far as the slave was 
allowed personality before the law, he was regarded chiefly, almost solely, 
as a potential criminal.”59
Planters lived in perpetual fear of slave uprisings and rebellions, 
aware th a t their mostly due to the appalling treatm ent to which slaves 
were subjected. Slaves were fully cognizant of the fact tha t their 
livelihoods were determined by their owners, bu t were always prepaired to 
escape inhum ane existence. Planters responded with brute force, which 
included hanging, breaking on the wheel and maiming as deterrent.60
Violence was an integral part of the system and was seen as 
necessary and vital to keep the system of slavery in place. Walvin 
explains that, “...[s]o all-encompassing was the role of violence in the 
slaves’ lives, th a t it is difficult to see the boundary between abnormal 
and normal behavior towards them .”61 The necessity of violence to 
m aintain the slave system was, however, a contradiction of the system, 
as it served to feed slave revolts and the popular movement in Britain to 
end slavery.
59 Ibid., p. 25.
60 Richard Hart, Slaves Who Abolished Slavery, Vol I. Black in Bondage (Jamaica; 
Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1980).
61 Walvin, Black Ivory, p. 250.
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4.2 . Emancipation as a Transformative Event
This section examines how external and internal factors led to the
abolishment of slavery, making it a  transformative event in the 
development of the state and society. Blackburn identifies four reasons 
for the abolition of slavery.62 These are the pressures of slave revolts; the 
declining significance of slavery for the British economy; the need for the 
British Government to address a national political crisis at a time of 
massive popular protest and the evolution of abolitionism to correspond 
with the emergent bourgeois thinking of a new social order. Other 
explanations for the abolition of slavery range from; the work of 
abolitionists such as the Quakers63; the rise of industrial capitalism64; 
the actions of slaves65; to an  expression of middle class social and 
political reform.66
Generally, it can be shown tha t t  he abolition of slavery was part of 
a broader process of social, political and economic reform in Britain 
which achieved initially the abolition of the slave trade. As the national 
crises intensified, the conditions for reform improved and eventually led 
to the abolition of slavery. From another perspective, emancipation can 
be seen as “...one society successfully imposing its view of morality, 
justice and social relations on another.”67 It might be more appropriate to 
summarize tha t slavery ended in the colonies at the confluence of social 
and political forces all linked to the rise of industrialization and the 
domestic pressures of slave revolts. Importantly, the dismantling the
62 Robin Blackburn, The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776-1848 (London; Verso, 
1998).
63 David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823 (Ithaca, 
N.Y. ; Cornell University Press, 1975).
64 Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill; The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1944).
65 Hart, Slaves.
66 Thomas Haskell, “Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensiblility” in The 
Antislavery Debate, ed. Thomas Bender (California; University of California Press,
1992).
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slave system was a  historical moment in the transformation of the 
production pattern of the plantation system. Correspondingly, the entire 
social and political structure changed and established a new relationship 
between state and society.
In this discussion, three major factors are presented: international 
economic changes, social and political changes in Britain and slave 
resistance in the colonies. These factors highlight the view that the 
movement to abolish slavery in the colonies was part of an international 
movement tha t emerged in the 1780’s from Germany to Brazil.68 
However, it was only in Britain th a t it became a massive social and 
political movement. Coupled with the internal realities of the colonies, 
emancipation would establish the context for a  new state-societal 
relationship.
4.2 .1 . International econom ic changes and the collapse of the
Plantation Economy
A num ber of significant changes in the economic positioning of the 
colonial powers forced a rethinking of the strategic importance of slavery 
as a  mode of production in the British West Indian colonies. Historical 
evidence shows tha t the plantation system in British colonies was in 
decline from the late eighteenth century. The French were in control of 
the sugar m arket in Europe and producing sugar at cheaper cost than  
British colonies.69
The settlement of the Seven Years Weu* underlined the strength of 
the planters lobby in Parliament. The group lobbied for the imperial state 
to relinquish power over Martinique, Guadeloupe, St. Dominique, St. 
Lucia and Cuba, in favour of the undeveloped islands of Grenada, 
Dominica, St. Vincent and Tobago. This was seen as an  attem pt to avoid
68 Seymour Drescher, “Public Opinion and the Destruction of British Colonial Slavery” 




possessing colonies with high sugar output tha t would increase 
competition for established plantations. However, in contradiction, it was 
the settlement of the War, through the Treaty of Paris in 1763 that 
contributed to the decline of the ‘plantocracy’ in the period leading to 
emancipation.70 New colonies generated an  increased demand for slaves, 
although supplies were already in decline. As the value of slaves 
increased, so did the hardship as plantations sought to extract 
maximum output from them.
The outbreak of the American War of Independence would have a 
devastating impact on the British colonies, as supplies were cut off and 
prices soared to five times the normal price.71 In addition to the increase 
in price of supplies, the colonies suffered from trading difficulties. These 
included the resurgence of privateering activity which decreased the 
am ount of sugar reaching England from 131,000 casks in 1774, to 
76,000 in 1778. Insurance rates increased by 23% of the value of cargo 
and freight rates by 50%. Even duties on imported colonial produce were 
doubled to help finance the War.72 Despite the increase in the price of 
sugar, the profitability of the colonies decreased significantly, sending 
many plantations bankrupt.
The beginning of the nineteenth century heralded a  further 
slump in sugar production, which affected profitability in the colonies. A 
glut in the m arket decreased the prices of sugar, bu t saw a continued 
rise in taxation, as Britain sought to finance the Napoleonic Wars. 
Planters faced higher prices for supplies from North America, as their 
availability became restricted, and the cost of purchasing slaves soared. 
The decline in estate labour also affected sugar production and further 
the decline of planters.
70 L. Ragatz, The Fall of the Planter Class in the British Caribbean, 1763-1833 (New York; 
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It was becoming apparent that the economic rationale behind 
slavery would be challenged. The importance of the West Indian 
plantation economy as the centerpiece of the British Empire was slowly 
declining. Annual production in the West Indies was now valued at 4.8% 
of the total value of production of goods in the Empire in 1812, 
decreasing to 2-3% by 1830.73
The decline can be attributed to many factors. Firstly, 
overproduction of sugar throughout the colonial world caused a 
reduction of price in the market. In the West Indian colonies, sugar 
output increased from 168,000 tons in 1812 to 202,000 tons in 1828. 74 
Secondly, peacetime served as an  occasion for Britain to find new 
m arkets and new sources of supplies beyond the Empire. Therefore, high 
production and low prices coincided with the colonies declining 
importance in metropolitan trade.75 From 1804-6, at least 21% of British 
exports went to the West Indies. However, from 1824-6, exports had 
dropped to 11%.76 Meanwhile, exports to Asia and Latin America 
experienced significant increases.
As life became more arduous, absenteeism increased considerably, 
reaching a m ean level of 70% throughout the colonies.77 The absence of 
planter-owners worsened the situation, as estate managers did not show 
the same industry as owners to the management of the plantations.
However, beyond those m arket issues there were structural and 
geographical realities tha t disadvantaged the West Indian colonies and 
precipitated the decline of the plantation economies. Williams recognizes 
th a t the small-scale size of the British West Indian plantation economy, 
with its small plantations and fewer slaves suggests “...an economy
73 Blackburn, Colonial Slavery.
74 Ibid.
75 Williams, Columbus to Castro.
76 Blackburn, Colonial Slavery.
77 Ibid.
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geared to subsistence production.”78 Obviously, these economies could 
never compete with the economies of scale of Brazil, Cuba, India and St. 
Dominique. Once preferences were removed or taxes increased, the 
future was doomed. There was also the persistent damage caused by 
hurricanes. A hurricane can destroy the entire crop of one island 
because of its small size whilst only affect a portion of the crop on the 
islands of Cuba and St. Dominique and never affect Brazil which is 
outside the hurricane zone. Lastly, Williams highlighted the hostility of 
certain vested interests towards imperial policy on colonial trading.79 For 
example, because of the exclusive system, shipping interests were forced 
to pay foreign shippers to ship to Britain. Even the port of Liverpool, 
which benefited from the slave trade, rejected the slave trade in 1833. By 
then the port served cotton producers in the United States, who shipped 
their goods to textile factories in Manchester. There were also refiners 
who wanted increased am ounts of sugar imported to Britain since the 
West Indian colonies could not meet their demand.
The decline of the plantation economy encouraged new imperial 
attitudes toward the utility and value of the West Indian colonies. The 
economic circumstances had created an  environment in both Britain and 
the colonies where slavery became untenable -  socially and politically.
4.2.2. Social and Political Reform in Britain and consequences
for Colonial Slavery
The emancipation movement drew inspiration from the same 
society which had earlier accepted these barbaric practices. Blackburn 
highlights tha t anti-slavery sentiments, as well as primitive abolitionism, 
can be traced back to the Middle Ages.80 However, despite the popular 
aversion to slavery in Europe, the imperatives of the plantation economy, 
and increasing profits, led to an acceptance and promotion of Negro
78 Williams, Columbus to Castro, p. 284.
79 Ibid.
80 Blackburn, Colonial Slavery, p. 36.
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slavery. As noted in the previous section, the decline of the colonies 
created a  situation whereby the action of various institutions coupled 
with new ideas on morality, justice and social relations swayed opinions.
Early intellectual arguments provided impetus for growing 
dissatisfaction with the treatm ent of slaves in the New World. Hutcheson, 
in 1775, provided the most radical argum ent tha t slavery and the slave 
trade were violations of justice and of Christian morality.81 A more 
radical position later denounced slavery on the basis tha t a  person can 
never lose their liberty and carries th a t right everywhere. Any sale of a 
person is therefore void. Criticism of slave labor was heightened with the 
use of economic arguments by Adam Smith in 1776 although the treatise 
was more a critique of mercantilism, than  slavery.82 The most 
comprehensive scholarly argument was made by Millar in 1771. He 
argued tha t the introduction of personal liberty would make individuals 
more industrious.83 Millar further argued tha t the cost of maintaining a 
slave is fair more than  paying a free m an in proportion to his work. 
Undoubtedly, Millar was expressing the views of an  emerging bourgeois 
order.
Accordingly, Davies summarized “...that by the 1760’s broad 
changes in cultural values had undermined traditional and religious and 
philosophic justifications for slavery.”84 The evolution of an  anti-slavery, 
which became international by the end of the eighteenth century, 
reflected the ideological needs and interest of various groups and 
classes.85 Davies’s approach is very instructive. He argued tha t the 
abolition movement was always related to the need to legitimize free wage 
labour. In Britain, it was an instrum ent of hegemonic control by the
81 Francis Hutcheson, A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy (Glasgow; Printed by R. & 
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proponents of wage labour. In response to the terrible working conditions 
of English labourers, referred to as ‘Lancashire slaves’ by radical voices, 
these early abolitionists drew a line between the moral contrast of the 
free and slave worlds. It was thought tha t the British system of labour 
had found a balance between freedom and order, and could be a 
measuring rod for other harsher systems. Therefore, for these 
abolitionists, the objective was to “...transform black slaves into cheerful, 
obedient and grateful labourers, whose w ants could be satisfied only by 
working voluntarily for wages.”86 The consequence of tha t motivation 
was, undoubtedly, to internationalize wage labour.
The role of the Quakers is therefore instrum ental in understanding 
the impetus of the anti-slavery movement and its link to a nascent social 
and economic order. Quakers were debarred from holding political office 
bu t were veiy wealthy and successful in business including the 
triangular trade. According to Davies, “[t]he very embodiment of the 
capitalist mentality, the English Quakers were in the vanguard of the 
industrial revolution.”87 They constituted the bourgeois elite, and 
combined their fight for a new economic order with the need for 
corresponding new social institutions and social rights. Increasingly, the 
conditions of slaves became a central concern of the Quakers and they 
were instrum ental in the fight for the abolition of the slave trade and 
later the emancipation of the slaves.
Despite the traditional aversion to bondage in English society and 
Western Europe generally, objections to slavery only became a serious 
issue in the metropolis, as the imperial order faced a crisis. An 
understanding of tha t context shows the influence of this external 
development on the abolition of slavery in the colonial world.
The emerging Hanoverian State displayed the nascent political 
power of the mercantile capitalists and landed oligarchy. The state was
86 Ibid., p. 165.
87 Ibid., p. 45.
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expected to protect all private property and the liberty and rights of all 
‘free-born Englishman’.88 This served the purpose of the colonists, who 
used the claim as the justification for colonial assemblies with the right 
to legislate for themselves.
The imperial crisis began after the success of the Seven Years War. 
The colonies recognized their significance in the war effort and with the 
defeat of the French, placed greater demand for concessions to the 
colonies.89 The coalescence of patriotic politics and ideology during the 
war fragmented into differing expectations and demands. In England, it 
took the form of a challenge to the established political order. Within the 
colonies, it took the form of greater legislative rights for resident 
Englishmen. The loss of the North American colonies was a blow to the 
Empire, which provided an impetus for radical politicians against the 
ruling elite and in favor of more representative and manufacturing- 
oriented politics. The ruling elite recognized tha t reform was necessary if 
the revolutionary successes of the colonists were to be contained.
After many defeats, the reform movement would incorporate the 
anti-slavery call, which included the slave trade and slavery in the 
colonies. It was based on the incompatibility of the call for metropolitan 
liberty and the existence of colonial slavery.90 Anti-slavery eventually 
became a popular movement with a national character. It is instructive 
tha t Granville Sharp, a Quaker who founded the Society fo r  Effecting the 
Abolition o f the Slave Trade was also a member of the Society for  
Promoting Constitutional Information. The early defeat of the Society in 
lobbying parliam entarians for abolition reflected the strength of the West 
Indian Planter. As the abolition movement rallied significant popular
88 Blackburn, Colonial Slavery, p. 74.
89 The colonies contributed to the financing through increase taxes on colonial products 




support, its approach changed from lobbying parliam entarians to 
demonstrating massive public support.
By the end of the eighteenth century, the international political 
environment was favorable for abolition of the slave trade. Earlier, it was 
thought tha t any unilateral action by Britain would strengthen France in 
the colonial battles. By 1772, the North American colonies and Denmark 
had abolished the slave trade. The international normative framework 
was slowly changing making it easier for the decision to be made in the 
British Parliament. That change was fueled by the view tha t the trade 
was not profitable, and not necessary as slaves can adequately reproduce 
and was therefore not justifiable. However, it can be argued tha t the 
Parliamentary concession to end the slave trade was an attem pt by the 
ruling oligarchy to mitigate the popular movement for democracy, and 
reestablish supremacy over the emerging bourgeois class.
The abolition movement again went through a lull after tha t victory 
as the political climate subsided. In 1830, the Anti-Slavery Society 
accelerated the call for immediate emancipation and like the early 
attem pts to abolish slavery, the success of this resurgence was rooted in 
the political crisis of the time. The period 1824-32 was one of economic 
dislocation and social distress in Britain, with the oligarchic state seen 
as corrupt and rooted in landed interest. It was also felt tha t the 
government should seek to include greater representation, by extending 
the franchise and should focus on the growing significance of 
industrialization and manufacturing. It was felt tha t the economies of the 
West Indies could recover if free labor existed as in India. Planters were 
seen as creating a brutal and immoral system to make profits whilst the 
anti-slavery movement provided a moral dimension to the call for reform.
The years 1830-2 witnessed a massive outpouring of workers 
through the Political Unions, as workers called for parliamentary reform 
and universal manhood suffrage. The call for an  end to slavery was
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intrinsically linked to the reform programme.91 Although radicals and 
democrats did feel, at various times, th a t anti-slavery calls were a 
distraction from domestic problems. Nevertheless, anti-slavery added a 
hum anistic appeal, which enabled the mobilization of a cross section of 
the public. Davies explains tha t the anti-slavery movement provided the 
param eters for an  emerging consensus and “...succeeded in making a 
sincere hum anitarianism  an integral part of class ideology, and thus of 
British culture.”92
The election of 1832 was decisive, as the new franchise and 
reforms allowed a significant num ber of abolitionists to be elected. Before 
the Emancipation Act was finally passed in August 1833, two conditions 
detailed by the planters had to be met. Firstly, a compensation package 
had to be agreed to in the form of a grant, rather than  loan. Secondly, 
arrangem ents had to be made to ensure a regular supply of labour in the 
post-emancipation period. Hence, the particular state-societal relations 
tha t emerged.
In the end, the popular wish of the reform movement was achieved.
Walvin best captures the sentiments:
[t[o end slavery would be to strike a blow for reform; it would be a step 
towards a  more ju s t society. It would assuage the Christian 
conscience, would exonerate the sense of national virtue, please the 
supporters of new economic theories and confirm the justice of 
popular demand. An end to slavery would unite more Britons than  any 
other issue. It was a  victory for morality, for religion and good 
economic sense. Who bu t the most unreconstructed planter could 
argue with that?93
4.2 .3 . Dom estic Influences -  the effect of Slave Resistance
The social and economic dynamics of the colonial society played a
significant part in ending slavery. News of its success in ending the slave 
trade increased opposition to the system of slave labour by slaves and
91 Blackburn, Colonial Slavery.
92 Davies, Age of Revolution.
93 Walvin, Black Ivory, p. 306.
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freed ‘coloureds’. The num ber of free people of colour began to increase, 
placing greater pressure on colonial authorities to dismantle the system 
of social discrimination.94 In Jam aica, free ‘coloureds’ even retained the 
services of an  agent in London, who represented their interest, calling for 
civic rights for slaves and themselves.95
The spread of religion among slaves and free ‘coloured’ by the 
Nonconformist Churches also played a role in destabilizing the system. 
Despite being required to teach obedience and hard work, the planters 
were concerned with the teaching of Nonconformist missionaries tha t a 
person cannot serve both a temporal and spiritual m aster.96 Religious 
teaching was also blamed for slaves’ reluctance to work on Sundays.
The contribution of slaves to the abolition of slavery through 
revolts and unrest was a  constant reminder of the volatility of the 
system. More than  any other group, the action of the slaves made it 
difficult to continue slavery. It can be speculated tha t even in the 
absence of popular unrest in Britain, the increasing difficulty of 
maintaining slavery would have rendered the practice burdensome.
Despite overwhelming odds and brutal punishm ent for resistance, 
slaves were able to dem onstrate their inherent rejection of bondage. In 
territories where maroon resistance was successful in disrupting normal 
life on plantations, island authorities were quick to negotiate agreements 
with the maroons to halt raids on plantations and to hand over escaped 
slaves.
Slave revolts were devastating for the colonial authorities, 
particularly in the two decades preceding emancipation. Referring to the 
increasing slave revolts, Crafton described them as constituting, “... a 
crescendo of resistance, each one more extensive, disruptive and
94 Ibid.
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influential than  the one before.”97 The revolts shattered the confidence of 
the planters whilst serving as a  source of pride for the slaves.
Slave revolts also fed on two distinctive developments.98 Firstly, as 
the num ber of ‘creole’ slaves increased the homogeneity and 
understanding and, correspondingly, the ability to coordinate a response 
against slavery increased. Secondly, the num ber of slaves who could read 
increased and they became more aware of the developments in Britain 
and were motivated by the prospects of emancipation. Slave revolts 
became more sophisticated and dem onstrated a high level of planning 
and execution. The major revolts in Barbados in 1816, Demerara in 1823 
and Jam aica in 1831, were testimonies to a new phase of slave 
resistance. In each case, public opinion in Britain was intensified against 
slavery.
4 .3  Shaping the Colonial State-Society Relationship
Findings stated above have shown tha t the establishm ent of 
colonies was part of the process of expansion of European society, guided 
by an emerging capitalist system of production. The early colonial state 
and society were creations of the imperial state to support the plantation 
economy as, the most efficient system of production.
The eventual abolition of slavery was the culmination of a process 
where a new social and political order came to ascendancy in Britain, 
and eventually Europe. Fed by the logic of the greater profitability in free 
trade and wage labour, the bourgeois order utilized the hum anistic 
appeal of anti-slavery in its battle to destroy the old English state. The 
appeal of the anti-slavery movement increased as reports of treatm ent of 
slaves and slave revolts reached England. The planters obviously stood in 
opposition to the emerging imperial moods, bu t eventually gave way to 
the political authority of the imperial state.
97 Crafton, Empire, p. 283.
98 Walvin, Black Ivory.
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The passing of the Act of Emancipation cam be seen as Britain 
addressing a  major domestic issue that threatened to destroy its social 
and political order. However, it cam also be seen as another step towards 
the universailizing of a British conception of morality and sociad relations. 
Britain had “...by its visible economic success amd by its navy, managed 
to effect a momentous change across national borders....into condemning 
the slave trade as repugnamt to the principles of hum anity and universal 
morality”.99 As it did with the slave trade, Britain sought to impose the 
anti-slavery doctrine on all other powers. The anti-slavery movement was 
both a reflection and source of the internationalization of political and 
social norms on the acceptable exercise of authority amd appropriate 
forms of labour orgamization.100
Therefore, when the bondage of nearly three-quarters of a million 
people ceased on August 1, 1838, it was with the expectation th a t they 
would become free persons in new sugar producing societies samctioned 
by a nascent politicad, economic and social order.101 However, the 
construction of tha t new society was conceived with a fundamental 
contradiction. The basis of slavery had been the necessity of lying labour 
to the estates, to ensure sugair production and the profitability of the 
sugar trade. It was a system based on force and violence with degrading 
work a symbol of inhumanity. Yet, it was expected that freed persons 
would gleefully remain on plantations to work. Rightfully, the planters 
were fearful th a t after emancipation, the slaves would choose 
subsistence cultivation instead of wage labour on the estates, bringing 
social chaos once the bonds of control were removed.
In the case of Saint Lucia, on the announcem ent of emancipation, 
the Governor reported tha t the “...planters and managers appear [to]
99 Fredrick Cooper, Thomas Holt and Rebecca Holt, Beyond Slavery (Chapel Hill; 
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calmly resigned to the consequences...they appear apprehensive only 
tha t the apprentices will not give them a sufficient quality of labor.”102 
The imperial authorities sought to assure the planters tha t emancipation 
would be conducted in a way to ensure tha t they still had a labour 
supply, and th a t they would be protected from a revengeful freed 
population.
There was also an expectation tha t emancipation would transform 
the societies into thriving enterprises of free wage labourers and an 
industrious peasantry.103 Much of that expectation was the result of the 
abolitionist campaign, which argued tha t free labour was more efficient, 
and th a t once freedom was attained, labour would thrive as it had done 
in Europe. The slave was expected to become a rational and disciplined 
being after two hundred years of demeaning socialization which denied 
self discipline and degraded the value of work. The preparation for a new 
society was to take place within six years of apprenticeship. The Colonial 
Governments, having the Act as the guide, were allowed to finalize the 
details of emancipation and prepare for tha t new era.
The state-societal relations which emerged were a reflection of the 
interplay of the external influence of the liberal imperial approach, 
defined by the new bourgeois order; and internal influences of the 
conservative planter resistant to give up their privileges, and the freed 
persons seeking to end all forms of bondage.
4.3 .1 . Imperial Policy as the Framework for State-societal
Relations
The new colonial state-society complex constructed within the 
framework outlined by imperial policy, underlined the dominance of 
external factors in tha t period. Such a policy was not static or 
homogenous, bu t represented a multiplicity of views, approaches and
102 c o  253/44 /88 . Letter to Secretary of State 2nd August 1833.
103 Walvin, Black Ivory.
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changing economic realities. Whilst there were significant external 
influences, including British trade and the role of the Colonial Office, 
there were internal influences such as the economic interests of the 
planters to consider.
As mentioned above, the post-slavery society was expected to be a 
showcase of the efficiency of a system of free labour over slave labour, 
and the emergence of a more civilized society. Eltis notes tha t there were 
two prevailing views among abolitionists on the way forward for the 
colonies after slavery.104 Firstly, the Brougham model which envisaged 
an evolution towards the English system of small farmers renting from 
landlords, producing a wider range of produce and dismantling the 
plantation system. The two class social system being replaced by a multi­
tier social system. The second model, the Buxton model, which was more 
favoured, involved a continuation of the plantation system. It would have 
all the attendant social features required to keep and, if necessary, force 
workers to stay on the estates. However, Lord Howick, a leading advocate 
of emancipation, in a  memorandum written in 1832, outlined his views 
which became the official colonial policy.105 The memo identified the 
central problem to be solved with emancipation was to get the slaves to 
continue working on the estates, after the fear of the whip is removed. It 
also observed tha t even if the planters could afford higher wages that 
would not prevent the slave from moving from estates, especially if land 
was readily available. He proposed as a solution: the imposition of a  high 
tax upon land as “...the m eans of enabling the planter to continue his 
business when emancipation shall have taken place...”106
There were always concerns about the possibility of success in 
transforming post-slavery societies, particularly the level of freedom to be 
accorded to former slaves. The British Emancipator opined tha t “...those
104 Eltis, Abolitionist Perceptions.
105 Williams, Columbus to Castro.
106 Ibid., p. 329.
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who have hitherto monopolized rule and authority and freedom in the 
colonies will make a general and determined effort to retain their 
dominion and to fix on the negro a yoke as heavy as tha t from which he 
is about to be delivered.”107 These concerns were all confirmed by 
missionaries based on observations th a t the planters were denying the 
freed persons their rights.108
The response of the slaves to emancipation was not the dreaded 
social unrest as expected from the former slaves rather it was the 
planters th a t sought to create an  atmosphere of uncertainty. On 19 
August 1834, the Governor of Saint Lucia proclaimed ‘...the tranquility of 
the colony...” and warned “...persons against spreading false reports 
calculated to disturb the public m ind.”109 The Governor identified the 
behavior of the ex-slaves as consistent with the occasion bu t he “...had to 
neutralize the effects of m uch injudicious conduct on the part of the 
white inhabitants.”110 He had to insist tha t there was no need to have a 
display of military force, as reports to him from planters of widespread 
unrest were found to be exaggerated, and in fact, the former slaves had 
accepted freedom with reasonable behaviour.
According to a contributor to the Select Committee, the freed men 
were as industrious as everyone was, when treated fairly, and would 
falter if only they were not paid enough. The planters were a t fault as 
they “...still imagined tha t they could behave under the new regime as it 
had under the old. If only employers were prepared to treat the freedmen 
the same way they would have British labourers, they would have 
nothing to fear. ”111
Like the earlier period leading to emancipation, the development 
and leadership of the Colonial Office played a significant role in shaping
107 Quoted in Howard Temperley, British Anti-slavery 1833-1870 (London; Longman, 
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the direction of the colonies. Lord Stanley, as Secretary of State, thought 
tha t once slavery was ended government would be centred in the colonies 
and “...prevent the collision between the Executive and the colonists.”112 
The role of the Governor would be to ensure tha t “...administration was 
impartial, efficient amd economical. Wider issues of education and 
religious instruction were not the concern of the Colonial Office.”113
Whenever governments changed, the conception of the role of the 
Colonial Office and colonial governments also changed. After 1834, there 
was a refocus on reforming the Colonial Office, to maike it more efficient 
in executing colonial policy. As it relates to govemamce in the post- 
emamcipation period, there were two m ain views -  either government 
should be subjected to the direction and control of the Colonial Office, or 
full authority should be granted to all the colonies’ representative 
institutions.114
Emancipation had addressed a short-term  problem in Britaiin, bu t 
failed to address issues of govemamce and structure in waike of the new 
social order.. The Emancipation project was not a  holistic conception. 
For such a transformational event, there was no programme for the 
incorporation of new persons, who had suffered generations of 
disadvamtage, into a new society. The Act created a new category of 
person through apprenticeship who was neither free, nor a slave in a 
coloniail society tha t wamted him to remain a slave. The Act contained 
general guidelines with the colonial government required to provide the 
specifics. Murray quite correctly states that, “...after emancipation the 
British Government was not concerned to be the m aster of developments, 
instead m atters would be left to be decided by the course of events.”115
The most critical decision taken by the Imperial Government in the 
post-emamcipation period up to 1844 addressed the protection of sugair
112 CO 112/18, Secretary of State Stanley to Lt. Gov. Smith 22 February 1834.
113 Murray, Colonial Government, p. 21.
114 Ibid.
113 Ibid., p. 229.
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from the colonies. Again, the decision highlights how domestic politics in 
the metropole served to shape the society in the colonies. The Navigation 
Acts had been an instrum ent to protect imperial interests two centuries 
earlier, bu t now became necessary to act in the imperial interest by its 
removal. It was clear tha t the favoured tropical products, especially 
sugar, were no longer cheaply obtained from the West Indian colonies. 
The duties charged varied, bu t were normally about 63s per 
hundredweight for non-British produced sugar, compared to 24s for 
British-produced.116 The initial attem pts to remove the duties split the 
abolitionist movement in Britain. The abolitionists included free traders 
from the rising middle class and industrialists seeking reform. Yet the 
link between sugar and slavery caused a  hesitation to support the 
abolition of duties on slave-produced sugar in non-British colonies.117 
The Government lost a parliamentary vote in 1841 as its opponents 
joined the abolitionists to support a motion against the removal of duties 
on sugar. However, the anti-slavery centres of Northern England were 
supportive of removing the duties.
It was clear tha t it was only a m atter of time before the issue would 
be back in the forefront of domestic politics. The reality of international 
trade highlighted tha t Britain was already importing slave-produced 
goods from Brazil and Cuba, and exporting goods to these countries. By 
1846, the Sugar Duties Act was passed to gradually remove all 
preferential duties for sugar from British Colonies. With protest from the 
West Indian interests and colonial assemblies, the removal was phased, 
being fully implemented by 1852.118
Whilst producers in Brazil and Cuba rejoiced as production 
increased, the consequences for the colonies were disastrous. According 





proposed equalization of slave and free grown sugar be carried out into 
full effect there is no prospect of any favourable change...”119 It was clear 
tha t sugar production in Cuba was on a scale incomparable with the 
West Indies and allowed for economies of scale and reduced unit costs. 
Large-scale production on flat terrain also led to mechanization which 
was difficult in the small islands. Finally, Cuba still used slave labour, 
which though proven more expensive, was available when needed, 
compared to cheaper free labour th a t was not usually available. The 
Sugar Act devastated the sugar industry which was already in decline 
and led to the abandonm ent of some colonies as productive sugar 
producers at a  time when sugar producers were adjusting to the 
inclusion of free labour as part of the state-societal relationship.
4.3 .2 . Free Labour and the emergence of a New Colonial
Economy
The period of apprenticeship represented an intense struggle 
between the planter class, colonial state and the freed society, in defining 
free labour and its role in a new colonial society. It was also the first 
testimony of the distribution of political power in the post-slavery 
configuration. The period was characterized by two conflicts. Firstly, 
conflict between a bourgeois imperial policy, which favored free trade and 
less protection for West Indian sugar and had liberal views on justice and 
morality, and a  conservative planter class, which favored the retention of 
the sta tus quo. The second conflict was between free labor and the 
colonial state which laid the basis for the emergence of a new colonial 
economy and the material conditions for the existence of the black 
majority population.
The planters expected the apprenticeship system to provide a 
solution to the feared problem of labor shortage by requiring laborers to
119 George Blyth (a missionary) to Scoble (Secretary to the Foreign and British 
Antislavery Society) quoted in Temperley, Antislavery, p. 162.
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commit a num ber of hours of free labor to the planters.120 However, the 
system allowed the laborers to charge for their labor outside these hours 
and th a t provided the opportunity for the first instance of bargaining 
between freed persons and the colonial state tha t set the wage limit. 
Whilst it was not a level playing field, it was the first opportunity for 
blacks to press for some measure of recognition of power by withholding 
their labor if they were not satisfied.
From all accounts of the Governor of Saint Lucia, the 
apprenticeship system started well and faced no expected problems.121 
However, it soon became necessary for legislation to be passed for the 
policing of apprentices, and to control the level of absenteeism through 
the creation of the Rural Police Establishm ent.122 The following year, 
legislation was passed punishing persons who employed or harboured 
runaway apprentices.123
Apprenticeship highlighted the major contradiction in the emerging 
society -  the planter class seeking to secure the lowest labour cost 
against a  labouring class, with the freedom to sell its labour, b u t no 
political power. The planters were relentless in exploiting the powerless 
apprentices, and sought to use their political power and influence to 
control the aspirations of the apprentices for better conditions of work.
By 1835, punishm ent of apprentices for withholding labour by 
unauthorized local magistrates was such a problem, tha t the Secretary of 
State was informed.124 These magistrates were reminded by the 
Governor, tha t it was beyond their competence to sentence apprentices, 
as only Stipendiary Magistrates had such power.125 Lord Glenelg directed
120 Ordinance No. 4 /34.
121 CO 253/46, Letter to Secretary of State, 3 November 1834; CO 253/52, Letter to 
Secretary of State 3 October 1836.
122 Ordinance No. 10/34.
123 Ordinance No. 8 /35.
124 C.O. 253/46, Letter to Secretary of State 16 December 1835; Letter to Secretary of 
State 26 December 1835.
125 Circular to Justices of the Peace, 25 November 1835.
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tha t the Governor take action “...to obtain redress for apprentices who 
had been illegally punished, or to censure any of the magistrates by 
whom acts so evidently illegal had been done.”126 Before receipt of the 
instructions, another incident by a m agistrate resulted in suspension.127 
There was also evidence of deliberate wrongful designation of apprentices 
as praedial and non-praedial, so th a t fewer apprentices would be freed 
than  anticipated in 1838. 128 Lt. Governor Bunbuiy reported tha t there 
were extensive errors in the Registry and th a t the books were made up in 
a disgraceful m anner.129 He accordingly requested permission to conduct 
a commission of inquiry.
There was an inherent incompatibility between a free labour 
arrangem ent and the traditional practices of plantation production. The 
availability of slaves had encouraged planters to acquire as many slaves 
as necessary for production which became excessive during the planting 
season. There was no optimization of labor. With a free labor force, the 
planters expected the same bu t laborers not required out of season 
would have to fend for themselves. Clearly, a seasonal demand would not 
be sufficient for freed persons with responsibility for their livelihood. 
Once the apprenticeship system ended and the stipulated weekly hours 
were no longer in place, laborers found their own livelihood on their own 
terms.
Freed persons were already becoming attracted to the new forms of 
economic activity centred on small-scale agriculture and retail trading. 
Retail trading became popular for u rban  slaves, as it represented a move 
to an activity tha t provided sufficient independence from association with 
servitude. Notwithstanding the colonial state representing the more 
liberal imperial state, it still sought to protect the economic interests of
126 C.O. 254/10, Despatch No. 464 from Lord Glenelg to Lt. Governor Hill, 1 February 
1836.
127 C.O. 253/46, Letter to Secretary of State, 12 January 1836.
128 Praedial apprentices were field slaves whilst non-praedial were non-field slaves.
129 CO.O. 253/57, Letter to the Secretary of State, 12 December 1837.
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the planters, and restrict the economic independence of the blacks. 
Therefore, the colonial state attempted to restrict any movement away 
from agricultural production. For example, the production of charcoal for 
export was made illegal on the basis that, though it was more profitable, 
freed persons were neglecting their crop cultivation and causing a  rise in 
the price of provision.130 Although Lord Glenelg overruled the 
Proclamation citing tha t “...it was questionable policy to compel them  to 
abandon the more lucrative employment.”131 The efforts of the colonial 
state was even more striking, as the last Ordinance passed before the 
end of apprenticeship sought to control entry into services, such as 
jobbers, porters, hucksters and pedlars.132 The significance of the Act 
was not the orderly management of the trade, bu t the low wages set and 
the high cost of obtaining a license to operate.
Lt. Gov. Hill in a  dispatch answering inquiries from Rt. Honourable 
Spring Rice on the effects of free labour on the colony noted the 
distressing financial situation that would first discourage any capitalist 
to invest in Saint Lucia, bu t adds tha t even if done “...the limited 
population would render such a measure abortive.”133 He explained that 
less than  a twentieth of the island was under cultivation and tha t no 
estate had a sufficient labour force and urged emigration as a solution to 
the labour problem.
It was not surprising then, that the Colonial State would seek to 
enact legislation to curtail the availability of land to freed persons. The 
first Ordinance sought to “...regulate the disposal of Crown lands, to 
make provision for the proper administration of uncultivated estates and 
to appoint Commissioners for carrying out these m atters into effect.”134 
The preamble of the Ordinance was bold in its reasoning as to the
130 CO 255/3, Proclamation No. 3 of 1837, 4 December 1837.
131 CO 254/12, Despatch of 14 February 1838.
132 CO 255/3, Ordinance of 30 July 1838.
133 CO 253/49, Letter to Secretary of State Lord Glenelg, 23 November 1835.
134 CO 255/3, Ordinance 7 /36  of 1 August 1836.
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necessity of the Act, stating tha t the increase in fugitive slaves and 
m anum itted apprentice labourers had led to an increase in the 
unemployed and vagrant population who became squatters. Among the 
objectives of the Ordinance were to set prices ensure that all territory to 
be cultivated is well cultivated; and to provide against any undue and 
unnatural depreciation of land and property.
Notwithstanding, the apprenticeship period did not last as 
planned. The intention of freeing all non-field apprentices on August 1, 
1838 became a complete abolition of the program. Three main reasons 
can be provided. Firstly, the plans of the Imperial Government for a 
transition period of training for freedom were not unfolding as envisaged. 
Secondly, there was the fear of a backlash when the non-praedial 
apprentices were freed in 1838 and others remained in limited bondage. 
Thirdly, and probably most importantly, the abolitionist movement 
increased its campaign against the system fuelled by the reports of the 
stipendiary magistrates and missionaries on the treatm ent of apprentices 
by planters.
The apprenticeship system was not abolished by the British 
Parliament, bu t by the colonial assemblies acting on a directive from the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies. It may be that the Imperial 
Government was fearful of another protracted battle in Parliament and 
prospect of resentful public opinion. After all, motions calling for an 
immediate end to apprenticeship were defeated in February 1838 in the 
House of Lords, and in May 1838 in the House of Commons.135 However, 
it showed the conviction of the Colonial Office tha t the apprenticeship 
system was not working and full freedom should be granted to all. That 
can be compared with the opposition of the planter class to any 
termination of the system.
135 Temperley, Antislavery.
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The planters in Saint Lucia objected to the termination of 
apprenticeship by petitioning the Secretary of State and causing so much 
uncertainty, tha t the Governor of the Windward Islands travelled to Saint 
Lucia to ensure passage of the Ordinance. The termination of 
apprenticeship was a classic example of the Imperial State overlooking 
the interests of the planter. This represented the decline of the planter 
class as an  economic force, and exposed the greater concern of the 
Imperial State to avoid any unrest in its colonies which could affect 
public opinion a t home. The Petition called the proposal “...an act of 
injustice unprecedented in the history of the British Empire.”136 The 
planters complained tha t they had agreed to the Act of Emancipation of 
1834 because they were assured of the services of the apprentices for six 
years and it was part of an  agreement with the Crown. They further 
complained tha t they had invested hugely since 1834 in their estates 
because of the six-year guarantee of labour. Apprenticeship was 
term inated in Saint Lucia by the Assembly with the Governor of the 
Windward Islands sitting in to ensure passage.137
This change brought about the critical issue of sourcing labour 
after the end of apprenticeship. In the territories where there was 
uncultivated land, planters who experienced a  decline in available labour 
were forced to rely on immigrants from India and China. They were 
known as indentured servants. In territories where land was scarce, 
planters were able to engage in negotiations to hire free labour or engage 
them  through other arrangements. In Saint Lucia’s case, the available 
labour force was 10,238.138 Less than  one twentieth of the island was 
cultivated.
The resolution of the conflict between free labour and the planter 
class was the establishment of the peasantry as a social and economic
136 CO 253/61, Petition to Secretary of State, 24 May 1838.
137 Ordinance 34/38.
138 Watts, West Indies.
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force. This feature differentiates the West Indian peasant from the classic 
understanding of the ‘peasant’.139 In the case of Saint Lucia, peasant 
development started largely through the practice of the Metayage System  
of cultivation. Metayage was first introduced into St. Lucia in 1840, later 
spreading to some other islands, after 1847.140 It was only in St.Lucia 
tha t it became an essential component of export agriculture.
The difficulties of labour cost, availability and the lack of capital for 
the estates, led planters to adopt Metayage as the dominant form of 
production. Yet, the Metayage System  became a powerful tool of 
empowerment for the labouring class. Historically labour sharing 
[koudmen), communal ownership and product sharing was part of rural 
life.141 According to Adrian, “...these types of land acquisition, ownership 
and cultivation were conditioned by French law and customs...hence, the 
planter opted for a system of agriculture with principles tha t were 
familiar to the agrarian labouring class.”142
The conditions of a metayage contract varied from estate to estate, 
b u t contained some common elem ents.143 The metayer was provided with 
land for a period (usually six years) to grow, m aintain and cultivate a 
particular. The metayer was also provided with land on the fringes for his 
house, provision gardens and animals; while the planter provided all 
major capital expenses; planters had the right to superintend the 
cultivation of the crop; to pay workers according to m arket prices, less
139 Woodville K. Marshall, “Notes on Peasant Development in the West Indies since 
1838,” Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 1 No. 3. The West Indian peasant did not have 
long established ties and tradition to the lands nor was it the rural dimension of old 
civilizations.
140 Peter Adrian, Metayage, Capitalism and Peasant Development in StLucia 1840-1957 
(Jamaica; Consortium Graduate School of Social Sciences, 1996); Breen, StLucia. The 
metayage was a French form of sharecropping where the metayer would be provided 
with land and all requirements including tools by the landlord who in turn would be 
given provisions in lieu of rent.
141 The Koudmen is a practice of help provided by family and friends for which no 
money is paid.
142 Adrian, Metayage, p. 16.
143 C.O. 253/79, Stipendiary Magistrate Report, Grey to Stanley, September 11, 1843.
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any advances and the planter could take legal action for the termination 
of the contract.
The system permitted a half share of produce in the early phase, 
bu t changed to a  two-thirds, then four-fifths in favour of the metayer.144 
What was most significant about metayage was tha t the metayers 
received their share in cash, bu t not kind. They were, therefore, able to 
penetrate the export market through the planter.
The system of metayage though created for the advantage of the 
planter, transformed the lives of many freed persons. Breen, who served 
as an  Official Member of the Legislative Assembly and as Registrar of the 
Court, described what he saw as the worst feature of the metayage 
system as,
the direct tendency to give an undue and overstrained impetus to the 
growth and accumulation of wealth among the labouring population; 
to induce consequent habits of indolence; by lowering the condition of 
the landowner, and elevating tha t of the labourer, to place both on a 
footing of equality; thereby to increase the num ber of small farm ers145
Whilst it has been argued that metayage could be seen as a system 
of exploitation of freed persons, there is evidence of its role in producing 
a new agrarian class.146 Adrien provided sufficient evidence of the 
superiority of metayage for capital accumulation compared to wage 
labour, as the metayer was able to earn monies from the sale of his 
surplus provision, from working on the estate and his metayage share. 
The metayer was also able to increase his labor input, if needed beyond 
his family, by using the traditional koudmen. 147
The system was not without its difficulties, and as was customary, 
the framework initially favoured the planter, despite the efforts of the
144 Ibid.
145 Breen, StLucia, p.302.
146 For an account of metayage as a form of exploitation see J. Davy, The West Indies 
Before and Since Emancipation (London; Frank Cass, 1854); Issac Dookhan, A Post- 
Emancipation History of the West Indies (London; Collins, 1977).
147 Adrien, Metayage.
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Stipendiary Magistrates. Contracts were deliberately written vague and 
ambiguous to favor the planters. With no legal provisions for metayage, 
legal redress was impossible. Despite the best efforts of the planters to 
discourage and frustrate any attem pts to pass legislation for the practice, 
in 1850 an Ordinance was passed to protect the metayers.
Notwithstanding, the metayage system  provided a mechanism for 
social change, as many labourers were able to accumulate capital to 
purchase their own lands and stimulate the emergence of an 
independent landowning class of smaller proprietors. Metayage became 
the only significant vehicle for the empowerment of many freed persons 
in the immediate post-emancipation period. Glaringly, it was not an 
initiative of the Colonial State or Imperial Government.
4.3 .3 . The Creation of a Free Labour Society
In as m uch as the slave society required a specific framework to
facilitate economic, social and political control, so did the post­
emancipation period require a framework to create and facilitate a free
labour society. The shaping of the new state-societal relationship was 
based on the successes of creating a free labour society. That process 
was started with the apprenticeship period with its main task  to 
discipline the labourers, the establishment of law and order and 
provision of welfare.
In attempting to discipline the labourers, the Imperial State
seemed concerned not to excite the abolitionist or hum anitarians in 
Britain, and sought to restrain any attem pt at abuse from the planter 
class. Yet, the Imperial State was careful not to undermine the status of 
the planter class, while maintaining control of the black population. In 
the end, the colonial state was allowed to create a framework that sought 
to balance the two considerations. Accordingly, the Emancipation Act 
provided for Stipendiary Magistrates who were agents of the Imperial 
Government and expected to function primarily as ‘guardians of public
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order’, especially as it was feared th a t with the blacks freed and the slave 
laws and estate discipline no longer in place, it would lead to an  increase 
in crime and social disorder. However, they had a more important 
function to ensure tha t the freed persons fulfilled their obligation to the 
planters and vice versa. According to Bum s, the apprentices were 
required to work honestly, avoid insolence, and remain faithful to their 
contracts. 148 In return, planters would ensure tha t they would receive 
food, clothing, lodging, medicine and an  allowance for their extra labour. 
Importantly, it was also intended th a t civil rights would be gradually 
introduced to freed persons, who would be taught how to use them by 
government agencies, whilst planters learn “...to make the necessary 
modifications...to bring about the transformation from a slave, to a full 
wage-paying mode of production.”149 In essence, the Magistrates 
supervised the apprenticeship arrangem ents and the preparation for a 
new labour market.
However, the apprenticeship system was a failure. The slaves saw 
it as a continuing denial of their full freedom, while the planters saw it as 
compensation and therefore, the right to exact the utm ost from 
apprentice labourers.150 Augier notably recognizes two reasons for the 
failure of the Special Magistrates.151 Firstly, they were not provided with 
the resources required to fulfill their duties. Secondly, the magistrates 
were required to operate within a framework established for expected 
post-emancipation difficulties, rather than  for development planning. 
That framework was not compatible with an apprenticeship programme. 
Accordingly, the Magistrates spent more time addressing issues of 
discipline, rather than  planning for the social development of a new 
society.
148 W.L Bum, Emancipation and Apprenticeship in the British West Indies (London; 
Johnathan Cape, 1937).
149 Watts, West Indies, p. 470.
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The second task  of establishing law and order through the 
enactm ent of new laws was seen as necessary to reshape the society and 
to bring it under the control of the colonial state. Its objective was to 
move from having each plantation as a  society in itself, or to construct a 
national society. According to Lord Glenelg, the Colonial Secretaiy, 
“[s]ociety...is more open to civilizing influences, more directly under the 
control of Government...and altogether is in a sound state, morally, 
politically and economically, than  if left to pursue its natural course.”152
The freed persons were no longer the responsibility of the planter.
Previously, the welfare and well-being of the slaves were largely within
the charge of the planter. After 1838, the freed persons became subjects
of the Crown, now the responsibility of the Imperial Government and
Colonial state. Hall brilliantly captures what should have been the
rightful configuration of the post-emancipation society,
[e] state slaves would become the general populaces of free people 
looking to their governments for the provision of justice and of the very 
basic elements of social welfare by which a citizen is shielded from the 
total destitution which may arise from injustice, old age, or physical or 
mental incapacity. Freedom would also cany  with it the right to 
choose between different occupations and different m asters, and it 
might well be necessary for tha t right to be protected in a society ju s t 
emerged from bondage.153
The new set of social laws in Saint Lucia was the result of the 
interplay between the Colonial Office and the local legislature. The 
Colonial Office was vigilant of the laws passed by the local legislature and 
was very interventionist.
Augier explains tha t the laws passed,
were all calculated to discourage any movement of workers away from 
the estates. There were harsh  m easures against vagrancy, taxes to 
discourage small scale landholding, and high rates for licences to 
traders and dealers; these attacked the main alternatives to work on
152 Dispatch, 30 January 1836 quoted in Cooper et al, Beyond Slavery.
153 Douglas Hall, Five of the Leewards 1834-1870 (Barbados; Caribbean University 
Press, 1971), p. 15.
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the estates. There were also efforts to introduce contracts which would 
hold the labourer on the estate for long periods.154
The first laws focused on ensuring tha t the planters were provided 
with their labour needs and that a  police force was in place to m aintain 
order. As required by the Act of Emancipation, the local legislature 
enacted tha t praedial apprentices with provision grounds were to provide 
forty hours per week of compulsory labor and those without grounds 
were to provide forty-five hours.155 At the same time, another Act was 
passed for the acquiescence of minority praedial apprentice labourer to 
ensure th a t once a majority of labourers agreed to provide extra hours of 
labour, all labourers would be compelled to work. The minority did not 
have the right to withdraw their labour and the penalties for absenteeism 
would apply if they did not work.156
There were also concerns about planters being able to safeguard 
their existing supply of labour, during apprenticeship and after its end. 
An Ordinance was passed to punish persons who employed or harboured 
runaway apprentices on the basis th a t they had contracts with planters 
who depended on them .157 In 1838, another Ordinance was passed to 
make it illegal for anyone to “seduce or take away any Menial-Servant or 
Servant in Husbandry, Artificer, or other labourer, who shall be under 
either a general or special hiring or engagement with any other 
person.”158 A few days later another Ordinance was passed which 
prevented boat-captains, boat-men, domestic servants and other 
labourers from being enticed into signing contracts to work in other 
colonies..159 In this case, the concern was more than  the loss of labour, 
although it was claimed that the persons left behind dependents who
154 Augier, The West Indies, p. 172.
155 CO 255/2, Ordinance 4 /34  of 19 August 1834 .
!56 CO 255/2, Ordinance 5 /34  of 19 August 1834.
157 CO 255/2, Ordinance 8 /35  of 9 July 1835.
158 CO 255/3, Ordinance passed 30 July 1838.
159 CO 255/3, Ordinance passed 23 July 1838.
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were not provided for, and who became destitute. It was also claimed 
th a t some left in debt. Persons wanting to leave the island were required 
to follow a long process to receive a certificate of departure, which 
included advertising their intention to leave the colony in three 
consecutive editions of the Gazette.
The second objective of the new laws was to ensure tha t there was 
effective control of the movements and activities of the apprentices and 
freed persons through the establishment of the rural police to regulate 
the activities of apprentices.160 The Ordinance created four classes of 
offences by apprentices: indolence, carelessness or negligence in 
performing their work; absence from work and running away from the 
services of the employer; drunkenness and disobedience of lawful 
commands; and conspiracy, or open resistance to the lawful commands 
of their employers.
Another major piece of legislation to facilitate social control 
provided for the policing of the town of Castries and was gradually 
extended to include other towns in later years.161 Initially, it was 
motivated by the increase in m anumitted apprentices and freed persons 
assembling in Castries. Among other provisions, it provided for the arrest 
of any idle or disorderly person on the streets after nine o’clock a t night; 
the prevention of beating of negro drum s;162 the prevention of selling of 
produce without permission; and the prevention of purchase of produce 
except at the Market. The Act was made more restrictive and defined as 
idle and disorderly, and subjected to one-month imprisonment, anyone 
who could not wholly or in part maintain themselves, anyone who 
begged, anyone who pedaled without authorization and any group of 
twelve or more assembling to dance without permission from the
!6o CO 255/2, Ordinance passed 31 December 1834.
161 Ordinances passed 24 August 1835, 3 November 1840 and 23 January 1844.
162 The Secretary of State objected to this inclusion. Despatch of 15 February 1836.
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Attorney General. 163 A rogue and vagabond was described, and liable to 
three m onths in Jail, as anyone who wandered about and lodged in a 
deserted building, occupied land without permission and had no visible 
m eans of subsistence and anyone involved in any indecent exposure.
The em phasis on control was very evident when on the eve of the 
end of apprenticeship new provisions were made to control freed persons 
in the rural areas and to establish rural constables. They were designed 
“...for the preservation of peace and good order throughout the island, 
and more especially on the several plantations, estates and places.”164 It 
was a rigid provision that allowed any two Justices of the Peace, a t the 
behest of the owner, manager or person in charge of the estate to appoint 
persons with full authority to arrest offenders for disturbing the public 
peace, tum ult, riots, trespass, misdemeanors, and felony.
The third task  of creating welfare support for the freed persons was 
treated as a minority concern. The Act in abolishing apprenticeship 
prevented planters from evicting from the plantations those persons who 
were willing to work on the estates and had not committed any offence 
and required planters to provide three m onths tenancy for those who had 
committed an offence.165 Furthermore, it provided tha t in the case of 
diseased and infirmed persons, the planter was to provide lodging, 
clothing, food, and medicine unless tha t person had relatives to do so. 
Significantly, if the planter could prove he did not have the means, the 
freed persons would be maintained a t the expense of the colony.
The only other example of welfare legislation provided for the 
Colonial State to maintain all those who were poor, impotent, old, blind 
and not able to work and having no means of subsistence; and all 
children up to eight who were bom  bastards and whose mothers cannot
163 CO 255/2, Ordinance 9 /36  passed 29 August 1836.
164 CO 255/3, Ordinance passed 30 July 1838.
133 c o  255/3, Ordinance passed 13 July 1838.
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provide for them .166 The Act provided for vacant lands to be set apart for 
the industrious and occasional poor, who might be able and willing, bu t 
could not find employment.
There was significant concern with education such that the Lt. 
Governor finally recommended th a t the Imperial Government provide 
schools for Negro education.167 A Committee of the Legislative Council, 
appointed on 19 May 1837, noted tha t there were two schools, in 
Castries and Soufriere, on the national school system funded partly by 
voluntary contributions and partly by the Lord Bishop of Barbados.168 As 
m ost apprentices were Catholics, they were not admitted to these 
schools. Two planters operated private schools, one in English and the 
other in French, to educate their apprentices. The Committee 
recommended tha t schools be built in Castries, Gros Islet, Soufriere and 
Vieux Fort and for His Majesty Government and public funds to meet the 
cost. The situation was so deplorable tha t the Lt. Governor made a 
special appeal to the Colonial Office for help.169
The colonial priority in shaping the post-emancipation society is 
highlighted by the assessm ent of the Attorney General that there was no 
hospital, no workhouses or any other such establishment maintained by 
public interest. In contrast, there were two houses of correction in 
Soufriere and Vieux Fort and one jail in C astries.170
4.3 .4  Governance in Colonial Society - Domestic and Imperial
Government Interplay
There were three main issues with the political development of the 
state and its relation to society. Firstly, what would now be the role of the 
colonial state in governing the new society; secondly, what would be the
166 CO 255/3, Ordinance passed 27 July 1838.
!67 CO 253/55, Letter of 14 April 1837 to Secretary of State.
168 CO 253/55, Report of the Committee for Promoting Education amongst the Children of 
the Labouring Population, 15 July 1837.
!69 CO 253/55, Letter to the Secretary of State, 15 July 1837.
170 c o  253/67 Letter from Attorney General to Governor, 25 February 1837.
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role of the Colonial Office in the direct government of the colony; and, 
thirdly, the response of colonial society to the new relationships.
As a Crown Colony where the Governor ruled by Ordinances, it 
was easier for imperial policy to shape the relationship between state and 
society, than  in colonies where Assemblies led through legislation and 
approval of monies. As mentioned earlier, the institutionalization of 
Crown Colony Government in Trinidad and Saint Lucia was a direct 
result of experiences with the old colonies th a t the imperial state wanted 
to avoid. Colonial society was left out of government except for the 
representation of the planters as non-official members. However, the 
conflict between the non-official members of the Legislative Council and 
the Governor was constant and bitter, and reflected the separation 
between the sentiments of local representatives and the Imperial 
Government.171 It can be argued th a t the Imperial Government was more 
concerned with either the circumstances of the wider populace, which 
was outside of the political process and more likely to revolt and cause 
em barrassm ent, or its obligations under the capitulation agreements 
whilst the non-official members were concerned with the interests of the 
English planters.
A typical example of conflict highlighted tha t contest between the 
domestic interests and the imperial state. In debating a draft order for 
altering and amending the administration of justice in Saint Lucia, there 
was a concern by the non-official members over the continued use of 
French laws in the courts. An alternate plan was proposed, which 
recognized an English system using the English language.172 In applying 
a casting vote, Governor Hill observed tha t members, “...were travelling 
entirely out of their way in making the presentation” and th a t “...the non­
official members shall recollect tha t the present Draft was bought before
171 The persistent conflicts led to two non-official members being suspended over their 
actions in relation to tax measures. CO 253/67, Letters to Secretary of State, 4 
February 1839 and 6 February 1839.
172 C.O. 256/3, Minutes of Legislative Council, 16 November 1835.
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them by the directives and expressed instructions of the Rt. Honourable 
the Secretary of State.”173 Smith in response vented the feeling of non­
official members by indicating tha t they were not obliged to pass every 
bill tha t the Secretary of State thought was necessary, and tha t they as 
non-official members, did not have the same interest in the colonies as 
the official m em bers.174
The colonial state also played an  active mediating role between the 
imperial state and the planter class in financing development in the 
society. The critical question was how social or development projects 
would be financed. There appeared to be a determined effort by the 
Imperial State not to use its own resources for the maintenance of the 
colony. For example, the m ass of freed persons was no longer the 
responsibility of the planters as they had been as slaves, and looked to 
the state for social support, particularly for medical services, education 
and subsistence. The infirm, aged and young were particularly 
disadvantaged. The Imperial Government remained firm in the view that 
the provision of these services had to come from local revenue. However, 
Saint Lucia was already experiencing severe financial difficulties with the 
Legislative Council submitting a request to the Secretary of State for 
£18,000 to help meet recurring budget deficits.175
In another instance, a formal loan application was made for 
£10,000 to meet the debts of the colony to creditors.176 The differences 
between the Imperial State, the Colonial State and the planter interests 
were also highlighted in the approach to solve the debt problem. The 
Colonial Office agreed to arrange a loan bu t required evidence of a 
willingness and ability to repay. The application by the Governor was 
accompanied by an Ordinance to raise custom duties on all goods, except
173 Ibid.
174 Ibid.
175 Dispatch No. 12 of 6 March 1834.
176 CO 253/51, Application of 18 January 1836.
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British linen, wool or cotton goods, to repay the loam.177 Instead, the
Non-oflicial Members requested a grant of £14,000 and a reduction of
taxes to deal with the problem.178 The Petition of the Non-official
Members claimed tha t the Crown had a responsibility to pay off the debt,
as it was the result of a policy to use the colony to make a  trial of the
emancipation m easures from 1826.179 Earlier in 1834, a petition had
been forwarded to the Secretary of State from forty-five planters objecting
to high taxes. According to the planters the taxes would,
complete the ruin of the wretched planter, and this at a moment when 
the fabric of colonial society is shaken to its foundation by the 
introduction of a great fearful experiment....and firmly protest against 
the exorbitant salaries paid to the person carrying out the Executive 
Government of such a colony as Saint Lucia .18°
In fact, non-official members went further to suggest tha t since the 
colony had a greater military role than  a role for the production of sugar, 
the Imperial State should also pay the salary of the Lieutenant 
Governor.181 The statem ents of revenue and expenditure show that the 
colony was never able to raise sufficient revenue to meet the cost of 
administering the colony.182 The m easures forced by the Imperial State 
only served to increase hardship on the population, frequently causing 
conflict between the planters and Governor.
Another persistent issue in the relations between colonial state, 
imperial government and society was reconciling the different imperial 
influences on the development of colonial state and society in Saint 
Lucia. The case of the use of language is instructive. French remained 
the official language until 1 January  1842 when after numerous 
complaints from the English elite, especially in judicial proceedings, the 
Imperial Government finally agreed to a  change. The articles of
177 Ordinance 15/36.
178 C.O. 253/51, Petition of 30 January 1836.
179 Ibid.




capitulation ensured tha t French customs, religion and laws would be 
continued in the ceded territories and therefore, the Imperial 
Government had an international obligation to retain the French 
language. The most active opponents were judges and planters, who 
frequently addressed the Lt. Governor to make a case for the use of 
English in the Royal Courts.183 However, the majority of inhabitants, 
mainly French, was against any such action and also petitioned the Lt. 
Governor.184 The Lt. Governor informed the Secretary of State of a 
decision to use English in the Courts and even issued a proclamation 
enforcing the use of English.185 However, it was revoked a few days after.
Breen, a former Official Member of the Legislative Council, arguing 
for the English elite, explained tha t the continued use of French was an 
obstacle to British interests and insistence of French by its users, 
encouraged anti-British sentim ents.186 Interestingly, after ten years of 
petitions and postponements, when finally adopted, only two members of 
the Bar were competent to plead in English before the Courts.187 Freed 
slaves spoke a French patois, laced with African derivatives, which was 
the language of the majority. It was quite clear tha t any change in the 
use of French as the official language of the Courts, would be a major 
disadvantage to the black majority.
Another issue was the guarantee of the right to religious worship. 
Again, the Imperial Government was obliged to respect the Treaty which 
permitted the practice of Catholicism.. The Catholic clergy had a 
powerful role in the colonies serving a quasi-political role of “...sole 
curator of parish registers under ancient French law.”188 The Clergy was 
responsible for registering all baptism s, marriages and burials. Until 
1838, there were three clergymen on the island. The end of slavery and
183 CO 253/46.
!84 c o  253/46, Petition to Lt. Governor, January 18, 1834.
185 Proclamation of February 22, 1834.
186 Breen, StLucia.
187 Ibid.
188 Ibid., p. 215.
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apprenticeship saw a request for an  increase by the inhabitants.189 
Plagued by funding difficulties, the Church proposed tha t a suitable 
allocation be made from the general revenue of the colony. After a 
protracted struggle, it was approved by the Colonial Office in Ju ly  1842 
on condition tha t priests receiving salaries should be of British birth .190 
Such a proposal was opposed by the local Protestants, who did not want 
to be taxed to support the Catholic Clergy and petitioned the Government 
to th a t effect.191 In the end, the view of the Colonial Office was 
implemented.
The only significant change to the political structure of Saint Lucia 
during 1834-44 was in the relationship with the Imperial Government. 
Lord Glenelg, citing the recurring disputes and controversies in the 
colony,, indicated tha t the colony would now fall under the jurisdiction of 
the Governor of the Windward Islands located in Barbados.192 Based on 
successes in other colonies, he felt tha t “...the vicinity of a superior 
authority, personally aloof, and yet near enough for prompt 
arbitration...effected the suppression of the petty controversies which 
were formerly so frequent.”
Breen noted the benefits from having a controlling power nearby 
for emergencies and for the avoidance of sending dispatches to the 
Colonial Office for references of form rather than  substance193. However, 
Breen recognized many deficiencies including the delay and loss of time 
to act on m easures as any dispatch for Saint Lucia would go to Barbados 
for transmission. Proposals of significance inevitably resulted in 
exchanges between Barbados and Saint Lucia before being sent to the 
Colonial Office. Finally, in 1839, Lord Genelg further downgraded the 
level of Imperial representation. In his view to cut the expenditure of the
!89 CO 253/46, Letter to Secretary of State, 15 November 1842.
190 Breen, StLucia.
191 CO 253/46, Petition forwarded to Secretary of State.
192 CO 254/12, Despatch to Colonel Bunberry, 15 February 1838. It appears that this 
was a result of the dispute between the Chief Justice and respective Governors.
193 Breen, StLucia.
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colony on imperial appointees, he stated tha t the Lt. Governor’s role 
could be performed by the Senior Officer in command of the British 
Troops.194
It appeared tha t the colonial state, as the representative of the 
Imperial Government, was constantly in conflict with the planter’s 
interest and their representatives. However, there were many occasions 
when the colonial state became an instrum ent of the planters as it 
passed legislation to favor them. In the final analysis the colonial state 
was not ready to fundamentally change the standing of the local planter 
elite in favour of the local black majority. Most notable were the 
occasions when the Colonial Office intervened to direct am endm ents to 
legislation tha t had been passed. A noteworthy example was the 
previously mentioned attem pt to curtail the production of charcoal by 
apprentices and freed persons that was opposed by the Imperial 
Government and caused planters to complain bitterly. There were also 
cases with Justices of the Peace who had their powers progressively 
reduced. These Justices of the Peace were all local white inhabitants who 
tended to act in the interest of the planters. There was also the famous 
case of Ordinance No. 3 of 1835, which provided for the Royal Court to 
make orders for certain additional privileged supplies to estates in Saint 
Lucia.195 The previous legislation allowed the Judges to order supplies for 
clothing, feeding, and estate hospitals on behalf of apprenticed labourers. 
The new Ordinance sought to include other estate requirements used by 
apprentices such as tools and equipment. The Secretary of State, Lord 
Aberdeen, disallowed the Ordinance because these supplies were the 
responsibility of the planters.196 However, the most glaring case was the 
institution of the Poll Tax on all male inhabitants aged between 16 - 60
194 CO 254/12, Despatch from Secretary of State, 28 January 1839.
195 CO 255/2, Ordinance passed 8 February 1835.
^  CO 254/10, Despatch of 2 April 1835.
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years. 197 The Secretary of State disallowed the Ordinance because it was 
not considerate of those who were able to pay, and those who were not. 
It was unfair to the apprentices since they were bound by law to give up 
a certain num ber of hours and to be paid for more hours at a fixed 
ra te .198 Instead, it was proposed th a t the planters pay for their workers. 
The Council responded by proposing tha t the planter receive labour in 
return , and tha t the payment of the tax by planters be postponed. The 
Colonial Office also rejected the proposal and directed tha t the Governor 
collect the paym ents.199
4 .4  Conclusion
The above account presents some significant findings towards the 
general examination of the interplay of external and internal factors in 
shaping the nature of the state and society in post-colonial societies. In 
general, the examination showed the role played by the rise of ideas such 
as free enterprise and the end of slavery, the role of institutions such as 
the Colonial Office, the Colonial State and the Imperial State, and the 
importance of material conditions such as the plantation mode of 
production, the trade patterns and the imperial state and society 
interests. Significantly, the period examined highlighted the dominance 
of external factors in establishing the state and society, thus defining the 
state-societal relationship.
This thesis started with Jackson’s reference to the absence of 
empirical statehood in post-colonial states as the role and place of these 
societies were examined in their contemporary setting. In response it was 
argued tha t a shortcoming with traditional IR theory was a historical 
approach, which does not account for the origin of state and society. This 
Chapter showed that the origin of the state and society was rooted in the
197 c o  255/3, Ordinance No. 3 /36  passed 11 May 1836.
198 Co 254/10, Despatch of 8 April 1835.
i"  CO 254/10, Despatch of 28 August 1835.
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process by which the colonies of the New World were incorporated into 
the British Empire. The establishm ent of colonies was the result of the 
expansion of European society, driven by a quest for national supremacy 
and greater economic opportunities.
These early colonies had rudim entary state structures as long as 
they were military posts. Society was defined by a similarly loose 
structure. These structures were dominated by the imperial state, 
through the military command and imperial society, as English 
adventurers and financiers were given proprietary rights to establish 
settled colonies. This was the period of the decimation of the indigenous 
society and the construction of a new state-societal configuration.
The transformation of these colonies from trading and military 
outposts into agricultural colonies created the conditions for the 
emergence of more defined state-societal relations from the looseness of 
the military outpost configuration. As the production technique changed 
from tobacco to sugar the social and political framework of the colonies 
became more defined. Therefore, the society and state were structured to 
legitimize the existence of the plantation system and the control of trade. 
Importantly, the virtual disappearance of indigenous people suggests 
that the resultant state and society were not natural offshoots of the 
indigenous communities of the colonies, bu t were extrinsic structures 
controlled by external forces.
The particulars of the early State in Saint Lucia were externally 
defined by the acquisition of the colony by Britain from France. The 
Treaty of Capitulation provided for the preservation of certain French 
privileges -  religion and language -  which would have a lasting impact. 
The State could not replace Catholicism with Protestantism and was even 
forced to finance the survival of the religion. Similarly, French as a 
language had to be maintained and English was not named the official 
language of the island until 1848. This may explain why French ‘Kewyol’ 
remained the language of people in rural areas and of the working class.
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In both cases - religion and language - the white elite opposed the 
Colonial State and Imperial State. It was clear in this instance tha t 
Imperial State was not always acting to satisfy the dem ands of the local 
landed elite class. However, it can be argued tha t when English was 
made official, it only served to accentuate the conflict and distinction 
between the state and society.
The early state in Saint Lucia represented direct control by the 
Imperial State with Governors ruling by directives and orders in the 
Legislative Council. Saint Lucia was governed under the Crown Colony 
System. As there was not an elected element, there was no indigenous 
source of state power; instead, state power flowed from the imperial 
state. The state was primarily externally determined and, in reality, was 
a minimalist state with a preoccupation for law and order. The Plantation 
State, a t it may be called, also functioned to m aintain the defense of the 
colonies to safeguard trade. The state did not have any relation to the 
majority of the population - the slaves - who were seen as chattel and the 
responsibility of the planters. Whilst not suggesting the need for 
participation in state affairs by society, it m ust be noted tha t the state 
existed for two reasons -  to m aintain the plantation system and the 
preservation of trade. Nonetheless, the state did show concern with the 
treatm ent of the slaves and often in conflict with the planter class. The 
appointment of a Protector of Slaves was one action of the colonial state, 
under the instruction of the Imperial State, to avoid abuse of slaves. It is 
im portant to note that the Imperial State would take such action as the 
reports of the Missionaries on life in the colonies often caused 
indignation in England. This shows tha t imperial society also played an 
early and increasingly important role in the evolution of the state and 
society in the colonies.
Similarly, the nature of the society is linked to the requirements of 
the plantation system. As a total institution, the plantation was largely 
autonomous and functioned as a  self-contained economic unit. There
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was a rigid stratification system on and off the estates, with the majority 
of the population comprising slaves with no societal rights except minor 
legal protection. The planter class expected little of the state, except the 
maintenance of law and order, defense of their trading rights to Britain 
and upkeep of the colony. In fact, there were frequents disagreements 
between the State, professional and planter classes over the priorities 
and actions of the State, especially on issues relating to taxation.
The best expression of the relationship between the state and 
society was in the laws of the colonies. The laws were primarily 
concerned with the slave as property, the action of the slaves relating to 
public order and legal protection for slaves. There was a total neglect of 
the slave as a person, member of a family or having rights outside the 
plantation. The slave was property and did not exist outside the 
plantation. The aforementioned sum m ed the rationale o f the state in 
relation to society -  a preoccupation with securing the framework fo r  a  
profitable plantation system. That framework was secured with violence, 
which encouraged the dismantling of the slave system, as it inspired 
slave resistance and stimulated the mood for change in the Imperial 
society. This represented a fundam ental contradiction within the 
plantation society, and produced the conflict tha t led to emancipation.
The emancipation of the slaves was a transformative act tha t 
qualitatively changed the nature of state and society. Emancipation was 
part of the internationalization of wage labour and the emergence of 
international norms on the acceptable exercise of authority. These 
powerful exogenous forces could no longer be contained, and when 
combined with slave resistance, accelerated the dismantling of the slave 
system. The Colonial Office played a significant role in ensuring th a t the 
provisions of the Emancipation Act were implemented through directives 
to the Colonial State. However, the planter class was opposed to a  free 
labour system, and eventually accepted a ‘compensated’ arrangement. 
Emancipation was the seminal point in the evolution of the state and
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society. The establishment of wage labour herald more defined 
capitalistic relations between state and society. Therefore, the form and 
rationale of the state had to be adjusted to meet the requirements of the 
new configuration. Likewise, a new society was created which included 
freed persons with rights as individuals who were no longer to be seen as 
property.
The freeing of the slaves established a  new society, b u t not
necessarily what was expected of a free society. The amelioration of the
conditions or aspirations of the slaves never seemed to be the focus, as
they were seen simply as a labour force, whilst the freed persons had
their own pretensions on shaping the society. According to Crafton,
for ordinary slaves freedom meant being free to be small farmers, 
working for the plantations, if at all, only for wages and on their own 
terms. They wanted to live in family units, to have ready access to land 
of their own, and to be free to develop their own culture, particularly 
their own syncretised religion.200
However, society remained subservient to the state, both colonial 
and imperial. The Imperial State continued to serve as a mediator 
between the Colonial State and majority of society, especially as the 
colonial state moved from its incipience to assum ing broader functions 
and responsibilities. The society was dominated by the small planter elite 
who were also present in the legislature by virtue of property ownership.
The post-emancipation colonial state is seen to expand its 
functions to facilitate the transition to a free labour system. This defined 
the nature of the state-societal relationship. The state extended its 
coercive activities especially in rural and plantation areas, its judicial 
activities increased with more legislation and for the first time the state 
became concerned with social issues. The social activities of the state 
were a quaditative change in its character and reflected the concerns of 
imperial state and society for the construction of a more hum ane post­
200 Crafton, Empire, p. 301.
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emancipation society. That sentim ent was in keeping with the emerging 
norms in Europe, which decried the slave trade and the brutal treatm ent 
of slaves. On the other hand, the local planter class showed little concern 
for the treatm ent and welfare of the freed persons. Instead, there was a 
preoccupation with securing a labour force a t the cheapest cost and 
ensuring tha t freed persons did not enjoy any disruption in social norms 
which could threaten the sta tus quo. However, the colonial state 
remained firmly rooted in its imperial function by securing the imperial 
interests whether it was the continuation of sugar production, protected 
Crown Lands, ensured law and order, facilitated trade and safeguarded 
the strategic role of the colonies.
Accordingly, the post-emancipation colonial state increasingly 
became the venue for an intense struggle to define the contours of a new 
relationship. The pre-emancipation state was minimalist and, with the 
exception of the planter class participation in the Legislature and keeping 
law and order, had little relations with the majority of society. The new 
configuration produced a  num ber of conflicts which shaped th a t new 
relationship between state and society. Firstly, there was a struggle 
between the elite planter class and a new agrarian class which 
challenged the planter’s dominance in the agricultural sector. That class 
also threatened the long-term survival of the plantations by diverting 
available labour. Planters were forced into the metayage system as a 
compromise to ensure the availability of labour and restrict the 
emergence of an  independent black landowning class. The state was 
often seen by the planters as the mechanism to manage the conflict to 
their satisfaction.
Secondly, there was a struggle between the elite -  planter and large 
commercial interests - and an emerging middle class of professionals and 
small businesspersons and an urban working class. This struggle was 
essentially about the emergence of a new economic configuration against 
an  old order centred on the needs and the practices of the plantation
166
economy. Professionals and small businesspersons increasingly looked to 
the state to facilitate their expansion, opposing attem pts to increase 
taxes and regulate their emergence. They were also becoming more 
politically ambitious, opposing the nominated members being selected 
from the planter class. The black urban working class -  porters, seamen, 
traders, etc -  were seen as undermining the plantation labour force and 
was subjected to rigid control by the state. The emergence of the black 
working class in urban areas ignited other issues within society, 
specifically, their social and economic conditions.
Thirdly, there was a struggle between the imperial interests and 
the elite. This struggle was centered on the planter class intent on 
securing all the privileges of the slavery period and demanding greater 
control of the state apparatus. In effect, the state was seen as the viable 
political instrum ent to ensure the sta tus quo. In many cases, the colonial 
state acted in opposition to the planter class in pursuance of imperial 
directives. The reluctance by the imperial state to give greater control to 
the local elite may have provided the freed persons and professional 
middle class with more space to influence social, political and economic 
development. Although, the majority of society -  the freed persons - 
remained outside the political process and were alienated by the state as 
these persons did not see the state to be exercising authority on its 
behalf or in its interest. Their d istrust was not aimed at the imperial 
state, bu t the colonial state which they saw as representing planter 
interests.
The state-societal relationship of the post-emancipation period in 
Saint Lucia showed a gross failure of the Imperial Government to focus 
on shaping a  new society tha t regarded the freed person as a  worthy 
subject, with the same rights and privileges as English subjects. Nor was 
the Imperial Government concerned with the social and economic 
advancement of persons who had been subjected to almost three 
hundred years of degradation. Whereas the imperial state was concerned
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about the inhumane treatm ent of freed persons, the evidence of the laws 
passed showed a preoccupation with establishing control of the freed 
persons as a labour force, while safeguarding the privileges of the planter 
class. In many instances, the imperial state had to intervene to override 
the colonial legislature. In the process, the abysmal social and economic 
conditions of the freed population were not addressed, leading to intense 
conflict which demanded imperial involvement. Yet, whenever the 
Imperial Government intervened, it was to maintain the notion of a 
civilized colonizer in the context of a hum anitarian minded British public 
and to safeguard imperial interests, defined by international prestige 
rather than value of trade. The fundamental disjuncture between an 
infant state structure and a destitute society with high expectations was 
not addressed. The notion of developing empirical statehood was not an 
issue giving rise to conflict and the transformational period in the 
evolution of the state-societal relationship.
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5S tate  and Society: From  Crisis of Colonial 
Rule to  Political E nfranchisem ent
The last Chapter examined the role and position of West Indian 
colonies in the wider colonial setting, paying particular attention to the 
development of state-societal relations. It demonstrated that state and 
society originated from colonialism. For two hundred years, as the sugar 
industry grew and prospered, the colonies became the jewels of the 
British Empire. A large part of British commercial wealth came from the 
“...dominance of the slave trade and exploitation of the sugar plantation 
of the West Indies.”1 During this period, colonies were so valuable, 
imperial powers were prepared to go to war to secure their interests, and 
acquire new territories.. However, domestic changes, in Britain, in the 
colonies, and international obligations forced a rethinking of colonial 
policy and demanded a new approach to administering the colonies. The 
earlier account of the post-emancipation period showed tha t as 
prosperity diminished, so did interest. As the great age of imperialism in 
Asia and Africa took root, the Caribbean became a ‘neglected estate’.2 
Other areas of colonial endeavour became more important. Interest now 
centred on ensuring tha t the colonial legislatures did not compromise the 
imperial interests of Britain. In 1865, Crown Colony governments were 
imposed on all British West Indian colonies, with the exception of
iS.R. Ashton and David Killingray, eds. The West Indies, Series B vol.6 of British 
Documents on the End of Empire, (London; The Stationary Office, 1999), p. xl.
2 W.D. McIntyre, Colonies into Commonwealth (London; Blandford Press, 1966).
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Barbados and British Guiana. The state of the colonies would lead 
Joseph Chamberlain to describe them  as the ‘Empire darkest slum ’.3
The second transformative period will be analyzed to show how the 
international framework for colonial rule began to change and coupled 
with the evolving political and social doctrines in Britain forced changes 
in imperial policy. The impact of imperial policy was accentuated by the 
debilitating social, economic and political situation in the colonies which 
generated new social forces tha t transformed colonial rule. This 
transformation created a new state-societal configuration.
The period was characterized by a challenge to the existing state- 
societal configuration which was described as the crisis of colonial rule in 
the West Indian colonies. The challenge to colonial rule, both external 
and internal, culminated in widespread riots and social unrest which 
undermined the stability of colonial rule. The imperial state reacted by 
examining the domestic causes of the social unrest and formulated a 
comprehensive remedial programme to remedy the deficiencies of 
colonial rule. The conflicting and complementary interaction between the 
imperial response and the domestic reaction gave rise to a new state- 
societal relationship characterized by the political empowerment of 
society.
Like the previous, this chapter has three sections. The first section 
will examine the nature of the colonial state-societal relationship in the 
period leading to the 1930s and will highlight the dominance of 
exogenous factors although showing an increasing role for domestic 
social forces in th a t period. The second section will examine the 
occurrence of the transformative event -  the labour unrest -  highlighting 
the role of both external and internal influences. The third section 
dem onstrates how external and internal forces responded to the 
transformative event, and the consequent state-societal relations.
3 Ashton, West Indies.
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5.1 State-Societal relations leading to  the Labour 
Unrest
After World War I, the colonies were placed high on the agenda of 
the imperial state, not for their prosperity, b u t for their poverty, and the 
inevitable consequences of the contradictions inherent in the structure of 
the societies. It was a view held tha t “[t]he British genius for colonization 
is an  article of faith.”4 Yet, the condition of the West Indies, the oldest 
tropical colonies and for almost two centuries the most profitable was a 
shame on the colonial conscience. The colonies had become the ‘pocket 
paupers of empire’.
It was claimed tha t imperial responsibility was guided by notions of 
trusteeship and the strategic advantage of possessing colonies in the 
global arena. Therefore, colonial policy was informed by two general 
considerations -  that Britain had a moral and hum anitarian 
responsibility to ensure the progress of colonies, and tha t colonies 
should contribute to British strength and prosperity.5 It was assum ed 
tha t these considerations were reconcilable, and often achieved through 
colonial policy. By the 1930’s, the twin principles of colonial policy no 
longer seemed in harmony in most parts of the British Empire. In the 
case of the West Indies, there seemed little hope for colonies th a t were 
overly dependent on sugar produced at a cost higher than  m arket price 
and had dismal social provisions in education, health and housing.
There was no prosperity for the population, both coloured and 
European. There is little evidence to show th a t the colonies, a t this stage, 
were still prime value as m arkets for exports, or as a source of cheap raw 
material. The colonies were largely underdeveloped, and the majority of 
the population, the freed coloureds, pointed to colonial control as the
4 W.M Macmillian, Warning from the West Indies (Faber and Faber Limited; London, 
1936), p. 13.
5 A.N. Porter and A.J Stockwell, British Imperial Policy and Decolonisation 1938-64,
Vol.1 (Macmillan Press; London, 1987).
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cause of their deprivation and destitution. If after three hundred years of 
colonial rule the socio-economic conditions were so dreadful, then the 
colonial system had to be overthrown.
Colonial policy was in crisis, and could not serve either of the twin 
pillars. That crisis would expose the contradictions of colonial society 
and underm ine the colonial order. The colonial state, though an 
extension of the imperial state, also functioned to safeguard the interest 
of the planter and commercial elite. The last chapter highlighted that 
though not present the control of these interests was achieved ‘absentee 
proprietorship’. However, the colonial state was always ready to confront 
the privileged classes to ensure tha t the majority of the population was 
not agitated to the point of rebelling against the colonial order. However, 
tha t colonial crisis was so overwhelming tha t it led to the 
transformational events of the 1930’s and the consequent attem pt to 
reform colonialism.
5.1.1 Imperial International Relations and the im plications for
Colonial Policy
For over three centuries, Britain had stood dominant in 
international affairs because of her possession of colonies for trade and 
resources, and her naval supremacy, which established the framework 
for imperial policies. The end of slavery, examined in Chapter 4, was 
highly motivated by changes in ideas which prevailed in imperial society 
and consequently changed the general attitude to the importance of 
colonies in the West Indies. The doctrine of free trade had played a 
significant role in influencing the end of slavery and shaped colonial 
policy into the twentieth century. It was Smith’s view that restrictions on 
colonial industry violated the most sacred rights of mankind, and capital 
which was spent on the colonial trade could be better invested
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elsewhere.6 The conflict brought about by this economic doctrine was 
reflected in the struggle between the rising middle class tha t favoured the 
expansion of commerce and the aristocracy tha t favoured colonial 
protectionism.7
That view of economic policy influenced a group of reformers who 
felt th a t freedoms should extend beyond commerce to the political 
sphere. For these reformers, the doctrine was tha t colonial freedom and 
self-government were compatible with being part of the Empire. 
Interestingly, during this period, the Colonial Reformers were arguing for 
the rights and freedom of the white settler colonies, whilst the 
hum anitarian movement was arguing for trusteeship for the coloured 
races.8
An alternative view of colonial policy later emerged which called for 
empire unity and consolidation. This new thinking was supported by the 
Disraeli leadership at the end of the nineteenth century.9 However, the 
attem pts at consolidating the British Empire failed, and the self- 
governing white colonies were officially named as Dominions in 1907, to 
distinguish them  from the Crown Colonies and India.10
The Dominions were white dominated colonies, except South Africa, 
in temperate areas and sparsely populated where settlers established 
perm anent homes. In the case of the West Indies, the colonies were small 
islands and were never truly settled as perm anent homes for whites, but 
served the purposes of trade and military strategy. The persistence of 
planter absenteeism highlights tha t observation. When enough money 
was made or hard times were faced, most whites returned to the
6 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the nature and causes of the Wealth of Nations (G.Bill and 
Sons, Ltd.; London, 1921).
7 Rita Hinden, Empire and After (London; Essential Books Ltd., 1949).
8 Ibid. The humanitarian movement was inspired by the French Revolution and as 
illustrated in the last chapter played a significant role in the abolition of the slave trade 
and the emancipation of slaves.
9 Disraeli speech in 1870 called the Crystal Palace speech is thought to mark the 
beginning of a new imperialist era in the Empire.
10 William McIntyre, Colonies into Commonwealth (London; Blandford Press; 1966).
173
metropolitan capitals until times were more favourable. The majority 
class of non-whites was never seen as capable of ruling themselves, a 
perception th a t influenced the colonial relationship with the non-white 
colonies. Such a  prevailing doctrine was also reflected in the intellectual 
writings of the time. John  S tuart Mill who had worked in the East India 
Company argued tha t the populations of the dependencies were not 
sufficiently advanced to be granted representative government and 
suggested th a t a  “...vigorous despotism is in itself the best mode of 
government for training the people in w hat is specifically wanting to 
render them  capable of a  higher civilization.”11
The end of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century 
introduced significant changes in the practice of colonial rule by colonial 
powers through the adoption of international conventions to standardize 
colonial administration. Of note are The Berlin Act of 1885, The Brussels 
Act of 1890 and the Covenant of the League of Nations. These 
Conventions provided general principles for colonial administration and 
sought to set limits on the exploitation of subject populations. The 
League of Nations, through its m andates system also sought to ensure 
equality for all sovereign states to share in the advantages of having 
colonies.
It was easier for international agreement on some issues such as 
suppressing the slave trade, prohibiting forced labour, control of traffic of 
arms and liquor, and the provision of essential public works and 
services.12 However issues of administrative policies, attitudes towards 
racial and language problems, commercial policies and colonial finance 
were highly contentious. Labour issues became one of the most 
persistent forms of external pressure on the imperial state. Britain 
became a member of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) as part
11 J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (London; Longmans, Green, 
and Co, 1872).
12 Royal Institute for International Affairs, The Colonial Problem (London; Oxford 
University Press, 1937).
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of the structure of the League of Nations and was required to apply 
minimum standards regarding labour in its colonies.13 The reaction of 
the imperial state was to resist all requests by the ILO for information, 
thus rejecting their call for the same regulations on labour to be applied 
to all colonies.14 However, the persistent pressure from the ILO forced the 
Colonial Office to take a tougher stance towards colonial governors who 
showed reluctance to promote labour legislation. It is clear tha t this was 
the beginning of the international framework undermining the colonial 
order, which strengthened local dem ands for better conditions and pay 
for workers.
Within the British political arena, colonial policy was supposed to 
be insulated from the ideological difference of party politics and was 
“...an  expression of the undivided national will.”15 Therefore, whilst there 
were minor changes in legislative composition and administrative 
arrangem ents for the colonies, there were no structural changes to the 
colonial relationship with the West Indian colonies. There was no 
consideration of ending the colonial relationship. Instead, by the early 
twentieth century, colonial policy was now guided by two imperatives. 
Firstly, the focus of the Imperial State was on the ‘scramble for Africa’, 
and the rise of Asia as the new source of trade and wealth. Secondly, it 
was thought tha t the coloured majority was not capable of governing 
themselves.16
The emergence of the British Labour Party provided a new doctrine 
for influencing imperial policy towards the colonies. The philosophy of 
the Party was guided by two schools of thought -  hum anitarian thinking
13 Porter and Stockwell, British Imperial Policy. The ILO established a committee of 
experts on native labour in 1924.
14 CO 323/941, Minute by Mr Ormsby to Sir S. Wilson, 24 August 1925.
15 W.M. Macmillan, The Road to Self-rule. A Study in Colonial Evolution (London; Faber, 
1959), p. 253.
16 Described by C.L.R. James as the ‘myth’ which governed British thinking on the 
colonies. Therefore, independence had to be given in stages according to the 
preparedness of colonial peoples for it. C.L.R. James, Nkrumah and the Ghana 
Revolution (London; Allison & Busby, 1977).
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and a radical internationalist dislike for imperialism.17 This led the 
Labour Party to take a strong position on self-determination and the 
protection of the rights of native people from exploitation.18 This is in 
comparison to the two trends within the Conservative Party of a prideful 
imperialist tradition, coupled with a belief in the viability of the Empire 
and a more moderate realistic belief of the inevitability of 
decolonization.19 Both Conservative trends saw the party as the ‘party of 
empire’.
The end of World War I initiated a  domestic crisis in the colonies as 
many colonial people from the West Indies who joined the British armed 
forces became sensitized to new ideas on race equality and democracy.20 
That sensitization, aided by new forms of communications through film 
and radio, and the spread of education and growing nationalism in 
Europe, served as an  inspiration for the emerging middle class in the 
West Indies. The knowledge attained by these people ignited the spark for 
greater participation in government and for responsibility for law making.
The post-World War I period also witnessed the emergence of the 
Mandates System as the mechanism for the administration of colonies 
tha t “...have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which 
formerly governed them  and which Eire inhabited by peoples not yet able 
to stand by themselves...”21 Though only a few colonies were under the 
Mandates System, what was im portant was tha t the standards of 
administration became the international norm for judging colonial 
practice.22 Public opinion, which began to demand stringent 
accountability in colonial practice, led to an approach by colonial
17 Hinden, Empire.
18 As reflected in the two major documents on the colonial issue -  The Empire in Africa: 
Labour’s Policy (1926) and Labour and the Nation (1928).
19 David Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1951).
20 The Imperial state was faced with unrest and insurrection in Ireland, India, the Near 
and Middle East. In the West Indies, there were increasing demands for self-government 
and greater economic assistance.
21 Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
22 Hinden, Empire.
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adm inistrations characterized by ‘sins of omission rather than  of 
commission’.23
Incidentally, a t the same time tha t the British Government was 
under pressure from the ILO to extend its labour legislation to the 
colonies, the Colonial Office was becoming concerned tha t the Labour 
Party would be increasing its questioning in Parliament on labour 
conditions in the colonies.24 After attending the First British Guiana and 
West Indies Labour Conference, F.O. Roberts recommended tha t the 
Labour Party select a group of members to study West Indian issues in 
order to have an  advantage in discussions with the Colonial Office and in 
Parliamentary debates and questions.25 The Labour Government of 1929- 
31 attem pted the first series of guidelines on labour issues for the 
colonies, and was responsible for advocating the end to penal sanctions 
in labour contracts and for the recognition of trade unions.26
By the 1930’s, it was being suggested within the League of Nations 
tha t as part of universalizing policies towards colonies, all colonial 
powers should abandon their exclusive rights to colonial areas and 
incorporate them  under the Mandates Systems.27 In response, British 
Prime Minister Baldwin explained tha t the dependencies would not 
welcome m andate status, as they were proud of their British subject 
sta tus and wanted to remain part of the British Empire.28 However, by 
then the international mood for the adm inistration of colonies had 
changed, making the maintenance of colonies a vital economic 
consideration.
23 Sins of commissions rather than sins of ommisson meant that colonial powers 
preferred to be accused of inadequate action rather than instigating wrongful acts 
against colonial people.
24 CO 323/941. Minute by Mr Ormsby-Gore to Sir S. Wilson 24 August 1925.
25 Neal R. Malmsten, “The British Labour Party and the West Indies,” Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History, 5, no.2, (1977). F.O Roberts was the representative of the 
British Labour Party and Trade Union Congress.
26 Porter and Stockwell, British Imperial Policy.
27 Royal Institute, Colonial Problem.
28 Ibid.
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5.1 .2  The Impact of Imperial Economic Policy on the Colonies
Beyond the framework of international relations, imperial economic
policy was instrum ental in determining colonial policy. The basic 
economic activity of the colonial system -  preferential trade -  gave way in 
the early twentieth century to an  open-door policy of trade within the 
British Empire.29 However, the West Indian colonies were allowed to 
establish a preferential trading regime with Canada from 1913, to 
compensate for the decline in the American market, due to the 
Americans annexing Puerto Rico, and the granting of preferences to 
Cuba and the Philippines.30 Trade with Canada became a major 
component of economic activity for the West Indian colonies and it is 
instructive th a t by 1927, Canada was now the leading trading partner 
with the West Indies with sugar obtaining 4s. 8d in the Canadian market 
compared to 3s. 8d in the British m arket.31 The United States m arket 
was also emerging as an im portant market for agricultural export and as 
a source of tourists. This represented the shifting of em phasis from 
Britain as the dominant trading partner, to the incorporation of other 
markets. However, by 1932, through the Ottawa Agreement, imperial 
preference was restored as the dominant economic trading practice.
The economic relationship between colonies and colonial powers in 
the early twentieth century expanded to include the financing of 
investment in the colonies. The early period of colonial development did 
not require significant financing except to meet the cost of establishing 
settlements and providing supplies. However, the later mechanization of 
production and the expansion of economic activities, including building 
infrastructure, attracted private and public investors. In this regard, the 
Colonial Development Fund was created “...for the purpose of aiding and 
developing agriculture and industry in certain colonies and protected and
29 F.V Meyer, British Colonies in World Trade (London; Oxford University Press, 1948).
30 Ken Post, Strike the Iron, Vol. 1 (New Jersey; Humanities Press, 1981).
31 H.V. Wiseman, A Short History of the British West Indies (London; University of 
London Press, 1950).
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m andated territories, and thereby promoting commerce with or industry 
in the United Kingdom.”32
In the case of the West Indian colonies, the greatest investment 
was in roads, bridges, railways, administrative buildings and public 
works. Thus, the economic role of the colonial state up to the 1930’s was 
restricted to the supply of essential services.33 More so, it was funded 
from the revenues of the colonies, or raised through loans on the London 
money m arket a t high interest rates.34 The level of external investment 
from 1900 to 1933 was the lowest in the British West Indies, when 
compared to other regions.35 Imperial assistance was restricted to the 
Colonial Loans Act, 1899 and the Colonial Stock Act, 1900 to attract 
investment, which was limited due to the high repayment cost. In fact, 
the Colonial Office did not establish the appropriate machinery and 
expertise to promote economic and industrial development in the 
colonies until 1934, when the Economic Department was created. This 
reflected the persistent differences between the Colonial Office and the 
Treasury on approaches to economic development in the colonies.36 The 
Colonial Office seemed to favour the need for a  significant fund that 
could be used to finance long-term development projects. The Treasury 
was firmly opposed to such a view and preferred investment tha t could 
contribute to relieving unemployment in Britain in the short-term .37
The severity of unemployment in Britain after World War I led to 
increasing support for colonial development as a means of relieving 
unemployment. This led to the use of emigration, through the Empire 
Settlement Act, to encourage settlement overseas and the reciprocal
32 Colonial Development Memorandum Explaining Financial Resolution, 1929. (Cmd. 
3357).
33 Royal Institute, Colonial Problem.
34 Hinden, Empire.
35 Royal Institute, Colonial Problem. British West Indies was £17,515,000, British Africa 
was £334,180,000; British East(Malaya and Ceylon) was £127,884,000.
36 S.R. Ashton and S.E. Stockwell, eds. Imperial Policy and Colonial Practice 1925-1945 
(London; HMSO, 1996).
37 CO 323/1016/8 , T. Jones to Sir Grindle, 12 October 1928.
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trading preferences to promote imperial products. In addition, the 
Imperial Government was asked to provide more loans and grants to 
colonies to facilitate the purchase of imperial products.38 The increase in 
production “...would benefit the colony, develop m arkets for British 
goods, and enhance the purchasing power of individual inhabitants in 
the Colonies, with future benefits to British trade.”39
As unemployment deepened in the late 1920’s, colonial economic 
development was increasingly seen as a solution, despite the objections 
of the Treasury. The passing of the Colonial Development Bill in 1929 
provided for the establishm ent of the Colonial Development Fund, to be 
administered by the Colonial Development Advisory Committee (CADC), 
was seen as a  tool to promote colonial economic development, and to 
relieve unemployment in Britain. Therefore, projects and schemes m ust 
not encourage competition, or promote industrialization. According to 
Lord Amery,
the colonies are essentially agricultural and producers of primary 
commodities. It is not very probable, or indeed, very desirable in the 
interests of the populations themselves, tha t industrial development 
should be unduly accelerated in their case.40
In consequence, the economic condition of the West Indian colonies in 
the period leading to the unrest of the 1930’s is best captured by the 
famous observation of Professor Macmillan that, “[a] social and economic 
study of the West Indies is ... necessarily a study of poverty.”41 The 
period during which the colonies brought huge profits and thus prestige 
and glory was over. The decline th a t began before Emancipation 
accelerated with the emergence of free trade and the loss of privileges 
within the British market. The post-war boom experienced by the
38 Michael Havinden and David Meredith, Colonialism and Development (Routledge; 
London, 1993).
39 Winston Churchill quoted in Ibid. p. 141.
40 Ibid. p. 169-70.
41 Macmillan, West Indies, p. 37.
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colonies collapsed by the mid-1920’s as wartime inflation, excessive 
reliance on sugar and a decaying social and economic system took its 
toll. The price of sugar declined from 60s per cwt in 1919 to 30s in 1923 
and 5s. 3d in 1935.42 There were similar drops in the prices of cotton, 
fruits, coffee and tobacco. The international crisis of the early 1930’s 
would aggravate the dire situation with disastrous consequences. 
Unemployment and low wages prevailed everywhere whilst migration 
from rural areas to towns intensified. The colonial state was in crisis, as 
the prices of exports collapsed and brought greater pressure on the 
imperial state to meet increasing expenditure.
In Saint Lucia, as was the case in other colonies, the basic problem 
was the very low price received for agricultural exports, resulting in 
curtailm ent of employment, which affected the working class most.43 
According to Palmer, “...prices have fallen, freights costs have risen, cost 
of imported goods has increased, and consequently the circulation of 
money amongst the labouring classes has diminished.”44 The 1930’s 
brought about a severe decline in the coaling services at Port Castries. 
Hundreds of persons were made unemployed, as ships moved from coal 
to other forms of fuel, and other ports became more competitive. One 
such port was St.Thomas which was made a duty-free port by the 
Americans. Sugar was also in rapid decline, while agricultural 
production was only aided by the growth of the banana industry. As was 
the practice in previous decades, the colonial state resorted to revenue 
generation through increased taxation, a practice tha t brought greater 
hardship for the poorer classes.
The economic decline of Saint Lucia was worsened by population 
growth, occasioned by natural increase and loss of migration 
opportunities to Panama, Cuba and the United States. Migration had
42 Wiseman, Short History.
43 CO 950/405, Memo of Labour Commissioner, Hon. George Palmer to Moyne 
Commission. Undated.
44 Ibid. p. 2.
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served as a  significant safety valve by reducing pressure for employment, 
for land to be available and by providing sources of remittances for 
destitute families in the colonies. The economic decline aggravated social 
deprivation and became the basis for a  political challenge to the colonial 
state by domestic society.
5.1 .3  Political challenge and the failure of Colonial Policy
In the early twentieth century, challenges to the state came from 
coloured, colonial middle class people, who demanded greater legislative 
representation. Prior to 1918, trade unions were illegal in the West 
Indian colonies. This was based on laws formulated in the state-societal 
configuration of the post-emancipation period to prevent freed men from 
uniting to demand better wages.45 By the 1930’s, the political situation 
was beginning to be dominated by the intense agitation of the coloured 
working class majority for improved working conditions and the 
professional middle class for political enfranchisement and control of the 
colonial state.
The Imperial State claimed the need for political control of the 
society, through Crown Colony government (CCG), for three reasons -  to 
establish efficient administration, to provide impartial government 
between competing classes and to protect the blacks from the whites and 
from themselves.46 However, the rationale for continuing with CCG was 
clear to the Imperial State. The Assemblies, which were white oligarchies, 
were incompetent and could not ensure stable government, was seen as 
an em barrassm ent to the imperial state. 47 Secondly, the possibility of 
coloured persons attaining the property rights to be able to vote meant
45 Richard Hart, Origin and Development of the working class in the English-speaking 
Caribbean 1897-1937 in Malcolm Cross and Gad Henman, eds. Labow in the 
Caribbean. From Emancipation to Independence (London; Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 
1988).
46 Roy Augier, ‘Before and After 1865’. New World Quarterly, Vol.2, No.2, 1966.
47 Morley Ayearst, The British West Indies. The Search for Self-Government (London; 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1960).
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tha t the black majority could assum e political control. Undoubtedly, the 
latter realization convinced the Assemblies and the local planter class to 
keep the CCG. According to Hart, the white planter had been persuaded 
that, “...the British Government would offer greater protection for their 
property and privileges than  they could provide for themselves.”48
Crown Colony Government was popular because it was amenable 
to public opinion in Britain which was more enlightened than  the West 
Indian legislatures which were noted for their reactionary tendencies.49 
Public opinion was desirous of greater imperial control to resist what 
many saw as planter abuse. However, the power wielders were not 
accountable to the people they served, b u t to a d istant imperial state. As 
all administrative posts were reserved for Englishmen, West Indians were 
not given any political responsibility and CCG represented the 
strengthening of imperial rule in the region.50 The structure and 
rationale for CCG was the basis for the num erous conflicts between the 
white oligarchy and the imperial state on the distribution of political 
power.
The case of Saint Lucia is illustrative. The island was formally 
incorporated into the Windward Island Federation in 1873, though it 
appeared mainly for administrative reasons and for savings on imperial 
expenditure. Unlike the Leeward Islands Federation, each island in the 
Windward Islands maintained their legislature and government. There 
was one Governor, resident in Grenada, and an adm inistrator for each 
island. Only the planter class had a voice in the nominated Legislature, 
as a minority, and had what could be described as “...some degree of 
representation without a corresponding degree of responsibility.”51 The
48 Richard Hart, From Occupation to Independence (Jamaica; Canoe Press University of 
the West Indies, 1998), p. 84.
49 Elizabeth Wallace, The British Caribbean. From the Decline of Colonialism to the end of 
Federation {Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 1977).
50 Denis Benn, Ideology and Political Development (Mona; ISER, 1987)
51 Royal Institute, Colonial Problem p. 238.
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Durham Report had recognized a serious deficiency in such an imperial 
policy, as it allowed persons - the planters - who had no chance to accept 
responsibility for government to act as an opposition in championing 
causes tha t challenged the colonial state, and to advocate positions that 
they would never have to pursue as a government.52 As a result, the 
history of the legislature was one of constant conflicts between the 
Executive and the non-official members, as the planters sought to defend 
their interest, and resist any attem pt to give power or privilege to the 
working and middle classes.
The emergence of local political agitation was part of a regional 
movement for representative government. The efforts intensified after it 
was agreed tha t Grenada, would receive a m easure of representation 
through a partially elected Legislative Council.53 The St.Lucia 
Representative Government Association was formally established in 
1921, after am initial attem pt in 1919. The Governor explained tha t the 
first attem pt did not excite a sufficient num ber of people, amd faltered, 
until the decision to grant Grenada constitutional chamge motivated a 
revival.54 The Association was essentially middle and professional class 
controlled, with its actions focused on political advancement. After 
num erous meetings, the Association petitioned the Secretairy of State, 
requesting a Legislative Council of a majority of elected members, amd an 
Executive Council made up equally of elected and nominated members, 
presided over by the Governor.55
It is interesting to note that among the reasons given for such a 
request, was tha t the system of selecting advisers to the Government was
52 Durham Report, quoted in Ibid.
53 CO 321/317, Memorandum of Administrator to Secretary of State, 1 August, 1921. 
Grenada’s proposal was accepted because it was felt that there it already had a number 
of elected municipal bodies and the peasantry as an electorate was not revolutionary.
54 CO 321/317, Confidential Despatch from Administrator to Governor of the Windward 
Islands, 16 June, 1921.
55 CO 321/317, Petition to the Secretary of State from St.Lucia Representative 
Association, 11 June 11, 1921.
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no longer tolerable in civilized communities, and tha t in the neighbouring 
French, Dutch and American colonies at least partially elected 
legislatures were in place. 56 The members also noted tha t the public had 
an indifferent attitude, almost approaching contempt for the unofficial 
nominated members who are not representative. These members were 
not seen as being accountable to the Governor, who selected them, or to 
the taxpayers on whose behalf they acted.
The petition, which was opposed by the Administrator and 
Governor, highlighted the nature of the relationship between colonial 
state and society.57 Firstly, they claimed tha t Saint Lucia was unsuited 
to such reform, since it had not had sufficient experience with 
representative institutions. Secondly, it was not possible to find an 
adequate num ber of well-known persons for elections. Thirdly, the level 
of illiteracy was so high that most persons did not understand w hat 
representative government m eant whilst those with education and 
property did not want it. Fourthly, the petition was a minority view with 
2.25% of the population, of which 20% were women of the servant 
class.58 Finally, some of the persons involved were of French descent, so 
were not viewed as loyal subjects.
After a period of intense agitation by the Representative 
Association, the Secretary of State informed the Association tha t the Rt. 
Honourable Wood, who would be undertaking a tour of West Indian 
colonies, would deal with the issues, as part of changes to all the 
colonies. In his Report, Wood first noted tha t there was no call for 
‘responsible government’ and even if it was requested, it could not be 
granted. Instead, Wood identified a call for ‘elective representation’ which 
was motivated by the effects of the War in spreading democratic 
sentiments, the return of learned professionals and others from abroad
56 Ibid.
57 CO 321/317, Confidential Memo from Administrator to Governor, 16 June, 1921.
58 The Association explained that they left out all government employees and all persons 
who signed with an ‘X’ and they had the support of persons from all sectors.
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with a broader view of life, the history of representative institutions 
present in the colonies, and the fact tha t the United States had bestowed 
representative institutions to Cuba and the Philippines.59 Wood outlined 
th a t the intention of reform in the West Indies was to ensure “...on the 
one hand tha t control of the Secretary of State m ust continue in effective 
form and on the other tha t the movement towards elective representation 
m ust be met.”60 Two stages were outlined towards tha t objective - the 
reduction of the majority of nominated unofficial members by bringing in 
some elected unofficial members, and then the shift from a majority of 
official members to a majority of elected and nominated unofficial 
members. 61 In the second stage, there would be local autonomy, bu t in 
cases declared to be ‘essential to the good government of the colonies’ the 
Secretary of State would be allowed to confirm or disallow.
Every effort was made by the colonial state, influenced by the 
planter and commercial class, to stifle the move to representative 
government. The Administrator, clear in the view that the society was not 
ready for elective government, argued th a t “...the introduction into the 
Legislative Council of an elective element (even a minority) would be 
dangerous to the best interests of the colony no m atter how 
representative the demand for it...”62 Even when concessions were made 
by the imperial state in order to award some form of representation, the 
class nature of the political struggle was exposed. In tha t instance, a 
Committee established to make proposals to the Secretary of State on 
granting a m easure of representative government, agreed unanimously,
59 Wood Report
60 Ibid. p. 8.
61 ‘Official members’ were imperial representatives and ‘unofficial members’ were the 
local representatives.
62 CO 321/317, Despatch from Administrator to Secretary of State, 1 August, 1921.
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tha t the qualifications to be an elector were too low in Grenada, and 
should be raised considerably in the case of Saint Lucia.63
The eventual modification to the Crown Colony system in Saint 
Lucia m eant th a t the Legislative Council now comprised five official 
members, the Governor, when present in the colony, the Administrator, 
three unofficial nominated members and three unofficial elected 
members.64 The right to be elected and to vote was dependent on clear 
property ownership and income earning capacity. The Legislature was 
modified again in 1931, to comprise three ex-officio members, three 
nominated officials, three nominated officials and three elected unofficial 
members.65 After the first stage of worker unrest, the Legislative Council 
was further changed to consist of the Governor, three ex-officio members 
(the Administrator, Attorney-General and Treasurer), three nominated 
members and five elected members.66
It was clear tha t the changes were not radical, bu t consistent with 
the notion tha t the coloured majority was not capable of making the right 
choices on representation and was not suitable to be elected. It also 
ensured tha t political power was only given to the propertied class. Most 
importantly, the changes sought to achieve the objective “...to preserve 
unimpaired the ultimate control of the Secretary of State.”67
The failure of colonial policy was most telling in the social and 
economic conditions of the majority of the population. It was clear that 
the initial opposition to Imperial rule was driven by the white population. 
It was borne of the belief that as Englishmen, they too had a right to be 
elected and to elect their representatives. The inclusion of the coloured 
population was a strategic move to dem onstrate wider support than  there
63 CO 321/321, Despatch of Governor to Secretary of State, September 7th, 1922. The 
Committee included persons from the Legislative Council and the St.Lucia 
Representative Government Association.
64 St.Lucia (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 1924.
65 Colonial Report, 1933.
66 Colonial Report, 1936.
67 Wood Report, p. 9.
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really was. The Representative Government Association made it clear to 
Wood tha t they did not have any grievances, bu t that their agitation was 
motivated “...on the ground tha t those who were taxed should have some 
voice in the selection of persons who were called upon to tax them .”68
For the coloured majority, the failure of colonial rule was not 
manifested in political development, bu t in the absence of the basic 
requirements for civilized living. Lewis noted tha t though wages and cost 
of living varied from island to island, the levels were so low, that 
subsistence was at an  appalling standard.69 In Saint Lucia, male 
agricultural workers received 1/- to 1 /6  per 9-hour day, sugar factory 
workers received 2 /-  to 2 /6  per 12-hour day, while domestic females 
received 9 /-  to £1 per 56-70 - hour m onth.70 The consequence was 
evident “...in the ragged clothing, dilapidated housing, and 
undernourished condition of the m asses and their children.”71 In 
addition, the colony suffered from chronic unemployment with over 
8,000 unemployed persons.72 The unemployed lived off their gardens and 
in the off-season fed on imported foodstuff. Palmer indicated tha t he did 
not know how the unemployed got money to purchase essentials and 
“...lives at the mercy of providence.”73
The dilapidated housing was endemic to the colonies and outside 
the estates there was a marked absence of any planned settlements. The 
Colonial Engineer in Saint Lucia drew to the attention of the Moyne 
Commission, the critical problem of slum s tha t arose because of the lack 
of planning of Negro settlements.74 Rental of property was too expensive
68 Ibid. 20.
69 Arthur Lewis, Labour in the West Indies: The Birth of a Workers Movement (London; 
New Beacon Books, 1977).
70 Saint Lucia Blue Book 1935.
71 Lewis, Labour, p. 15.
72 CO 950/405, Memo of Labour Commissioner, Hon. George Palmer to Moyne 
Commission.
73 Ibid.
74 CO 950/402, Memo of Colonial Engineer, Mr. Wright North to Moyne Commission.
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for labourers, so they built shacks instead. 75 It was remarkable that, up 
until the 1930’s, almost a  hundred years after slavery ended, there had 
not been any housing programmes to accommodate the thousands of 
coloured people who were now free. There were no sewers and the state 
of waste disposal was deplorable. There was little consideration for the 
quality of water which was made available. The situation became so dire, 
th a t an  appeal had to be made to the Imperial Government to provide 
small sum s to homeowners to improve the quality of water by shifting 
from drinking from polluted rivers to saving rain water in tanks.76
Given the low wages and high unemployment, especially seasonal, 
m alnutrition was prevalent.77 Poor dieting and deplorable environmental 
conditions created one of the most insalubrious regions in the colonial 
world, despite its natural beauty. The population, especially the coloured 
labouring class, was prone to the effects of num erous diseases with 
malaria, typhoid fever, yaws, hookworm and venereal diseases being 
widespread.78
Although education was compulsory, the law was not enforced 
because of the lack of school space and the distance children had to 
travel. In 1938, there were 45 denominational primary schools and 2 
secondary schools.79 There were no government schools, bu t the 
government paid the salaries of the primary school teachers and provided 
grants to the two secondary schools. Palmer observed tha t such was the 
effect of poverty on education tha t in homes where there was more than 
one child, tha t clothing was shared. One child would use it one day, the
75 Ibid.
76 CO 950/399, Memorandum on Medical and Sanitary Matters to Moyne Commission.
77 CO 950/405, Memo of Labour Commissioner, Hon. George Palmer, to Moyne 
Commission.
78 St.Lucia Blue Books, 1930-35.
79 Colonial Report 1938.
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other the next to enable all the children to attend school.80 School 
records showed a low attendance of students.81
A commission appointed to investigate primary and secondary 
education in the West Indies noted tha t its primary education was the 
least progressive in the British Empire in term s of resources spent, 
training of teachers and relationships with other educational 
institutions.82 The situation was made worse in Saint Lucia because of 
low spending, its denominational s ta tus as Catholic and because of 
language differences.83 In other colonies, the Anglican Church provided 
the resources for educational development, bu t was reluctant to do so in 
Saint Lucia because of the low num bers of Anglicans. Education was 
based on the English Language, which was not the first language of the 
majority of people on the island. In the 1921 Census, it was noted tha t 
56.5% of persons spoke only Kweyol.84 There were no technical schools 
or even agricultural schools for training, despite agriculture being the 
dominant economic activity. The call for vocational training and an 
agricultural school was a common theme in presentations to the Moyne 
Commission.85
Generally, there was no legislation to address social conditions 
relating to housing, health, workmen’s compensation, or provisions for 
sickness or old age pension.86Lewis explained tha t West Indian colonial 
governments were concerned with planter interests, and showed little
so Ibid.
81 St.Lucia Blue Books, 1930-35.
82 CO 884/13/19 . Education in the West Indies.
83 CO 256/45. The Annual Education Report of 1951 mentions that the Lobb 
Commission of 1917 recognised that in comparison with the whole of the West Indies, 
St.Lucia was spending less on primary education then any other colony.
84 CO 321/317, 1921 Census.
85 CO 950/400, For example, the presentations by the Youth Delegation and by Mr. 
C.A. Beaubrun.
86 Colonial Report 1938.
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desire to redress these conditions, especially as they only affected 
coloured people.87
The colonial society in Saint Lucia during the period leading to the 
unrest was a volatile confluence of an  impoverished and agitated 
majority population, a self-interested elite which controlled the state and 
an  imperial state, which saw the survival of its Empire for strategic 
reasons and prestige.
5 .2  Labour Unrest as a Transformation Event
The above account of the social, economic and political situation in
Saint Lucia clearly demonstrates the prevailing crisis of colonial rule. The 
ruling planter class stood in opposition to the state as a  result of the 
denial of political rights and the fact tha t the sugar industry was in 
decline. In addition, the professional and commercial classes were 
fighting for greater political involvement, whilst the black majority faced 
social destitution. The 1930’s witnessed an intensified challenge to the 
colonial order tha t ignited a decolonization process, and the 
disintegration of the British Empire. There were two major issues which 
characterized the challenge. Firstly, the collapse of the international 
trading and financial systems, followed by the Great Depression, 
generated a conflict over the management of flows of capital and goods. 
The Empire provided Britain with a network of countries tha t enjoyed 
preferences to the benefit of Britain. Understandably, the United States 
aspired to dismantling such a system of preferences. Simultaneously, it 
was a strategic period for the Soviet Union to intensify its anti-imperialist 
campaign against Western colonial powers. Secondly, the crisis within 
the colonies brought about by economic dislocation and the rise of a 




Therefore, the challenge to colonial rule took the form of 
international support for the anti-colonial struggle and domestic 
upheavals aimed at overthrowing the colonial system. This crisis forced 
the British Government to appoint the Moyne Commission with a clear 
intention to transform colonial rule and create a new state-societal 
relationship in the colonies.
5.2.1. International Politics and the Anti-colonial Struggle
The early anti-colonial struggle received its greatest international 
support in the successes of the Russian Revolution in the 1920’s. 
Although in theory, early Communist thought recognized the historical 
necessity of colonialism and its role as an  objective progressive process.88 
Throughout the early writings of Marx and Engels and the deliberations 
of the Communist Internationals, it was very clear that the debate on the 
national and colonial question was heavily contentious.89 It was not until 
the early 1920’s tha t Lenin advocated a  new understanding of the role of 
colonies, based on the equality of all peoples and their inherent right to 
secession as independent states. Support for the anti-colonial struggle 
was based on the principle tha t every nation had a right to secede, bu t 
any relationship should be voluntary and guided by equality of rights 
and sta tus.90
The growing disgruntlement of colonial peoples and the 
disappointment with the pace of an anticipated European revolution in 
the 1920’s led to a new approach to the colonial question. The colonies 
assum ed a significant role in Soviet foreign policy, with the objective that 
“[t]he socialist revolution of the industrial workers and the national- 
democratic uprisings of the colonial middle and lower classes would thus
88 Demetrio Boersner, The Bolsheviks and the National and Colonial Question 
(Connecticut; Hyperion Press, Inc., 1957).
88 Ibid.
90 Hinden, Empire. v
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form the two component parts of a single world-wide invincible force.”91 
The increasing unlikelihood of a European proletarian revolution forced 
greater Soviet attention on the colonies to produce national-democratic 
revolutions as a means of weakening the capitalist world.
Throughout the West Indies, there was evidence of the influence of 
Marxist information and involvement. Publications included pamphlets 
on ‘How to organize a struggle\ ‘Horn to organize and educate the working 
m asses’, as well as messages addressed to T he workers and oppressed 
people o f the West Indies’.92 In fact the fear of Bolshevik involvement in 
inciting agitation in the colonies started from the early 1920’s, and led 
the Secretary of State to request an  investigation in Saint Lucia.93 In the 
1930’s, there was significant propaganda material coming from the 
Communist Party of the United States, which had a large num ber of 
black people, including West Indians, in its membership. It was believed 
tha t some communist agitators were involved in the coal strikes of the 
early 1930’s were also using the Italy/Abyssinia War to mobilize.94
Another external influence on the anti-colonial struggle came from 
the geographical proximity of the colonies to the United States, as the 
expansion of its economy promoted unofficial commercial and political 
relations with the West Indian colonies. The ongoing economic crisis in 
the colonies encouraged the large-scale movement of people to the United 
States to seek employment, and in the process, established a  large 
Diaspora of West Indians in major cities. The rise of organized labour, 
the growth of Pan-Africanists views and the movement of West Indians to 
and from the American mainland influenced anti-colonial sentim ents in 
the colonies.95 In addition, activists were conscious of the relations
91 Boersner, The Bolsheviks.
92 George Belle, The Struggle for Political Democracy: 1937 Riots in Cynthia Barrow-Giles 
Introduction to Caribbean Politics (Kingston; Ian Randle Publishers, 2002).
93 CO 321/317, Secret Letter to Administrator, 16 August, 1921.
94 CO 321/362/8 , Report from Governor to Secretary of State, 5 November 1935.
95 Roy S. Biyce-Laporte and Delores M. Mortimer, Caribbean Immigration to the United 
States (Washington, D.C.; Smithsonian Institution, 1983).
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between America and its colonies, and the modalities th a t existed for 
consultation on colonial policy. Even the Moyne Commission recognized 
the importance of this influence, which is why it visited the American 
colonies, citing this model as worthy of consideration.
Another powerful influence on the rise of the anti-colonial struggle 
in the West Indian colonies was the impact of Marcus Garvey’s teachings. 
Garvey argued tha t the lack of political power was responsible for the 
social, economic and cultural deprivation of black people. Garvey 
established a formidable international organization, the United Negro 
Improvement Association (UNLA), which had millions of members 
throughout the United States, Latin American, Africa and the West 
Indies. The UNLA had commercial, religious, political, and educational 
arms, which provided political education and hope for oppressed blacks 
ostracized from the colonial order. In fact, most of the emerging grass 
roots leadership in the West Indies were ex-Garveyites or active 
Garveyites.96 The UNLA espoused black pride and consciousness, and 
inspired blacks to rise against the colonial system and overcome their 
problems through organized political activity.
5.2.2. Labour Unrest and Political Action
The initial response of the working class to their problems was 
centred on industrial protest demanding better pay and working 
conditions. The middle class on the other hand, was preoccupied with 
issues centring on representation in the legislature, and control of the 
state apparatus.
The dispossession of the middle class was most evident in their 
minimal participation in government and lack of representation in the 
legislative bodies. By the 1930’s, significant changes had been made to 
the Crown Colony Government system, bu t influence remained within
96 Belle, 1937 Riots.
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the  p lan ter and  com m ercial classes. G overnm ent w as seen  as ensuring  
law and  order which had  a  repressive function. The fundam ental 
responsibility  w as “...the  m ain tenance of a  clim ate conducive to the  well­
being of investors in London and  the ir agen ts in the  colonies.”97
The prevalence of white persons controlling the  public service 
increasingly bred opposition from the  growing educated  m iddle class of 
coloured people, who felt th a t they were equally capable of adm inistering 
their own affairs. Further, the failings of colonial projects and  
program m es did not provide any justification  for W hitehall civil servan ts 
to head  public departm en ts.98 The choice of W hitehall civil servan ts over 
local people, even w hen less qualified, w as seen  a s  racist, w hich in tu rn  
fed the  local Representative G overnm ent Association and  the  black 
consciousness m ovem ent.99
The end of WWI signalled the  com m encem ent of a period of u n res t 
th roughou t the  W est Indian colonies. In S ain t Lucia, re tu rn ing  soldiers 
had  a significant role to play in su ch  agitation, som e of whom  were 
persuaded  to em igrate to avoid any prob lem s.100 The effect of the 
agitators w as m ore telling in Sain t Lucia, because  unlike o ther islands 
where m ost w orkers were agricu ltural^and away from the town, m ost of 
the  labourers were employed cariy ing coal or doing work in the  tow n.101
There w as a  general wave of strikes in early 1920, w hich included 
coal carriers, b read  boys, the steam er crews and  the  employees of the 
C astries Town B oard .102 However, the  m ost significant strike was 
un d ertak en  by twenty-two police constables, who were dem anding higher
97 J.M. Lee, Colonial Development and Good Government (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 
1967), p. 8.
98 The Moyne Commission recognized the serious deficiencies with imperial civil 
servants and made specific recommendations to upgrade the quality of persons sent to 
the colonies.
99 CO 3 2 1 /3 6 2 /6 , Letter from Hon. Augier McVane to Lord Rhyader, 16 August 1935.
100 CO 3 2 1 /3 1 0 , Despatch from Governor to Secretary of State, 6 March 1920.
Ibid.
102 CO 3 2 1 /3 1 0 , Confidential Memo from Administrator of Saint Lucia to Governor, 23 
February 1920.
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salaries.103 In response, the Administrator requested the assistance of a 
warship, the constables were fired, whilst a  sum  of £5 was granted to 
each officer who had remained loyal. The continued presence of the 
warship H.M.S. Constance also served to quell all intention of strike 
action tha t still existed. Racial or class antagonism towards the Police 
appeared to play a part in the action of the police officers. They were 
described by the Governor as “...young Policemen, none of them  having 
three years service, and a large proportion of them are worthless, and 
associates of the worst characters in Castries.”104 It was also reported 
that there was open contempt for the Police by the local press and 
members of the ‘better classes’.
The unrest of 1920 seen as the work of one group of agitators, 
related to the Universal Negro Improvement Association, led the 
Administrator to conclude tha t though the high cost of living was used as 
an excuse, the main cause was racial antipathy.105 The solution to the 
unrest was seen in simple repressive terms -  position ships close to the 
islands, and if the situation got worse, station a few soldiers on land to 
curtail any thoughts of rioting.
Throughout the 1920’s there was an atmosphere of unrest on 
sugar estates and among coal carriers. The next major strike started on 3 
January, 1929, when coal carriers requested an increase from Id to 2d 
per basket. The coal m erchants refused, threatening to send the coal 
steamers away to dispose of the coal. Despite representation from 
members of the Legislative and Executive Council, the workers remained 
adamant. The situation seemed to worsen when it was reported that 
labourers in the sugar factories were planning to strike in solidarity.106 
The Administrator requested a warship as a display of force to end the
103 Ibid. The Force had 76 Non-Commissioned Officers.
104 Ibid., p. 3.
105 Ibid. See also CO 321/310, Secret Memo from Chief of Police to Administrator, 21 
February 1920.
loe qo 321/339/1 , Despatch of Administrator to Secretary of State, 16 January 1929.
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strike. The presence of ‘H.M.S. Heliotrope’ proved useful for the colonial 
state, as workers returned to work two days later.107
The strike aroused tremendous concern among the planter class, 
with members of the Legislative Council requesting tha t the warship 
remain as a demonstration of force. Instead, the Governor expressed 
confidence in the Police Force and requested the establishm ent of a 
Volunteer Force to avoid calling warships whenever there was trouble.108 
The concern of the local elite was reflected in the opinion of the owner 
and Editor of the ‘Voice’ that they were “...sitting on a  volcano which 
might erupt a t any time.”109
Like the 1920’s, the early 1930’s witnessed persistent stoppages in 
work and growing labour unrest. As news of unrest in other colonies 
reached workers, it seemed to embolden them to pursue similar action. 
On 4 November 1935, coal workers went on strike, following 
disturbances in Saint Vincent, where a num ber of persons were killed 
and injured The Governor did not hesitate to declare a state of emergency 
and summon a w arship.110
The coal workers representatives requested tha t their wages be 
doubled. The demand was denied by the Governor on the grounds that 
the coaling companies were not profitable, and any wage increase, would 
destroy the industry.111 As a form of appeasement, the Governor offered 
to established a Commission of Inquiry to examine working conditions 
and make recommendations for redress. Interestingly, the Governor 
lamented the failure of workers to make representation before striking. 
The workers’ response that they were not able to meet with the
107 c o  321/339/1 , Despatch of Governor to Secretary of State, 8 January 1929.
108 CO 321/339/1 , Confidential Despatch from Governor to Secretary of State, 23 
January 1929. The Volunteer Force was disbanded during World War I as most of the 
able persons went to the frontline and those who returned were not interested in 
regrouping.
109 CO 321/339/1 , Report of Administrator to Governor, 2 February 1929.
no CO 321/362/8 , Telegram from Governor to Secretary of State, 4 November 1935.
in CO 321/362/8 , Report of Meeting Between the Governor and Representatives of the 
Coaling Industry, 5 November 1935.
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Administration was reflective of the relationship between state and 
society -  the absence of avenues for the majority of society, the labouring 
class, to influence the state.
On 5 August 1937, the biggest strike occurred, as several hundred 
agricultural workers protested for higher wages, following similar action 
in Trinidad, Barbados, Jam aica and British G uiana.112 At a meeting with 
the owners of the estate, it was pointed out tha t there was a fear tha t if 
an increase were granted, other small and unprofitable estates would be 
affected resulting in increased unrest and discontent.113 The seriousness 
of the situation warranted a Legislative Council meeting, where the 
unofficial members requested the Governor to summon a warship, and 
for a naval aeroplane to fly over disaffected areas.114 These official 
members, all of the planter class, claimed tha t the strikes were 
influenced by events in the other colonies, and feared tha t the strikers 
would riot and destroy property.
The Governor offered to establish a Commission of Inquiry into the 
Minimum Wage Order and noted that, plantations were evading the 
minimum wage requirements by paying per task, and even employing 
children.115 By September, the strikes spread to workers on the Road 
Works Project and on certain Banana estates.116 The strikes finally ended 
when am increase in the wage level for agricultural labourers was agreed 
and implemented, pending the final report of the Commission.117
112 CO 321/374/10, Confidential Despatch of Administrator to Governor, 12 August 
1937.The owner of Roseau Estates, Joseph Duboulay estimated between 1300-1500 
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115 Ibid. The Commission of Enquiry was established on 10 August with no 
representation from the striking workers but included the owners and members of the 
Legislative Council.
116 CO 321/374/10, Despatch of Administrator to Governor, 3 September 1937.
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5.2 .3 . Imperial State Response -  the Moyne Commission
The riots and unrest of the 1930’s forced the Imperial Government 
to consider investigating the state of the West Indian colonies and to 
institute ameliorative measures. However, there was no commitment tha t 
Britain would meet the resources required for sustained improvement. 
The initial view of the West India Department was tha t no case for a 
general commission had been made and whilst the idea was politically 
attractive, any large-scale improvement required significant expenditure 
which was not likely to be approved.118 However, an  alternative view 
supporting the establishment of a Royal Commission argued th a t the 
unrest might continue to give the impression th a t unrest and riots were a 
colonial problem.119 In addition, the strategic interest of the United 
States in the West Indies and their desire to paint a dark picture of 
British colonialism were seen as important considerations.
The decision to appoint a Royal Commission was hastened by the 
expectation of a question in Parliament on tha t subject.120 In doing so, 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies warned Cabinet th a t the 
Commission’s recommendations would involve more expenditure, and it 
made no sense to send out a Royal Commission and reject its proposals 
on financial grounds.121 Interestingly, it was stated tha t part of any 
monies needed would come from increased taxation in the colonies, 
reflecting the continued belief tha t the colonies should provide for 
themselves. Cabinet approved the establishm ent of the Commission, with 
the understanding tha t more finance would be necessary.122
The Commission members were appointed in August 1938, and 
from October 1938 to March 1939 undertook a tour of the Caribbean 
investigating the social, economic and political conditions th a t gave rise
118 CO 318/433/1 , Memorandum of West India Department, 20 May 1938.
"9 CO 318/433/1 , Minute by Sir John Campbell, 23 May 1938.




to the unrest. The recommendations were designed to reform the colonial 
relationship with the Imperial State accepting greater responsibility for 
the development of the state and society in the colonies.
The declaration of war in September 1939 disrupted IV^Donald’s 
momentum to reform colonial policy and practice, despite the Secretary’s 
directive th a t social development activities should not be affected.123 In 
light of the War, every policy and action had to serve the imperial interest 
first. In fact, the colonies had to be mobilized to contribute both hum an 
and material resources to defend the British Empire.124 The War forced a 
rethink of the urgency to redress the colonial situation and in particular 
generated an inter-departmental debate on the wisdom of releasing the 
Moyne Commission Report.
It was argued tha t the Report contained several sections that 
portrayed the Empire in an  unfavourable manner, and could be used for 
hostile propaganda. On the other hand, there was caution that with the 
general expectancy pending the Report, any delay could lead to more 
unrest. In addition, withholding the Report would lead to speculation 
tha t its contents were worse than  what actually existed, and that the 
Commission would object to a delay, having already mitigated the 
severity of its statem ents.125 In the end, the concerns of war 
predominated, and only the recommendations of the Commission were 
published. At the same time, a  Statement of Policy on Colonial 
Development and Welfare was presented in Parliament.126
The recommendations were a comprehensive response to the 
disturbances in the West Indian colonies. The highlight of the Report was 
the establishm ent of a West Indian Welfare Fund of £1,000,000 annually
123 CO 691/174/42154/1 , Circular Telegram from the Secretary of State to all Colonial 
Dependencies, 15 September 1939.
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125 CO 318/439 /9 , Note by C. Carstairs, Acting Principal Secretary, West Indian 
Department of the Colonial Office, 6 January 1940.
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for twenty years, to be administered by a  Special Comptroller who was 
independent of West Indian Governments.127 In summary, the Report 
was the m ost detailed attem pt to reform colonial policy and compensate 
for centuries of systemic and deliberate neglect of the social and 
economic development of the colonies.
In Education, the Commission’s main recommendations were the 
establishm ent of more schools and teacher training colleges, and the 
provision of free meals and clothes for poor children. In public health, it 
advocated the training of nurses, centralizing medical facilities and 
promoting preventive medicine. It proposed to clear slum  areas and 
provide government-financed rural housing projects. The Commission 
recommended laws to protect Trade Unions and the right to peaceful 
picketing. Proposals were made for Labour Departments and Wage 
Boards to be created, and workers compensation to be enacted. 
Similarly, the proposals for economic development were also extensive 
and included an increase in the sugar quota, improving imperial 
preferences, developing peasant agriculture, and facilitating land 
settlement schemes. For political development, the Commission 
recommended universal adult suffrage, greater elected representation in 
the executive, bu t suggested tha t power should remain with the 
Governor.
However, despite the extensiveness of the Moyne Commission, it
did not reflect the aspirations of the m asses tha t had revolted. The
Moyne Commission itself concluded tha t the
disturbances can only be regarded as a symptom of which the 
principal causes are low earnings and irregular employment...and 
...the discontent...is...no longer a mere blind protest against the 
worsening of conditions, bu t a positive demand for the creation of new 
conditions tha t will render possible a better and less restricted life.128
127 West India Royal Commission Report, (Cmd. 6607, June 1945).
128 Ibid. p. 197.
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Yet the recommendations, though having a social welfare bias, 
failed to address the fundamental issue of sustainable economic 
development of the region.129 Lewis argued tha t the Commission 
attem pted to repair the social fabric of colonial life without seeking to 
replace the social fabric.130 Therefore, it paid little reference to economic 
equality, and projects had a rural bias seeking bit-by-bit improvements 
in agriculture and social services. The Colonial Development and Welfare 
Organization, established to implement the recommendations, was 
staffed by Englishmen and had little indigenous input.
The approach to reforming colonial rule and building the future
state and society was built on the old assumption,
th a t a  pattern of social life has been achieved in the past which, given 
a  few administrative reforms, is adequate for the needs of any people; 
th a t if troubles arise anywhere, all th a t is necessary is tha t the British 
way of life should be more fully understood and more closely 
followed.131
5 .3  Reformed Colonialism and a New State-societal 
Relationship
The response of the British to the crisis of the colonial order was to 
offer a  reformed relationship. The earlier opposition of the Treasury to 
the Commission was based on the fear th a t any addition of welfare 
spending would undermine the historical practice of insisting on colonial 
self-sufficiency and would pu t a strain on the Exchequer.132 However, the 
unrest in the West Indian colonies had led to public em barrassm ent and 
a political necessity to support colonial development, in particular 
welfare spending. Further, the Colonial Secretary, Malcolm MacDonald,
129 Gordon K. Lewis, The Growth of the Modem West Indies (New York; Modem Reader 
Paperbacks, 1968). Lewis noted that recommendations were similar to the programmes 
advocated by West Indian Labour Parties which were only taken seriously because they 
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was committed to colonial reform, and his attention went beyond the
West Indies to effect change in all colonial policy.133 The Secretary
intended to use the outcome of the Commission’s work as part of a
broader scheme for a  new imperial policy. That new scheme would be
implemented within a new political framework. According to Fraser,
the central concern was to devise the institutional mechanism tha t 
would ensure the implementation and supervision of the new colonial 
dispensation -  a process th a t envisaged a token increase in 
representation at the level of colonial government and a  policy of 
greater participation by colonial elites in colonial adm inistration.134
The Moyne Commission’s recommendations, whatever their 
shortcomings, changed colonial practice which led to the construction of 
a new state-societal relationship in the West Indian colonies.
5.3 .1 . International Framework as the Context for British
Colonial Policy in the Caribbean
The reform of the state-societal relationship in Saint Lucia took 
place in a changed international context, occasioned by World War II and 
the allied victory. Most significantly, the United States and the Soviet 
Union emerged as superpowers, and unfolded a Cold War characterized 
by an  intense ideological battle between capitalism and socialism. The 
emergence of the United Nations as the embodiment of world opinion and 
order, and in practice as the source of international law, would have a 
significant impact on British colonialism.135 Such an international 
framework helped define the contours of the new state-societal 
relationship.
The decline of Britain as the dominant world power was most 
evident by the early victories of the Fascists and the th reat tha t Britain
133 Ibid. See Also Aston and Stockwell, Imperial Policy.
134 Cary Fraser, Ambivalent Anti-colonialism: The United States and the genesis of West 
Indian Independence, 1940-1964 (Connecticut; Greenwood Press, 1994). p. 12.
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faced for its own survival. At the same time, the United States was 
concerned about the change of events in Europe and was fearful of 
German occupation of the colonies in the Western Hemisphere.136 In May 
1940, Prime Minister Churchill formally requested materiel and the 
assistance of forces from the United States. Finally, an  agreement was 
formalized between Britain and the United States in September 1940 to 
exchange materiel for bases in the colonies. Earlier, the United States 
was able to secure an agreement with Hemispheric Foreign Ministers to 
establish a trusteeship to administer all colonies, should there be an 
attem pt to transfer ownership to any other European power. The meeting 
also agreed th a t the United States would be allowed to act unilaterally to 
occupy the colonies if it were deemed necessary.137
The assistance of the Americans, noted for their anti-European 
colonialism, in the fight against Fascism was not without demands for 
changes in the British Empire. The ‘bases-for-destroyers’ deal 
transformed the context for colonial policy in the West Indies. It implied a 
derogation of Britain sovereignty in the colonies, and formally opened the 
door for an American presence in the colonies.138 The formal involvement 
of the United States was extended when the British finally agreed to an 
American economic mission to the colonies, although for the Americans 
it was an investigation of the implications of American occupation if it 
became necessary.139
The Americans were adam ant tha t the future of the colonial empire 
would have to be addressed before its involvement in the War was 
intensified. It was no secret tha t the Americans thought tha t British
136 Fraser, Anti-Colonialism.
137 Ibid. The meeting was held from July 21 to July 27, 1940.
138 David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-41 (London; 
Europa Publications, 1981).
139 Even after having agreed, the British tried to stop the visit of the Taussig Mission. It 
was only after the American pointed out that the Moyne Commission was allowed to 
visit American colonies that the British agreed. The Mission was undertaken in 
November 1940.
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imperialism “...obstructed free trade, prevented self-determination and 
reinforced the worst features of Britain’s class-ridden society.”140
The Atlantic Charter sought to resolve differences on the future of 
the colonial empire by defining “certain common principles in the 
national policy of their respective countries on which they base their 
hopes for a better future for the world.”141 There existed acute differences 
between the Colonial and Foreign Offices during the War on the nature of 
the colonial relationship that should exist after the War. Similarly, there 
were num erous debates on the role of America in the colonial empire. 
The Colonial Office sought to exclude the Americans even while the 
imperial government gave in to many of the American dem ands especially 
transferring the responsibility of defending the West Indian colonies to 
America.142 The difference over the influence of America in colonial policy 
was demonstrated in the formation of the Anglo-American 
Commission.143 Despite the opposition of the Colonial Office, the Imperial 
State agreed and promoted the Commission, as necessary to assist in 
rehabilitating the Caribbean colonies and encouraged American 
participation in domestic issues during the W ar.144
The American strategic context changed at the end of the War as 
the focus of the power struggle was in Central and Western Europe. The 
Americans were willing to accept the continuation of colonial bonds in 
the Caribbean as the safeguard for their hemispheric in terest.145 The
140 Porter and Stockwell, British Imperial Policy, p. 26.
141 The Atlantic Charter, Joint Declaration by the President and Prime Minister, p. 12. 
August 1941. The Charter caused differences between the Colonial and Foreign Office 
especially over Article 3, which was believed to be a submission of the rights of Empire. 
Churchill later explained that it only referred to countries under Nazi control.
142 Reynolds, Anglo-American Alliance. Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary, accepted that 
Britain had compromised its sovereignty in the colonies but that it had no choice.
143 Fraser, Anti-colonialism. The Anglo-American Commission was an American idea to 
institutionalize Anglo-American cooperation in the Caribbean.
144 Ibid. American troops were used to put down unrest in St.Lucia and the Bahamas in 
July 1942.
145 This is evident by the acceptance of the European position on colonialism in San 
Francisco and the establishment of the Caribbean Commission including France, 
Britain and Netherlands to coordinate development in the region.
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Caribbean Commission became the mechanism through which the 
United States was able to influence colonial policies of various European 
powers in the hemisphere. The Americans were contented with British 
attem pts to reform colonialism rather than  create a vacuum  for the 
Soviet Union, with a stated anti-colonial philosophy, to encourage and 
strengthen independence movements in the Caribbean region. With the 
experience of the majority of the former colonies becoming strident anti­
colonialists and leading the decolonization process, the Imperial State 
became concerned with ensuring th a t the West Indian colonies did not 
give allegiance to the Soviet Union. In the context of the Cold War, the 
Imperial State had to find a balance between decolonization and 
maintenance of its influence in the colonies.
The greatest criticism of colonialism was within the United Nations
which began to increase from the late 1940’s, as India and other South
Asian countries joined the body. Britain was required to provide
information on its custody of the colonies to the Secretary-General and
was frequently criticized by the General Assembly. In many instances of
granting independence, foreign policy officials in Britain cited UN
criticism. According to Philpott,
to UN criticism, as to other criticism, Britain responded by insisting 
rhetorically on its ideal of gradual self-government and exceeding it in 
practice. Again and again, it fretted about its reputation, irritated and 
surprised tha t it should be so challenged.146
5.3.2. A New Imperial Economic Policy and Persistent
Underdevelopment in the Colonies
The approach to economic development of the colonies in the post- 
1938 period was initially influenced by the debate between the United 
States and Britain, especially a t the First West Indian Conference. The 
Americans wanted a complete diversification of the economies and 
promotion of intra-Caribbean trade immediately whilst the British
146 Philpott, Sovereignty, p. 186.
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wanted to wait until after WWII to diversify and to reduce preferences for 
sugar. The British, obviously considering its sugar interests in the 
colonies and in London, objected to such economic development p lans.147 
Despite the differences, the Conference did issue a comprehensive joint 
declaration on economic policies and procedures.148 Following on the 
work of the Conference, the Caribbean Commission promoted a num ber 
of projects for the economic development of the colonies.149
In contrast to the liberal international economic order advocated 
by the Americans in the 1930’s, the post-war framework was a 
reinforcement of mercantilism. Such a framework was necessary for the 
economic revival of the British economy, through the sterling area. For 
the West Indian colonies, it m eant tha t any restructuring needed to 
promote economic development would be disregarded. In a public 
announcem ent in Saint Lucia, the Secretary of State made it clear that 
there would be little substantial change to economic policy following the 
W ar.150 The supply of goods from overseas would not improve, and 
production for consumption and export, would be maintained at the 
highest level. However, development projects tha t were deferred would be 
executed.
After the War, the economic policy for the colonies was modified to 
expand colonial production and export to the dollar area, and to restrict 
all imports tha t were made wholly or largely of dollar materials, including 
those from the sterling area.151 Britain was able to serve as the centre for 
the receipt and disbursement of dollars. The policy was designed to 
integrate the colonies into a system th a t would restore Britain’s economic
147 CO 1042/101, Report to Secretary of State on the First West Indian Conference, 21- 
30 March 1944.
148 Annette Baker Fox, Freedom and Welfare in the Caribbean. A Colonial Dilemma (New 
York; Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1949).
149 The most significant was the Caribbean Tourist Development Plan.
150 St.Lucia Gazette, 30 June 1945. Statement of Secretary of State on Economic Position 
in Period Immediately After Cessation of Hostility.
151 St.Lucia Gazette, 13 March 1948, Statement from President of Board of Trade on the 
Use of Hard Currency in the Sterling Area.
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and financial standing.152 The policy was so exploitative tha t Howe stated 
tha t it “...may well have been the m ost oppressive form of economic 
imperialism yet seen in British tropical colonies, carried out with a 
combination of self-interest, myopia and liberal good intentions.”153 
Similarly, the trading pattern was turned into Great Britain’s advantage 
at the expense of cheaper and easily obtainable goods from the United 
S tates.154
The conflict with West Indian colonies over economic policy was 
accentuated when a delegation sent to London in 1950 to appeal for an  
increased sugar quota was rebuffed. The imperial response was that 
colonial farmers were not entitled to the same assistance as British 
fanners and tha t they should seek more assistance from colonial 
governments.155 This response was taken as a  grave insult and signalled 
the attitude of the imperial state to resolving the issue of economic 
development.
The absence of any systematic policy for economic advancement 
was also reflected in the failure of the Imperial State to address in a 
structural approach, the unemployment situation plaguing the coloured 
majority. In Saint Lucia, the colonial government was forced to expand 
its public works programme to absorb all surplus labour. The feeder road 
and school building programmes became the largest sources of 
employment after agriculture. In addition, the colonial government 
continued to encourage migration to solve the unemployment situation. 
During the War, the Imperial Government encouraged migration to the
152 Ibid. Press Statement on Import Restriction in British Colonies. The restrictions on 
importation of goods to secure balance of payments was relaxed in 1948 to allow 
imports from UK and other colonial territories provided it does not affect sterling 
balances. The restrictions no longer applied on goods such as coal or capital equipment 
from the UK.
153 Stephen Howe, Anticolonialism in British Politics: the left and the end of Empire 1918- 
1964 (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1993).
154 CO 256/45. Annual Administration Report 1951. Imports from the UK was $2.9 
million and the rest of the Empire $2.2 million while the US was only $0.4 million. 
Exports showed a similar pattern. This was in sharp contrast to the 1920’s and 1930’s.
155 Fraser, Anti-colonialism.
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United States through organized contractual labour schemes. After the 
War ended, the policy continued as the Department of Labour in Saint 
Lucia continued to organize labour schemes to Curacao, Aruba, Panama, 
the United States and the French Territories. After m ost countries 
discontinued the labour schemes, the Imperial State allowed increased 
migration to its territory.156 The economic impact of remittances was 
significant for working class families and the economy.157
Agricultural diversification did have some success in developing a 
major second export. The increasing significance of bananas compared to 
sugar, as an  export crop is noted as “...in 1956 sugar production 
increased by 25% on the 1954 figure and in value by $288,788, banana 
exports rose by 16% in production and by a total of $1,030,799.”158 
Bananas was expected to become the major crop, as it had a ready 
export market; the active involvement of a producer organization; 
supportive government policy; and required a regular labour force to 
m aintain production.159 Bananas were also a peasant crop, which 
encouraged larger smallholdings outside of the established plantations 
and represented the first step in breaking the dominance of plantation 
agriculture.
However, the greatest deficiency in economic development was the 
continued reluctance of the imperial government to pursue an 
industrialization programme for the West Indian colonies.160 The 
Bentham Commission appointed in 1945 had discouraged 
industrialization in Jam aica and similarly, another Commission in 1952 
discouraged any programme of industrialization.161
156 CO 256/60, Annual Labour Report 1956. Migration to the UK increased from 217 in 
1955 to 693 in 1956.
157 Ibid. Remittances through the Post Office increased from $52,705 in 1955 to $208, 
790 in 1956.
158 CO 256/50, Annual Labour Report, 1956.
!59 Ibid.
160 Lewis, Labour. Simey, Welfare and Planning.
161 Terrence Farrell, “Arthur Lewis and the case for Caribbean Industrialisation,” Social 
and Economic Studies, Vol. 29, No.4.
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The opposition to industrialization was rooted in the imperial 
approach, conscious or otherwise, that the West Indian colonies were 
best suited to be producers of raw and agricultured products and to be a 
m arket for m anufactured goods from Great Britain. The economic 
difficulties in Britain in the early 1920’s had generated concern in the 
Treasury over increasing industrial development in the colonies, 
especially the Far East and fear of a spread to other regions.162 This led 
to a practice of limiting industrialization to some colonies.
Eventually, criticism and the realization of the impossibility of 
sustaining a welfare programme on an agricultural economy contributed 
to imperial rethinking. In addition, the pressures for overseas expansion 
of investment after the post-war recovery led to the Overseas Resources 
Development Act to support private investment through the Colonial 
Development Corporation which operated on a commercial basis.163 This 
period coincided with the onset of colonial governments granting 
privileges, including tax exemptions to investors.164
Economic development in the West Indies was also affected by the 
colonial adm inistration which was inept and principally served imperial 
commercial interests. The Colonial Office was criticized for failing to 
improve the adm inistration of the colonies to undertake development 
projects and the failure to reduce the influence of expatriate commercial 
interest.165 Fraser summarized tha t “...through, design and default, 
economic transformation in the West Indies was hindered by colonial 
policy.”166 The absence of any systematic economic transformation 
programme to address the fundamental cause of distress in the colonies 
resulted in a perpetuation of economic underdevelopment. In the final
162 Ashton and Stockwell, Imperial Policy.
163 Fox, Freedom and Welfare.
164 One such provision in St.Lucia was The Hotels Aid Ordinance No. 17 of 1948.
165 D.J. Morgan, Developing British Colonial Resources, 1945-1951, vol.2 of The Official 
History of Colonial Development (London; Macmillan, 1980).
166 Fraser, Anti-colonialism, p. 80.
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analysis, the dearth of economic opportunity denied any emergence of 
confidence in the state as a tool for advancement of the population.
5.3.3. Social Development under Reformed Colonialism
The move to reform colonial policy actually started with the
succession to office by Secretary MacDonald, and preceded the release of 
the recommendations of the Moyne Commission. The deteriorating social 
situation in the colonies and the drive of MacDonald, led to the first act 
of reform by the establishment of a Social Services Department in March 
1939. In addition, the Colonial Office considered establishing social 
services departm ents in the colonies to coordinate implementation of 
welfare projects.167 The second act in July  1939 was to recommend new 
colonial legislation to guide development tha t abolished the requirement 
tha t all schemes m ust promote commerce or industry in the United 
Kingdom, and to expand the Colonial Development Fund.168
The implementation of the Moyne Commission recommendations 
began with the Commonwealth Development and Welfare Act (1940), 
which provided for a fund to replace the Colonial Development Fund and 
offered greater possibilities for social development in the colonies.169 It 
was noted during parliamentary debates tha t not m uch could be done 
until after the War, with the exception of the West Indies.170 The Fund 
provided £1,250,000 for projects in the West Indies and for the 
Development and Welfare Organisation to be established. The Fund had 
limited success in the colonies, disbursing only £1,147,500 by 1944 out 
of £22,000,000 for which authority was provided.171
!67 CO 852/190/10 , Note of Departmental Meeting, 16 December 1938.
168 CO 852/250/10, Minutes of a CO Departmental Meeting, 31 July 1939.
169 CO 859/19/18 , Letter from MacDonald to Sir J Simon, 11 October 1939. This Act 
was followed by the 1945 Act.
170 CO 859/81/10 , Minutes of meeting on Wartime Colonial Development and Welfare 
Expenditure, 28 February-13 March 1941.
171 D.J. Morgan, The Origins of British Aid Policy, 1924-1945, Vol. 1 of The Official 
History of Colonial Development (London; The Macmillan Press; 1980). Morgan provides
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Notwithstanding, the construction of a new societal configuration 
in Saint Lucia was linked to the recommendations of the Commission. 
The obvious backwardness of education ensured tha t it became an 
immediate priority for social reordering, with provisions for training of 
teachers and instructors, enhancing administrative capability and 
infrastructural development. Teachers were trained in Trinidad and 
Barbados in areas such as domestic science and handcraft. The 
Education Department expanded to monitor and inspect the conditions 
of schools. It is worth noting tha t by 1951, of forty-eight public schools, 
only three met the basic colonial standards and were all built from 
provisions of the Fund.172
The num ber of children attending school and the rate of 
attendance increased, as greater em phasis was placed on education. 
School attendance was 70% in 1954 up from 60% in 1949.173 The 
availability of scholarships was expanded, offering more working class 
students the opportunity to undertake further education, including a 
special scholarship established for women.174 The increased training for 
Saint Lucian public servants and the availability of scholarships 
accelerated the development of an indigenous core of technical expertise 
that started to replace imperial civil servants.
In health, there was a  noticeable increase in the monies allocated 
by the colonial state for new programs. The colony witnessed significant 
improvement, particularly in the reduction of malaria and tuberculosis. 
From the destitution facing the colony in the 1930’s, the most 
remarkable improvement was the reduction in the death and infant 
mortality rates, and in the death rates for tuberculosis, disease of early
an extensive discussion on the many problems faced to spend monies allocated for the 
West Indies.
172 CO 256/45. The standard required that 70% of all students on roll should have 
access to desks and chairs.
173 CO 256/48, Annual Education Report 1954.
174 Ordinance No. 43 of 1953.
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infancy and m alaria.175 These improvements can be attributed to the 
provision by government of medicines th a t were previously available only 
to those who could purchase them. Spraying of dwelling areas to 
eradicate mosquitoes clearly had a beneficial effect, and the 
commencement of a dry skimmed milk distribution programme for all 
infants was also significant.176 The establishm ent of the Public Health 
Engineering Unit was important to address health issues and alleviate 
the conditions in the slums. The Unit was well known in working class 
areas for building drains, footpaths, garbage disposal, erecting public 
latrines and public baths, and providing concrete pit slabs for home 
latrines.
Housing for estate workers was given increased attention with the 
establishm ent of the Sugar Labour Welfare Fund Committee which 
assum ed responsibility for constructing housing schemes for estate 
workers.177 The managements of the estates in Roseau, Cul De Sac and 
Dennery were quite generous in providing the land for the schemes.178 
The Government enacted a series of legislative m easures to guide 
housing improvement and established the Central Housing Authority in 
1946 to control housing and planning in the entire colony.179 The 
Government also became involved in constructing housing schemes 
particularly in Castries, after the major 1948 fire and the Soufriere Fire 
of 1955.180
175 CO 256/48, Annual Health Report, 1954.
176 CO 256/49, Annual Health Report, 1955. Reported cases of malaria fell dramatically 
from more than 6000 in 1952 to 3225 in 1953. Deaths from tuberculosis fell from 76 in 
1952 to 47 in 1955, death from malaria cases from 109 in 1952 to 53 in 1955.
177 The Committee is financed by a cess imposed on every ton of sugar exported and is 
concerned with improving housing for sugar workers.
178 CO 256/45, Annual Labour Report, 1951.
179 The Town and Country Planning Ordnance (No. 10 of 1945); The Slum Clearance 
and Housing Ordnance (No. 11 of 1945); and The Land Acquisition Ordnance (No. 12 of 
1945).
180 The Castries Housing Scheme was built with loan funds provided by the Colonial 
Development Corporation. Soufriere Schemes was financed by the local government.
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Beyond improvements in social welfare, there were attem pts a t 
social empowerment. The co-operative movement became an area of 
interest, as the Secretary of State issued a memo in 1944 on the 
development of the co-operative movement in the colonial 
dependencies.181 The co-operative movement in Saint Lucia was revived 
by the Co-operative Societies Ordnance, No. 17 of 1946. Saint Lucia 
became the first colony to have a comprehensive ordinance to cover all 
types of co-operatives, and was unique in making it compulsory to set up 
education committees in each society to undertake educational and 
propaganda work.182 By 1953, there were three credit societies, one co­
operative store and a num ber of producer, marketing and processing 
societies.
Despite the attem pts of the imperial government to redress the 
destitute living conditions, there were glaring deficiencies in undertaking 
social welfare programmes tha t still threatened the relationship between 
state and society. Firstly, its primary concern was the shifting of 
financial responsibility for programmes, started by the CD&W Fund, to 
the local government or even worse, term ination.183 This was part of the 
debate on the relevance of the Development and Welfare Organisation 
which initiated projects and programmes then shifted the responsibility 
to the colonial state for continuation. The debate was brought about by 
the continued economic plight of the colonies, as the colonies were 
unable to meet the cost of maintaining the programmes.184
Secondly, the housing shortage was worse for the working class 
and was exploited by landowners and commercial interests. In 1942, the 
Executive Council sought to restrict the freedom of property owners to 
increase rent, bu t faced continual stalling from the Legislative Council
181 CO 256/47, Report on Co-operative Development, 1953.
182 Ibid.
183 Noted examples were the scheme for the provision of schoolbooks to primary school 
students that was terminated in 1951 and the Social Welfare Department funding 
which was terminated in December 1950.
184 Morgan, Colonial Resources, 1945-1951.
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which largely served the interest of the planter class.185 The rental cost 
was high, while living conditions were generally low, in particular tha t of 
the working class.186 Despite the increases in wage rates from 1949, the 
cost of living and house rental increased further.187 The housing shortage 
continued to be an urgent problem up to 1955 as the cost of building 
m aterials and rental increased. This had a serious implication for 
working class housing.
Thirdly, whilst significant improvements were made to reduce 
m alnutrition and infant mortality, there was no school meal programme 
to address the serious absenteeism among working class children. The 
infant nutrition programme was started after 1951, and was made 
possible by funding from UNICEF to distribute skimmed milk powder.188 
Similarly, the large-scale Insect Control Programme which complimented 
earlier measures, and had tremendous success in reducing malaria, was 
started  with the assistance of UNICEF and WHO in 1953.189
Fourthly, there were still inadequate school places by 1955 and 
despite improvements in school attendance, there were numerous 
problems such as “...irregularity of attendance due to poverty and a 
shortage of food; ill-health of the pupils, the necessity for greater interest 
to be taken by parents and shortage of school equipment.”190 There were 
no programmes to alleviate the extensive illiteracy among the population, 
nor was there any emphasis on teaching agriculture in schools, despite 
the background of the colonies.
Generally, the attitude of the majority coloured population 
remained apathetic towards the work of the colonial government. In a 
noted instance, members of the community who were asked to co­
185 Minutes of Legislative Council Meeting of 19 December 1941.
186 CO 246/45, Annual Labour Report, 1951.
187 c o  256/50, Annual Labour Report, 1955. With a 1939 base figure of 100, the index 
was 279 by December 1955. CO 256/50, Annual Labour Report, 1955.
188 Ibid.
!89 CO 256/47, Administrative Report, 1953.
190 CO 256/48, Annual Education Report 1954.
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operate on a  school improvement project refused because they felt that 
the school belonged to the Government.191 Such an attitude 
dem onstrated th a t the population did not see themselves as owners of or 
even participants in the development process. It was a  case of the 
colonial government, under the control of the British Government 
undertaking programmes and projects for the population. The black 
majority was yet to feel a  sense of attachm ent to the colonial state and its 
functioning.
5.3 .4 . The Labour Movement as Institutionalized Opposition
One of the most significant changes in the state-societal relations
during the post-1930s was the institutionalization of the labour 
movement as a  social force. The workers unrest in the 1930’s, similar to 
the situation in other parts of the Empire, accelerated the adoption of 
regulations to address the demands of the labour movement for better 
working and living conditions. The mechanism used to settle the 
dem ands of workers for better pay was controlled by the colonial state, 
through The Labour (Minimum Wage) Ordinance, No. 5 of 1935 and 
amended by No.3 of 1937. The Ordinance provided for the Govemor-in- 
Council, le. through Executive Council Order, to fix the minimum wage 
in respect of any occupation, if the Governor was satisfied tha t it was too 
low and an increase was in the public interest. Accordingly, as a  means 
of settling strike action, the Governor issued Orders for coal workers, 
agricultural labourers and shop assistants.
As unrest began in the colonies, the Colonial Office sent a 
despatch requesting the colonial government to, “...review their 
arrangem ents for the supervision of conditions governing the 
employment of labour in the territories under their adm inistration.”192
191 CO 256/45, Annual Education Report 1951.
192 CO 323/1429/9 . Secretary of State Despatch No. 1, 9 November 1935.
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However, the Governors were unresponsive despite the unrest 
intensifying and extending to other workers.
By 1937, the Secretary of State expressed the view tha t it was 
necessary for all colonial governments to ensure tha t workers got a fair 
share of the improvements in the financial positions of the colonies.193 
Colonial governments were urged to establish labour organizations to 
supervise all labour relations, including agricultural labour and to 
address other issues affecting workers. The Imperial State was concerned 
th a t many international conventions relating to labour had not been 
addressed in the colonies. Colonial governments were similarly urged to 
ensure tha t necessary legislation was in place to implement all 
conventions signed by the imperial state which applied to the colonies.194
A num ber of local commissions established after continued unrest 
suggested th a t unrest occurred because there was no mechanism for 
discussion between employers and workers.195 The Secretary of State 
finally insisted tha t labour departm ents be established and rather than 
be given marginal sta tus should be seen as one of the most important 
departm ents.196 Despite the stalling efforts of the planter-controlled 
Legislative Council, the Department of Labour in Saint Lucia was created 
by the Labour Ordinance, No. 14 of 1938.197 It is noticeable tha t the 
duties did not include many concerns raised by the Secretary of State in 
the 24 August 1937 despatch. However, legislation was passed to amend
193 CO 323/1429/9 . Secretary of State Despatch to Colonial Governors No. 3, 24 
August 1937.
194 Ibid. In particular, the regulation of contract labour and eliminating penal sanctions 
from master and servant legislation. Both of these issues were to be addressed by the 
ILO in 1939.
195 CO 950/1. Memorandum by Colonial Office West Indian Department for the Moyne 
Commission, 20 May 1938.
196 CO 850/135/12 . Secretary of State Despatch to Governors No. 16, 5 September
1938.
197 Colonial Report, 1938.
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the conditions of contract and repeal the penal clauses th a t had 
existed.198
The efforts to empower the labour movement in the 1930’s were 
frequently given momentum by the directives of the Colonial Office and 
served the purpose of overcoming planter and commercial interests. In
1940, Lord Moyne clarified the necessity for colonial governments to have 
‘reasonable facilities’ in place for the establishm ent and activities of trade 
unions, to qualify for funding under the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act of 1940.199 As was the case with colonial practice, legislation 
varied according to the local situation, b u t was usually based on 
legislation passed in the United Kingdom.200
In Saint Lucia, the institutionalization of labour was furthered with 
the Trade Dispute (Arbitration and Inquiry) Ordinance, No. 15 of 1940. 
The Ordinance established a  mechanism for the settlement of trade 
disputes and for the Governor to establish a Board of Inquiry to examine 
such m atters and any other economic or industrial condition.
The most significant step towards legitimizing trade unions and 
industrial action was taken after the Trade Union and Trade Dispute 
Ordinance, No. 4 of 1948 law was passed.201 The legislation made it legal 
for workers to form trade unions to serve as their bargaining 
representatives in industrial disputes. Further, peaceful picketing was 
legalized and employers were required to allow workers to engage in 
peaceful acts to dissuade other workers from working. Undoubtedly, this 
was the most valuable achievement in laying the foundation for the 
emergence of institutionalized opposition to colonial rule, or from another 
perspective to institutionalize opposition to colonial rule.
198 Employers and Servants Ordinance No.29 of 1938.
199 CO 859/49 /14 . Circular Despatch from Lord Moyne to Colonial Governors, 12 July
1941. The initial despatch was sent by Lord Lloyd on 10 September 1940.
200 For example the Trade Union Act, 1871; the Trade Disputes Act, 1906; and Trade 
Dispute and Trade Union Act, 1927.
201 The Election of 1947 increased the number of labour movement sympathizers on the 
Legislative Council.
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However, the debate on the Bill showed tha t the planter class while 
conceding on the recognition of trade unions, which was now universal, 
was more concerned with the emergence of political movements and the 
association of unions with them .202 The planter representatives argued to 
make it illegal for trade unions to finance political movements. It was 
finally compromised that such an objective had to be approved 
beforehand, by resolution of the members of the trade union.
The period after 1948 witnessed an increase in labour legislation 
as the colonial government became more accommodating of labour 
issues. Amendments were made to a num ber of existing labour laws, 
including workers compensation. Another feature of the post-1948 
legislation was the emergence of collective bargaining and wage increases 
resulting from joint negotiations.203
Despite that, a  series of strikes took place on the sugar estates in 
1952 as workers rejected negotiated wage rates. It is significant tha t this 
took place after the first elections under universal adult suffrage in 1951. 
A commission of inquiry established to investigate noted th a t the strikes 
were due to a num ber of reasons, including the high expectation of 
workers caused by one candidate during the campaign, and the reduced 
role of the major union which was now more focused on politics.204 This 
dem onstrates the increasing shift of the coloured leadership from labour 
leadership to political leadership, and control of the Colonial 
Government. In response, the Labour Advisory Board which included 
government representatives, who were also labour leaders and trade 
union representatives’, forwarded recommendations tha t were 
significantly more progressive, compared to the efforts of previous bodies. 
These included establishing a Wages Council, Work Committees at the 
sugar estates, appointment of Labour and Welfare Officers at the
202 Minutes of Legislative Council Meeting, 30 March 1948.
203 Annual Administration Report 1951.
204 Annual Administration Report 1952.
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workplace, and payment of bonuses from profits to workers. The Colonial 
Government, which was still controlled by the Governor, accepted all the 
recommendations, except the payment of bonuses, as it believed tha t 
profits should remain with the employers for reinvestment.
Despite the militancy of workers, employers still circumvented the 
law. With limited staff, the num ber of inspections by the Labour 
Department were few. When offenders were caught, it was difficult to 
prosecute as workers were forced to give statem ents favouring the 
employer, or faced dismissal.205 There were no laws protecting employees 
when they were called to give evidence. However, the balance of political 
power was clearly shifting towards the workers from the commercial 
class as was made evident by seventeen instrum ents of labour legislation 
being passed in 1952 to address the terms and conditions of 
employment.
5.3.5. Reform of the Colonial State
The other area of significant change was in the political 
management of colonial society with the fall of the planter government. 
Even before the Moyne Commission had been appointed, gradual 
constitutional reform had been proposed by the Wood Commission to 
satisfy the increasing dem ands of the middle class for representative 
government within the West Indian colonies. The related occurrence of 
labour unrest provided added impetus, and eventually led to the granting 
of self-government.
The Saint Lucia (Legislative) Order in Council of 1936 constituted a 
new Legislative Council tha t expanded the elected element.206 To satisfy 
the concern th a t the elected members might hinder the functioning of 
government, the Governor was given reserve powers to ensure the 
passing of legislation tha t was felt necessary to control government
205 Annual Administration Report, 1951.
206 Colonial Report 1938.
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finances, and also in the public interest. The Executive Council 
comprised official and unofficial members, none of whom were elected, or 
represented the majority of the population. .
The membership of the First Legislative Council reflected the 
dominance of the planter and commercial classes in the legislative 
process. With the exception of official members who were sent by the 
Colonial Office, all others had landed or commercial interest. Even the 
nominated unofficials were two planters and one businessperson. The 
Council was noted for its reluctance to advance any legislation that was 
not in its best interest. For example, an  attem pt by the Governor to pass 
a Land Tax Bill in 1940 was strongly opposed by the Legislative Council 
as it argued tha t rather them tax the land to raise funds, what was 
needed was a land policy to encourage the use of the land.207 The 
Colonial Government had tried to enact a similar bill in 1890 and 1908, 
bu t withdrew due to intense opposition. A resolution was introduced in 
1946 for the levy of a tax on land by the elected member for the South 
Constituency, a lawyer with labour sympathies..208 Reflecting the class 
basis of the issue, the member noted th a t in the villages and towns it is 
accepted tha t land should be taxed to m aintain the society. However 
beyond the boundaries of the towns and villages, some people argued 
tha t a  different principle should apply.209 On that occasion, the vote in 
Council was tied with the official members asked not to vote and the 
Administrator withholding his support. A land tax was finally passed in 
1949, as a Land and House Tax by a Council more sympathetic to 
working class dem ands.210 Another famous action of the Council was the 
stalling of the Rent Restriction Ordinance in 1942. The Ordinance sought 
to restrict the freedom of landlords to increase house rents. In
207 The Governor proposed a Land Tax on unutilized land to assist in balancing the 
budget.
208 By then the Council was reconstituted after the 1944 elections and presided over by 
a more conservative Administrator.
209 Minutes of Legislative Council Meeting, 26 September 1946.
210 Land and Tax Ordinance No. 29 of 1949.
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frustration, the Administrator noted tha t the Bill had been before the 
Council for two years bu t could not be passed.211 The planter and 
commercial interests ensured th a t the Bill was not passed, as they felt it 
limited the economic power of landlords.
The election of 1944 witnessed the first significant move towards 
labour leadership a t the level of the Legislative Council with the election 
of Allen Lewis and Francis Carasco, both of whom were from the middle 
classes, and a lawyer and businessm an, respectively.212 The men were 
active in the labour movement, advocating issues on the working class 
agenda. It was also clear tha t by 1945, the demands by the public for 
better representation and a  more concerted challenge to imperial control 
were being undertaken by the Council. For example, the announcem ent 
by the Administrator tha t the Secretary of State had appointed the 
elected member, a businessm an, for the North Constituency as a senior 
unofficial member, led to intense derision from other elected members.213 
In debate, the point was made tha t there was no objection to the choice 
of person bu t to the procedure followed, and the continuing situation of 
other elected members having lesser precedence to nominated members. 
One member informed the Administrator tha t they had already decided 
among themselves tha t the appointed member, whenever the occasion 
arose, would speak on behalf of the elected members. In effect, they had 
constituted themselves as a united body for engaging the Administrator 
and officials and in practice became an opposition. In response, the 
Secretary of State, though insisting on the right of the Crown to appoint 
as it saw fit, reviewed the order of precedence and gave elected members 
precedence over nominated members.214
211 Minutes of Legislative Council Meeting, 19 December 1942.
212 Allen Lewis, a lawyer, would later become the first Chairman of the St.Lucia Labour 
Party at its formation in 1951.
213 Minutes of Legislative Council Meeting, 27 April 1945.
214 Co 256/43, Message from Administrator, 18 February 1946.
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The d istrust of imperial rule was becoming so acute tha t the 
Governor appealed for the support of elected members, bu t denied that 
the reserve powers of the Governor served to discourage full participation 
of elected members.215 Governor Grimble explained tha t the “...aim had 
been, rather, to encourage you in the responsible use of the powers 
which you yourselves command, and to enlist you in teamwork with the 
Administration.”216 For example, the Governor appealed for elected 
members to assist in the ‘banishm ent of false m istrust’ caused by delays 
in implementing development projects. Finally, the Governor appealed to 
the public not to treat the Commonwealth Development and Welfare 
Fund personnel as “...common interlopers...” bu t “...with high courtesy 
due to friends and helpers...”217
On the initiative of the Colonial Office, discussion on 
representative government was furthered a t the level of the Government 
of the Windwards, with the hosting of the Windward Islands Conference 
on Constitutional Reform.218 The Conference advocated a liberal 
programme for advancing representative government: including
recommendations to have unofficial members of the Executive chosen 
from elected members of the Executive Council; introduction of the 
Committee System to be chaired by elected members; awarding universal 
adult suffrage through a literacy test; restricting the Governor’s reserve 
powers; advancing Federation at the level of the West Indies and 
Windward and Leeward Islands; and allowing absolute freedom of speech 
in the Legislative Council.219
215 CO 256/43, Address by Governor Grimble to Legislative Council, 1 November 1945. 
He noted that the powers had never been used in St.Lucia and only once in the 
Windward Island since 1936.
216 Ibid., p. 2.
217 Idem.
218 The Conference was held in Grenada from 16 to 18 January 1945.
219 St.Lucia Gazette, 30 January 1945. Many of the recommendations were taken from 
the Moyne Commission Report and some had already been implemented in other 
colonies. A Resolution on the Amalgamation of the Leeward and Windward Islands 
under a single government was passed on 2 May 1946.
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Meanwhile the level of dissatisfaction of elected members within 
the colonial state intensified. The Secretary of State, responding to a 
refusal by the Council to approve the increase in pay for Appeal Judges, 
threatened to direct the Governor to approve the increase. The Elected 
Members argued tha t they should have been consulted before the 
increase was awarded, and not asked to approve it as a formality. The 
Elected Member for the South Constituency, Honourable Allen Lewis, 
claimed tha t the threat of the Secretary of State was, “....a very, very 
serious allegation against the responsibility, the capacity and the ability 
of the members of this Council.”220 At the same meeting of the Council, a 
resolution was passed by all elected members calling on the Secretary of 
State to expedite approval of all schemes forwarded by the colony, so that 
implementation could commence. Members were also critical of the 
Administration for its inability to implement num erous projects and 
schemes tha t were approved, bu t delayed.221
The election of September 1947 saw an expansion of working class 
representation on the Council, when for the first time a nominated 
member came from the labour movement. However, the final demise of 
the planter government took place after intense lobbying by the labour 
movement, including petitions to the Secretary of State for universal 
adult suffrage to be granted. Finally, the Legislative Council was 
reconstituted in 1951, with the Administrator as President, the Crown 
Attorney and the Financial Secretary as ex officio members, three 
nominated members and eight elected members.222 The Executive 
Council was also reconstituted with the Administrator, the Crown 
Attorney and the Financial Secretary as ex officio members; one 
nominated member of the Legislative Council, and three elected
220 Minutes of Legislative Council Meeting, 8 April 1947.
221 Minutes of Legislative Council Meeting, 10 July 1947.
222 St.Lucia (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 1951.
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members.223 For the first time, elected members had a  clear majority over 
the ex officio and nominated members in the Legislative Council. The 
presence of three elected members on the Executive Council marked the 
beginning of responsibility by the Executive to the Legislature.
The election of 1951 was held under universal adult suffrage and 
was contested on a party basis with the working class. The St.Lucia 
Labour Party won four of the eight electoral constituencies, and other 
labour interests winning two seats.224 This marked the shifting of 
complete control of the colonial state to labour leaders, who would now 
be represented in the Executive Council. The first Legislative Council 
meeting after the elections of 1951 is instructive of the relationship that 
existed between the planter class and the labour movement. Honourable 
Jaimes Luc Charles, a member of the Labour Party, pointed out tha t the 
ultimate aim of the working class political struggle was Self-Government 
with Dominion S tatus within the British Commonwealth.225 It was clear 
tha t the planters and commercial classes, aggrieved by the victory of the 
labour movement, expected their stewardship to fail. Honourable Charles 
asked for a burying of the political hatchet and noted that, “...the 
electorate have made their choice, the first such popular choice in our 
political history, and this choice m ust be respected, though it may not 
meet with general approval.”226 In response, the senior nominated 
member, a planter, expressed the hope tha t “....no political party nor in 
fact anyone will look upon the Nominated Members as persons who have 
been placed there by Government for the purpose of thwarting the 
Elected Members and preventing them from achieving the ju s t 
aspirations of the electorate.”227
223 Article 9 of the Royal Instructions, 10 August 1951.
224 The other major party the People Progressive Party (PPP),a conservative party, won 
two seats and two other seats were won by Independents, who were also labour 
activists.
225 Minutes of Legislative Council Meeting, 13 October 1951.
226 Ibid. p. 6.
227 Ibid. p. 7.
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The ensuing period would be characterized by the struggle between 
the working class movement and vested commercial and planter interests 
in pursu it of a  programme to improve the conditions and lives of the 
majority, who felt cheated by the colonial order.
The Executive Council was further expanded in 1955 to include 
four elected members. However, the most fundamental change in the 
state structure during tha t period was the introduction of the Ministerial 
System in March 1956, when three elected members from the Executive 
Council were appointed Ministers by the Governor. Each Minister was 
responsible, in the Legislative Council, for the functioning of the 
Department assigned to him. This effectively commenced the 
accountability of the Executive Council to the elected Legislative Council. 
The representatives of society were now also responsible for the 
governance of the society.
5 .4  Conclusion
The nature of the state-societal relationship in Saint Lucia during 
the period under review showed the dominance of external factors, 
although they highlighted an increasing role for internal factors, 
compared to the previous period. The rise of internal forces can be clearly 
traced from the pre-1930s riots, to the granting of universal adult 
suffrage in the 1950’s. The political empowerment of domestic society 
represented a significant achievement towards the integration of state 
and society.
Three external factors can be seen as significant in shaping the 
relationship th a t led to the riots and unrest of the 1930’s. Firstly, the 
accession of Britain to a num ber conventions, in particular the ILO 
agreements, and the rise of the British Labour Party forced a greater 
focus on the working and living conditions of the majority coloured class. 
The emergence of a fraternal relationship between the British Labour 
Party, the Trade Union Congress and labour representatives in the
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colonies led to more questions raised in the British Parliament, and 
greater agitation for change in imperial policy. On the other hand, labour 
sympathizers in the colonies were emboldened by the support given by 
British politicians.
Secondly, the West Indians who served in World War I were 
exposed to new ideas on political participation and racial equality. The 
experience of serving in Europe provided a new political sensitization 
which encouraged them  to form alliances with middle class professionals 
to agitate for change upon their return.
Thirdly, imperial economic policy failed to ameliorate the living 
conditions of the majority and increased resentm ent towards the colonial 
order. The failure by the imperial state to implement a systematic 
economic plan showed the declining interest in the colony as an 
economic asset. Once the colonies were no longer seen as providing a 
steady flow of profits and other regions became more profitable, it was 
obvious tha t possession was motivated by strategic reasons and empire 
prestige.
As conditions worsened, the calls for self-government and 
improved living conditions increased. The conditions created three 
distinct conflicts in the colony - the attem pts by the planter elite for 
greater control of the colonial state; middle class attem pts to increase 
participation in colonial government and state; and the calls from the 
working class for better wages and working conditions. These conflicts 
provided the motive force for a transformation in the state-society 
relationship.
Politically, only the planter class had any representation in the 
Legislature, based on a limited franchise, and resisted any attem pt to 
broaden tha t franchise. That achievement was itself the product of years 
of agitation for greater local influence in the functioning of the colonial 
state. Whereas local planter representation was a qualitative 
achievement in an earlier period, it was now limiting and a source of
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conflict. The middle class intensified its cedi for increased elective 
representation in the Legislature bu t wanted more than  political 
participation as they thought tha t they had the education and skills to 
play a greater role in the public service. On other hand, the Imperial 
State had consistently claimed the need for political control of the society 
to establish efficient administration, to provide impartial government 
between competing classes, and to protect the blacks from the whites 
and from themselves. It was obvious tha t the Imperial State wanted 
control as the Assemblies, which were white planter oligarchies, were 
incompetent and could not ensure a stable government which was an  
em barrassm ent to the Imperial State. There was fear also among the 
planter elite and colonial state tha t should coloured people attain  the 
property rights to be able to vote, the black majority would assum e 
political control. This realization convinced the Assemblies and the local 
planter class to accept the system with its limited franchise, rather than  
continuing to fight for change. For the Imperial State, CCG was already 
acceptable among public opinion in Britain, which usually wary of the 
reactionary tendencies of the West Indian planters. That 
notwithstanding, there remained conflicts between the white oligarchy 
and the imperial state on the subject of distribution of political power.
The intensification of calls for greater political participation, from 
the middle class, resulted in the assignment of the Wood Commission to 
study the political situation and make recommendations. This was the 
first major concession by the Imperial State to reform the colonial state 
and to allow an expanded elected element. It m eant tha t the middle class 
now had an opportunity to participate in the state apparatus, as there 
was little likelihood of becoming nominated members. Despite such 
progress, Wood admitted tha t the object of his work was to ensure tha t 
the Secretary of State maintained control of the colonial state. In other 
words, the attem pt was really to find a more sophisticated m anner of 
control. Even then, the colonial state apparatus led by the Governor
228
sought to stifle any attem pt at reform which would allow greater middle 
class participation through an expanded elected element.
More importantly, the debilitating economic and living conditions 
led to increasing demands from the black majority, for higher wages. It is 
instructive th a t their struggle, unlike tha t of the middle class, was not 
aimed a t political control of the state b u t at economic betterment. Saint 
Lucia, like many of the other West Indian colonies, was facing acute 
poverty in the 1930’s arising from the decline of the sugar industry and 
its failure to pursue a sustainable economic development policy. The 
consequence was economic backwardness, suffered by the coloured 
majority, as employment opportunities declined in the coaling industry. 
In addition to economic hardship, there was increasing social destitution 
faced by the black majority living in urban  areas of Castries.
The state of the colonies led to the crisis of colonial rule, and to 
widespread riots and social unrest. The labouring class calls for higher 
wages and better working conditions culminated in social unrest. The 
failure of the imperial state to adequately respond encouraged an alliance 
between the working and middle classes. The demands soon became 
more than  a  labour issue, and included a call for greater political 
participation for the working class in the functioning of the colonial state. 
Unlike some of the larger colonies where the labour struggle was taken 
over by middle class professionals, the working class struggle in Saint 
Lucia was led by trade union working class leaders, although there were 
a few elected representatives who were middle-class professionals with 
Labour sentiments. The immediate response of the colonial state was to 
use force to quell all disturbances, actions th a t were sanctioned by the 
imperial state. This highlighted the commitment to ensure the survival of 
the colonial order. Notwithstanding, the agitation of the working and 
middle classes made existing colonial rule outmoded and forced a 
transformation.
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This Chapter has highlighted th a t the transformational events of 
the 1930’s were part of a regional movement for change in colonial rule, 
and better working and living conditions. It also thrived on the growing 
international sentim ent against colonial rule, and an emerging right to 
self-determination of colonial peoples. These events took place on the eve 
of another WW I which momentarily shifted the focus of the imperial 
state, and created a new context within which to address the crisis of 
colonial rule.
Two external forces shaped the rethinking of imperial policy 
towards the colonies. Firstly, the weakening of the largest imperial 
power, Britain, politically, militarily and economically by World War II 
m eant tha t its political influence was under greater challenge, and 
political actions were increasingly criticized. Secondly, the emergence of 
anti-colonialism as a sentim ent to characterize new standards in the 
administration of states, received support from the two new 
superpowers, USSR and USA, and became the clarion call of oppressed 
colonial people, giving new direction in the struggle against colonial rule. 
The anti-colonial struggle was also fuelled by the emergence of an 
international black consciousness movement tha t sought to fight racism, 
and the institutionalized oppression of black people. The rise of anti­
colonialism as a movement was significant in providing ideological 
direction and guidance to the domestic struggles throughout the colonial 
world. Colonial peoples were now able to refer to an  identifiable source of 
their backwardness, and claim the institution of new arrangements for 
self-rule as a way out.
Whatever the arguments against the Moyne Commission, the 
imperial response resulted in a  comprehensive programme of 
ameliorative m easures tha t dramatically changed the colonial state- 
societal relationship. An unprecedented social welfare programme was 
undertaken to relieve the state of destitution tha t existed. Living 
conditions and social opportunities were increased for the black majority,
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the concerns of workers were given attention at least a t the legislative 
level, and the call for greater political participation received support.
Amongst the most significant changes, were the rights granted to 
workers to organize themselves and agitate for improvements in their 
wages and conditions of employment. Whilst, this did not always result 
in higher wages and better conditions for the workers, they now had the 
constitutional right to demand such improvements.
Other significant changes were the rights to organize political 
parties and increased space for elected members to participate in the 
legislature. This gradual reform of the colonial state allowed the middle 
class professionals and small business people to become part of the state 
apparatus and represented the beginning of the end for planter 
government. Noticeably, the majority population was still isolated. 
Interestingly, as middle class involvement was increased the powers of 
the Governor were also increased to ensure the safe passage of 
legislation. This reflected the concern of the imperial state tha t the 
impending conflict between the planters and the middle-class 
representatives should not stall the functioning of the colonial legislature 
or impair the imperial interest in stability and order.
A significant development took place in 1947 when a labour 
representative was nominated to the Legislative Council. That 
represented another shift from planter control to labour control. 
Eventually, universal adult suffrage provided the opportunity for the 
working class and labour representatives to take control of the Legislative 
Council. The shift to labour control was completed when the elected 
members were also given responsibility for the executive functioning of 
the colony. This was a fundamental transformation in the nature of the 
colonial state and its relationship to the society.
It m eant tha t the colonial state was now in the hands of a 
legislature elected by a majority of society. The final decision on all 
m atters still came from the imperial state bu t there was greater local
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autonomy and the shaping of local power. It also meant tha t the planter’s 
authority, as elite rule and as a political force in manning the state, was 
destroyed. In term s of the government of the colony, there was also a 
corresponding shift to local control, as the executive was chosen from the 
legislature, and imperial control of the government was being 
dismantled. Undoubtedly, the conditions were right for the creation of a 
domestically empowered state with institutional authority and ability to 
improve the lives of its citizen, in keeping with Jackson’s notion of 
empirical statehood.
Notwithstanding the above, two conditions existed within the state 
and society which militated against the advancement of the colony 
towards empirical statehood. Firstly, changes in social and political 
development was not matched by the economic policies adopted by the 
imperial state in the immediate post WWII period. It can be argued that 
such policies were needed for the revitalization of the British economy, 
bu t did little to revive fortunes in the colonies, especially with the ailing 
sugar industry. The absence of any programme of industrialization, or a 
systematic approach at economic viability for the colonies, was a gross 
deficiency in relationship between the Imperial State and the colonies. At 
the domestic level, although there were improvements in welfare, the 
absence of sustained economic development undermined the confidence 
of the majority in the colonial state. It was also noted tha t imperial state 
was never interested in pursuing an industrialization programme for the 
colonies as a basis for economic self-sufficiency.
Secondly, it can be argued th a t granting political and social rights 
was an easier way for the imperial state to curtail the unrest and control 
the fermenting desire to overthrow the colonial order. The colonial state 
was still largely influenced by the planter elite, as an economic force and 
they sought as usual to stifle the empowerment of workers and the 
labour movement. The Secretary of State still controlled the major 
decisions affecting the colonies, and the imperial state continued to be
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blamed by the coloured political leadership for restricting the 
development of the colony.
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6S tate  and Society: From Associated S tate  to  
In ternational Actor
Chapter 5 assessed the crisis of colonial rule and the consequent 
domestic response to the riots and social unrest. The imperial response 
through the Moyne Commission sought to reform colonialism and 
consequently laid the basis for a new state-societal configuration. Social 
discontent, though abated, continued as the imperial response was seen 
as inadequate and lacking urgency. Political activities, now legalized, 
were centred on anti-colonialism primarily through the call for greater 
self-rule. This led to the third transformative period which immediately 
followed the period of reformed colonialism which lasted from 1945 to the 
1960’s. The period which will be examined lasted from the mid-1960’s to 
the mid-1980’s witnessed the most distinctive change in the 
international system, with the institutionalization of national self- 
determination, which had emerged as a sentim ent after WWI, as a right 
for all colonial peoples.
As with the two previous chapters, three distinct features of the 
transformational period will be examined: the nature of the existing 
state-societal relationship, highlighting the external and internal forces 
involved in shaping tha t relationship; the origin and nature of the 
transformative event; and the consequent state-societal relationship. 
This Chapter has additional significance because the imperial state, in 
the first case instance, decided tha t the small states could not be granted 
sovereign statehood, so instead instituted a three-quarter way house to
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sovereignty. Therefore, the examination of the state-societal relationship 
will be a review of the process leading to the granting of Associated 
Statehood, and the impact of tha t experiment on the development of the 
state and society. Finally, the chapter will examine the influences -  
domestic and external -  tha t led to the granting of independence and the 
effect on shaping the state and society.
6 .1 .0  Imperial Policy and Decolonisation in Saint 
Lucia -  Impact on State and Society
The period after 1945 witnessed a dramatic change in the criteria
for acceptance of territories as independent states in the international 
system. The realities of Cold War politics and independence movements 
ensured tha t a new international norm emerged which pressured 
imperial powers to accept the aspirations of colonial peoples for 
independence, as a right and not a privilege. These realities would 
transform  the international system and provide the motivation for 
smaller colonies like Saint Lucia to move towards independence and 
emerge as international actors. This background highlights the role of 
international influences -  the emergence of decolonization as a norm 
within the UN - and American concerns in shaping imperial policy and 
the eventually granting of the first steps of decolonization. The first steps, 
through associated statehood, provided a new state, bu t left the issues of 
economic viability and international enfranchisement of the state 
unanswered.
6.1.1 International Relations and the context for Imperial
Policy
The acceleration of decolonization within the British Empire, which 
begun after World War II, was inevitable as the mood within the 
international system, encouraged by the Soviet Union and the United 
States, for different reasons, was to end colonial empires. The general
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response of Her Majesty’s Government (HMG)1 was to decry the claims of 
anti-colonialists who focused solely on political evolution as the m easure 
of advancement for colonial territories.2 Instead, HMG argued th a t self- 
government should be granted according to the particular circum stances 
and people should be trained and equipped socially, economically and 
politically, for eventual self-government.
Following on the decisions a t the Yalta Conference, the San 
Francisco Conference led to agreement on three Chapters in the United 
Nations Charter dealing with decolonization.3 Accordingly, Britain and 
other colonial powers had the responsibility to transm it certain 
information to the Secretary-General relating to the non self-governing 
territories. International pressure on colonial powers was intensified, 
when in 1946, the first session of the General Assembly passed a 
resolution requesting that the Secretary-General include a statem ent in 
his annual report on the state of the non self-governing colonies.4 The 
colonial powers were not in agreement with such a resolution, as they 
felt tha t the Charter requested updates for information purposes, and 
not for the general study of the General Assembly. This appeared to the 
colonial powers as an attem pt by some countries to pursue political 
objectives through the colonial issue, although it appeared th a t many 
former colonies were involved. For example, the Philippines noted the 
absence of a suitable mechanism to implement Chapter XI of the Charter 
and proposed a World Conference of Non Self-Governing Peoples, where 
the colonial powers would not be represented. Regardless, the tone and
1 HMG is used interchangeably with the imperial state henceforth simply because 
primary documentation makes reference to the actions of the imperial state as that of 
the HMG. It allows for ease of reference in all citations.
2 Secretary of State, House of Common Debate, Vol. 391, Col. 49, 13 July 1943.
3 Chapters XII and XIII dealt with the international trusteeship system and Chapter XI 
dealt with non-self-goveming territories.
4 D.J Morgan, Guidance towards Self-Government in British Colonies, 1941-1971, vol.5 of 
The Official History of Colonial Development (London; The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1980).
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intent of the anti-colonial lobby a t the United Nations stim ulated the 
international movement towards decolonization of all territories.
Decolonization became an urgent issue at the United Nations in 
1960, with the adoption of a resolution calling for immediate steps to end 
colonialism. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) 
provided guidance to all colonial powers tha t other than  being granted 
independence, a country could also be considered as self-governing if it 
established a free association or integrated with an independent state, 
and did so by free choice expressed through democratic processes. In 
these cases, countries had the option to proceed to independence if they 
could dem onstrate tha t this was the popular will.
However, by 1963 the United Nations General Assembly considered 
the Report of the Group of Twenty-Four which showed mounting anxiety 
over the increasing independence of smaller territories. The Committee 
requested tha t the General Assembly consider the progress of these 
countries to independence and the “...possibility of international 
assistance in order to facilitate the exercise of their rights to 
independence.”5 Despite the concern with the viability of small countries 
becoming independent and the need for international assistance, the 
pressure for decolonization was intensified.
Another influence affecting imperial policy was US policy and 
attitudes towards decolonization in the Caribbean. The US Government 
was supportive of the Federation, provided some limited aid and 
participated in a joint US/UK/Canada economic mission to the Eastern 
Caribbean in 1961. However, the collapse of the Federation, the anti-aid 
mood of Congress and US bureaucratic differences led to a termination of 
direct US involvement with the British colonies.6 Whilst the U.S. 
Government had not yet taken any position on the new initiatives after
5 Morgan, Self-Government, p. 203.
6 FO 371/185004, no. 10, US Policy in the Caribbean, Despatch from Sir P Dean to Mr. 
Brown, 29 November 1966.
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the collapse of the Federation, a high-ranking State Department official 
had indicated th a t they would not welcome the creation of any politically 
and economically weak federation, and would not want to see a possible 
federation of the seven smaller colonies, given independence.7
It appeared tha t the Americans had not focused on the 
decolonization process in the Caribbean, presuming instead th a t the 
sta tus quo would be maintained. They had seen the British presence as a 
stabilizing influence and expected a continued guarantee of British 
interest in the security of the Southern Hemisphere. However, the 
granting of self-government to the Bahamas and British Honduras 
caused some alarm about the possibility of communist, and in particular 
Cuban, influence in the region.8 Sunderland stressed tha t the Americans 
would be disappointed if there was a  diminution of British responsibility 
in its area of longest historical interests, which was also an area closest 
to the US.9 By the end of the 1960’s, the US became worried th a t the 
arrangem ents proposed by HMG would allow the smaller territories to 
vote themselves into independence and establish mini-states, and at 
worst become ‘little Cubas’.10 Concerned tha t the reaction of the US 
would be a reluctance to grant aid to these territories, the Foreign Office 
lobbied for the proposed Act to include a clause which would ensure tha t 
Associated Statehood could only be terminated by a  difficult two-thirds 
majority in Parliament and in a referendum.11
7 FO 371/173580, no.2, Letter from IJM Sutherland to AR Thomas on the concerns of 
the State Department, 7 January 1964. The high-ranking official was W C Burdett, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, US State Department. At that 
stage, there was consideration of Grenada merging with Trinidad and the remainder of 
the seven small territories forming a Federation.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 FO 371/184567, no.269, Minute by HAF Hohler, 5 December 1966. The proposed 
arrangement was the granting of associated statehood through the West Indies Act of 
1967.
11 Ibid. Associated Statehood was established as a semi-autonomous relationship 
between the smaller colonies and Great Britain.
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The 1960’s was also a period of inter-departmental conflicts within 
the State Departm ent which led to an  ambivalent US policy towards the 
region.12 The colonies were under the Bureau of European Affairs, whilst 
the independent territories in the Western Hemisphere fell under the 
Inter-American Bureau. The conflict finally ended with the colonies 
falling under the ambit of the Inter-American Bureau.
The crux of US policy in the region was clearly articulated by 
President Johnson in 1965 with the declaration tha t the “American 
nation cannot, m ust not and will not permit the establishment of another 
Communist government in the Western Hemisphere.”13 The Americans 
used the opportunity a t the Antigua Conference in 1966 to assure all the 
colonies th a t they would endeavour to provide aid and have a closer 
relationship with them .14 These developments led to a  feeling in the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) that America was developing a 
new relationship with the colonies, which should be welcomed. It was 
also felt tha t if the British proved unable to ensure tha t the colonies 
remained faithful to the Western camp, the Americans would step in and 
take any action necessary to prevent communist infiltration.15
6.1 .2  Imperial Policy and the Decolonization Process
The decade of the 1960’s witnessed the preoccupation of imperial 
policy with the constitutional future of the smaller colonies in the pursu it 
of a balance between the international pressures for decolonization and 
the stated obligation to assist the colonies to become self-governing. The 
official post-war policy of Britain was to,
12 S.R. Ashton and David Killingray, eds. The West Indies, Series B vol.6 of British 
Documents on the End of Empire, (London; The Stationary Office, 1999).
13 Ibid. p. 720.
14 FO 371/185004, US Policy. The Antigua Conference was held to discuss the Tripartite 
Economic Survey which is discussed later in this section. The assurances were 
necessary as the Inter-American Bureau had taken over colonial affairs and was no 
longer interested in the Tripartite Economic Survey.
15 Ibid.
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guide the colonial territories to responsible government within the 
Commonwealth in conditions that ensure to the people concerned both 
a fair standard of living and freedom from oppression from any 
quarter.16
The Secretary of State also explained tha t a territory would only 
become independent if it had a viable economy and could defend its own 
in terests.17 Whilst the policy for larger colonies seemed quite clear, since 
they were capable of achieving independence, the peculiar situation of 
smaller colonies became the subject of investigation for a Committee of 
Enquiry into Constitutional Development in the Smaller Colonial 
Territories in 1949. The main objective of the Committee was to 
“[e]nquire into the present constitutional position of the smaller Colonial 
territories and the probable trend of their future political 
development...”18 The Committee concluded tha t there was little 
prospect for these territories becoming independent as apart from the 
strategic importance of some of them, they had few resources to m aintain 
self-government. However, the official responses from various 
departm ents were most unfavourable to the recommendations of the 
Committee.
By 1951, in a new statem ent of colonial policy, the Secretary of 
State, Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, declared th a t in addition to building the 
institutions necessary for self-government, HMG would be pursuing the 
economic and social development of the colonies to keep pace with their 
political development.19 This position was a slight change in approach as 
it suggested tha t political development could and was proceeding a t a 
faster pace than  other components. Colonies were accordingly 
categorized as those capable of achieving full independence, those tha t
16 The Colonial Empire, 1947-1948, Cmd. 7433, June 1948, Para.3.
17 C.A. (48) 12, 8 December 1948. Memorandum by the Secretary of State on the 
Constitutional Development of Smaller Colonial Territories.
18 Morgan, Self-Government p. 35.
19 Ibid.
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by forming units could become capable of achieving independence, and 
those th a t fell into neither category.
There was little concern with the future of small colonies in the 
West Indies as they were part of the second category and would be part 
of the West Indies Federation.20 Discussions were held in 1961 to ensure 
th a t the smaller territories of the Leeward and Windward Islands had 
parity of sta tus within the Federation.21 Though the smaller territories 
wanted immediate self-government in the same way as the larger 
territories had, the Imperial State decided th a t it would be granted only 
as part of an  independent Federation. The Federation was formed in 
1958 b u t collapsed in 1962 giving way to a successor attem pt to form a 
‘Federation of the Eight’.22 When th a t attem pt also failed, the smaller 
colonies of the West Indies were drawn back into the broader 
considerations of the HMG on the future of smaller colonies.
Meanwhile, HMG was concerned tha t few federations and mergers 
had been formed, the effect of which would mean tha t num erous small 
countries would request to become members of the Commonwealth. A 
working party was established to examine, inter alia, possible 
constitutional forms for these smaller colonies to satisfy the requirement 
of Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter to achieve self-government in 
all dependent countries.23 A draft policy was finally circulated to all 
relevant departments, and revised for discussion a t the Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers meetings of 1964.24 The draft policy recommended the 
granting of independence to all territories capable of achieving it;
20 The West Indies Federation was formed in 1958 and comprised the British colonies 
excepting Guyana, Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands, and 
Bermuda.
21 Report of the Leeward and Windward Islands Constitutional Conference, June 
1961{ Cmnd. 1434, 1961).
22 CO 1031/3374, no.l ‘Federation in the Caribbean: predictions and possibilities’, 
Memorandum by G.W. Jamieson. The eight were the Windward and Leeward Islands 
and Barbados.
23 Cabinet Office File 10 /4 /8 3 /1 , Part 2. Note of Sir Norman Brook, 17 October 1961.
24 DO (O) (64) 16, 23 March 1964.
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granting ‘free association’ to others not capable of achieving it; and 
changing the nomenclature used for colony to avoid international 
criticism.25
Meanwhile, Secretary of State Mr. Greenwood undertook a tour of 
the E ast Caribbean to hear views on proposals for a Federation for the 
smaller territories. In a submission to the Overseas Policy Committee, he 
noted th a t although the territories no longer had the strategic and 
commercial value for Britain, which they had had in the eighteenth 
century, they were in an  internationally sensitive area close to America 
which made them attractive to hostile interests.26 He noted the diverse 
opinions on and lukewarm response to Federation, and noting the 
importance of the potentially dangerous situation recommended four 
possible constitutional futures - a strong Federation; a weak Federation; 
two Federations of Leeward Islands and Windward Islands to later join 
with Barbados; and independence for Barbados with a kind of ‘free 
association’ with Britain for the others.27
As a  follow-up, a Conference on Colonial Policy was held in July  
1965 to explore arrangements for territories tha t did not wish or would 
not be able to sustain independence, or were unlikely to be part of a 
federation or integrate with other territories.28 The Conference produced 
a White Paper which proposed negotiations for free association of the 
smaller territories, as integration with Great Britain was not a possibility.
It is worth noting that throughout these discussions, there were 
differences between the various departm ents of Whitehall on the process 
of decolonization. This was especially highlighted over the contents of the 
proposed White Paper on Decolonization. According to Morgan, “[r]arely
25 Morgan, Self-Government.
26 CAB 148/20, OPD (65)51, Memorandum by Mr. Greenwood.
27 Ibid.
28 CAB 21/5295/5 , annex, Conference on Colonial Policy, 8-11 July 1965. The 
Conference was held for only Governors, Whitehall officials and other imperial 
administrators.
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in Whitehall had argument been so powerfully marshalled against a 
proposed White Paper...”29
6.1 .3  The Granting of Associated Statehood
The above account dem onstrates the desire of HMG to find a
solution to its colonial dilemma -  escaping responsibility for the colonies, 
avoiding international criticism for abandoning the territories, and still 
protecting its strategic interest in the context of the Cold War. The next 
step in the decolonization process sought to resolve the dilemma and 
represented a significant stage in the development of the state and 
society in Saint Lucia. The proposed solution involving granting 
‘Statehood in Association with Great Britain’ was intended to grant 
sovereignty beyond self-government, bu t not full sovereign statehood. In 
effect, the smaller colonies would now become responsible for their social 
and economic development. The state/society complex was to function as 
a fully viable and independent entity, bu t with autonomous no 
international role.
The Legislative Council of Saint Lucia, after debating the future 
constitutional sta tus of the island following the abandonment of the 
Federation efforts, formally requested the granting of full internal self- 
government by 1 January  1966.30 The request was made because the 
“...ministerial form of government wherein the powers of the members 
elected by the people of Saint Lucia are limited to an extent inconsistent 
with present political m aturity.”31 The request presupposed the 
‘traditional sta tu s’ of self-government, where Britain would have 
responsibility for external affairs and defence, have ultimate power over 
the constitution and be held responsible for the government of the 
territory. It is noteworthy that the territories did not ask for
29 Morgan, Self-Government, p. 236.
30 Minutes of Legislative Council Meeting, 24 September 1965.
31 Ibid. p. 10.
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independence, as they still wanted access to imperial aid. According to
the Chief Minister, the colony was facing desperate poverty which was,
inherited from a colonial power th a t has exploited us, our people and 
our land, for their profit; and now the easy way to get out of it, as 
cheaply as possible is to give you independence. If we were passing a 
resolution today for Independence, we could get it.32
The request of the Legislature m eant tha t there would still be a 
colonial relationship in the understanding of the United Nations. 
Therefore, Britain would continue to be held internationally responsible 
for the development of the territory yet would no longer be in control of 
the day-to-day functioning of the government machinery. The leadership 
of the colony was more interested in the control of decision making for 
the colony. It was felt tha t self-government would remove the 
“...humiliations which only members of the Executive Branch of 
Government, past and present understand....the humiliation we get at 
the hands of the Colonial Office.”33
HMG was hesitant to agree; instead, the Secretary of State desired 
a constitutional relationship that in his view “...would be satisfactory 
both to Britain and to the people of the territory in the longer term.”34 It 
was argued th a t the traditional grant of self-government was only 
appropriate for territories that were near to independence bu t not for 
territories unlikely to attain independence.35
At tha t stage, it was clear tha t Britain no longer wanted 
responsibility for the territories especially as they would not have control 
of the local administrative machinery under self-government and feared 
tha t HMG may frequently have to intervene to resolve difficulties. The
32 Ibid. p. 14.
33 Ibid. p. 22. Presentation by Minister for Communications.
34 FO 371/179142, no.5, Letter from Sir H Poynton to Sir P Gore Booth on future 
constitutional arrangements, Enclosure: The constitutional future of the Leeward and 
Windward Islands’.
35 Report of the Windward Islands Constitutional Conference, 1966 (Cmnd. 3021, June 
1966). Response of the Secretary of State to an explanation as to why the traditional 
form of self-government was not offered.
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British wanted a relationship tha t did not have any ‘colonial stigma’, but 
would not compromise on the broader concerns of political stability and 
ideological expansion of Communism. It was proposed by HMG to enter 
into a ‘voluntary’ association with the territory tha t would assum e full 
power over its constitution and government, except for defence and 
external affairs.36 In such a constitutional arrangem ent for the states, 
the constitutional provisions to ensure democratic practices were to be 
entrenched and the procedure to declare independence unilaterally was 
to be entrenched even deeper.37 However, HMG would have the power to 
legislate, if required, in pursuit of its responsibilities for defence and 
external affairs. Further, whilst not having the power over the decisions 
of the associated state, the HMG could refer any executive action of any 
territory to the courts for determination of its constitutionality, with its 
decision having the force of law. In a sense, the courts would become the 
impartial arbiter, a  role traditionally performed by the Secretary of State. 
HMG also had the right to terminate the association at anytime, after 
giving six m onths notice and obtaining Parliamentary approval.
In the view of HMG, this represented significant progress towards
satisfying international pressure for decolonisation, while relieving itself
of the difficulties of responsibility for the territories’ development. Sir
Poynton explained that,
we have no great commercial or defence interests in these islands any 
longer; and the ties tha t we have with them are largely cultural, moral 
and sentimental. Our principal ally, the United States is, however, very 
sensitive about anything tha t happens in these territories and would 
not welcome a situation developing in which Britain withdrew and left 
seven potential little Haitis or Cubas on their door-step.38
36 Ibid. Enclosure, Constitutional Future.
37 Unilateral declaration of independence would require a long period of public 
discussion and two-thirds support in the Legislature and from voters in a referendum. 
It was this provision for unilateral declaration of independence which made the 
association ‘voluntary’.
38 FO 371/179142, no. 5, Letter from Sir H Poynton to Sir P Gore Booth on future 
constitutional arrangements,
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For HMG, the new approach would be acceptable to all concerned 
parties. The colonial state would be under the control of the majority 
middle and working classes and this arrangem ent met their desire for 
total internal self-government with responsibility and power. It satisfied 
the concern of the US Government over the possibility of num erous small 
independent states in the region, giving rise to more ‘Haitis’ and ‘Cubas’. 
It m et the geopolitical concerns of the imperial state on defence issues 
and the participation of these new states in the international arena in a 
period of Cold War tension. It also ensured th a t constitutional issues, 
would be resolved by the courts, or a t least provides a legal basis for the 
use of force if necessary.
Accordingly, a Windward Islands Constitutional Conference was 
held to examine the general nature of the relationship with the Imperial 
State under ‘associated statehood’ and the particular constitutional 
provisions for each territory.39 However, Saint Lucia’s delegation 
requested full internal self-government in the conventional m anner with 
the option to review after a few years to decide if to proceed to 
independence on their own, in association with Britain, or with other 
territories in the West Indies.40 The Secretary of State rejected tha t 
approach and indicated that either the British approach was accepted, or 
full independence would be offered immediately.41
The representatives of the territories were of the view th a t the 
discussion on constitutional advancement should consider arrangem ents 
for trade, aid and immigration, as they feared tha t they would find 
themselves in a less favourable position. It was strongly felt tha t the 
opportunity to fashion a new relationship should be used to strengthen
39 Constitutional Proposals for Antigua, StKitts/Nevis/Anguilla, Dominica, Saint Lucia, 
StVincent, Grenada (Cmnd. 2865, December 1965).




their position and ensure their viability.42 Saint Lucia’s delegation argued 
th a t constitutional advancement without a supporting economy would 
not make the constitution meaningful nor would it safeguard 
democracy.43 HMG insisted tha t an  increase in aid was not feasible, but 
th a t allocated aid should be used more effectively. HMG also agreed that 
the Caribbean Division of the Overseas Development Ministry would 
assist to rationalize the use of aid.44 It appeared that this was another 
missed opportunity for HMG to ensure tha t colonies were placed on a 
path  of economic viability.
The West Indies Act of 1967 provided for the conferment of a new 
sta tu s of association with the United Kingdom. It was clear tha t the 
unanim ous adoption by the Legislature in Saint Lucia of the new 
Constitution was an act under duress. There was no possibility to 
change any provision as agreed at the Constitutional Conference even if 
the Legislature was in opposition. Even worse, HMG had allowed only a 
few provisions to be negotiated. A legislative member captured the 
common feeling by denying tha t the sta tus of independence, in 
association with Britain was free and voluntary “...a fraud, an 
imposition...it is a dictation.”45
The official assessm ent was th a t the negotiations for Associated 
Statehood were bitter and hostile and left an  unfavourable atmosphere 
for a new relationship tha t should be based on m utual tru st and 
understanding.46 The public was apathetic to the negotiations as it was 
noted tha t it was only with the arrival of Statehood Day and the 
prospects of celebration tha t any interest was shown by the public. 
According to the Briefing, “...even so the jubilation with which the end of
42 Windward Islands Constitutional Conference.
43 Minutes of Legislative Council Meeting, 28 June 1966.
44 Windward Constitutional Conference.
45 Legislative Council Meeting, 28 June 1966. Presentation by Minister for 
Communications.
46 FCO 43/125, Confidential. Briefing to Hon. Herbert Bowden, 24 February, 1967.
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colonialism was welcome might be viewed as strangely lacking.”47 An 
earlier intelligence report had highlighted tha t the Labour Party had 
advised its supporters not to take part in any celebrations and had 
accused the Secretary of State of betraying the Labour Party.48
However, in ending the colonial relationship, HMG felt tha t it was 
the best arrangement, in the absence of a Federation, as it would limit 
HMG expenditure on the territories, and would encourage international 
responsibility for the region.49 HMG explained the new arrangem ents to 
the US Government and sought their support within the United Nations 
as a  full m easure of self-government.50 However, the concept of 
‘Statehood in Association with Great Britain’ did not receive recognition 
by the United Nations, since it was not seen “...as constituting effective 
decolonization, especially as there was no popular expression of self- 
determination. ”51
6.1 .4  The Emergence of an Autonomous State
A critical aspect of statehood is the capacity of the state to
determine the power relations in society and to execute policy. Whilst the 
attainm ent of associated statehood was short of independence, it still 
represented the achievement of internal self-government and the 
emergence of a  semi-autonomous state. For the first time, the structure 
and functioning of the state would be controlled by local interest and 
accountable to the local legislature. This in effect ended over 150 years of 
colonial rule. The constitution proposed to the states was modelled on 
the Westminster system.52 However, after the Constitutional 
Conferences, each constitution was modified to satisfy the local dem ands
47 Ibid. p. 2.
48 FCO 43/125, Secret. Saint Lucia Intelligence Report, 1 March 1967.
49 Morgan, Self-Government
50 FO 371/184566, no.54. Letter from Mr. Stewart to Mr. Rusk, 29 April 1966.
51 Tony Thorndike, “The Politics of Inadequacy”, Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 19, 
No.l.
52 Constitutional Proposals for Antigua, StKitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, Saint Lucia, 
StVincent, Grenada, Cmd. 2865, (London; H.M.S.O., 1966).
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of the respective states. The intention was to have a constitution and 
model for a perm anent rather than  transitional government.53 The 
Constitution provided the framework for a state that was significantly 
different to the Crown Colony state in the entrenchm ent of fundamental 
rights, the role of the Head of State, and the executive provisions to 
secure basic democratic rights. However, an examination of the 
Constitution of the Associated State in Saint Lucia highlights how the 
dem ands of the Saint Lucia Delegation produced a distinct constitution 
tha t satisfied the ruling elite. Under the new state structure, the Head of 
State was the Governor, b u t unlike the Colonial Governor or 
Administrator, this was now a ceremonial post and a symbol of national 
unity. Under the W estminster System, tha t person m ust function above 
the narrow interests of party politics and have fairness of judgment, bu t 
m ost importantly, m ust be seen by the people to be independent and not 
subject to partisan persuasion. However, the Constitution did not 
provide any formal procedure to select a  Governor and thus satisfy the 
necessity for selecting an impartial person. The constitutional proposals 
made provision for the Secretary of State to be guided by the Chief 
Minister when advising Her Majesty.54 It was recommended tha t the term 
of office would be five years. The agreed provision allowed the Governor 
to, “...hold office during Her Majesty’s pleasure...”55 It was felt tha t such 
a provision which provided a time limit, actually allowed for the 
appointment of the Governor to be subjected to the preferences of the 
party in power. This stands in opposition to the national image tha t the 
Governor ought to represent.
The impartiality of the Governor is most obvious in the role tha t is 
played in safeguarding the democratic practices by which elections and
53 Urias Forbes, “The West Indies Associated States: Some Aspects of the Constitutional 
Arrangement” in Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, March 1970.
54 Constitutional Proposals.
55 Saint Lucia Constitution Order, 1967 (S.I. 1967, No. 229), s.32.
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constituency delimitation takes place. Therefore, in most other 
Associated States’ Constitutions, the provision allowed the Governor to 
appoint Supervisors of Elections, who were not politically influenced, or 
in the case of Dominica, for the Governor to exercise general supervision 
and control. In the case of Saint Lucia, the Supervisor of Elections was 
appointed by the Public Service Commission after consultation with the 
Premier.56 Given tha t the Public Service was not safeguarded against 
impartiality and the need for the approval of the Premier, there would 
always be questions regarding the objectivity of the Supervisor. Similarly, 
the provisions for the delimitation of constituencies had the least safety 
devices in the case of Saint Lucia. Unlike most other associated states 
where the delimitation of constituencies was handled by an independent 
agency, in Saint Lucia it was handled by a standing committee of the 
House of Assembly.57 There was no attem pt to hide or mitigate any 
partisan considerations, a significant difference from the perm anent non­
political mechanism under the Westminster model. This was another 
example of the entrenchment of the ruling political elite through the 
formulation of a new constitution.
There was also a divergence from the model in the mechanism for 
appointment of the Public Service Commission. This Commission is 
highly significant in small societies where the public service is the largest 
employer and is responsible for implementation of governmental plans 
and projects. In effect, the public service m ust not be the place for the 
repayment of political support, nor show political biasness in the 
functioning of the institutions of the state. The provisions were generally 
common for all associated states. In the case of Saint Lucia, the Public 
Service Commission was appointed by the Governor on the advice of the 
Premier. The Constitution made it impossible for elected politicians and 
public officers, or persons recently employed as public officers to become
se ibid.
57 Ibid. s. 49.
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members, and fixed the period of service. Once in office, however, it was 
also made difficult to remove members from their positions. However, 
there was no independence given to the Governor to act on his or her 
considered judgment. It allowed the Premier to make as many partisan 
recommendations as was felt necessary.
From the above, it was clear tha t the imperial state was not 
anxious to enforce provisions tha t made the acceptance of associated 
statehood more difficult. Local political leaders were allowed to modify 
the proposals once the idea of associated statehood was going to be 
accepted with the colonial-type limits extending to defence and foreign 
affairs. It appeared tha t since control of external affairs and an 
economically viable state were not going to be provided, then at least 
greater domestic political control, as requested by these leaders, would 
be provided. The Government, led by the United Workers Party (UWP), 
indicated its satisfaction with the proposed Associated Statehood 
Constitution and according to the Chief Minister, “[t]here is nothing too 
much in it....what we felt should be enshrined in the Constitution, has 
now been enshrined in the Constitution and it is a Constitution tha t I 
ask this Honourable House to approve.”58 The imperial state did not 
seem concerned with structuring a  state that gave meaning and 
expression to the fundamental rights of citizens which was entrenched in 
writing. This concern should have been foremost given the historical 
experience of the colonies and the separation of the society from the 
functioning of the state. Instead, the associated state was designed to 
continue the practice of politics without participation.
Another critical aspect of sovereign statehood is the international 
role of the state -  the capacity to participate as an actor in the
58 Proceedings and Debates of the Meeting of the House of Assembly, 20 October 1978. p.
2. The United Workers Party won the 1964 elections and comprised a splinter group 
from the Saint Lucia Labor Party called the National Labour Movement (NLM) and a 
disintegrating planter/business interest group calling the Peoples Progressive Party 
(PPP).
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international system. This role involves responding to a  num ber of 
externally induced demands for state-to-state relations as well as 
domestically determined needs for external support. However, it was 
clear th a t the new constitutional arrangem ent which provided statehood 
to Saint Lucia, though in association with Great Britain, was designed to 
solve the decolonization dilemma and address the concern of having 
small states existing within the international system. The formula 
provided full internal self-government bu t limited the most fundamental 
characteristic of independent statehood -  international recognition of 
independence. Whilst in private HMG officials expressed concern about 
the islands becoming ‘little ‘Cubas’, in public the official explanation was 
less patronizing. The Secretary of State explained tha t Britain met the, 
“...legitimate demands for maximum degree of internal autonomy, while 
at the same time recognizing your difficulties in providing the costly 
accompaniments of independence in the exercise of defence and external 
affairs...”59 In effect, the responsibility for external affairs and defence 
was presented as a deliberate delegation of responsibility to HMG.
HMG had the ultimate say in external affairs consistent with the 
discussions at the Constitutional Conference, which informed the 
Agreement signed with each associated state on the Delegation of 
Authority in External Affairs.60 It was tha t Agreement tha t defined the 
embryonic, though restrictive, international role for the state in Saint 
Lucia. It allowed Saint Lucia to apply for full membership of the UN 
Specialised Agencies and similar organizations of which the UK was a 
member. Saint Lucia was restricted to signing trade agreements that only 
dealt with the treatm ent of goods, and to negotiating and concluding 
agreements, if agreed to by HMG, of a purely local nature with other 
independent Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean, other
59 FCO 43/14, Arthur Bottomley Address to Statehood Day Celebrations in Saint Lucia, 
1 March, 1967.
60 FCO 43/31, Agreement on Delegation of Authority in External Affairs.
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associated states and colonies. There was greater latitude for agreements 
of a financial, technical, cultural or scientific nature bu t these had to be 
agreed to by HMG. The Saint Lucia Government was required to inform 
HMG of all its actions under delegation and to accept the decision of 
HMG where any disagreement arose. Finally, HMG agreed to train 
officials in the conduct of external affairs and defence. The international 
role of the state was expanded to allow contact with consular officers 
from third countries to perform their duties if only tha t consular officer 
was provided with permission by HMG. These duties only related to 
protection of nationals of tha t country and the promotion or protection of 
trade between tha t country and the associated state.61
The first concern for HMG in separating an international role from 
autonomous self-government was with the phrasing of new international 
agreements, which would be silent on territorial application and taken to 
apply to the associated states since HMG was responsible for their 
external affairs.62 HMG was fearful tha t the states, with full internal 
authority, might not implement the provisions of HMG agreements, 
which in effect would prove embarrassing. Some of the agreements might 
not apply to the states in question who may lack the capacity to 
implement them. The m atter was settled with the UN making it clear 
tha t all treaties signed by HMG which were applicable to associated 
states before ‘Association Day’ would remain in force. However, 
concerning future treaties, the associated states would have to be 
consulted if it applied to them, which would then be ratified in their 
nam e.63 Any agreement tha t was ratified without reference to any 
particular state would not apply. It is noteworthy that the provision was
61 FCO 43/30, Proposals of Interdepartmental Working Party on External Affairs of 
Associated States.
62 FCO 43/28, Letter from M.G. Winton to A.D. Watts, 28 February 1967.
63 FCO 43/28, Letter of UK Permanent Representative to the UN to the UN Secretary- 
General, 12 October 1967.
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made for HMG to ‘consult’, rather than  ‘sign with the consent of the 
associated state’.
Another instance of HMG attempting to define the international 
role of the associated states arose when the states sort membership of 
the Commonwealth. It had been decided a t the 1965 Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers Meeting (CPMM) that the associated states could join 
Commonwealth organizations in their own right and attend meetings 
dealing with m atters of concern to them .64 However, there was no 
agreement on their participation a t the CPMM. Guyana objected to their 
exclusion, stating tha t entire region governed by one Prime Minister was 
insufficient.65 The British had objected to their inclusion because there 
would be too many representatives at the meeting and more importantly, 
the obligations tha t would be discussed would not apply to the 
associated states. Guyana argued that the states were not colonies and 
the responsibility for defence and external affairs, which Great Britain 
had, was akin to a treaty arrangem ent.66 HMG informed the 
Commonwealth Secretariat tha t the Associated States would not be full 
members of the Secretariat, bu t could participate in all Secretariat 
meetings, except those dealing with organizational, budgetary or political 
m atters.67 All invitations to meetings should be issued through HMG.
In the areas of international trade, HMG insisted on the need for 
HMG approval before the associated states could agree to any 
arrangements. In the first such instance, HMG insisted tha t it was 
required to provide permission to sign the treaties establishing the 
Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) and the Eastern Caribbean 
Common Market (ECCM). In the case of CARIFTA, HMG permission was
64 FCO 43/27, Memorandum from R.Walker to all British Government Representatives, 
24 April 1967.
65 Guyana had noted that Rhodesia had been allowed to attend CPMM although it was 
not independent nor was a member of the UN.
66 FCO 43/27, Letter from Prime Minister Burnham to Prime Minister of Great Britain,
8 June 1967.
67 FCO 43/27, Letter from R.Walker to T.W. Aston, 5 May 1967.
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necessary because it involved other independent Caribbean territories. In 
the case of ECCM, which was established among the associated states 
and the colony of Montserrat, permission for signing was given at the 
final moment. It was given “...on the understanding tha t finalization of 
the common external tariff will be the subject of prior consultation with 
HMG because of international implications.”68
The limited role given to the associated states betrayed the fact 
tha t they were not independent or sovereign, which would accentuate the 
desire for full statehood.
6 .1 .5  External Concerns for Economic Viability
Another critical aspect of statehood is the capacity of the state to
meet the expectations of its citizens or a t least to deliver their needs. The 
vital question was whether in granting self-government through 
associated statehood, and thus ending imperial responsibility, HMG 
would ensure economic viability. Throughout colonial rule, from slavery 
to reformed colonialism, the majority of the population in the colony 
suffered from economic deprivation and social destitution. Accordingly, 
the persistent argum ent against granting independence to the smaller 
territories was their inability to achieve economic viability. The argum ent 
moved from a genuine concern in the mid-twentieth century, arising from 
the riots and unrest of the 1930’s, to a  fear tha t if given independence, 
the lack of economic viability could lead to little ‘Haitis or Cubas’. In the 
context of the Cold War, tha t was a major concern for the US. It was also 
an acknowledgement tha t economic viability was vital for the attainm ent 
of sustainable and independent statehood.
In the last days of colonialism, the issue of economic development 
was linked to the belief tha t the Federation was a panacea. It was no 
secret tha t the British wanted a Federation in order to reduce their own
68 FCO 43/44, Confidential Memo from British Government Representative to all 
Premiers, 30 April 1968.
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financial burden.69 In fact, the motivation for all integration attem pts was 
always to reduce reliance on the Imperial Exchequer -  either to impose 
‘grant-in-aid’ sta tus in the golden period of colonialism or to achieve 
economic viability in the age of decolonization. With the Federation in 
place, the British hoped that the more prosperous colonies would come 
to the aid of their poorer neighbours. This issue, like so many colonial 
issues, was characterized by disagreement between the Treasury and the 
Colonial Office over the level of aid to be distributed to an  independent 
Federation. It was also thought tha t with an independent Federation, the 
US which had greater strategic interest would be willing to contribute a 
larger portion of aid.70
The United States’ concern regarding the viability of the Eastern 
Caribbean colonies to withstand communist infiltration led to their 
suggestion th a t a  tripartite survey be undertaken to formulate a joint 
approach to the economic problems of Barbados and the Leeward and 
Windward Islands.71
The Survey was commissioned by the Governments of the United 
Kingdom, Canada and United States “...to formulate plans for the 
achievement of economic viability and to suggest priorities for the next 
five years...”72 The study also examined the potential for further 
economic co-operation among the islands. It represented the only 
attem pt to address the issue of economic viability as a precondition to 
independence. Before the 1930’s, the Imperial State’s primary concern 
was with the colonies ability to balance their budgets and the need for 
‘grants-in-aid’, while the post-1930’s saw the introduction of social 
welfare projects to redress the grave social conditions of colonial neglect.
69 S.R. Ashton and David Killingray, eds. The West Indies, Series B vol.6 of British 
Documents on the End of Empire, (London; The Stationary Office, 1999).
70 Ibid.
71 F.O. 371/185004, US Policy.
72Ministry of Overseas Development, Report of Tripartite Economic Survey of the Eastern 
Caribbean (HMSO; London, 1967), p.iii.
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Interestingly, it was undertaken before Britain gave up its responsibility 
for development of the colonies with the granting of associated sta tus 
and th a t it was tripartite. It was reasoned tha t once associated sta tus 
was granted, the Imperial State would no longer have the sole duty of 
ensuring the economic viability of the territories. This explains why HMG 
wanted to make it an  international issue, or a t least one where the US 
and Canada had an equal stake.
The Report of the Survey Group focused on the obstacles to 
economic growth, the expenditure and policies required to overcome 
them, and the priorities for the next five years. This constituted the 
strategy for development which would achieve economic viability.73 The 
islands were seen as having two distinct features in their economic 
structure which had to be addressed. Firstly, there was a high 
disproportion between the large size and the rate of growth of the 
population, and the ‘uncertain availability’ of land, capital, skills and 
enterprise. Secondly, the islands had a propensity towards foreign trade 
with a heavy reliance on the export of a single crop.
The solution to the first feature was to reduce the population 
growth though the effect would not be immediate. The other option was 
to attract growth industries tha t needed little land bu t would attract 
capital and skills, and earn foreign exchange. In tha t regard, the 
accelerated development of the tourism industry, which was ideal for the 
region with its natural attributes and close proximity to the North 
American market, was highly recommended. Possibilities for industrial 
development were seen as limited in the short- to medium-term, as no 
industrial base existed in the islands. Restraints were identified as the 
domestic m arket size and scale of production, obstacles to trade in the 
region, competitive tax concession among islands, unavailability of 
skilled labour, lack of financial institutions and transportation costs.
73 Ibid. The following account is based on that Report.
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Agriculture was identified as critical for the provision of employment, to 
expand exports and to substitute imports.
The second feature involved two issues. Firstly, the practice of 
importing items such as capital and consum er goods, and therefore, the 
need to pay attention to food crops th a t could be produced locally. The 
other more im portant issue was the heavy focus of each island on the 
export of a single product -  sugar or bananas with few prospects for 
expanding the markets. The Report noted th a t neither of the two crops 
could compete in the world market, while the UK market, though 
protected, was limited. Similarly, all the other traditional crops had little 
prospect for expansion. The Group estimated funding for projects needed 
to attain  economic viability over the five-year period a t £  40,693,000.
Specifically, in relation to Saint Lucia, the Report noted tha t 
bananas made up 80% of the island’s exports. However, it advised a 
responsible expansion policy tha t focused on improving the quality of the 
fruit. It noted tha t developing the potential of other areas of agricultural 
production, by the expansion of fisheries, land tenure reform, irrigation 
and agricultural credit, was critical for viability.
The tourism industry was seen as having tremendous potential for 
development with a large num ber of good hotel sites. An expansion in 
hotel beds and development of the former military airport would also 
contribute to the development of a sizeable tourist industry.
The Report suggested that in the case of Saint Lucia, industrial 
development should be encouraged to the maximum as there appeared to 
be substantial possibilities for light industry. However, these were import 
substitution of wood products, imported processed meats, vegetables and 
fruit products. The specific restraints on industrial development would 
still be a concern. There were concerns raised by the survey group 
regarding the level of education, poor health services and water supply, 
as these would impact on any efforts to achieve economic viability.
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The Survey Group identified the financial needs of Saint Lucia to 
attain economic viability at £8,741,000, over a five-year period.
Both Houses of Parliament referred to the Survey as part of the 
debate on approving the West Indies Act. Parliamentarians in approving 
the Bill, recognized the difficulty of the challenges raised by the Survey 
Group, b u t seemed content tha t the new sta tus -  associated statehood - 
given to the islands would stimulate the islands themselves to manage 
their own economic development.74 There was no attem pt to ensure tha t 
the colonies pursued a programme tha t would ensure they attained 
economic viability, which was the motivation for the survey. Nor did the 
imperial state make available the resources identified to pursue a path 
towards economic viability.
6 .2 .0  Independence as a Transformative Event
The issues discussed above highlighted tha t the experience of
associated statehood was always going to be transitional, for while it 
provided the first autonomous state structure for self-government and 
was given a limited international role, the experience failed to meet the 
expectations of the associated state as an  avenue to promote its 
economic development. It was this sentim ent tha t led to the call for 
national independence and self-determination.
When introduced, associated statehood was presented as a 
political relationship for territories tha t were unlikely to achieve 
independence.75 By 1972, the FCO’s view was tha t associated statehood 
was not expected to last forever, although the territories would be 
reluctant to exchange it for independence unless they were sure tha t 
seeking independence would not disadvantage them .76 However, two 
main arguments were pu t forward to justify a request for national
74 Morgan, Self-Government, p. 278.
75 See Footnote 34.
76 FCO 44/635, Briefing Notes for Anglo/US Talks on the Caribbean, 7-8 February 1972.
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independence. Firstly, it would enhance the capacity of the state to 
promote its development. Secondly, the denial of independence was 
incompatible with international practice. In any event, HMG was 
prepared to grant independence as it was satisfied tha t the associated 
states were becoming an increasingly heavy burden. One major concern 
for HMG was the international perceptions tha t HMG was forcing 
independence.
This section examines the interaction between external influences 
-  the imperial state and the international system -  and the domestic 
forces tha t led to independence. In the final analysis, the emergence of 
the state as a sovereign international actor was not a societal aspiration, 
bu t represented the convenience of the Imperial State and the ambitions 
of the ruling elite tha t controlled the Colonial State.
6.2 .1  Changes in Imperial Policy and the End of Imperial Rule
The fear of the smaller territories becoming ‘little Cubas’ was a 
persistent concern for the Americans and HMG. Ironically, it was this 
concern which would provide the final impetus for a change in colonial 
policy and which encouraged the dem and for national independence. 
Before associated statehood was granted, a survey of the internal 
security capacity was requested to ascertain the ability of the territories 
to ensure political stability. In the case of Saint Lucia, it was assessed 
tha t the operational organization was fully comprehensive and effective.77 
The internal security competence of the Police Force was rated as 
considerable. On the eve of associated statehood, a  review of the political 
situation found tha t there were no external forces at work that pose a 
subversive threat.78
77 FCO 43/48, Confidential Survey of the Police Forces in the Eastern Caribbean, 
November-December 1966.
78 FCO 43/48, Confidential. The Current Situation in the Caribbean. 27 January 1967.
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Soon after associated statehood was granted, there were difficulties 
with the St. Kitts/Anguilla arrangement, as Anguilla refused to be ruled 
by St.Kitts and unilaterally seceded. This brought the issue of internal 
security and the responsibility of HMG to the fore.79 In response, officials 
in the FCO considered the possibility of passing legislation to intervene 
in the event of a  breakdown of constitutional or democratic government, 
especially in the case of a  Communist takeover.80 It was noted tha t HMG 
no longer had such responsibility and could only intervene if requested 
by a state, and if considered appropriate in the circumstances by HMG.
The issue of internal security was forced on the agenda again as 
the United States expressed concern about the internal security of the 
Associated States and its expectation tha t HMG would preserve 
stability.81 The response of HMG to the growing security concern was to 
make the Overseas Police Adviser available to advise all sta tes and to 
encourage the establishment of a Regional Police Reserve, to which 
Antigua and Saint Lucia had already agreed.82 That initiative was never 
pursued as it was noted tha t Governments did not want to spend money 
on security as it did not win them votes. In the end, the idea was not 
pursued.
Significantly, HMG effected a change in policy, in response to the 
Anguilla experience, as the Cabinet agreed to a new approach to the 
associated states. 83 The aim of the new policy was to “...transfer to viable 
new political and economic units or to other friendly governments the 
responsibilities for those Caribbean territories which do opt to remain as
79 St.Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla became an associated state on 27 February 1967. On 30 May 
1967, the contingent of St.Kitts Police on Anguilla was ejected by islanders claiming 
that they would not be ruled by St.Kitts.
80 FCO 43/27, Memorandum from M.G. de Winton to Mr.Hall, 5 July 1967.
81 FCO 43/48, Confidential. Internal Security in the Associated States. Memorandum 
from T R M Sewell to Mr. Godden. 9 April 1968.
82 FCO 44/149. Confidential Briefing Note. Minister of State Visit to the Caribbean, 29 
October 1969.
83 FCO 44/149. Secret. Steering Brief. Minister of State Visit to the Caribbean, 29 
October 1969.
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colonial dependencies.”84 The aim was to get these associated states to 
integrate or better yet, persuade the US or Canada to take responsibility 
for these territories, using a ‘carrot and stick’ tactic.85 The ‘carrot’ 
approach was to indicate that HMG had no intention to force integration, 
bu t would assist such efforts and give assurances tha t aid would not be 
affected by the change in constitutional status. HMG would encourage 
other governments especially Canada to participate. The ‘stick’ approach 
was to indicate tha t a  state-by-state review would be undertaken and any 
state lagging behind in integration efforts would be informed th a t HMG 
would consider terminating association after two years and review aid 
contributions.
The imperfections of the associated statehood approach were now 
clear to HMG, especially after the Anguillan experience. Not only were the 
states not taking their internal security seriously bu t when HMG 
intervened a t the request of St. Kitts, the level of insularity was so high, 
tha t it created difficulties with Parliament, the press and international 
opinion. Secondly, associated statehood was not accepted by the UN, 
while states continued to express their dissatisfaction with the external 
affairs arrangem ents.86
By 1971, the policy towards independence of the associated states 
was made more definitive after a visit to the region by the Minister of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. It can best be described as 
a policy of abandonment. The Minister recommended to Cabinet tha t it 
“...adopt a  consistent policy in the Baham as and Associated States of 
encouraging them towards independence without necessarily insisting on 
a referendum in every case.”87 In addition, attem pts a t Federation should 
be abandoned as they were doomed to fail b u t if any state pursued it,
84 Ibid. p. 1. The main candidates were the US, Canada and Trinidad.
85 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
87 FCO 44/473. Confidential Policy in the Commonwealth Caribbean, 15 March 1971.
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then the attem pt should be supported.88 It was noted tha t the territories 
no longer held a  strategic interest for Britain, bu t lay in the shadow of 
the United States, who should now determine their future.
The first attem pt to implement the new policy started with 
Grenada. Premier Gaiiy complained to the Secretary of State on the 
necessity of a  two-thirds majority in a referendum as a requirement for 
independence.89 Interestingly, the Secretary of State responded th a t if 
independence was the main issue a t the next General Election, and Gaiiy 
won a clear majority, he would then be willing to discuss independence. 
This signalled the transformation of the existing policy, and opened the 
door for the independence of the associated states.
Gairy’s party won 13 of the 15 seats in the elections, so he duly 
requested independence under Section 10 (2) of the West Indies Act of 
1967, which placed the responsibility to terminate associated statehood 
on HMG. A Constitutional Conference, attended by governments and 
opposition parties, was held, where discussions centred on approving an 
independent constitution. Despite the late withdrawal of support from 
the opposition, Grenada was granted independence by HMG terminating 
the association.
6.2 .2  State-Societal Conflict and the attainm ent of
Independence
Unlike Grenada, the other associated states were not intent on 
seeking independence. Saint Lucia indicated a  wish for independence, 
bu t only as part of a larger territory.90 In repeated throne speeches, the 
official policy announced was th a t associated statehood was a 
transitional process, which would eventually lead to full independence, 
and tha t Saint Lucia would become independent as part of a political
88 FCO 44/473. Confidential. British Interest in the Caribbean. Report by Minister of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. 15 March 1971.
89 Ibid.
90 FCO 44/635. Confidential. Record of Talks on the Caribbean with a United States 
Delegation. 7 February 1972.
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union of West Indian states.91 It should be noted tha t the pursu it of
political unity was one of the avenues to achieve independence as
provided by the Act of 1967, rather than  for its intrinsic necessity. For
example, following the ‘Petit St.Vincent Initiative’, the Premier announced
that, “[m]y Government will continue this quest until the final goal of
independence, through unity, is achieved.”92
The Independence of Grenada in 1974 dramatically changed the
political landscape as HMG sanctioned another route to independence
and, consequently, diminished the possibility for independence through
unity. Therefore, the Government of Saint Lucia announced tha t “...if our
endeavours at political unity manifest no hope of success within the next
two years, my Government will be presented with no alternative bu t to
seek national fulfillment alone.”93 In 1975, the Government announced
that it was unlikely to reach a political union tha t would lead to
independence and all Associated States had agreed with the full backing
of the independent Caribbean countries to seek independence
separately.94 This would be done by requesting the termination of
association in accordance with Section 10(2) of the West Indies Act.
Independence was said to be a right as,
under the unrelenting stim ulus of world opinion in an age of growing 
awareness of hum an dignity, the process of freeing subject colonial 
peoples has proceeded to the point where our own West Indian islands 
are involved.95
The Government promised to discuss the timing and procedure for 
requesting the termination of association with political parties 
represented in Parliament, and to seek the “broadest m easure of 
approval on the form and contents of a Constitution.”96 These actions
91 Throne Speeches of Governors, 1968-1973.
92 Throne Speech by His Excellency, Mr. Ira Simmons on 20 December 1972.
93 Throne Speech by His Excellency, Sir Allen Lewis on 30 December 1974.
94 Throne Speech by His Excellency, Sir Allen Lewis on 18 December 1975.
95 Government of Saint Lucia, The Approach to Independence (n/a; n/a).
96 Ibid.
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were to take place before negotiations commenced with HMG. The 
approach outlined by the Government suggested recognition of the need 
for the widest support for independence for HMG to grant independence 
under Section 10(2). HMG had repeatedly stated tha t its policy was 
neither to impose independence on those who did not want it, nor was its 
intention to delay independence for those who wanted it bu t th a t it m ust 
be the wish of the people concerned. However, the opposition party, the 
St. Lucia Labour Party (SLP) objected to any immediate request for 
independence as they felt tha t they had not been consulted, th a t the 
Government had no m andate to seek independence and th a t the people 
had not been consulted.97
Instead, the Government passed a resolution in the House of 
Assembly requesting HMG to terminate the association under Section 
5(4).98 The Opposition argued that this request was inappropriate and 
unconstitutional, as Section 5 (4] did not provide the m eans to achieve 
independence. Clearly, the Government was trying to circumvent the 
requirements of Section 10(1) for a two-thirds majority in a referendum 
and in the House of Assembly, and of Section 10(2) tha t required HMG to 
be satisfied tha t there was popular support. The attem pt by the 
Government was probably reflective of the recognition of its precarious 
position after the General Election of 1974, where the ruling party, the 
United Workers Party, won 10 of the 17 seats and 53.5% of the popular 
vote.99 It was obvious tha t the Opposition was a powerful force and any 
popular support for independence would not be forthcoming without the 
active support of the opposition.
97 “Reply by the Leader of the Opposition at the Saint Lucia Constitutional Conference,” 
Crusader, 5 August, 1978. The Crusader was allied to the Saint Lucia Labour Party 
which was a left-leaning party.
98 Ibid. Section 5(4) provided for HMG to alter the constitution of an Associated State or 
parts of the constitution or alter any law that alters the constitution.
99 The initial election results showed 9-8 for the ruling party. The recount gave a seat to 
the ruling party which was contested in the High Court and was in doubt for three 
years. See Rick Wayne, It will be Alright in the Morning (Saint Lucia; Star Publishing, 
2003).
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The announcem ent by the Government to seek independence from 
HMG was done against the background of a highly charged domestic 
political environment. The General Election of 1974 was held against 
charges by the opposition party th a t the voting list was flawed. For 
example, the num ber of people on the voters list for the 1969 General 
Election was 44,868, declining to 39,815 for the 1974 General 
Election.100 In addition, the preliminary announcement of the results of 
the 1974 Election showed tha t the ruling UWP had lost a seat by one 
vote.101 However, a recount disclosed th a t the UWP candidate had won 
by 36 votes. The resultant legal action lasted over three years, bu t ended 
in favour of the ruling party.
The Opposition announced tha t it would em bark on a campaign of
political mobilization until the electoral list was revised, and the basic
tenets of democracy were in place. The Opposition claimed th a t the
Government was abusing state institutions such as the state radio
station, the Police through its Special Services Unit (SSU), and the
Electoral Office for electoral advantage. The result was an  intensive
campaign of political action particularly aimed a t the Prime Minister, and
against corruption in Government.102 In addition, the independence
announcement came at the height of the fallout of the oil crisis of 1973.
Prices were skyrocketing, crime was on the increase, tourism  and
agriculture were in decline, and there was tremendous social and
economic uncertainty. According to one review,
It was in this highly combustible atmosphere tha t the premier of Saint 
Lucia had announced his intention to seek independence from Britain. 
Almost immediately, there was strong resistance from the opposition 
party-particularly from the radical Odlum-Josie wing. They called on 
the premier to settle the independence question by referendum. When 
he refused, the SLP radicals led protest dem onstrations islandwide-
100 Saint Lucia Labour Party, Independence? Do it Right Let the People Decide (Castries; 
Voice Press, undated).
101 See footnote 97.
102 Rick Wayne, Foolish Virgins (California; Star Publications, 1986).
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which often resulted in clashes with the heavily armed Special 
Services Unit.103
The highly charged political atmosphere made independence a  
partisan issue as the views of most people coincided with their party 
affiliation. The SLP supporters argued th a t they did not officially oppose 
the principle of independence bu t th a t it should be done the right way 
through consultation with the people and with their assent. They argued 
that the Premier could not guarantee democracy and act in the best 
interests of the people. The ruling UWP supporters argued tha t 
independence was necessary, tha t Saint Lucia had been preparing since 
1967 for independence, and tha t independence was necessary for its 
continued development.
The Saint Lucian Government and Opposition were invited to hold 
informal talks with HMG in April 1977 on future constitutional changes, 
which concluded with a request tha t the Government of Saint Lucia 
prepare a consultative document indicating the reasons for independence 
and the constitutional changes tha t they wished to propose.104 A further 
meeting would be organized to review the consultation process. The 
Government released a  Green Paper outlining its case for 
independence.105 It argued tha t Saint Lucia should not be left behind in 
an ‘inferior constitutional sta tu s’ whilst other associated states 
proceeded to independence; neither was the country too small to seek 
independence; nor was she too poor; and tha t Saint Lucia’s economic 
performance was the best among the associated states. Strangely, the 
Green Paper stated tha t the existing constitution was satisfactory and no 
substantial change was necessary. Interestingly, the Government also 
argued tha t if Saint Lucians rejected independence, the United Kingdom
103 Ibid. p. 5.
104 Saint Lucia Labour Party, Independence?
105 Government of Saint Lucia, The Approach to Independence.
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would not hesitate to invoke the provisions of Section 10(2) of the West 
Indies Act if approached by the elected Government.106
The Opposition claimed tha t there was no popular will for 
independence and public reaction to proposed independence was 
overwhelmingly adverse.107 Citing four reasons, the Opposition Party 
stated that: there was no compelling reason why Saint Lucia should 
become independent; the people are convinced tha t the burden of 
independence would be unbearable and only worsen the economic 
situation; the sta tus of Saint Lucians living overseas would be of grave 
concern, if independence was achieved; and the histoiy of the 
Government since Associated Statehood had been one of gross neglect of 
the needs of citizens and denial of their fundam ental rights. The 
opposition also argued that the Government was using independence to 
reinforce itself in office.
Notwithstanding the partisan nature of the campaign led by the 
Labour Party, the society was bitterly divided over the independence 
issue. A follow up Conference was held in London in March 1978 to 
discuss the outcome of the consultative process. In a Press Release from 
the FCO, it was explained that “...the process of consultation would be 
consolidated and, as a part of this, the Government of Saint Lucia would 
publish for public discussion a draft constitution for an independent 
Saint Lucia.”108 If satisfied, the Minister of State Ted Rowlands would call 
a constitutional conference after four months.
The Labour Party’s interpretation of the discussions reflected the 
division within the society. It reported tha t the Minster of State was not 
satisfied tha t there had been adequate consultation and declined to 
make a decision on the request for termination of association, or accede
106 Ibid.
107 Saint Lucia Labour Party, Independence?
108 Crusader, 18 March 1978.
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to announcing a  date for independence.109 Instead the Party claimed 
that,
the world recognizes tha t in many colonial countries including Saint 
Lucia, it is the metropolitan government which had to fill in the role of 
champion of the colonial people against the excesses and intentions of 
their leaders.110
The period following the Ju ly  1978 Constitutional Conference was 
characterized by an intense contest between society (those who opposed 
independence), the state and HMG. The opposition maintained th a t the 
consultative process had not been extensive and where consultations 
had been held, the majority of persons were hostile to independence.111 
They further argued tha t the constitutional positions presented by the 
Government were not representative of the few submissions of the public, 
or the consultations where they had taken place. The Opposition noted 
the trend of Caribbean Governments not to consult their people on 
important issues, even when the law required them to do so, and 
appealed to HMG not to give in to the dem ands of the Saint Lucia 
Government. HMG was asked to act in “...accordance with the West 
Indies Act and the guiding principles enunciated by the British 
Government, [that there] be clear evidence indicating tha t they have said 
yea or nay to independence because the choice is theirs.”112 The Labour 
Party undertook to organize a num ber of public marches throughout the 
country to demonstrate to HMG that the Premier was not consulting the 
people.113
On the other hand, Premier Compton asked HMG to use the 
precedent established by granting independence to Dominica and 
Grenada to grant independence to Saint Lucia. He further assured HMG
109 Ibid. Labor’s Delegation Press Release.
110 Ibid. Compton’s Fails Again!
n iReportof The Saint Lucia Constitutional Conference, 1978. (Cmd. 7328), p. 16.
112 Ibid. p. 8.
113 S.L.P. Plans Public Marches, The Voice, 21 November 1978.
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tha t Saint Lucia would retain the Queen as head of state and remain 
within the Commonwealth.114
HMG concluded tha t as a follow-up to the constitutional talks, the 
FCO legal advisers would prepare a draft constitution for submission to 
the Government. The procedure for the final determination of 
independence was unclear. According to Minister Rowlands, the 
constitution would be brought before the House of Assembly and HMG 
would be informed of the wishes of the Government, Opposition and 
people and “...it will be for Her Majesty’s Government to take appropriate 
action in the light of these views and wishes.”115
Despite the acute division in the society, the Draft Constitution 
was brought before the House of Assembly for debate on 24 October
1978. The debate was along party lines with Parliament voting its 
approval by majority in the House of Assembly bu t with the Opposition 
voting against its adoption. Independence was granted on 22 February
1979. There were few attem pts to ascertain the wishes of the people, 
except through the partisan positions of the elected parliamentarians, 
partisan political gatherings and a few submissions by some educated 
and interested persons.
6 .3 .0  The Impact of Independence in Saint Lucia - A 
new State-societal Relationship
The above account dem onstrates tha t the attainm ent of 
independence did not represent the common aspiration of state and 
society. In fact, the arguments of the Opposition tha t independence 
should be decided by the people and tha t a general election should be 
called, with the subject of independence at its forefront, remained 
unheeded.116 Five m onths after independence, the ruling party lost the
114 Constitutional Conference, 1978.
115 “Statement made by Mr .Ted Rowlands, M.P.” Crusader, 29 July 1978.
116 House of Assembly, 20 October 1978, p.24-26. Elections was due within six months 
of independence.
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general election in a landslide victory for the Saint Lucia Labour Party. 
Undoubtedly, the transition to independence was not characterized by a 
thorough preparation of state and society. HMG was intent on relieving 
itself of the colonial burden, whilst the political elite saw the opportunity 
to reinforce political rule. The state was now independent and sovereign, 
and fully assum ed its role as an  international actor, providing a new 
configuration of forces to shape the nature of the state and society.
The move towards independence was not a societal aspiration in 
the sense tha t it was driven by the society as a necessary stage in its 
development. There was little societal involvement in the decision to seek 
independence and it appeared to be an  initiative of the political elite that 
controlled the state. The view tha t there was no ‘quest’ for independence 
was reinforced by the fact that HMG had already adopted a policy of 
colonial divestment from its remaining colonies.117 However, there were 
discussions with some societal organizations such as the Chamber of 
Commerce, Bar Association and Employers’ Federation regarding the 
Draft Constitution, bu t not with the required scope and depth of societal 
involvement necessary for such major constitutional change.118 However, 
there was public support for the view tha t there had not been 
satisfactory social and economic progress as an associated state, and 
independence would bring greater opportunities.119 It was thought that 
the capacity to develop independent relations with other countries would 
facilitate financial and technical assistance not forthcoming from the 
British.
As Independence Day approached, national discontent increased 
as public servants took industrial action against the Government in 
pursuance of higher wages and better working conditions. Independence
117 Interview with Cletus Springer, Former Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Planning 
and Development. 29 September 2004.
118 All persons interviewed held the view that there was little societal involvement in 
discussions on independence.
119 Interview with Cletus Springer.
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would be accepted not as a national achievement bu t as national division 
in the m idst of national industrial un rest and major political opposition, 
including threats of civil unrest. The celebrations were clearly partisan- 
based and reflected that it was pursued by and for political interests 
rather than  motivated by national sentiment. Whatever the national 
sentiments, the state was an international actor, imbued with 
sovereignty and self-determination, and finally able to join the 
international community.
6.3 .1  Independence and the shaping of an international role
With independence, the Prime Minister also became the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs until later changes took place. Even when the Prime 
Minister was not the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the role was still 
associated with him. It was a feature of the immediate post­
independence period in the Caribbean for prime ministers to assum e the 
position of foreign minister since they felt they were best able to deal with 
foreign affairs.120 This was rooted in the colonial experience, as the 
Colonial Office prior to independence would communicate with the Chief 
Minister on m atters of foreign affairs relating to the colony. This was 
more pronounced in the case of the associated state, as certain 
responsibilities for foreign affairs were given to the premier. It appeared 
logical tha t he would be best suited to the portfolio of minister of foreign 
affairs.
The experience of Saint Lucia shows tha t there was a 
communication gap between the Ministry and the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. From 1982-86, the Prime Minister is reported to have visited the 
Foreign Ministry twice, allowing the Permanent Secretary to make day-to-
120 Interview with Earl Huntley, Former Permanent Secretary -  Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade, 3 June 2004. Mr. Huntley served as the first Permanent 
Secretary in the Ministry.
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day decisions while major decisions remained his responsibility.121 
Further examples are given of the Foreign Ministry being bypassed in the 
decision making process, with foreign ministry officials informed by other 
foreign ministries and by am bassadors of the plans, actions and 
decisions of the Prime Minister.
The approach to foreign relations was made clear from as early as 
the Constitutional Conference in Ju ly  1978. Premier Compton had 
explained to the Conference that, M[f[ull sovereignty will not be for u s a 
cause for seeking to s tru t on the international stage. We have no 
illusions of impending international grandeur.”122 The approach to 
foreign policy following independence was restricted to relations with 
traditional partners and requests for grant assistance for specific state 
projects.123 There was no formulation of a foreign policy or a broadening 
of the search for new sources of support. Although the policies of the 
short-lived Labour Party became more focused as the Government 
sought to broaden its diplomatic relations beyond the traditional Western 
partners of Britain, US and Canada.124
It was understandable tha t as the issues involved in foreign 
relations increased, other functional ministries would be involved in 
foreign policy. However, the Prime Minister, who also served as Minister 
of Finance and Planning, ensured th a t all projects for external aid or 
financing were identified through his ministry and then channelled to the 
respective ministries for implementation.125 The Foreign Ministry served 
protocol functions, whilst a powerful Ministry of Finance and Planning 
identified projects and facilitated external assistance, while the Prime 
Minister determined all major decisions on foreign policy and on the 
receipt of foreign assistance.
121 J. Braveboy-Wagner, The Caribbean in World Affairs. The Foreign Policies of the 
English-speaking States (Boulder, Colo.; Westview Press, 1989).
122 Report of The Saint Lucia Constitutional Conference, 1978. (Cmd. 7328), p. 13.
123 Interview with Earl Huntley.
124 These included Cuba, Iraq, Hungary and Scandinavian countries.
125 Interview with Earl Huntley.
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The attitude of the society in Saint Lucia to foreign affairs was one 
of total indifference. Much of this indifference was due to an  ignorance of 
the foreign relations policy of Saint Lucia by the wider society, the media 
and even the foreign ministry, bu t more importantly, issues of foreign 
relations were not presented for public consumption, particularly in 
Parliament or during electoral campaigns. Outside of the state 
apparatus, the educated elite appeared to have a similar disengagement 
from foreign policy.126 In fact, given the style of dominant personality 
politics, it was difficult to imagine the extent of involvement th a t an 
educated elite would have been allowed. If it did occur, it would have 
m ost likely been those with informal social links who supported the 
Prime Minister.
The isolation of foreign affairs from the established state-societal 
relations was indicative of the purpose tha t independent statehood 
served. By maintaining its isolation, the state was able to establish its 
own policies and priorities in the conduct of international politics, 
without the need to be accountable to the society, or to consider societal 
pressures when shaping foreign policy. For example, the voting patterns 
and positions adopted by the government at international meetings were 
not provided for public consumption. The isolation of society from the 
conduct of foreign policy allowed the state to establish a monopoly in 
obtaining external assistance that provide benefits for the population. It 
was no surprise that every externally funded project becomes a major 
showpiece to boast of the efforts of the government to provide for the 
population and to seek re-election.
6.3 .2  National Development Policy and the Role of
International Aid
The pursuit of independence was seen as critical for the economic 
development of Saint Lucia. In fact, the early quest for self-government
126 Ibid.
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involved the right of the majority to vote and have a say in managing 
their affairs was seen as necessary to overcome deprivation and 
economic backwardness. In 1964, the Chief Minister in announcing the 
termination of grant-in-aid described it as the end of a period of pain, 
penalties and humiliation.127 At the Constitutional Conference in 1966, 
the Chief Minister made the case tha t constitutional advancement 
without a  supporting economy was useless, which clarified the strategy 
for requesting full internal self-government instead of statehood. As that 
case was rejected, it was stated tha t Saint Lucia was accepting statehood 
with Britain with caution until “...HMG recognizes the need for realism in 
settling the economic basis for meaningful advance in the Constitutional 
advance of our territory.”128 Therefore, the pursuit of constitutional 
advancement was justifiable if only it could overcome the “...frustrations 
and delays which we experience in our efforts to get ourselves to the 
twentieth century.”129 From as early as 1969, the Government had 
expressed the view that “...nationhood, through Associated Status, 
creates a limitation on our sovereignty, while it denies u s access to 
sources of capital sorely needed for our development...”130 Independence 
represented an attem pt to place the tools of development firmly within 
the control of the state. In 1978, the Premier in introducing the 
resolution for the request to HMG to terminate the association indicated 
that “...independence is sought primarily to place in the hands of the 
duly elected representatives of the people all the instrum ents of power 
which are needed for this country’s development.”131
By being granted Associated Statehood, Saint Lucia was able to 
secure loans with the approval of HMG but grant funding was limited 
from only Britain and Canada. The lack of recognition as an independent
127 Address by Hon. George Charles at the Budget Meeting of the Legislative Council, 25 
February 1964.
128 Minutes of the Legislative Council Meeting, 28 June 1966. p. 39.
129 Ibid.
130 Government of Saint Lucia, Independence.
131Proceedings and Debates of the Meeting of the House of Assembly, 20 October 1978.
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state and insufficient international rights and privileges, undoubtedly 
limited the island’s possibilities. Similarly, Saint Lucia was not able to 
benefit significantly from the membership of multilateral lending 
agencies and other overseas development agencies.
It was very clear from the attainm ent of associated statehood, that 
the state would assum e responsibility for promoting economic 
development to redress the deficiencies of colonialism. The absence of a 
developed national bourgeoisie and low levels of foreign private 
investment reinforced the belief that the state m ust play the leading role. 
The state became a major employer and, through its capital works, a 
significant contributor to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The capital 
works programme was heavily financed by British aid until 1970 when 
the Canadian Government announced an aid package of $13.7 million 
over five years for capital works.132 The importance of grants for 
financing development was marked in the post-1967 period b u t begun to 
decline from the mid-1970’s .133
In the post-independence period, the state assum ed an even 
greater role in promoting economic growth and development.134 However, 
this required increases in central government expenditure.135 The role of 
the state, in its broadest sense, was exemplified in the increases in 
expenditure of the consolidated public sector, which includes statutory 
bodies and parastatals, such as the Central Water Authority, Electric 
Company, Port Authority, and the National Development Corporation.136
132 British Development Division, Saint Lucia: Economic Survey and Projections, 
(Barbados; BDD, 1970).
133 Ibid. See also Arnold M. McIntyre, The Economies of the Organisation of Eastern 
Caribbean States in the 1970’s  (Barbados; ISER, 1986). Grants represented over 10% of 
government revenue up to 1975.
134 McIntyre, Economies.
135 World Bank, Saint Lucia. Economic Peiformance and Prospects (USA; The World 
Bank, 1985). Total expenditure and lending increased from EC$59.9m in 1977/78 to 
EC$90.64m in 1979/80 to EC$ 139.80 in 1983/84. Current revenue increased from 
EC$51.65m in 1977/78 to EC$72.35m in 1979/80 to EC$111.3m in 1983/84.
136 Ibid. Total expenditure and lending increased from EC$ 105.63m in 1977/78 to 
EC$165.50m in 1979/80 to EC$245.25m in 1984/84.
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A significant feature was the increase in current expenditure, 
especially on personal emoluments, suggesting an increase in 
employment, as well as in wages and salaries and retroactive payments 
due to union agitation. Wages and salaries increased from $22.23 million 
in 1977/78 to $44.2 million in 1979/80 to $114.5 million in 1983/84.137 
These represented 45.6%, 49.3% and 54.4% respectively of current 
expenditure.
The role of the state as the engine for economic development led to 
significant increases in expenditure for capital projects to improve the 
infrastructure for growth, reduce unemployment and redress social 
deficiencies. As early as 1968, the Government loaned EC$2m to finance 
road construction, water supplies and other infrastructural works.138 The 
capital expenditure for the public sector increased from EC$22.72m in 
1977/78 to EC$28.91m in 1979/80 to EC$41.45m in 1984/85.139
These increases required revenue, which could be earned through 
current revenue, grants and loans. In the case of Saint Lucia, central 
government current revenue was healthy and experienced tremendous 
growth after independence.140 Most of the revenue came from increasing 
indirect taxes from import duties, export duties and exchange taxes 
reflecting the openness of the economy and the high levels of reliance on 
imported goods. This is in contradistinction with direct taxes which are 
more politically sensitive and which society is less willing to accept. The 
state had never made direct taxation the major source of revenue as the 
production base was very small and would not have brought in m uch 
revenue. The emphasis on import substitution also tended to encourage
137 Ibid. The Saint Lucia Labor Party which won the July 1979 elections provided 
significant increases in wages and salaries to public servants. Salary increases were a 
contentious issue in the election campaign.
138 British Development Division, Saint Lucia.
139 World Bank, Saint Lucia.
140 Ibid. Current revenue of central government increased in real terms from 
EC$51.65m in 1977/78 to EC$72.35m in 1979/80 to EC$111.3m in 1983/84.
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taxes on imports bu t not the agricultural or the emerging tourism  
sectors.
The role of grants in financing development was not as marked as 
would be expected after independence. In 1968 and 1969, grant funding 
represented 14% and 13.8% respectively of revenue.141 However, despite 
absolute increases it represented 10.1% in 1977/78, 12.63% in 1979/80 
and 7.7% in 1983/84 of revenue.142 However, the sources of grant 
funding increased to include the United State Agency for International 
Development, Canada International Development Agency, European 
Development Fund, Organisation of American States and the World 
Bank.
The major source of financing of the fiscal deficit was through 
borrowing from local and foreign sources. Saint Lucia’s external public 
debt, excluding debt to the International Monetary Fund and the Eastern 
Caribbean Central Bank, was US$8 million in 1977, US$14.2 million in 
1979 and US$31.2million in 1984.143 It was clear tha t low public sector 
current account surpluses and the high cost of modem infrastructure 
forced an increasing reliance on foreign financing of economic 
development, with greater reliance on loans as opposed to grants.
Accordingly, economic policy and politics were linked to aid and 
foreign loans. Aid became a mechanism for economic development, to 
meet shortfalls of revenue and, more importantly, for the political 
survival of the state. Development projects were used to satisfy the 
political demands of constituencies as the state had control over their 
form and location. It was a repeated complaint of opposition parties tha t 
the Government neglected opposition areas and ensured that only 
Government constituencies’ concerns were addressed. Projects involving 
water distribution, low cost housing, electricity distribution, road
141 British Development Division, Saint Lucia.
142 World Bank, Saint Lucia. It should be noted that an independence grant was 
provided in 1979 and rehabilitation support was received after Hurricane Allen in 1980.
143 Ibid.
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construction and recreational facilities were known to be highly political.
Despite the occurrence of partisan benefits in development 
projects, there was a wider consequence of strengthening the legitimacy 
and capacity of the state. Projects such as the construction of health 
centres, fisheries facilities, road construction in banana areas, industrial 
factory buildings and school buildings demonstrated the state’s attem pt 
to pursue its stated economic development plans and meet the needs of 
the population.
6 .3 .3  International Politics o f National Economic Management
Economic growth has historically depended upon trade in 
agricultural products in an international market, though protected, and 
private direct investment. It was noted in the previous section th a t the 
state assum ed a greater role in the impetus for growth after 
independence. Despite the desire not to be dependent on Britain, there 
was no attem pt to pursue any radical economic policy to disengage from 
the existing structural relationship. The dependent relationship built 
through colonialism and so heavily blamed for the backwardness of the 
colonies, was allowed to continue.144 As appendages of Britain, the 
colonies developed as economies geared towards satisfying metropolitan 
interests rather than  developing endogenous economic growth 
capacity.145 They were dependent on the rest of the world especially 
Britain for markets, capital, supplies, a  relationship which determined 
levels of employment and production. Consequently, the colonies were 
not resilient to changes taking place in the international economy.
144 Many dependency theorists and the New World Group in the Caribbean provided 
academic explanations for the causes of underdevelopment in the third world.
145 See George Beckford, Persistent Poverty (New York; Oxford University Press, 1972); 
Lloyd Best, “A Model of Pure Planation Economy”, Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 17, 
No.3, September 1968; Alister McIntyre, “Some issues of Trade Policy in the West 
Indies”, New World Quarterly, Vol. 2., No.2, 1966 and C.Y. Thomas, Monetary and 
Financial Arrangements in a Dependent Monetary Economy: a study of British Guiana, 
1945-62 {Mona; ISER, 1974).
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The Government in Saint Lucia continued to increase its role in 
facilitating development commensurate with the increasing autonomy 
provided by the imperial state. In practice, th a t role was limited to 
putting in the infrastructure for economic growth and social investment, 
as there was little capital investment in direct productive activity. Whilst 
some other states were engaging in im port-substitution policies, the 
Saint Lucia did not venture into state ownership, nor did she implement 
a programme of direct support for local entrepreneurs to spur 
industrialization. The emphasis was on an  investment policy centred on 
attracting foreign investors through incentives and basic infrastructure, 
such as factory buildings for ren t.146 There was the hope th a t investors 
would bring in capital, skills and new technologies which would establish 
an  industrial base.
Although the manufacturing sector grew as a contributor to GDP 
from the 1960’s to 1984, it remained small in relation to agriculture.147 
M anufacturing was primarily centred on assembly enterprises tha t had 
little added value and was geared towards the export market. These 
enterprises were attracted by the incentives offered. The only tangible 
benefit was low wage employment for people who would otherwise be 
unemployed. Meanwhile the dependence of the island’s economy on 
imports intensified after independence.148
The insistence to remain incorporated in the established economic 
relationships may have been related to the nature and significance of the 
two main earners. The state was so entrenched and dependent on its 
structural relationship established during the colonial period tha t its 
stability and survival were predicated on the continuation of that 
relationship.
146 World Bank, Saint Lucia. The approach to industrialization was supposed to be 
based on the industrialization model outlined by Sir Arthur Lewis.
147 Ibid. In the 1960’s, manufacturing contributed less than 5% of GDP, by 1977 it was
8.8%, and in 1984 it was 8.9% of GDP.
148 Ibid.
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The first income earner was the export of bananas to the protected 
United Kingdom market. Bananas replaced sugar as the main export 
crop in the early 1950’s and became the largest contributor to GDP. In 
1967, bananas accounted for 80% of exports, bu t in 1985, only 50% of 
domestic exports.149 The banana industry was also important for the 
society because of its peasant-based nature. Unlike sugar cane, bananas 
did not necessarily need large estate holdings bu t could flourish in 
family-held plots. By 1984, the state began a policy of breaking up the 
plantations which were formerly owned by the multinational, Geest 
Industries, for resale to small farmers. Geest decided to remain in the 
high-end activities of distribution and marketing whilst moving from the 
high risk and uncertain production role. The cultivation of bananas led 
to a process of empowerment of rural residents as many came to own 
land, and thereby a means to prosperity. There were about 7,000 active 
registered members of the Banana Growers Association in 1985 with over 
75% of farmers having plots of 10 acres or less, although small farmers 
accounted for only 10% to 20% of production .150
Bananas also offered another powerful advantage over sugar, in 
tha t its weekly production pattern provided weekly wages for farmers as 
against the seasonal harvest of m ost other crops. There was a high level 
of cash flow within the economy and to the farmers. In 1985, the banana 
industry was contributing over EC$1 million per week directly to the 
local economy, with half the population depending on the industry.151 
However, the prices of bananas fluctuated widely depending on demand 
in the UK and the value of the pound. Notably, the farmer received 
significantly lower prices, after deductions by Geest and the Banana 
Growers Association (SLBGA) for their services.152 The economy in Saint
149Ministry of Overseas Development, Economic Survey; World Bank, Saint Lucia.
iso ibid.
151 Ibid.
152 For example, in 1983 the average price was EC$0.77 per pound, the SLBGA was 
paid EC$0.42 by Geest and the farmer EC$0.18 by the SLBGA.
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Lucia rested upon the preferential treatm ent of bananas in the UK 
m arket, the significance of which discouraged any attem pt to deviate 
from the established economic relationship.
The second income earner, tourism, emerged as another critical 
component of the economic development policy of the independent state. 
It was noted th a t tourism was identified as early as 1967 to be the sector 
with the greatest potential to lead the development p ro c e ss !^  The 
tourist sector expanded from tourist expenditure of EC$2.27 million in 
1965, to EC$33.4 million in 1979 and EC$ 42.4 million in 1984. In 
addition to the fragility of the industry, as shown after the hurricane of 
1980 when visitor arrivals collapsed, the industry was heavily dependent 
upon external factors. For example, the success of the industry was 
dependent upon the economies of the home country. Importantly, the 
tourist infrastructure was also heavily dependent upon foreign 
investment.
State involvement had been restricted to creating the conditions for 
investment and tourism promotion rather than  directly investing in 
constructing hotels, restaurants and tourist attractions. The industry 
was experiencing rising costs as it was highly dependent on fuel prices, 
fluctuating exchange rates, and the cost of imported goods. Despite the 
successes of the tourist industry, it remained in the early 1980’s an 
industry tha t offered seasonal employment to m ost workers. It was also 
an industry with a  high foreign exchange leakage rate as m ost consumed 
goods were imported and most business were based on packaged tours. 
However, it offered increasing opportunities for employment.
Despite the buoyancy of the economy in the late 1970’s, led by 
high banana prices and the expansion in tourism, increasing 
unemployment had been a feature. Unemployment was estimated at 14%
153 Ministry of Overseas Development, Economic Survey, hd  -
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in 1975 b u t increased to 25% in 1983.154 Agriculture employed 40% of 
the labour force, manufacturing 8%, and the tourist industry 12%.155 
The government sector was a significant employer, with its perm anent 
staff of 4,300 in 1985 or about 13% of workforce.
The above account highlights the link between economic 
development and the realities of the international relationship. It 
illustrated the fact tha t many Eastern Caribbean islands suffered 
dramatically from the depression of the early 1980’s, although Saint 
Lucia fared m uch better because of the high prices afforded to bananas. 
Similarly, when prices dropped the country likewise suffered. 
Importantly, there was no need for the state, unlike Jam aica, Trinidad 
and Guyana, to enter into negotiations with the IMF for any structural 
adjustm ent programmes. However, there were concerns expressed on the 
instances of default of payments and the accumulation of arrears by the 
sta te .156 Generally, in the period immediately after independence, the 
state was able to utilize its increased ability to mobilize external 
financing and exploit its dependence on the preferential treatm ent of 
bananas and the tourism industry to meet the promise of a  new day after 
the dawn of independence. It was also noteworthy tha t a t a time when 
many third world countries were attempting to break from the 
dependency cycle, by experimenting with various non-traditional 
approaches to development, Saint Lucia remained committed to the 
incorporation of the island’s economy in the international economic 
order.
6 .3 .4  Independent State Structure and implications for
Domestic Society
The attainm ent of independence was supposed to grant society the 
tools tha t would shape its policies and programmes for the development
154 World Bank, Saint Lucia [ nd
!55 ibid.
156. World Bank, Saint Lucia ! h d
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of the island.157 Instead, it appeared tha t independence placed greater 
power in the hands of the state, and by extension the Government. The 
shaping of the state structure, through a new constitution, did not 
indicate a commitment by the Government to create a mechanism for 
greater control or input in policy making by society. Nor did there appear 
to be a concern for ‘good governance’ -  practices and procedures, 
necessary to ensure tha t government carries out its business honestly 
and efficiently. In most cases, where concessions were made, it was the 
result of agitation from the Opposition.
The process of consultation requested by HMG should have 
allowed for individuals and organizations to comment and participate in 
the shaping of the Constitution. Despite the view tha t HMG was in haste 
to agree to independence for the associated states, it is to its credit tha t it 
had insisted tha t the Government in Saint Lucia engage the public in 
dialogue on a  draft constitution.158 Although the Opposition expressed 
their disapproval of the procedures towards independence and the level 
of consultation, they maintained a  constructive approach to the 
formulation of a constitution tha t reinforced fundam ental rights and 
freedoms and allowed for more democratic provisions. Of the changes 
made to the Draft Constitution, “...the most important of these were the 
establishm ent of a Parliamentary Commissioner, an  Electoral 
Commission and a Constituency Boundaries Commission, all proposals 
pu t forward by the Opposition.”159
The attitude of the UWP Government was consistent throughout, 
in th a t it was satisfied with the Associated Statehood constitution and 
was reluctant to make any significant changes th a t the Opposition felt 
were necessary to promote democracy.160 For example, the Opposition
157 Proceedings and Debates of the Meeting of the House of Assembly, 20 October 1978.
158 Constitutional Conference, 1978.
159 Ibid. p.l.
160 Proceedings and Debates of the Meeting of the House of Assembly, 24 October 1978. 
An examination of the Committee Stage discussion of the Draft Constitution reveals the
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requested a  Senate to act as a review chamber in the Legislature 
consisting of persons elected from a list of individuals recommended by 
community organisations. At the Constitutional Conference, the 
Government objected and instead proposed tha t the dorm ant provisions 
of the existing constitution tha t provided for nominated members, with 
the majority to be appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister, should 
be activated a t Independence.161 The Chief Minister conceded th a t the 
Senate was one provision tha t he felt the public had demanded bu t 
m aintained th a t the Prime Minister should advise on the nomination of 
the majority.162 The Government also had difficulty in accepting th a t the 
Prime Minister should consult the Leader of the Opposition on the 
appointment and removal of the Chairman and Members of the Public 
Service Commission, before advising the Governor-General. In addition, 
the Opposition’s proposal tha t a  person should not serve more than  ten 
consecutive years as Prime Minister was not accepted.
It was noteworthy tha t in the deliberations of Parliament, to 
consider the Draft Constitution, many outstanding issues from the 
Constitutional Conference were settled in the Government’s favour by 
use of the parliamentary majority. For example, the appointment of the 
Public Prosecutor on the advice of the Prime Minister was strongly 
rejected by the Opposition. The Opposition argued tha t the Judicial and 
Legal Services Commission did not need to consult the Prime Minister as 
political intervention can influence the appointm ent.163 The m atter was 
settled by majority vote in Parliament in favour of the Government. 
Another significant issue dealt with was the handling of a  declaration of 
a state of emergency. It was agreed a t the Constitutional Conference tha t 
the law would be consistent with the provisions of the Trinidad
persistent approach to deny any attempt to change the constitution in any fundamental 
way.
161 Report of The Saint Lucia Constitutional Conference, 1978. (Cmd. 7328).
162 Proceedings and Debates of the Meeting of the House of Assembly, 24 October 1978.
163 Ibid.
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Constitution for a statem ent to be made to Parliament within three days 
providing an explanation for such action. However, Parliament approved 
the provision included by the Government despite the objection of the 
Opposition tha t it was not consistent with the decision made a t the 
Conference.164
Notwithstanding the above, the Independence Constitution 
removed all control by HMG of the domestic structure of the state and 
any political conditionality within the Constitution. However, the State 
would retain the Privy Council as the final appellate court in the absence 
of a  regional appeals court. The state had achieved autonomy and 
international enfranchisement bu t despite a new structure, the historical 
separation with society was maintained. Instead, the power and control 
of the ruling elite was strengthened.
The immediate post-independence period was one of intense 
political agitation occasioned by the public reaction to independence and 
industrial unrest relating to wage increases. The change of Government 
in Ju ly  1979 was almost inevitable given the heightened tensions and 
anti-government sentim ents which prevailed. The period between 1979- 
81 was one of unprecedented turmoil caused by a leadership struggle 
within the SLP. The struggle led to the break up of the ruling party and 
left the government with a single seat majority in Parliament. Similar to 
the period after the 1974 Elections, there were nightly public political 
meetings and a high level of mobilization of supporters by the UWP and 
the newly formed Progressive Labour Party (PLP). The Government faced 
frequent public demonstrations am idst claims of corruption and abuse of 
power. Eventually, the Government collapsed and was replaced by an 
interim government until the General Election in May 1982.
Despite these political aberrations, Saint Lucia and the Caribbean 
have been generally known for a high level of political accountability,
Ibid.
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respect for basic hum an rights and the basic practices of democracy. The 
international community has tended to focus on other regions where 
there are greater concerns about politically motivated killings, torture, 
imprisonment without trial, denial of multiparty electoral democracy, 
and restrictions on forming political parties, holding of public meetings 
and publishing newspapers. Issues such as holding free and fair 
elections and the transfer of power from ruling party to opposition are 
not usually of such gravity to concern the international community.
This is not to suggest tha t there were no concerns with governance 
bu t rather th a t there was a general absence of systematic armed 
suppression and genocidal use of force. Instead, successive Governments 
were able to be coercive using sophisticated techniques of control, 
exploiting existing poverty and dependency among the population and 
the historical separation of state and society. These techniques included 
the selected use of force, nepotism to silence critics, strategically placed 
development projects, government contracts granted to favoured 
companies in exchange for campaign financing, and legislative powers 
used to control protest and freedom of the press. This explains the 
absence of major civil unrest and coups. The sovereignty and national 
self-determination of the state, by its membership of the international 
community of states, gave the state a primacy tha t was exercised in 
favour of the government, with little fear of external intervention.
It can be noted tha t the foundations of democracy were not built 
on an educated citizenry or the fostering of civil society groups bu t on a 
m anufactured state framework and a society which was able to avoid 
disintegration despite, and in spite of, the state’s coercive nature. In the 
post-independent period, the state did not become an instrum ent of 
transformation as the historical nature of the state was merely 
reinforced. Whilst the society had always been dependent on the state for 
the delivery of services satisfying needs and expectations, there had also 
been a tradition of struggle for survival, which itself insulated the state.
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For example, the informal economy of speculators and local trading of 
produce represented the most vibrant attem pts of society to survive 
despite the state. The success of these struggles for resources and 
survival may explain why there has not been civil unrest as the state has 
generally not intruded on and controlled th a t sphere. The growing 
significance of the drug trade is another component of the informal 
economy, which represents an  alternative strategy for survival, though in 
constant conflict with the state. The opposition to the Police by members 
of communities where drug busts take place is instructive of the 
relationship between state and society and the strategies for survival of 
poor communities.
6.3 .5  Transnationalisation of Dom estic Society
The colonial sta tus of Saint Lucia m eant tha t the emergence of civil 
society organizations aiming to shape and influence social life was always 
constrained by the need for the imperial state to control the affairs of the 
colony. It can be argued tha t the first attem pts to build an autonomous 
civil society organization began with the establishm ent of trade 
unions.165 However, from the 1970’s to the early 1980’s, a num ber of 
organizations emerged which sought to mobilize domestic society and 
deliberately influence the functioning of the state. These organizations 
showed a greater concern for issues such as social marginalization, 
poverty reduction, community empowerment and the environment.166 
The establishment of many of these groups can be attributed to 
homogeneity -  the process by which similar concerns, norms and 
institutions are spread throughout the international system .167 Among
165 Interview with Embert Charles, Former Director of the Folk Research Centre, 4 
November, 2004.
166 Ibid.
167 Halliday, Rethinking International Relations (London; Macmillan, 1994). For example, 
the National Youth Council was formed in 1985 during the United Nations International 
Youth Year. The Women Crisis Center was formed after a number of regional and 
international meetings on domestic violence.
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these groups were the National Youth Council (NYC), National Women 
Organisation, Women Crisis Centre, Mothers and Fathers Groups, Folk 
Research Centre (FRC), and the National Farmers Association (NFA). The 
range of concerns and interests of these groups offered an opportunity 
for greater interaction between state and society to complement the 
functioning of the state. There existed little co-operation and more 
confrontation, which was probably due to the autonomous nature and 
mobilizational potential of these groups, and the possibilities for co­
operation within opposition parties and civil society.168 The area of 
greatest concern to the state was the capacity of these groups to propose 
alternative policies, offer policy where none existed, and their ability to 
deliver programmes to clients outside of the state apparatus.169 The 
functioning of these groups became very popular and many of them 
appeared as alternative ministries of government. Free from bureaucratic 
and political control, these groups found it easier to function and were 
quicker to respond to the needs of their members. The independent state 
found itself building alliances to address many social and economic 
issues.
The increasing strength of domestic society lay not only in its 
capacity to mobilize people or to fill the vacuum created by the shortfalls 
of the state b u t also in their link with an emerging transnational civil 
society. It was tha t link of domestic society with a global commonalty 
addressing concerns such as hum an rights, gender equality, good 
governance, and the environment which strengthened domestic society. 
In addition, the state found itself forced by international conditionalities,
168 Incidents of confrontation include the non-recognition of the NYC by the Ministry of 
Youth in 1985 because of its leadership; the NFA’s mobilization of farmers to influence 
agricultural policy; and the National Women’s Organisation’s call for the removal of the 
Minister of Women Affairs and for changes in discriminatory legislation.
169 For example the NYC Draft Youth Policy (1987); the Folk Research Centre’s wide 
range of cultural activities; and the NFA’s facilities to assist small farmers.
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to include domestic society in its planning process and even in 
delegations attending international gatherings.170
The strengthening of domestic society in Saint Lucia through its 
interaction with a transnational civil society can be analyzed at two levels 
-  the normative and the institutional. The normative level was facilitated 
by the dissemination of information through the media and exchange of 
information by fraternal organizations. The global communications 
network allowed individuals to learn of events, and the opinions and 
activities of others across the globe. The effect was to provide domestic 
society in Saint Lucia with the information capacity to act, as well as 
attain  a frame of reference against which they could assess their own 
work and the performance of the state. Trade Unions had on occasion 
called upon their regional counterparts, the international grouping of 
their affiliation and the International Labour Organisation to alert them 
to the practices of the state and to request their solidarity. The women 
groups were able to compare existing legislation in countries where sister 
organizations existed to campaign for reform.171 Networking with 
fraternal organizations outside the country was an established part of 
the programming of social groups within domestic society.
The other level of strengthening operated through organizational 
and programme support provided to groups through international 
funding agencies. In the case of Saint Lucia, the limited monetary and 
trained hum an resources available to social groups were an inhibition to 
their functioning. The NYC, NFA, FRC, Crisis Centre and the National 
Trust received funding from a num ber of international funding agencies, 
for example HIVOS, OXFAM, CUSO and HelpAge. Such assistance has 
enabled these groups to establish an institutional base for their 
functioning and enhanced their organizational capacity. It has also
170 Interviews with Cletus Springer and Embert Charles.
171 Such legislation included the treatment of women as in Saint Lucia teachers were 
dismissed on their second pregnancy if unmarried.
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enabled them  to bring in hum an resources to assist in their 
programming where such expertise could not have been found locally. 
Therefore, issues such as hum an rights, gender equality, environmental 
conservation, and youth rights were increasingly introduced from the 
outside. Some of these issues were also emanating from international 
governmental organizations and forums in which the independent state 
was influenced by the views of domestic society.172
Therefore, the independent state began to face a domestic society 
strengthened by its interaction with a  globed civil society and advocated 
norm s and values which are upheld by the inter-state system bu t appear 
in opposition to state interests. The transnationalisation of domestic 
society represented a  m eans by which the moral concerns of Western 
civil society came to shape domestic policy. In most cases, these 
concerns -  women, environment, and hum an rights -  had been 
supported by Western governments, as policy issues within the 
community of nations. In particular, action on these issues had become 
a pre-condition for grants and loams from Western governments and 
finamcing institutions. In other instances, positions adopted a t 
intemationad fora forced the state to accept these concerns. The 
consequence was th a t the independent state in Saint Lucia found itself 
having to find an accommodation with domestic society in order to 
satisfy criteria for aid amd mitigate intemationad criticism. This effectively 
accelerated the process of integrating state and society.
6 .4 .0  Conclusion
This Chapter further shows the increasing influence of the 
domestic in shaping the state amd society. The role of the international 
remains significant bu t the domestic has assum ed greater influence in 
shaping the state-societal relationship. This period also highlighted the
172 Interview with Cletus Springer. For example, UN-sponsored Conferences on 
Population, Environment and Development, Women, and Social Development.
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process of by which the society was being strengthened which in tu rn  
weakened the state and allowed for greater integration. Three significant 
processes can be identified which dem onstrated how the interplay of 
international and domestic influences has shaped the relationship 
between the state and society.
Firstly, it demonstrated the leading role played by international 
forces in propelling the anti-colonial movement towards dem ands for self- 
government and improved living and working conditions, which 
influenced the changes in imperial policy towards the colonies. This 
eventually led to independence. Secondly, it showed the failure of 
colonial policy to create a sustainable economic framework for the state 
and to provide civilized living conditions for the population, thereby 
accentuating the crisis of confidence in the state. It also explained the 
context for the failure of the independent state to embark upon a 
development policy tha t would address the criticisms tha t were 
historically levelled at the colonial state. Thirdly, it identified an emerging 
trend of transnationalisation of domestic society which transformed the 
capacity of society to challenge the independent state. In effect, society 
was able to influence the state in its policy formulation and execution, 
which started to ease the historical separation of state and society.
After 1945, the role of international forces became more significant 
in encouraging groups tha t were critical of colonial rule to embark upon 
anti-colonial action. The consequence was the emergence of an 
international norm which saw independence as a right to be enjoyed by 
all nations, although concern was raised about the viability of small 
states as independent entities. Ironically, tha t norm did not seem to have 
inspired the state or society in Saint Lucia. The anti-colonial call 
remained for self-government and right of the Imperial State to meet 
development needs, rather than  for independence. The social, political 
and economic conditions experienced by the majority black population 
had encouraged the struggle against colonialism, bu t it was for better
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working and living conditions and more control of the government of the 
colony.
The attainm ent of independence was an externally motivated 
decision as the imperial state sought to rid itself of its colonial ties. It was 
clear by the 1970’s, tha t smaller colonies were not able to demonstrate 
economic viability bu t the imperial state was equally not willing to accept 
responsibility for their development. The failure to get associated 
statehood accepted as a form of decolonization, and thereby relinquish 
all responsibility, was a major set back for the imperial state. The 
growing concern with the issue of security in the associated states 
virtually provided the final impetus for the imperial state to disengage 
with the smaller colonies of the Caribbean.
The Chapter highlighted tha t the challenge for the Imperial State 
was to find a balance between the international pressures for 
decolonization and the obligation to assist the small colonies to become 
self-governing. The initial imperial policy was that a state should only 
become independent if it had a viable economy and could defend itself. 
This was a clear recognition tha t economic viability -  the ability to 
provide the concrete benefits of sovereign statehood -  was necessary 
before independence could be provided. The failures of the federation 
attem pts, as a m eans of addressing economic viability, ensured a 
continued concern with w hat should be done with small colonial states 
like Saint Lucia.
HMG solution by granting the smaller colonies ‘Associated 
Statehood with Britain’ which represented a three-quarter way house to 
independence was not accepted by all colonial states. Saint Lucia did 
not w ant associated statehood or independence bu t instead requested 
the granting of the traditional form of self-government. It was clear that 
the colonial state wanted to have continued access to imperial aid and to 
hold Britain responsible for its development. At the same time, the local 
government wanted complete control of the colonial state. The new
293
arrangem ent of associated statehood satisfied British needs, bu t not 
those of colonial states, including Saint Lucia. At the Constitutional 
Conference, Saint Lucia noted tha t constitutional advancement, without 
a supporting economy would be meaningless and suggested tha t any 
constitutional discussion should be linked to trade and aid talks. HMG 
refused to provide more aid and recommended rationalization of available 
aid. While the colonial state did not want associated statehood, the only 
other option was independence, which was less desirable. The greater 
concern of society was social and economic development and reflected 
the concern for advancing the social and economic development of the 
colony. On the other hand, it was another attem pt by the imperial state 
to address the issue of empirical statehood through economic viability. 
Instead, HMG sought to control defense and foreign policy, which 
satisfied its strategic interest in the context of the Cold War. The effort at 
economic development was made more difficult as the challenge of 
managing economic development required international assistance, and 
the conduct of international relations. The nature of associated statehood 
restricted such state practice and served as another conflict between 
HMG and the associated state. The attem pt by the Americans to lead a 
tripartite survey, as the basis for pursuing economic viability was not 
followed with an implementation programme of action.
The attainm ent of independence provided the state with an 
international role and the right to conduct its own foreign policy. The /- 
Chapter showed that the state did not use these new opportunities to 
define an  effective foreign policy which exploited all possibilities for 
developmental assistance. Instead, the state pursued a course of 
maintaining contact with traditional Western countries. Undoubtedly, it 
was the pursuit of a safe policy which did not offend the United States. It 
was noticeable tha t the international role of the state was defined by and 
centred on the Prime Minister. There was no public discussion or 
announcem ent of foreign policy actions or international obligations of the I
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sta te . Yet, independence w as p resen ted  to the  society a s  a  necessity  to 
source capital needed for national development.
In reality, in ternational aid as a  p a rt of the  national developm ent 
policy w as no t as significant as expected. However, the s ta te  did expand 
its role a s  the  engine of growth, b u t relied on external borrowing as the  
source of capital. Developm ent projects were a  frequent a  source of 
contention, as  opposition political forces claim ed th a t they were being 
used  to en trench  the  ruling party. Regardless, the  expansion of activity 
did enhance  confidence in the  sta te  and  in  its capacity to deliver.
Confidence in  the  sta te  w as also increased  by the  expansion  of 
both  the  b a n a n a  and  tourism  industries. The b an an a  industry , w hich 
w as dependen t on preferential trea tm en t in the  UK m arket, expanded 
rapidly, occasioned by high prices and a high exchange ra te  against the  
English pound. The fickle n a tu re  of the  dependence on the  b a n an a  
industry  w as rem iniscent of the  sugar industry . The b a n an a  industry  
w as significant for the  developm ent of the  society a s  it involved 
sm allholdings an d  provided weekly cash  paym ents. On the o ther hand , 
tourism  developm ent w as not inclusive of local society except as w orkers 
a t the  hotels. The involvem ent of the  sta te  w as restric ted  to creating the 
conditions for investm ent and  tourism  prom otion ra th e r th a n  directly w 
investing in constructing  hotels and  re s tau ran ts . Consequently, the  sta te  
rem ained in the  dependent m ono-crop agricu ltu ral fram ework an d  had  
little involvem ent in strategic ow nership of the  tourism  sector. W hilst, the  
society benefited from the expansion in the  b an an a  and  tourism  
industries, the  fundam enta l s tru c tu ra l deficiencies of dependency and  
underdevelopm ent of the  economy were never addressed. There w as no 
national econom ic developm ent policy aim ed a t elim inating the  
s tru c tu ra l dependency created  by colonialism, or to satisfy the  
asp ira tions of the  society for greater economic control.
Despite the  d isappoin tm ents, in term s of the  developm ent of the  
state , associated  sta tehood  aided the  em ergence of a  sem i-au tonom ous
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sta te . The s ta te  w as now controlled by local in te res ts  and  accountable  to 
the  local legislature. At the dom estic level, the  society w as no t p a rt of the 
move tow ards associated  statehood. The only significant involvem ent w as 
from opposition forces who w anted  to en su re  th a t the  governing elite did 
no t en trench  the ir power. Associated sta tehood  transform ed the 
rela tionsh ip  of the  society to the  sta te , in  th a t it provided some 
constitu tional provisions for the  functioning of a dem ocratic governm ent 
and  en trenched  the  fundam ental righ ts of the citizen, a lthough in 
practice the  society did not have a significant influence. However, the 
changes were fair reaching com pared w ith the colonial s ta te  b u t failed to 
serve a s  the  m echanism  for participatory  politics. The absence of an  
educated  and  mobilized citizenry required th a t the  new sta te  facilitate 
g reater participation. Therefore, the  new sta te  failed to give m eaning and  
expression to citizen’s participation in the  political developm ent of their 
society, w hich would overcome the historical experience of the colonies 
and  the  separa tion  of the  society from the  functioning of the  state . The 
new sta te  s tru c tu re  continued the  practice of politics w ithout 
participation.
The decision to seek independence coincided with the a ttem pts of 
HMG to disengage totally from the sm aller colonies. The Anguillan 
experience highlighted the difficulty in ensu ring  political stability  and 
the  recognition th a t B ritain could no t evade responsibility  a s  long as the 
decolonization process w as no t complete. This explains why Britain 
adopted its policy of abandonm ent w here colonies would be encouraged 
tow ards independence w ithout holding a  referendum .
The decision by the s ta te  in  S ain t Lucia to seek independence, 
fu rther divided the society, as  opposed to un iting  it. . The governing elite 
argued th a t independence w as necessary  for developm ent, while the 
opposition in terpreted  such  policy a s  a  move to en trench  them selves in  c; '  
power, especially as there were no public call for independence during 
th a t period. The eventual a tta inm en t of independence w as no t a  national
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achievement b u t was rooted in ( national) discontent about partisan r 
politics. This served to reinforce the separation of state and society and 
increased the empirical statehood deficit.
Another consequence of independence was the greater power 
placed in the state and by extension the Government rather than  
empowering citizens to control the state structure. The state structure 
remained unchanged from associated statehood, whilst the process 
towards independence divided loyalties to the state and retarded the 
acceptance of institutions and symbols of nationhood. Again, this was 
another lost opportunity to address the historical separation of state and 
society bu t instead, independence reinforced political power in the hands 
of the ruling party, through the Government. Notwithstanding, a t the 
level of the state, historical experience had led to undoubted acceptance 
of the custom s and practices of democracy, though not always performed 
to the letter and spirit of the constitution. At the level of the society, 
although there was no allegiance to the state or dem onstrated 
nationalism, there was an acceptance of constitutionalism and rule of 
law.
The conflict created by the separation of state and society and 
deficiencies in economic and social development encouraged civil 
institutions within domestic society to expand their contact with civil 
institutions in other countries which assisted in addressing societal 
concerns. That vacuum  created by the shortcomings of the state, began 
to be occupied by organizations that were produced by the citizens 
themselves. The state found itself having to compete with strengthening 
civil institutions comprising people that has historically been left outside 
its functioning and always treated the state as alien. The role of a 
transnational civil society in aiding the strengthening of domestic civil 
society was significant. Domestic civil society organizations received both 
information and organizational support tov facilitate their work. In 
addition, these transnational civil society institutions had a  significant
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effect on Western society and encouraged Western governments to 
internationalize their concerns a t international fora.
Undoubtedly, the rise of an organized civil society with 
transnational links and the pressures from international institutions 
accelerated the integration of state and society.
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7State-Society R elations: Providing 
U nderstanding w ithin an  IR Framework
This thesis examined the historical evolution of the state and 
society in a post-colonial setting to show the interplay of external and 
domestic factors in shaping tha t evolution. This examination was 
undertaken against the claim tha t post-colonial states lacked the 
features of classical states and possessed ‘limited empirical statehood’. In 
studying the evolution of the state and society, the thesis highlighted the 
origins of ‘limited empirical statehood’ as identified by Jackson and its 
direct relation to external factors.1
In his account, Jackson noted tha t there are classical states 
possessing the traditional attributes of sovereign statehood and there are 
quasi-states tha t lack the institutional features of sovereign states. This 
thesis claimed tha t Jackson’s use of a  totality approach to understanding 
the nature of the state in the inter-state system was inadequate as the 
internal conditions of the ‘quasi-states’ are recognized b u t taken for 
granted and their historical evolution is ignored. Therefore, Jackson’s 
explanation remains rooted at the level of the international system and 
the state remained a monolithic entity tha t is not subjected to scrutiny. 
This thesis has shown tha t to understand how limited empirical 
statehood exists, the evolution of state and society m ust be studied in its 
historical context. In order to achieve tha t objective a different IR 
framework to Jackson’s was used.
1 Robert Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World 
(Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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7.1 Utility o f a new IR framework
This thesis argued tha t to study the evolution of state and society, 
IR theory had to be broadened beyond its traditional conceptions to allow 
for analysis tha t dismantles the state and brings in the society as a  unit 
of analysis. It m ust also allow domestic forces to be accepted as useful 
for explanation in accounting for the nature of states in the international 
system. The use of a  new IR framework achieved three valuable 
theoretical achievements and was only possible by going beyond the 
black-box of the state in IR.
Firstly, the use of a critical historical approach in this thesis meant 
tha t post-colonial states as units of analysis were not examined as pre­
determined entities with a stated national interest of survival bu t as 
products of the inter-state system. This approach allowed the study of 
colonial state formation, and the analysis of the internal features of the 
state to comprehend the consequences of state formation and its 
incorporation into the system. The state became important both as a 
domestic and as an  international actor which broaden the scope of 
enquiry to accommodate such an expanded notion of the state. It was 
possible to examined the state as an incipient state during colonial 
expansion; as a plantation state serving the interests of the imperial 
state and planter; as a reformed state after the 1930’s; and as a  national 
state after independence. In all cases the state was shown as having a 
‘j anus-faced’ character where it faced both internal and external 
influences. By highlighting the j anus-faced nature it m eant tha t varying 
influences were examined at various historical periods. Therefore in the 
first period of examination, the state was heavily influenced by the 
external, which was colonial expansion. The second period showed the 
increasing role of the internal, which was the reaction to the colonial 
crisis and the riots. The period showed the disengagement of direct 
external control and the shift of responsibility to domestic sources of
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power. The third period showed the growing influence of the internal as 
the state is forced to integrate with domestic society.
Secondly, using a  critical approach allowed theoretical space to 
highlight other constitutive actors, understanding how they interact and 
the levels of interaction. This approach created what Rosenau described 
as an  enlarged space for the study of IR.2 In the case of St.Lucia, rather 
than  taking the state for granted, the thesis was able to bring in more 
sources of action and influences tha t shaped the state, and show how 
the state and other influences shaped society. Therefore, using the 
Coxian notion of historical structure a framework was used which 
allowed for the identification and examination of various sources of 
action on the development of the state and society.3 The consequence is 
tha t the colonial state was examined not in isolation bu t in relation to 
colonial society and the international system. This satisfied Hobson’s 
view that the state m ust be seen as constitutive, since it is integrated 
within domestic social relations as well as international relations.4 For 
the state to be studied in its relation to the society and the international 
system, the definition of the state was moved from its monolithic 
conception which was necessary to characterize IR as a separate 
discipline. Instead, the state was conceived as the unity of its two 
dimensions -  the ‘state as external’ and the ‘state as internal’. This 
followed Clark’s suggestion tha t the state be treated as the common but 
contested ground tha t brings the international and national together.5 
The state was analyzed as a set of institutions headed by an  executive 
authority and responsible for the ordering of social relations. In this
2 James N. Rosenau, The Study of Global Interdependence: Essays on the 
Transnationalisation of World Affairs (New York; Nichols, 1980).
3 Robert Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Order’ in Neorealism and its critics, ed., 
Robert Keohane (New York; Columbia University Press, 1986)
4 John Hobson, The State and International Relations (Cambridge; Cambridge University 
Press, 2000).
5 Ian Clark, Globalisation and International Relations Theory (Oxford; Oxford University 
Press, 1999).
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definition, the functioning and rationale of the institutions, the material 
conditions tha t determined the social relations, and the ideas tha t guided 
the executive authority all became important.
Thirdly, a  critical approach to understanding the state highlighted 
the importance of historical specificity, meaning tha t the conditions - 
material, ideational and institutional - tha t existed at the time shaped 
social existence. Therefore, the examination of the evolution of the state 
and society in Saint Lucia was unfolded as continuing processes which 
had to be interpreted in each instance for their changing forms in specific 
reference to the determining conditions of the time. The critical approach 
treated social reality as an  interrelated whole which required th a t the 
state be studied alongside its social and economic relations. The state in 
Saint Lucia was studied in its relation to the society and the 
international system at three levels of interaction or spheres of activity -  
the social forces which are generated at the domestic level; the changing 
forms of the state; and the nature of the inter-state system. This fact was 
reflected in Cox’s notion of a totality of historical structures within three 
interrelated levels of activity. A persistent feature was observed at all 
three levels of activity - the conflicts caused by the material conditions, 
contesting ideas, and the functioning of institutions. These conflicts led 
to the transformative events and shaped state-societal relations. For 
example, it can be observed tha t the origin of the state was rooted in the 
demand for sugar in Europe; the movement to end slavery was the 
product of the decline of the sugar industry and the rise of new 
conceptions of hum an dignity; the riots of the 1930’s was driven by 
poverty and deprivation in the colonies and the rise of trade unions as 
workers institutions; the attainm ent of independence was influenced by 
the decolonization movement and the role of the FCO in terminating the 
relationship with the colonies.
Focusing primarily on the evolution of the state and society and 
the forces tha t shaped tha t evolution during the three periods, it is clear
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tha t the essential difference between classical and post-colonial states 
was the experience of colonialism as practiced by European society in the 
fifteenth century. This reinforced Tilly’s view that there were two paths to 
state formation and tha t the post-colonial state was the product of a 
process of deliberate creation of new states by existing states. Therefore 
the existence of limited empirical statehood in post-colonial states is 
recognized as a  failure of colonial rule and as the product of the 
internationalization of the sovereign state as the most efficient 
mechanism for the m aintenance of the states-system. This failure 
produced three political achievements as theoretical milestones 
elemental to the transformation of state-societal relations in Saint Lucia. 
Firstly, the establishm ent of a free labor m arket arising from the ending 
of slavery and the granting of the right to choose one’s form and place of 
work. Secondly, the emergence of the m asses as a  political force capable 
of influencing social and political development through the attainm ent of 
adult suffrage after the riots of the 1930s. This created the context for 
the emergence of the citizenry as a political entity. Thirdly, the 
attainm ent of a place in the global community of nations and the 
ascription of nominal equality in the global system after independence. 
This arose from the intense anti-colonial sentim ent in the international 
system.
7 .2  The Origin of State-Societal Relations -  
Colonialism and External Dominance
The state in the St. Lucia was a product of the expansion of the 
European states-system  - an external influence. The origin of the state 
and the early relationship with the society was largely influenced by an 
external influence, in this case the colonial experience. Colonialism was 
an unbridled attem pt by European national powers to acquire possession 
to satisfy the demand for products, valuables and naval prestige. The 
colonial experience m eant the subjugation of the colony to imperial
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economic, social and political control to serve imperial purposes. It was a 
statem ent of the strength of a m onarch and state to possess colonies. 
However, different powers developed differing colonial policies which in 
tu rn  shaped their relationship with the colonies.
In the case of the British, it was first an attem pt to thwart Spanish 
power by conquering their possessions, then the establishm ent of 
agricultural colonies for producing tobacco and sugar. As military 
stations, there was no need for a state structure and it was satisfactory 
to have a  military structure tha t sought to organize defense. It was the 
dem and for tropical products, in this case tobacco, which introduced the 
need for an  embryonic state as planters needed the infrastructure such 
as roads and warehousing and facilities for trade such as ports and 
customs clearing. However, the shift to sugar cane cultivation provided 
the break with the embryonic state and impelled the establishm ent of a 
more elaborate state structure. Sugar became a  major commodity for 
trade and the plantation represented the primary focus for production of 
sugar for exchange on the world market. Significantly for the emerging 
state and the creation of societal relations, sugar production had a 
distinct mode of production centered on the use of brutal force and 
subjugation of the African labor force.
The state as a imperial creation to facilitate imperial needs in 
tropical products and trade is reflected in the early establishment of the 
state. The first elementary state structure in St.Lucia under settled 
British colonialism was Crown Colony Government which served to co­
ordinate the establishment and maintenance of basic facilities and to 
ensure order. The fundamental role of the state was the maintenance of 
slavery and order. The early state had to guarantee a level of order and 
social stability necessary for the maintenance of the structures and 
relations of economic production based on the plantation system. This 
was largely achieved through the threat and, in some cases, use of force.
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In addition, it was shown tha t the legal framework was designed to 
ensure the survival of the plantation system.
During tha t period, the influences on the state were dominantly 
external. The Imperial State’s primary concerns were to ensure the 
profitability of the colonies by maintaining order and, most importantly, 
the possession of colonies as a display of imperial and economic power. 
The local planters though, were less concerned with the possession of 
colonies as a  geopolitical concern and focused more on social control and 
economic prosperity. This divergent motivation was often the cause for 
conflict between the imperial state and the planter class. As the issue of 
economic prosperity was seen by planters as a responsibility of the 
Imperial State, the planters established lobbies in London and 
Parliament to fight their cause. This reflected the reality tha t the locus of 
power was really in London with the colonial legislature vested with little 
real power. Therefore, local planters expected and demanded th a t the 
Imperial State ensure tha t the trading policies and financing facilities 
were in place to ensure their profitability. There was benefit for the 
Imperial State as increased supply m eant increased taxes and more 
shipping which m eant good news for the Imperial Treasury. Even in their 
divergent objectives, there was common ground to ensure the survival of 
the plantation system.
The seed for the separation of society from the state was borne in 
tha t early period. Separation did not m ean the literal disjointing of state 
from society. State and society exists in constitution to each other. There 
cannot be a state without a society although it is possible to have a 
society without a  state. In this case, the early colonial state was not a 
product of society bu t a colonial imposition designed to safeguard the 
plantation system and served the interests of the minority landed class 
and imperial interests. Therefore it was separated from the majority who 
were slaves. The state’s relation to the majority was to ensure social 
control by using force and the legitimization of racism.
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The issue of race achieved its own dynamic in the evolution of 
state-societal relations. Beyond its economic role, rascism  became an 
ideological explanation for the existence of the social order and for the 
separation of state and society. Blacks who were enslaved were not seen 
as capable of managing themselves and had no role bu t to serve as 
subjected labour. This was the reason for deeper racial sentim ents from 
the local elite compared to the metropolitan ruling class. An example is 
the objection of the local planter class to the abolition of the slave trade 
in 1807 and the dismantling of the slave system even after it was no 
longer economically viable. Therefore, beyond all economic and political 
arguments, it m eant tha t blacks were not seen as capable hum an beings 
and had no legitimate existence outside the plantations.
However, the use of force became a source of major conflict 
between the Imperial State and the local planter class with the colonial 
state set in between. The treatm ent of slaves became a constant cry for 
the anti-slavery lobby in the attem pt to end slavery. The imperial state 
was always more progressive than  the colonial state on m atters relating 
to the treatm ent of blacks, both freed and enslaved.
It is noticeable tha t during the early period the colonial state had 
no economic role except to facilitate conditions for imperial possession of 
the colonies reflecting the dominance of external forces. It also reflects 
the attainm ent of empirical statehood was not a  consideration in the 
establishm ent of the state. The colonies were oriented to import their 
needs and export their primary products, which were in demand in 
Europe. The surpluses where kept in Britain and used to help finance 
burgeoning capitalist enterprises and other investments. The colonies 
developed what is best known as ‘absentee ownership’ as plantation 
owners hired British managers to oversee their estates while they 
participated in the expansion of business a t home. From the above it is 
obvious tha t there was no development of an indigenous bourgeoisie that 
controlled any wealth or economic power. There was a large managerial
309
class active in managing the estates, banking and retail b u t they were 
not the owners of the businesses.
The emancipation of slaves in 1838 was a seminal historical 
achievement as it brought about new economic relations tha t 
transformed economic, social and political relations in Saint Lucia. The 
role of external factors was dominant in the emancipation process as 
highlighted in role of the Colonial Office, Parliament and imperial society. 
The end of slavery was a necessary outcome of the growth of capitalism 
and the emergence of new ideas on morality and justice in Europe. The 
high cost of maintaining a slave mode of production and the logic of 
having a larger buying m arket for industrial goods encouraged the end of 
slavery and establishm ent of a free labor market.
Despite the dominance of external influences, it is worthy to note 
tha t slave revolts represented the early rise of domestic society 
influencing state-societal relations. These revolts made the maintenance 
of slavery expensive to the imperial state both in actual costs and in 
having to resist antislavery sentim ent in imperial society. Such a 
sentim ent was based on new views on morality and justice rooted in the 
emergent bourgeois thinking of a new social order and associated with 
the rise of capitalism. That thinking influenced the massive social and 
political movement in Britain and changed imperial policy towards the 
colonies.
The terms and conditions for the emancipation of slaves and the 
establishm ent of a free labor m arket are other examples of how the early 
state-societal relations were shaped by the ‘external’ and were resisted by 
local interests. For example, the emancipation of slaves created a 
problem of labor for the planters as freed persons occupied the abundant 
lands available and hence gave rise to the emergence of the peasantry. 
Whilst the planters’ labor problem was solved with the interim 
arrangem ents of indentureship, the peasantry would become an 
economic problem as their productive capacity became a source of
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competition in the export of commodities. The planters then had the 
additional concern of controlling the ownership and occupation of lands. 
Interestingly, the differing ways in which the peasantry was established 
in various islands would influence the new state form though in degree 
rather than  kind. But it was clear tha t emancipation of slaves and the 
creation of a  freed society represented the end of external dominance and 
the rise in the importance of domestic influences on the development of 
the state.
7 .3  The Development o f State-Societal Relations -  
Rise o f Internal Influences
The post-emancipation period witnessed the expansion of activity 
tha t gave birth to conflicts tha t would further shape the state giving more 
scope for domestic influences and integrating more of society into its 
sphere of existence. For example, the emancipation of slaves and 
consequent creation of a peasantry, through the metayer system, opened 
up the society by spreading commodity relations beyond the plantations. 
In addition, as the state increased its level of activity for the ordering of 
social relations and the provision of needs for an increased population, 
the functioning of the state changed. Under the plantation system the 
plantation engaged the labour of the slaves, was responsible for the 
welfare of the slaves, provide its own security and was a  total institution. 
With the establishment of a free society, it was the responsibility of the 
state to provide a range of new services and functions. It m eant tha t the 
state had greater responsibility and increased decision-making though 
not more autonomy from the Imperial State as decisions were either 
directives from the Colonial Office or had to be approved by the Secretary 
for the Colonies. This increased responsibility and power made control of 
the state more im portant than  in the pre-emancipation period and set 
the stage for an  intense struggle between the planter class and the 
imperial state. The only domestic political force remained the planter
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class because of its economic power and a  limited franchise tha t allowed
it to influence the legislature and government. On the other hand, the
role of the imperial state, through the Colonial Office, was vital in
protecting the interests of the newly-freed persons. For the imperial state
tha t was an  im portant task  in the face of an enlightened imperial society
tha t continued to lobby for better treatm ent of ex-slaves.
$
The state in Saint Lucia increased it scope of engagement with 
colonial society as it managed the development of a free labor market, 
governed a free society with the majority being ex-slaves and enforced the 
indentured labor program. It also had to monitor and control the 
emerging peasantry comprised of ex-slaves who opted for agricultural 
self-employment. The colonial state became more active compared to its 
laissez-faire approach in the previous period. The state now assum ed 
responsibility for education, roads, health care and became more 
involved as a regulatory body by enacting laws to regulate business 
activity.
The other distinctive change in the state was the considerable 
strengthening of the coercive arm of the state. Voluntary militias were 
abandoned in favor an  established police force. The judicial system 
started to consider a wider range of issues including land disputes, 
money exchange and resulting from the growth of commerce. The system 
for land control and settlement patterns was developed with ‘Crown 
Lands’ becoming the dominant form of land ownership. A rigid labor 
regime was developed to control the emerging free labor force. Persons 
were evicted from plantations for withholding labor. Movement from 
estate to estate in search of the best terms of employment was outlawed 
and emigration from colony to colony was prohibited. Investments in 
education and public health became more of a concern with the large 
num ber of freed persons. Finally, the Colonial Office insisted on a system 
of taxes and duties to finance colonial state activities.
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At the international level, capitalism was established as an  
international system as national economies became more integrated. The 
global division of labor was clearly demarcated between industrialized 
countries and the producers of raw materials. The role of agricultural 
producers like Saint Lucia was marginal and was insignificant among 
producers of raw materials as large-scale mining was in great demand. 
Saint Lucia, like other smaller islands, experienced a continuous decline 
of the plantation sector and gave rise to the dominance of the peasantry. 
It was also the period of great diversification into other areas of 
investment such as shipping, telecommunications, rum  distilling, and 
retail trade. However, the investments were led by multinational 
companies and were all foreign owned. The manufacturing class tha t 
emerged in Britain was not replicated and production remained in a 
precapitalist state. There was no indigenous accumulation of capital for 
development and surpluses were transferred to the Britain. Critically, 
neither the state nor society was given the impetus to develop an 
autonomous capacity to meet the needs of the citizenry.
By the tu rn  of the twentieth century, there were a num ber of other 
significant developments tha t shaped state-societal relations and 
transformed the political configuration of Saint Lucia. Firstly, the class 
structure of the colony became more defined. The growing middle class 
comprising professionals and businessm en began to realize tha t their 
interests would be advanced by control of the political apparatus. Yet, 
they faced exclusion by the planter and colonial elite. That class also 
included non-whites, which reinforced the opposition to their inclusion. 
Increasingly, their concerns took the form of nationalist aspirations and 
they sought allies in the emerging working class. Many of their members 
served in World War I and gained first hand knowledge of the democratic 
advancements tha t took place in Britain. Secondly, the establishm ent of 
the representative association represented the rise of organized domestic 
society as a challenge to the state. Led by the middle-class it challenged
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the Imperial and Colonial States and demanded an expansion of the 
franchise and greater representation in the Legislature and in the State 
apparatus. It was an attem pt to break planter influence in the legislature 
bu t not to establish universal participation. Thirdly, deteriorating social 
and economic conditions served as fertile ground for discontent and anti­
colonial activity among the working class. The establishm ent of a  labor 
m arket led to both the formation of a numerically superior working class 
and a large num ber of unemployed. In that context, the trade union 
became a standard feature of the political landscape of the colony based 
on the experiences in Europe. The support of the British Labour Party 
and the Trade Union Congress was instrum ental in the development of 
trade unions in the colonies. The rise of trade unions accentuated the 
challenge of society against colonial rule.
The Moyne Commission was an  attem pt by the Imperial State to 
address the deficiencies of colonialism in the West Indian colonies and 
represented an example of the interplay between external influence and 
the increasing role of internal influences in shaping state-societal 
relations. The Commission paved the way for the legitimization of trade 
unions and political parties and eventually adult suffrage. Following on 
the emancipation of slaves, the implementation of the Moyne 
Commission recommendations was the second most significant external 
influence on shaping state-societal relations.
Adult suffrage, one of the recommendations of the Moyne 
Commission, was a historic achievement in the political evolution of 
Caribbean colonies as it ushered in the involvement of the m asses in the 
political process. The provision of adult suffrage was an 
acknowledgement tha t direct colonial political control would no longer be 
the future form of control in the colonies. However, this was does not 
suggest tha t colonies were free to determine their own mode of insertion 
into the international system. In tha t period after WWII, self- 
determination was emerging as a universal norm and imperial control
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would have to be more sophisticated. Therefore, Riviere is right in 
arguing tha t a strategy tha t was based on continued colonial 
subservience in the global economy had already been defined.6 Thomas 
also recognized four elements of tha t strategy which were all present in 
St. Lucia.7
The first element of the strategy required tha t economic 
development policies place emphasis on either production of low value- 
added import substitution utilizing cheap labor tha t required foreign 
capital or continued reliance on agriculture. In the larger territories there 
was some semblance of an  industrial base emerging, however the smaller 
territories remain heavily agricultural based. Secondly, foreign capital 
control required a local capitalist class tha t could serve as a collaborator 
in investment. The intention was to develop a  class th a t would be 
tolerant and accommodating and not an indigenous class tha t promoted 
local entrepreneurship. Thirdly, the establishm ent of parliamentary 
democracies based on the Westminster model and a gradual phasing of 
the system to ensure tha t there was sufficient nurturing of the practices 
and the principles of representative politics. It should be noted this was 
in denial of emerging movement of m ass politics tha t tended to favor 
participatory politics. Finally, the administrative apparatus of the state 
was reinforced to ensure tha t it was capable of accomplishing the other 
elements of the strategy. Therefore, public institutions were focused on 
maintaining law and order, revenue collection and encouraging foreign 
capital.
Another important internal influence was the use of the principle 
of self-determination as the basis for the call to end colonial rule. 
Increasingly colonialism was seen as a crime tha t constituted a violation 
of the Charter of the United Nations, the Declaration on the Granting of
6 Bill Riviere, State Systems in the Eastern Caribbean (Institute of Social and Economic 
Research: Jamaica, 1990).
7 C.Y. Thomas, The Rise of the Authoritarian State in Peripheral Societies (London; 
Heinemann Educational Books Ltd).
315
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and the principles of 
international law. The case against colonialism was extended by the UN 
to recognise nationalist struggles for self-determination as legitimate and 
resistance against self-determination as contrary to the UN Charter. All 
colonies now had the right to request independence and therefore 
recognition by the international community and if suppressed to call 
upon the support of other states against the involved colonial power. 
There was now a clear basis in international politics for determining the 
emergence of new states as sovereign states. This also showed tha t 
despite the rise of internal influences, external considerations were still 
im portant in understand the evolution of the state.
Importantly, it can be argued tha t the use of the principle of self- 
determination to achieve independence of the Caribbean territories was 
not the attainm ent of the sta tus of viable statehood bu t international 
recognition of the right to exist as a state. This thesis has shown that the 
Imperial State did not seek to address the issue of economic viability as 
the basis for viable statehood. In fact, Saint Lucia did not request 
independence when it was granted bu t wanted the imperial state to 
address the issue of viability. What the domestic state, by then controlled 
by local interests, wanted was greater self-government with imperial 
responsibility for development.
With independence the Colonial Caribbean pursued three distinct 
strategies towards economic development: traditional export of primary 
goods; im port-substitution industrialization; and ‘industrialization by 
invitation’ which was export-oriented.8 The Eastern Caribbean islands, 
including St.Lucia, were conditioned by their limited size and instead 
remained rooted in their traditional export trading ties with mainly 
metropolitan countries and an undiversified domestic economy.9
8 Riviere, State Systems.
9 Carl Stone, Patterns of Insertion into the The World Economy: Historical Profile and 
Contemporary Options, “Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Sept). The
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Therefore, countries like St. Lucia m aintained a  place as a supplier of 
tropical products. However, the islands continued to have a high level of 
foreign capital control in other spheres of economic activity such as 
banking, tourism, shipping, utilities, insurance and manufacturing 
which continued the high incidence of capital repatriation.
The absence of an indigenous capitalist class capable of leading 
capital accumulation for domestic development ensured a continuation 
of dependence on foreign capital. The independent state did not seek to 
develop and development path predicated on state ownership of 
production to facilitate accumulation of capital for national development. 
The state found itself mediating between a m ulti-strata business class -  
propertied class, merchants, m anufacturers, and small entrepreneurs 
primarily in services -  to ensure the survival of the existing order. Thus, 
the state has ensured the continuation of the inherited economic order 
and the place of the state in the global capitalist system as a  producer of 
primary products.
With the attainm ent of independence, the state was recognized by 
the society as the major provider of the needs of citizens for adequate 
material and social existence regardless of its capacity. In fact, the ruling 
party had provided the argument that the colonial state was the source 
of deprivation and self-rule would address societal deficiencies. However, 
as explained above the state was not in any position through domestic 
capital accumulation or economic activity to satisfy the needs of the 
majority of the population.10 This deficiency provided fertile ground for 
the emergence of practices of patronage and clientelism as a means of 
maintaining political support.
In addition, after independence the state became an  arena for 
contest between previously united domestic forces. The commonality of
difference with the larger territories only exposes a dependency in degree rather than 
kind.
10 The state is also limited in its capital accumulation because of the small tax base 
from which it raises revenue.
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the nationalist cause against colonial rule gave way to fragmentation of 
the national independence aspirations. The contending parties disagreed 
on independence as each thought they had the rightful claim to lead the 
nation into independence and tha t additional power would only entrench 
the ruling party. Such disunity came at a  time of increasing social 
dem ands from the working class and underprivileged causing any 
possibility tha t independence would bring greater state legitimacy to be 
rapidly eroded. Unlike the European state tha t came about after a long 
historical evolution and represented the coalescence of state and nation, 
the post-colonial state was established after a  long history of separation 
of state and society and represented a crisis of legitimacy as it is not 
designed to meet the needs of its domestic society. The state assum ed a 
powerful role in reshaping and refashioning the social structure. The 
state therefore finds itself in a schizophrenic relationship with foreign 
businesses, as it has to engage in a frontal verbal attack on their 
operations to elicit the support of the poor and disadvantaged but the 
economy was not structured to encourage the development of an  
entrepreneurial class.
Similarly, the state apparatus was not transformed to address the 
historical baggage of a disjuncture between state and society. 
Historically, the colonial bureaucracy was seen as an enforcer of colonial 
policy. In the transition period to independence, the bureaucracy was 
reinforced as an institution of reactionary thought and was accountable 
to itself rather than  the public. The heavy reliance on rules and 
procedures served to contain the aspirations of the society and actions of 
the nationalist politicians. The bureaucracy was bereft of any creativity. 
At a general level, the state structure was not transformed to allow for 
greater societal participation or influence in decision-making. Unlike the 
European state, there few active civil society groups influencing public 
policy. Mills is correct in the view tha t the bureaucracy was designed to 
focus on maintaining law and order and collecting revenue and not to
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manage a dynamic and creative process as was needed after
independence.11 Significantly, one of the mechanisms used to bypass 
tha t bottleneck has been the establishm ent of state enterprises and 
statutory bodies and the expanding role is reflected in the level of state 
financial resources tha t are channeled towards their work.
One outstanding notion of the nature of post-colonial states and
the relationship between state and society merits mention. Stone refers 
to the relationship of patronage and clientelism, which arises when the 
state similarly cannot meet the expectations of most citizens.12 There is 
no doubt tha t the post-independent state in St. Lucia exhibited these 
qualities. Politicians used the limited resources and economic
possibilities to secure the support of persons for political reasons and 
along party lines. The state machinery became a valuable object for 
control and vital for the distribution of material benefits.
With independence, the state was able to establish its own 
transnational links to secure resources for its development agenda. 
These external links increased the capacity of the state to deliver and 
increased it legitimacy within society. However, it was always contended 
tha t the ruling party utilized these development projects for the purpose 
of reinforcing their rule. Beyond the official governmental structures, 
institutions in society established transnational links with other civil 
society institutions tha t have empowered society in its relationship to the 
state. Such links have led to the view th a t society is actually pursuing an 
agenda th a t is determined and shaped from outside, and in the process 
adding a new dynamic to the state-societal relationship.
However, beyond a donor-inspired or transnational agenda, the 
society is also able to mobilize locally to influence the state to respond to
11 Gladstone Mills (ed) Training of Public Officers in Barbados, The Leeward Islands and 
the Windward Islands. Report of a Conference held in Barbados. Quoted in Riviere, State 
Systems.
12 Carl Stone, Democracy and Clientelism in Jamaica (New Brunswick, N.J. : Transaction 
Books, 1980).
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societal concerns. Some of these may be issues tha t the state has 
consented to enforce through international conventions and society 
dem ands application. Society also develops transnational links th a t 
assist persons in formulating their own ‘strategies for survival’ and in the 
process reinforce the fragility of the state.
Whilst historically decision-making in postcolonial states has been 
with the exclusion of the society, there is a process of gradually including 
elements of society. This represents the gradual integration of state with 
society, where the state appears to have an organic link with society 
seeking to meet the needs of society and shaping its institutions to 
incorporate society in decision making and allocation of resources. This 
was glaringly absent from the early periods of state building.
7 .3  State-Societal Relations - Im plications for 
Empirical Statehood
The nature of state-societal relations in St. Lucia is rooted in the 
social and political experience of colonialism which lasted until 
independence. That experience not only created a state and society, as 
against modifying existing ones, bu t was so imposing as to stifle any 
integration between the state and society. In the period leading to 
independence and after, there was no attem pt to break the stranglehold 
of an  inherited colonial state-societal relationship bu t instead the local 
political elite sought to exploit the existing relations to perpetuate their 
hold on political power. The first step to pursuing ‘empirical statehood’ -  
the integration of state and society - was never pursued by the state. It is 
another development within the evolution of the international system -  
the growth of a transnational society - tha t is forcing the integration.
The end of slavery in 1833 did not provide any fundam ental 
change in the role of the vast majority of the population in the political
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development of the society. The strengthening of Crown Colony 
government after the end of slavery placed greater power in the hands of 
the Crown as necessary to protect the m asses from the abuses of the 
propertied class. In contrast, the general movement towards greater 
democracy which accompanied the decline of the landed aristocracy in 
Europe was not replicated fully in the colonies as the state continued to 
be an  instrum ent of colonial control. It was not until after World War I 
tha t there were increased calls from the emerging middle class 
comprising largely of professionals and m erchants for greater equality in 
the executive, constitutional reform and democratic institutions. At this 
stage of colonial experience, St. Lucia could not be considered as having 
a state which represented its society -  it was a creation of the imperial 
society and remained under imperial control.
In discussing the distribution of power in third world societies, 
Migdal argued tha t what existed was a  weak state versus a strong 
society.13 Equally Migdal highlighted a separation of state and society. 
However, this observation was largely based on the African reality and 
suggested the existence of a melange of social ties which competed with 
the state for loyalty. The colonial state in Africa was required to compete 
with other forms of social bonding which had existed for centuries. The 
situation in the Caribbean and in St. Lucia was different. The society was 
a m anufactured society with the vast majority of the population having 
no indigenous links to the islands. There were no existing loyalties for 
the colonial state to compete with and the control of the state was 
virtually absolute. Loyalties in the St.Lucian society developed in spite of,
13 Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States. State-Society Relations and State 
Capabilities in the Third World (New Jersey; Princeton University Press, 1988).
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bu t also because of, the colonial state. The absence of any powerful 
lobbying groups in the political process outside of the commercial 
interest groups and the trade unions is due to a legacy of individualism 
and survival bred by the colonial system and the subsequent exploitation 
of this legacy by the new local political elite.
The shape of the new state after 1979 was based on a  strict 
adherence to the Westminster System bu t because of the absence of a 
similar evolution which characterized the system in England, there was 
no inherited coalescence of state and society. In the absence of popular 
political participation, the state continued to be controlled by the party 
with the best electoral machinery usually determined by the material 
well-being of the party and not by the conscious actions of citizens.
With the expansion of educational opportunities to a greater 
section of the population it was inevitable tha t the more educated and 
more conscious individuals in the society would create organisations of 
similar interest to each other. The period of the 1970's and 1980's 
witnessed a growth in social organizations with interests in culture, 
farmers, youth, women, environment and community development. The 
state has not sought to utilize the existence of these organizations to 
facilitate the development process bu t instead seeks to stifle their 
emergence to avoid a  diminution of state power.
The case-study of St.Lucia shows tha t the strength of the state was 
in the inheritance of a state apparatus tha t was designed^an instrum ent 
of control for colonial purposes. The consequence of such a system was 
to create a social setting where the rest of society was alienated from the 
functioning of the state and at independence the state was faced with the
322
I
,u task  a t independence of establishing its legitimacy. This weakness is 
seen as the absence of empirical statehood.
Notwithstanding the nature of the state-societal relations in 
St.Lucia, the society cannot be described as a subservient society. The
) /  /society is not characterised by docility b u t rather an  indifference to the ' *
functioning of the state. This is not to suggest tha t people do not expect 
the state to provide educational, housing, health or employment 
opportunities. Rather, the legacy of slavery and a colonial state which 
was never in existence for the benefit of the wider society created a 
society which developed its own modes of survival outside of the 
apparatus of the state. Such modes of survival are deeply rooted in 
familial, kinship and communal relations.
Thus, the ability of the society to survive without the state makes 
the task  of establishing legitimacy more difficult for the state. However, 
the activities of organisations within the society are not restricted to 
sourcing domestic means to assist individuals to meet their needs.
Despite the effort by the state to establish a monopoly in foreign
relations, there is an  unfolding contest with civil society to extend their 
sources of benefit. In summary, there exists in St.Lucia a strong state 
tha t utilizes its right to participate in the inter-state system to reinforce 
itself while the society historically separated from the state is empowered 
by the growth of its interaction beyond the boundaries of the state. It is 
the growth of this interaction tha t serves to challenge the state and force 
integration between state and society.
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